Crispin Wright on the moral, semantic and psychological implications of naturalism and ontological materialism

I've mentioned that many, perhaps most, metaphysical naturalists and materialists don't like to make explicit the full logical implications of their worldview, because in such case it becomes obvious that their ideology is irrational and self-defeating. They get nervous when you press them to draw the exact implications of their position, and carefully avoid making any explicit predictions (on concrete metaphysical topics entailed) by their ideology.

When exceptionally, they make some prediction entailed by their worldview, and you refute it or question it, they assert that naturalism doesn't entail any such predicition (what refutes the previous position) or appeal to other naturalists who think otherwise about such prediction (without realizing that naturalism, if it's true, cannot entail logically inconsistent implications. This is a clear example of how a monumental faith in naturalism can overpower rationality and critical thinking).

Morever, some metaphysical naturalists and materialistic pseudo-skeptics are professional propagandists for atheism and, therefore, act like lawyers in a court of law in defense of materialism, naturalism and (its ethical corollary) "secular humanism". They don't have the intellectual, emotional and professional equanimity to search the truth; rather, their purpose is to defend their ideology against any possible objection.

As their main existential and emotional motivation is atheism (they want atheism to be true), they try to leave all the possibilities open to naturalism, even is such possibilities are logically inconsistent with each other or (more importantly) with naturalism itself.

Fortunately, there are a few honest metaphysical naturalists out there. They're truth seekers who are not interested in propaganda for atheism or materialism, but in a true inquiry into naturalism itself, and in its metaphysical implications. They're not afraid of critially examining their own position (see for example the book Naturalism in Question as an example of this. And read philosopher David MacArthur's paper on the skeptical implications of naturalism)

One of these naturalist philosophers is Crispin Wright. In his contribution to the book Conceivability and Possibility, Wright writes:

"A central dilemma in contemporary metaphysics is to find a place for certain anthropocentric subject-matters—for instance, semantic, moral, and psychological—in a world as conceived by modern naturalism: a stance which inflates the concepts and categories deployed by (finished) physical science into a metaphysics of the kind of thing the real world essentially and exhaustively is. On one horn, if we embrace this naturalism, it seems we are committed either to reductionism: that is, to a construal of the reference of, for example, semantic, moral and psychological vocabulary as somehow being within the physical domain—or to disputing that the discourses in question involve reference to what is real at all. On the other horn, if we reject this naturalism, then we accept that there is more to the world than can be embraced within a physicalist ontology—and so take on a commitment, it can seem, to a kind of eerie supernaturalism". (p. 401. Emphasis in blue added)

Let's to comment this in detail.

1-As a consistent naturalist (and an honest truth seeker and philosopher, not an ideologue or propagandist), note that Wright doesn't believe that naturalism is neutral regarding metaphysical questions about semantics, moral and psychological matters. He fully realizes that naturalism, as a metaphysical position, HAS actual implications for all of these questions.

2-Based on point 1, Wright realizes that contemporary metaphysics faces a dilemma, caused in part because naturalism is the widely accepted metaphysical position and, at the same time, there is not an obvious or clear place for certain phenomena and properties (that Wright calls anthropocentric subject-matters: semantic, moral and psychological properties) in a purely physicalist world (a world where purely physical and material causes are operative) entailed by naturalism.

Note that it's not a sort of argument from ignorance. The argument is not that we ignore or don't know or lack evidence on how to place moral and similar properties in a physicalist ontology and thereby naturalism is false. Rather, the argument is that if naturalism is true, then a physicalist ontology has to be true; and a physicalist ontology by definition EXCLUDES non-physical entities or phenomena. Therefore, if moral or psychological properties are non-physical (=not fully reducible to physical processes or entities), naturalism is false.

3-As consequence, Wright realizes that, if naturalism is true, then reductionism to the physical follows. Moral, psychological and semantic properties are, somehow, "physical", because non-physical entities and properties cannot have a place in purely physicalist ontology. This is entailed logically by naturalism.

Note that this is exactly the same conclusion of another naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg. Regarding morality, Rosenberg writes: "If there is no purpose to life in general, biological or human for that matter, the question arises whether there is meaning in our individual lives, and if it is not there already, whether we can put it there. One source of meaning on which many have relied is the intrinsic value, in particular the moral value, of human life. People have also sought moral rules, codes, principles which are supposed to distinguish us from merely biological critters whose lives lack (as much) meaning or value (as ours). Besides morality as a source of meaning, value, or purpose, people have looked to consciousness, introspection, self-knowledge as a source of insight into what makes us more than the merely physical facts about us. Scientism must reject all of these straws that people have grasped, and it’s not hard to show why. Science has to be nihilistic about ethics and morality. There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon" (emphasis in blue added)

Regarding psychological properties and consciousness "Nevertheless, if the mind is the brain (and scientism can’t allow that it is anything else), we have to stop taking consciousness seriously as a source of knowledge or understanding about the mind, or the behavior the brain produces. And we have to stop taking our selves seriously too. We have to realize that there is no self, soul or enduring agent, no subject of the first-person pronoun, tracking its interior life while it also tracks much of what is going on around us. This self cannot be the whole body, or its brain, and there is no part of either that qualifies for being the self by way of numerical-identity over time. There seems to be only oneway we make sense of the person whose identity endures over time and over bodily change. This way is by positing a concrete but non-spatial entity with a point of view somewhere behind the eyes and between the ears in the middle of our heads. Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us. But of course Scientism can explain away the illusion of an enduring self as one that natural selection imposed on our introspections, along with an accompanying penchant for stories. After all it is pretty clear that they solve a couple of major design problems for anything that has to hang around long enough to leave copies of its genes and protect them while they are growing up" (emphasis in blue added)

Regarding semantic properties and beliefs: " It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs"(emphasis in blue added)

Like Rosenberg, Wright fully recognizes that naturalism, being a picture of the entire world (a worldview) is not and cannot be neutral regarding metaphysical problems about moral, psychological and semantic matters. Naturalism has to have implications for all of these fields; implications that if are proved false, would falsify naturalism.

I suspect that the latter point is what naturalist propagandists are afraid of. As they're true believers and they WISH that naturalism and atheism be true, they carefully and smartly avoid making explicit the implications of naturalism for concrete areas of inquiry. With this strategy, they avoid that the implications of naturalism be fully and rigurously known and examined.

This is why they prefer to write debunking articles about creationism, God, afterlife or parapsychology, instead of critically and objectively working out the full implications of their actual position and testing the implications with the relevant evidence and philosophical arguments.

They don't want to know the truth, except it if confirms naturalism. They are not intellectually nor emotionally prepared to reject naturalism if the evidence or philosophical arguments force them to do it. It's a sophisticated method of self-delusion and a silly way to avoid cognitive dissonance.

4-Wright concedes that the acceptation of non-physical properties or entities would imply the denial of naturalism and, therefore, provide evidence for "supernaturalism" (he calls it "eerie supernaturalism")

Note that Wright is not talking about a specific religion or God, but simply about a worldview which is incompatible with the implications of naturalism, and therefore can be called "supernaturalism" (beyond the limits of nature). If such supernaturalism entails a specific form of theism, is another (important) question, but it is not the point relevant for Wright's argument.

His point is that naturalism has clear implications that need to be true if naturalism is right. But if the implications are false, then naturalism is false, and some kind of "supernaturalism" has to be right.

If naturalism were false...

What you would expect if naturalism is false? I submit that IF naturalism were false, then we would expect:

1-That consciousness cannot be explained by materialism (because consciousness is not material). And for the time being, everybody agrees that there is not (materialistic) explanation at all of consciousness.

2-That consciousness, intention and mental states are causally efficacious (as seen in placebo effect, biofeedback and psychokinesis). And this is what we found both in our daily life and in some psi experiments:





3-That consciousness, not being reducible to the brain, survives after death (as suggested by some cases of near-death experiences and afterlife literature in general).

4-That believing in materialism (which is false) only can be done by faith or, at least, by partially irrational factors And this is why materialist William Lycan has expressed: "Being a philosopher, of course I would like to think that my stance is rational, held not just instinctively and scientistically and in the mainstream but because the arguments do indeed favor materialism over dualism. But I do not think that, though I used to. My position may be rational, broadly speaking, but not because the arguments favor it: Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for materialism. And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by them. My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not proportion my belief to the evidence." (emphasis in blue added)

If arguments for materialism and dualism both fail, then a neutral or agnostic position would be the rational choice. But believing in materialism when the arguments for it don't work, and rejecting dualism when the objections to it fail, it's irrational. (We survivalist, including dualists and others accept psi phenomena and afterlife evidence that warrant our rational choice in favor of some kind of metaphysical dualism, even if we concede, for the argument's sake, Lycan's point that the traditional or standard philosophical arguments for dualism do fail)

The next point (a complement of this) could explain why materialists accept materialism, even if it is not the rational choice.

5-That naturalism and materialism, being false, only can be believed and motivated at the bottom by irrational factors (fears, double standards, prejudices or even obsessions and delusions). And this is what naturalist philosophers like Thomas Nagel has realized: "I believe that this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life... My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world"

If you change "religion" by "supernaturalism", you'll see that Nagel is referring to the same topic than Wright. Nagel is not referring to religion as an social instituion or dogma, but to the existence of supernatural (nonphysical) phenomena.

6-That empirical evidence for phenomena prima facie incompatible with naturalism and materialism would exist. And this is why we find, for example:

7-That the evidence for such phenomena be rejected, by rhetoric and irrational arguments, by materialists and professional debunkers (and this is exactly what we found).

8-That true believers in materialism and naturalism will defend many other obviously absurd and false beliefs, without realizing it. (In fact, if they are not able to see the fallacies and incoherences of the materialistic position, it's perhaps because their minds don't function properly. So it's not surprising that they also will believe in and defend many other ridiculously false, irrational and self-destructing beliefs) And this is exactly what we found, for example:

I could mention another 10 or 20 facts, phenomena, evidence or arguments that exist and we'd expect to exist if naturalism were false. But this post is already too long and I think I made my point clear.

Vinstonas Wu: Why James Randi, Michael Shermer and the CSICOPers are not Real Skeptics

This is a interesting recent article by Vinstonas Wu on pseudo-skeptics.

Why Randi, Shermer and the CSICOPers are not Real Skeptics

Randi, Shermer and the CSICOPers are highly selective with their skepticism. Not only do they not question their own beliefs, but they never challenge or apply skepticism to the status quo. Instead, they have a fanatical allegiance to it, evidenced by their behavior. A true skeptic examines all sides, including his own. But pseudoskeptics only point their skepticism at what they don't believe in, which everyone else does too. So what makes them different than anyone else then? Only one thing: The SIDE they're on. In this case, they are on the side of authority, orthodoxy and materialism. That is why their skepticism and critical examination is ONLY directed at anything and anyone that challenges the status quo, but NEVER at the status quo itself. In essence, that makes them "establishment defenders" (or establishment whores), not real skeptics.

That is why you will never see James Randi, Michael Shermer or the CSICOP crowd apply any skepticism, criticism or condemnation toward orthodoxy or establishment. They hold that side to be blameless and infallible, not overtly, but by their selective skepticism. And they take on faith anything that the establishment says as true, without the need for evidence or critical inquiry. You can see this in ALL their publications, writings, interviews and speeches. Thus they are the farthest thing from objectivity, logic, freethinking, unbiased mindsets, or true skepticism, for they hold the programmed mentality that "authority = truth".

Now, is that the mark of a freethinker, truth seeker, or true skeptic? I don't think so.

This is why not only are they against all validity of the paranormal, but also against all claims of conspiracy as well, which are not even paranormal in nature. In their view, anyone that challenges the system or the agenda of the elite, is automatically discredited, regardless of whether their claims are true, credible or backed by evidence. And this includes former high ranking government officials as well.

For those of you who have followed the work of Randi, Shermer or CSICOP, ask yourself this: Have you ever seen them criticize anything of the establishment, including crimes, murders, lies, conspiracies, evil plots, etc?

I'll bet not.

Consider the following documented facts and let me ask you:

Do they ever speak out against the senseless killings in the Iraq War for power and profit?

Nope.

Do they ever admit that the US Navy was wrong to fake the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 (which has now been exposed) which resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese, making the war and their deaths a FRAUD?

Nope.

Are they outraged with the fact that the CIA has been involved in drug trafficking for many years, which even some in the mainstream media have reported? Or the CIA assassinations of foreign leaders who refused to abide by US policy?

Nope.

Are they outraged that the EPA lied after 9/11 that the air was safe to breathe, which caused thousands of First Responders to develop cancer from the toxic air and slowly die?

Nope.

Are they outraged that upper levels of government have concocted secret plots to sacrifice innocent lives to stage terrorist activities and blame it on others to start wars, such as Operation Northwoods and Operation Dirty Trick? (Google them for more info)

Nope.

Do they speak out against the thousands of people that die from pharmaceutical drugs every year?

Nope.

But will they go ballistic if ONE person allegedly dies from alternative treatment such as homeopathy?

You betcha!

So, what does it say about them then if they have no problem with lies and evil plots that result in the death of millions, yet have a big problem with the death of a few if alternative medicine is involved?

It tells you that they are one sided with an axe to grind, rather than fair, honest or objective. They are fanatical defenders of establishment and orthodoxy, holding that side to be blameless. As such they are totally blind to the faults of authority, or deliberately ignore them at least. Their critical thinking and skepticism can ONLY be directed at anything AGAINST the establishment, and NEVER at anything FROM the establishment.

Tell that to the pseudoskeptics. And when they deny it, challenge them to produce a publication from a media skeptic or skeptic organization that openly condemns or criticizes the above crimes of the establishment (elite or shadow government, whatever you want to call it). When they come up empty handed, then you've got them. From that point, it does not matter if they continue in their denial, for the facts speak for themselves.

Now, is that true skepticism to you? Is that objectivity, logic and science? Is that the mark of a freethinker independent of authority or bias? Or is that fanaticism from a programmed mind who has given up his intellect to become an intellectual slave of authority?

You tell me.

A REAL skeptic is able to apply skepticism to ALL SIDES, including their own. They do not hold one side to be blameless and the other to be always wrong, like the Randis, Shermers and CSICOPers do. Fanatics are always one-sided, independent free thinkers aren't.

The ability to independently assess all sides, including your own, is the mark of a true freethinking at a higher level of consciousness. These folks clearly do not fit the bill.

You gotta remember that "actions speak louder than words". Anyone can claim to be a skeptic or critical freethinker. But if their ACTIONS do not show the hallmark of one, then they aren't. And by their actions, the Randis, Shermers and CSICOPers aren't.

-----

Jime's comment: In general, pseudo-skeptics are ideologues and propagandists for the mainstream orthodoxy, because current orthodoxy is materialistic and, therefore, support the pseudo-skeptics' ideology and the atheistic faith. What motivates pseudo-skeptics is a monumental uncritical faith in materialism and naturalism (and a hatred and hostility to everything related to God, religion or spirituality in general), and they hold to that faith even in the few cases where orthodoxy is contrary to it (for example, the big bang is accepted by mainstream science as the best supported theory about the universe' origin. But many pseudo-skeptics, specially the propagandists for atheism, realizing that an absolute beginning of the universe suggest a possible non-physical and trascendental cause of it (and therefore, makes plausible the idea of God), have intented to reject the absolute beginning of the universe and speculate, without any evidence at all, about multiverses. They WANT to believe in multiverses, even if such theory has not empirical support at all. This is more evidence of the ideological nature of pseudo-skepticism and materialistic atheism and specially of the evident self-delusion of these individuals who see themselves as rational, free-thinkers and "brights".

Richard Carrier on Alex Rosenberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 4)

Let's to examine another of atheist Richard Carrier's objections to Alex Rosenberg's essay on the actual and consistent implications of the naturalistic worldview.

Carrier's objection 6 is this:

(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..

Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:

1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".

But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.

Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)

Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)

It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.

2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."

But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.

But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).

For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.

The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.

Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.

More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).

The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).

Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).

This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".

3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."

What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).

As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)

This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)

TO BE CONTINUED...

Part 1 of this series here.

Part 2 of this series here.

Part 3 of this series here.

Rupert Sheldrake: What if Telepathy Really Happens?

Alan Crossley on the physical mediumship of Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.

Alan Crossley talks about his experiences of materialisation seances with Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.

Intelligent design: Is it viable? Debate bewteen William Lane Craig vs. Francisco Ayala

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Opening Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Rebuttal Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Closing Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Question and Answer Session from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Richard Carrier on Alex Rosenberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 3)

This is part 3 of my critical analysis of naturalist and atheist Richard Carrier's objections to naturalist Alex Rosember's essay on the actual implications of a consistently assumed metaphysical naturalist worldview.

Given that Carrier's objection 3 is about morality, and my previous post on Carrier addressed that aspect, I'll skip it and examine the objection 4 and 5.

Carrier's objection 4 is this:

(Objection 4) When it comes to cognitive science (as some have noted here already) Alex succumbs to a common error: trusting scientists to be good philosophers. Alex mistakenly follows the error of Libet in confusing our perception of ourselves, with our actual selves. Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision. Once you abandon the fallacy of conflating the two, Alex’s conclusions from Libet’s experiment no longer follow. Philosophers long ago settled this issue: even if determinism prevails, free will exists in the compatibilist sense, which is the only kind of free will anyone would ever really want. Science has never proved otherwise.

Let's to examine this objection in parts.

1- Carrier says "Alex mistakenly follows the error of Libet in confusing our perception of ourselves, with our actual selves"

Carrier's reply assumes (without any argument) that perception of ourselves is different of our selves. But, if naturalism is true, what's the difference between them? What's the "self" without any conscious perception of the "self"? What's the referent of that conscious perception, but the conscious perception itself?

2-Carrier says "Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision. Once you abandon the fallacy of conflating the two, Alex’s conclusions from Libet’s experiment no longer follow"

Carrier's reply misrepresents Rosemberg's point. What Rosemberg said is "Then there is the fact, discovered by Libet, that actions are already determined by your brain before you consciously decide to do them!"

Note that Rosemberg's point is about the implications of determinism (as apparently shown by Libet's experiments) to free will.

Even though I disagree with the common interpretations surrounding Libet's experiment, Rosemberg's point is that if the deterministic interpretation is true, then free will is a mere illusion. It doesn't actually exist, because your choice was already determined by your brain.

Carrier's reply miss the point. When he says "Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision", he's arguing against a straw man.

Rosemberg is not saying that Libet's experiment implies that we don't make our decisions. His point is that our conscious decisions (made by us) is DETERMINED by previous processes in our brain. And therefore, it implies that free will is illusory, because our "choice" is fully determined in advance (hence, it's not actually free).

Claiming that we did the choice is irrelevant, if our choice was determined in advance by factors not dependent on us. Let's to see that in a diagram:

Cause ----> Cause -----> Cause ----> Cause (Jime's choice)-----> Cause ----> Cause (ad infinitum).

Note that "Jime's choice" is a link of a impersonal and deterministic causal chain, and that choice is fully DETERMINED by all the previous causes (1,2...) which are not dependent on me.

Therefore, my choice is actually an EFFECT (absolutely determined) of a previous causal chain, not an actually free and self-determined choice. So, saying that my choice is "free" because it was MY choice is a clear fallacy, a rhetorical sleigh of hand intented to fool unwary and unthinking people into the idea that determinism is actually compatible with free will.

If determinism is true, free will doesn't exist. (Only exist a causal chain whose one of the links- my choice- is arbitrarily called "free" by naturalists who don't want to reject determinism but don't dare to accept the full implications of their position)

3-Carrier asserts this falsehood "Philosophers long ago settled this issue: even if determinism prevails, free will exists in the compatibilist sense, which is the only kind of free will anyone would ever really want. Science has never proved otherwise"

This is simply false. Carrier presents the topic about free will as something that philosophers have already "settled". He misleads the readers into the thinking that "philosophers" have solved the free will debate and have agreed that free will exists in the compatibilist sense.

Readers familiar with the philosophical literature know that the free will problem hasn't been settled by philosophers. In fact, there are many positions (in addition to compatibilism) regarding the free will problem, and some philosophers even think the problem has no solution at all.

Again, Carrier begs the question against Rosemberg by assuming as truth one position (compatibilism) which is only one of the positions in the free will debate, and doing it without any argument.

As Rosemberg said in his reply to the commenters: "As for Libet, the aim of my appeal to his experiment, and to its vast number of replications, was to undermine our confidence in introspection as a source of reliable information about the mind, or anything else for that matter. I credit Libet with the conclusion that the consciousness of willing is no reason to suppose that willing is a conscious act of the mind. If my précis seemed to say more, that was overhasty of me. The point is when it comes to the nature of the mind and will, “never let your conscious be your guide.”

Scientism is physicalist—the physical facts fix all the facts. But it is not eliminativist about higher-level ontologies, provided that they are compatible with physics and supported by reliable empirical evidence. That means it must be eliminativist about free-floating designs and purposes, original intentionality and ethical values. It accepts higher level ontologies, so long as they play roles in our best (most predictive, transparent and unifying) explanations and theories. If some higher level ontology is incompatible with physics, then it cant do any of these things, since all the evidence for physical theory is evidence against them. Naturalists unwilling to eliminate so much must dispense with physics. And with it, they lose their most compelling argument for the hegemony of the higher-level process they really need—the one Darwin discovered." (emphasis in blue added)

Naturalists unwilling to eliminate what MUST be eliminated (if naturalism is true) are legion, because they're afraid that the implications of their position lead to obviously false, self-refuting or irrational results.

Naturalism leads unavoidably to irrational conclusions, but most naturalists, by self-delusion or intentionally, carefully avoid critically examining the full implications of naturalism, because doing such thing would destroy their position and undermine their faith on it. They prefer to spend their time in imaginary battles with creationists (thereby the well known obsession with creationism by most naturalists and materialistic atheists) instead of examining their own naturalistic position with critical rigour, honesty and objectivity.

As a rule, naturalists want to leave all the doors open (except the divine or spiritual door) to avoid making explicit predictions or implications of their worldview, and so cleverly avoid being refuted by contrary evidence or by philosophical arguments. This strategy allows that, whatever is the evidence or philosophical topic under discussion, naturalists can always, through ad hoc and post hoc modifications, force a compatibility with their naturalistic ideology. (If they specify in advance ALL the implications of their worldview, most people would realize the fallacies and self-refuting conclusions essentially implied by naturalism.)

Fortunately, honest naturalists like Rosemberg, Fodor, Nagel, MacArthur, and some others don't swallow that obvious fallacy. They have the courage to critically examine and make EXPLICIT the actual implications of naturalism and to face the ethical, moral, spiritual, social and intellectual consequences of that worldview.

Carrier's objection 5 is this:

(Objection 5) Alex commits a similar fallacy when he says blindsight suggests we might have to reject the conclusion “that when you see a color you have a color experience.” To cut right to the chase: since neither he nor any scientist has ever had a conversation with the part of the brain cut off from the cerebral cortex in blindsight cases, neither he nor any scientist can claim to know whether that part of the brain does or does not experience color qualia. The evidence of split-brain patients, however, should lead us to predict that it does. Which puts Alex’s inference to the contrary back into the circular file. Nevertheless, apart from this objection and the last, all Alex says about the errors of folk psychology is quite correct. The actual facts are quite different in cognitive science (such folk notions often being as wrong as the facts have turned out to be in cosmology and biology and everything else we’ve thought about for the last few thousand years). He just draws the wrong conclusions from those facts

Let's to examine it in detail:

1- Carrier says that "Alex commits a similar fallacy when he says blindsight suggests we might have to reject the conclusion “that when you see a color you have a color experience.”

Here Carrier again misrepresents Rosemberg's actual argument. What Rosemberg said was "Neuroscience will eventually enable us to understand the mind by showing us how the brain works. But we already know enough about it to take nothing introspection tells us about the mind on trust. The phenomenon of blindsight—people who don’t have any conscious color experiences can tell the color of a thing—is enough to give us pause about the most apparently certain conclusion introspection insists on: that when you see a color you have a color experience."

Note that Rosemberg is not suggesting that we have to reject the conclusion that we have a color experience; his point is that we have to have a pause when considering what introspection tell us about the mind, because there is evidence (like the phenomenon of blindsight) that cast doubts on the reliability of introspection as a method to discover what's actually happening inside of our minds.

Even though I disagree with Rosemberg's point, I agree that Rosemberg is right IF naturalism is true and consciousness is an illusion. Would you take the contents of an illusion seriously or at face value? Would you trust the contents of your illusions?

As naturalist, professional skeptic and consciousness scholar Susan Blackmore has argued: "Different strands of research on the senses over the past decade suggest that the brave cognitive scientists, psychologists and neuroscientists who dare to tackle the problem of consciousness are chasing after the wrong thing. If consciousness seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed sights, sounds, feelings and thoughts, then I suggest this is the illusion.

First we must be clear what is meant by the term “illusion”. To say that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it seems to be―more like a mirage or a visual illusion. And if consciousness is not what it seems, no wonder it’s proving such a mystery."(emphasis added)

Note that Blackmore includes "sights" (and hence color perception) as part of the illusion.

Blackmore adds that by "illusion", she's not referring to something non-existent; rather, she's talking about something that is very different than what it SEEMS to be (like a mirage or visual illusion).

Therefore, if the contents of consciousness are illusory (in the sense mentioned by Blackmore), and color experience is part of that illusion, is not logical Rosemberg's argument that we shouldn't take the results of introspection at face value? Is not the right position (like Rosemberg argues) tot take a pause when considering the qualia (including color) contents of such illusory experience?

Instead of refuting Rosemberg's argument, Carrier misrepresents it and begs the questions against him.

2-Carrier says " To cut right to the chase: since neither he nor any scientist has ever had a conversation with the part of the brain cut off from the cerebral cortex in blindsight cases, neither he nor any scientist can claim to know whether that part of the brain does or does not experience color qualia. The evidence of split-brain patients, however, should lead us to predict that it does"

But it's irrelevant and misrepresent Rosemberg's point. Rosemberg's argument is not based on this or that part of the cerebral cortex having or lacking experience color qualia, but in the reliability of such experience given the illusory character or nature of consciousness (and hence of experience color qualia).

As Carrier cannot refute Rosemberg's argument in its actual and best formulation, he creates and refutes a straw man.

Unlike Rosemberg, Carrier doesn't want to draw the full implications of his naturalist position, because he perceives its self-refuting and irrational consequences. He accepts the premises of naturalism but carefully and uncritically avoid their implications.

At least, Rosemberg (and a growing number of reflective naturalists) has the intellectual courage to assume the actual implications of his position and to follow the (naturalistic) argument where it leads.

TO BE CONTINUED...

Part 1 of this series here.

Part 2 of this series here.

Charles Tart and the questions of consciousness

Atheist Peter Atkins says we're NOTHING and come from NOTHING.

LOL.

Enjoy.

Links of interest:

-Naturalist Alex Rosemberg's article on the actual implications of naturalism.

-Naturalist David MacArthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"

William Lane Craig and Lewis Wolpert: Public lessons on atheist, pseudo-skeptical and materialist irrationality... from England with love.

The above video is an excerpt of the debate between Christian philosopher William Lane Craig and atheist/materialist Lewis Wolpert.

Readers of my blog know that I'm of the opinion that atheistic materialism and metaphysical naturalism, when consistently assummed and believed, destroy and impair the ability to rational and logical thinking. As consequence, believers in materialism and naturalism tend to be VERY irrational (this is well known for any person who has debated wtih these individuals).

However, some materialists, naturalists and pseudo-skeptics are smart, so their fallacies and irrationalities are not very obvious; you need to examine their whole philosophy, behaviour and arguments (in different contexts) to realize their inconsistencies. With training and practice, however, you can spot their irrationalities almost instantaneously.

But in the case of Lewis Wolpert, you don't need any training at all. His fallacious thinking is straighforward and obvious (as you can see in the above video, where the audience easily realized Wolpert's fallacies).

In the video, Craig is explaining that the first cause of the universe has the following properties:

-Timeless (because that cause created the universe and therefore the space-time itself)

-Spaceless (because space, which is part of the physical universe, was created too with the universe.)

-Immaterial (because the cause created the physical or material world itself. It's the origin of matter)

-Very powerful

-Personal.

Please, examine carefully the above properties mentioned by Craig. Read it again carefully.

You don't need to be a genius to see that such properties are like the properties or attributes that traditional monotheistic religions consider as typical and proper of God. But in any case, they're definitively NOT the properties of any finite material object like a horse or a TV or a T-shirt or a basketball ball.

Well, what's Wolpert's atheist reply to Craig's argument? That the first cause, with these properties, is actually a COMPUTER!

My God... I've read a lot of atheist, pseudo-skeptical and naturalist literature, and I'm used to their fallacies and irrational thinking, but I must confess that Wolpert's reply is a MASTERPIECE OF ATHEIST IRRATIONAL THINKING.

This is definitevely the worst reply for an argument that I've seen in my entire life, and this is a fine example of the destructive intellectual consequences of a consistently assumed naturalism and atheistic materialism. This is good evidence of the destructive potential of atheistic materialism and naturalism for the mind of its believers and followers.

Even the most stupid, retarded and inept person would understand that a computer CANNOT have the properties or attributes of the first cause of the universe by the following reasons:

1-Computers are material (and the first cause is immaterial)

2-Computers have a position on the space and time (and the first cause is the creator of the space and time)

3-Computers are artifacts and therefore are designed by an intelligence. Therefore, they're effects of intelligence, not the cause of it. And if they're effects of something else, then they're not a first cause at all.

Wolpert tries to force the ad hoc argument that the first cause is a computer, with atypical properties (self-designed, nonphysical, etc.). But note that if these atypical properties are accepted, then you're not talking of a computer anymore, because any object or entity is defined precisely by its essence and essential properties; and the essential properties of a computer don't include immateriality, timeless, etc.

Craig, realizing Wolpert's world-class atheist fallacy, exposes him with the obvious reply (in the second 54 of that video): Wolpert is calling "computer" what everybody understand as God (because the first cause has the properties of God, not of computers).

Wolpert didn't refute the argument about the properties of the first cause, he's only ARBITRARILY and in a AD HOC WAY, changed the name or label of the entity which has the properties that everybody agree are typical or proper of God.

Please, note Wolpert's face in minute 1:01 (when the audience applauded Craig for exposing Wolpert's ridiculous atheist fallacy)

Perhaps you're laughting a lot after watching the video (I concede it's very funny). But it has a sad side: If an academician like Wolpert, in a public debate, is able to reply with a world-class fallacy and irrationality like that, what do you expect of online amateurs materialistic atheist and pseudo-skeptics? Moreover, what could you infer about an scholar who argue like that?

More importantly, the destructive effects of materialistic atheism and naturalism on the human mind is actually what's in stake here. This is a serious motive for concern. The destructive psychological effects of atheistic materialism become obvious when the topic of discussion is God (because an essential part of the materialistic atheists' irrationality is their obvious and constant obsession with God and creationism. They have these topics constantly in their minds.) If in a debate, you press the point about God with an atheist, you'll see the atheist' full destructive potential for irrationality and delusion to become evident. You'll have a monster in front of you.

And in that point, any more argument with the atheist will be time bomb. You'll be confronted with his irrationality, delusions, resentment and therefore his intellectual (intentional) dishonesty.

If you'are smart, and know the psychology of pseudo-skeptics (grounded on emotional and spiritual factors), you should to anticipate all of this, and avoid that kind of intellectually sterile debate with hard-core atheists, materialists, naturalists, secular humanists, pseudo-skeptics and similar dogmatists. They're not rational, and debating with them tends to force you into irrationalism too.

You should to follow philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer's very wise suggestion in his book The Art of Controversy:

"As a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, of mutual advantage, in order to correct one's thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning and in mental power both disputants must be tolerably equal: If one of them lacks learning, he will fail to understand the other, as he is not on the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks mental power, he will be embittered, and led into dishonest tricks, and end by being rude.

The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool - desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la verite. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace" (emphasis in blue added)

Please, think about Schoperhauer's practical suggestion in the context of Wolpert's reply to Craig.

Links of interest:

-Lewis Wolpert debate with Rupert Sheldrake on telepathy.

Spiritualist Medium Gordon Smith: Documentary on the mediumship afterlife communications

The Making of An Atheist: How Immorality leads to unbelief by James Spiegel. Reflections on the psychology of atheism and pseudoskepticism

I've gotten a copy of the book "The Making of an Atheist: How Immorality leads to Unbelief" by professional Christian philosopher James Spiegel. (See the summary of this book on the end of this post)

I haven't read the book yet, so I cannot comment anything about its specific contents.

However, I'd like to say the book addresses an aspect that, in my opinion, have been largely neglected in the literature critical of atheism and pseudo-skepticism in general: the psychological roots of atheism (and pseudo-skepticism, I'd add).

This psychological aspect has been neglected because it's thought that the origin of any belief has nothing to do with the validity of the belief. And this is true from a logical point of view, but it's false from a psychological point of view.

Let me to explain it better:

From a logical point of view, the truth or falsity of a proposition X is independent of the psychological or emotional motivation of the people who hold it. For example, the statement "God exists" is true or false, regardless of the psychological reasons to affirm or deny it.

However, from a psychological point of view, the statement "God exists" will be considered positive and good (or at least with a sympathetic eye) by many people (spiritual people, religious persons, etc.), and will be considered negative and bad by another people (atheists).

In other words, the psychological background of each person will determine, or strongly influence, the receptivity of the idea that God exists. And this psychological background will determine too how people respond to arguments in favor of God's existence (this is why the same argument is considered good by some people, and bad for others).

Spiegel's book is an examination (from the Christian perspective) of the psychological roots of atheism; and as the title suggest, the immorality seems to be (according Spiegel) the stronger factor leading to atheism.

I don't know if Spiegel's thesis about the connection immorality-atheism is correct; personally, I tend to think the root of atheism (and particularly, of the ideological atheistic materialism typical of pseudo-skeptics) is mainly due to the following TWO factors:

1-A personal painful emotional experience (mostly during childhood or adolescence) related to religion or spirituality or something connected with it; in particular:

-Being forced to pray

-Being forced to go to the Church

-Being abused by some religious relative or authority (e.g. being sexually abused by a religious believer; or being abused by a religious teacher in school; or being emotionally or socially abused by some religious bigot)

This deep emotional and spiritual wound, connected with religion/spirituality, is the basic psychological motivation behind militant forms of atheism, naturalism, materialism and pseudo-skepticism; and fully explains the dishonesty, irrationality, intellectual submission to the authority of mainstream science and arrogance typical of these individuals (remember that some of them proclame themselves as "brights", implying that non-atheists are not brights).

In this paper, David Leiter, who had a long first-hand experience dealing with materialistic atheists and pseudo-skeptics, discoveried this: "The theme that has emerged time after time, as I become closely acquainted with individual PhACT members is this: Each one who has disclosed personal details of their formative years, say up until their early 20’s, has had an unfortunate experience with a faith-based philosophy, most often a conventional major religion.

Very often, their family or community has (almost forcibly) imposed this philosophy on them from a very early age; but then as they matured, they threw off this philosophy with a vengeance, vowing at a soul level never to be so victimized again. Less often, it appears that they have instead voluntarily and enthusiastically embraced, for example, a New Age cult, or have become say, a born-again Christian. Then after a few years, they become convinced of the folly of that infatuation with the same basic result. They throw off this philosophy with a vengeance, vowing at a soul level never to be so victimized again.

A person who has been duped frequently in everyday life might learn by bitter experience to be cautious and wary. The reaction of those who have joined PhACT is however more dysfunctional. They have been wounded at a deeper level, to the extent that what was purported to be a valid philosophy of life, and in which they were heavily involved, turns out to be empty and useless, even damaging, in their eyes. Thus, they gravitate to what appears to them to be the ultimate non-faith-based philosophy, Science. Unfortunately, while they loudly proclaim their righteousness, based on their professed adherence to “hard science”, they do so with the one thing no true scientist can afford to possess, a closed mind. Instead of becoming scientifically minded, they become adherents of scientism, the belief system in which science and only science has all the answers to everything. This regrettable condition acts to preclude their unbiased consideration of phenomena on the cutting edge of science, which is not how a true scientist should behave. In fact, many “Skeptics” will not even read significantly into the literature on the subjects about which they are most skeptical. I have direct experience with this specific behavior on the part of a number of PhACT members. Initially, I attributed that behavior to just plain laziness, but lately I’ve begun to suspect that those individuals may actually have a phobia about reading material that is contrary to their own views. It seems entirely possible that they fear “contamination” from that exposure will eventually lead to (Gasp!) acceptance of the opposition’s position. Such scientifically inclined, but psychologically scarred people tend to join Skeptics’ organizations much as one might join any other support group, say, Alcoholics Anonymous. There they find comfort, consolation, and support amongst their own kind".

2-As consequence of point 1: there is exists very often a hatred towards and fear of God (or spirituality and religion in general) and therefore an irrational wishful thinking for atheism and naturalism (even in the face of contrary evidence) that impairs, distortions and destroys the atheist/materialistic's rational thinking skills. This makes them essentially irrational.

This point has been noted by some honest naturalists themselves. In his book The Last Word, first rate naturalist philosopher Thomas Nagel argued that:

"I believe that this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life.

In speaking of the fear of religion, I don’t mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper—namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and wellinformed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world" (emphasis added)

In his paper The Contents and Appeal of Naturalism (which is part of the excellent book Naturalism In Question), another first rate philosopher, naturalist Hilary Putnam, wrote: "Naturalism", I believe, is often driven by fear, fear that accepting conceptual pluralism will let in the "occult", the "supernatural" (emphasis added)

Another first rate naturalist philosopher, John Searle, has realized that point too. He wrote: How is it that so many philosophers and cognitive scientists can say so many things that, to me at least, seem obviously false?... I believe one of the unstated assumptions behind current batch of views is that they represent the only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the anti-scientism that went with traditional dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on. Acceptance of the current views is motivated not so much by an independent conviction of their truth as by a terror of what are apparently the only alternatives. That is, the choice we are tacitly presented with is between a "scientific" approach, as represented by one or another of the current versions of "materialism", and an "unscientific" approach, as represented by Cartesianism or some other traditional religious conception of the mind" (The Rediscovery of the Mind, pp. 3-4. Emphasis in blue added).

Whoever has interacted with pseudo-skeptics and dogmatic atheists has realized their intellectual dishonesty, their irrationality (e.g. they continously and obsessively talk about creationism and God even when you're not talking about these topics), and their tendency to ad hominem attacks. These factors are clearly IRRATIONAL and suggest that something is seriously wrong with the cognitive faculties of these individuals.

Many of them are deluded; and the main self-delusion is to think that they're rational and free thinkers.

As part of my study of the cultural, psychological and philosophical origin of materialistic pseudo-skepticism, I'm sure the naturalist ideology is rooted in a certain psychological and emotional structure, and I've discoveried a lot of curious and not well-known facts related to it (but I haven't commented anything in detail yet... stay tuned) because I'm still collecting the evidence to support my hypothesis.

Spiegel seems to suggest that immorality is a causal factor in atheism too; but in my opinion, the immorality is CONSEQUENCE of the irrationality and resentment rooted in the deep emotional wound suffered by militant pseudo-skeptics and atheistic materialists during their formative years, not a cause of this phenomenon as such. But I don't discard Spiegel's hypothesis.

Just by the record, in my opinion, all the above factors apply only to dogmatic, militant, ideological kind of atheists (e.g. the militant members of skeptical organizations, many of the commenters and posters of Richard Dawkins' internet forum or the strident bully-like atheist-materialist believers who comments in PZ Myers's blog; the hard-core followers of James Randi, the "fans" of Michael Shermer, etc.).

These factors don't apply necessarily to open mind seekers who, in their research, are not convinced of God or anything spiritual. However, in my experience, this kind of "rational unbelievers" are rare birds, are very exceptional (in fact, this kind of honest atheists are annoyed by the rhetoric, dishonesty, irrationality and ad hominem attacks of militant and strident atheists; and are open to a sympathetic consideration of the evidence for parapsychology, afterlife research and even religion. They don't have an axe to grind against these topics).

Anyway, I think you should read Spiegel's book and draw your conclusions.

Links of interest:

-Interview with James Spiegel about his book.

-Naturalist philosopher Alex Rosemberg's article on the actual implications of metaphysical naturalism.

-Naturalist philosopher David MacArthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"

-My post on naturalist philosopher Thomas Nagel and the Fear of God.

-Some notes on (pseudo) skepticism.

P.S.

A summary of Spiegel's book can be read here:

Sigmund Freud famously dismissed belief in God as a psychological projection caused by wishful thinking. Today many of the “new atheists”—including Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens—make a similar claim, insisting that believers are delusional. Faith is a kind of cognitive disease, according to them. And they are doing all they can to rid the world of all religious belief and practice.

Christian apologists, from Dinesh D’Souza to Ravi Zacharias, have been quick to respond to the new atheists, revealing holes in their arguments and showing why theistic belief, and the Christian worldview in particular, is reasonable. In fact, the evidence for God is overwhelming, confirming the Apostle Paul’s point in Romans 1 that the reality of God is “clearly seen, being understood from what has been made so that men are without excuse” (Rom. 1:20, NIV).

So if the evidence for God is so plain to see, then why are there atheists? That is the question that prompted The Making of an Atheist. The answer I propose turns the tables on the new atheists, as I show that unbelief is a psychological projection, a cognitive disorder arising from willful resistance to the evidence for God. In short, it is atheists who are the delusional ones.

Unlike Dawkins and his ilk, I give an account as to how the delusion occurs, showing that atheistic rejection of God is precipitated by immoral indulgences, usually combined with some deep psychological disturbances, such as a broken relationship with one’s father. I also show how atheists suffer from what I call “paradigm-induced blindness,” as their worldview inhibits their ability to recognize the reality of God manifest in creation. These and other factors I discuss are among the various dimensions of sin’s corrupting influence on the mind.

I’ve been told that The Making of an Atheist is a provocative book, but I didn’t write it to provoke anyone. I simply wanted to tell the truth about this issue. Anyway, since the new atheists are bold enough to trumpet their claim that theists are delusional, it seems appropriate that someone should be willing to propose that the opposite is true. As they say, turnabout is fair play.

Richard Carrier on Alex Rosemberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 2)

This is part 2 of my critical analysis of naturalist and atheist Richard Carrier's objections to naturalist Alex Rosember's essay on the actual implications of a consistently assumed metaphysical naturalist worldview.

Carrier's objection 2 is this:

(Objection 2) I disagree that science “has to be nihilistic about ethics and morality.” Science factually demonstrates the truth of “ought” statements all the time (in medicine, surgery, engineering, car repair, what have you). Thus it is not a fallacy to derive an ought from an is. It’s a fallacy to think you can’t derive an ought from an is–or to think you can get an ought any other way. Obviously if we can derive an ought from an is in every other sphere of human life, we can do it in morality. And several scientists are doing exactly that. More and more we are accumulating evidence that living by the Golden Rule is essential to our happiness. Once we realize that “is” we derive the consequent “ought”: if we want to be the happiest we can be in the circumstances we are actually in, we ought to live by the Golden Rule. It could have been otherwise, had we evolved differently. But if we want to discover the best way to live, we have to attend to the way things actually are. If we can apply science to progress in the best way to cure disease, we can apply science to progress in the best way to live. And we ought. Because there is nothing we all want more than to know the best way to live.

Let's to examine Carrier's objection in parts:

1-He claims that Science factually demonstrates the truth of “ought” statements all the time (in medicine, surgery, engineering, car repair, what have you).

This is simply false and show Carrier's fundamental misunderstanding both of science and ethics.

First, "ought" statements are prescriptive or normative, not descriptive. They don't factually describe any state of affairs, but pose a prescription or command of what must be. For example, if I say "You ought to love your parents", that statement doesn't refers to an actual empirically verifiable state of affairs, but a command about how you should be to feel about your parents. The pretentions of validity of that normative statement holds even if you, factually, don't love your parents. (This is why ought statements are not empirically falsifiable).

For this reason, Richard Dawkins has argued: "Science has no methods for deciding what is ethical. That is a matter for individuals and for society" (A Devil’s Chaplain, p.34).

And in this interview, Dawkins expands the idea: "Now, if you then ask me where I get my 'ought' statements from, that's a more difficult question. If I say something is wrong, like killing people, I don't find that nearly such a defensible statement as 'I am a distant cousin of an orangutan"

The reasons why Dawkins claims that is 1)He's a metaphysical naturalist; 2)Unlike Carrier, Dawkins is logically consistent about the ethical implications of naturalism and atheism; and 3)Unlike Carrier, Dawkins has a good command and understanding of natural science, and therefore he realizes that ought statements are not descriptive and thereby are not empirically verifiable (therefore, empirical science has not methods to deal with them)

Even though Carrier is not a philosopher, the above ideas about ought statement not being empirical are so ridiculously obvious that I'm sure that Carrier, who's a historian, understands it.

So we have to be more charitable in the interpretation of Carrier, and try to make sense of his point and interpret his objection in its strongest and charitable formulation.

2-Carrier's examples give us a clue about what he's in mind. He mentions, as examples, medicine, surgery, engineering and car repair. Note that all the examples mentioned by Carrier refers to practical disciplines or technologies, not to descriptive or basic sciences (medicine has a descriptive side, when it researches the causes and description of diseases and their symptoms; and a technological or practical side, when prescribe certain treatments to attain the goal of healing).

Technologies and practical discplines have in common the use of certain MEANS to reach or attain certain ENDS. The ends themselves are chosen by individuals, but the relation means-ends is objective. These practical disciplines are essentially INSTRUMENTAL, because they use certain instruments to reach certain practical ends.

Their instrumental purpose is not to describe or explain the world, but to produce certain effects or ends chosen by human beings.

For example, suppose that you want to read your e-mail. This is the END. But what's the mean to attain that end? Well, you need an internet connection and a password.

Based on these facts, we can formulate an "ought statement": if want to read your e-mail (end), you ought to have internet and type your password (means).

So, apparently, you can derive "ought" statements from "facts". This is what Carrier has in mind when he mentions the above examples:

-Medicine (e.g. if you want to cure your disease, you ought to use the treatment X)

-Surgery (e.g. If you want to extirpate the tumour and avoid its extension, you ought to cut right here in this way)

-Engineering (e.g. If you want to run your machine, you ought to put the parts in this way and not in that way, etc.)

-Car repair (e.g. if you want to repair your car, you ought to fix this part, etc.)

Note that all of these examples refers to a means-to-ends connection. And certainly, science can teach us which are the best means to get certain ends. What science CANNOT teach us is why certain ends are more valuable than others, because it's a ethical matter, not a scientific one.

And this is where Carrier's argument breaks.

The VALUE of ends themselves is what is at stake.

Science tell us that if you jump from the top of a building, you'll die. What science cannot tell us is whether suicide is good or bad, because it's a ethical and moral question, not an empirical one.

Knowing that A is the best mean to reach B doesn't tell us anything about the value of B.

3- Based on the above considerations, we're in position to understand the faulty reasoning of Carrier.

Carrier's basic fallacy is to suppose that the "ought statements" (in the normative, not purely instrumental sense) derive from facts. He conflates a purely conditional imperative or technical-pragmatic rules (e.g. if you want to get X, you ought to do Y) with categorical commands typical of ethical thinking (e.g. torturing children for fun is absolutely, inconditionally, necessarily and always WRONG and BAD)

He says: Thus it is not a fallacy to derive an ought from an is. It’s a fallacy to think you can’t derive an ought from an is–or to think you can get an ought any other way

Since Hume, any philosopher or student of philosophy would know that, from a strictly logical point of view, it's impossible to deduce prescriptive statement from descriptive ones. In his book A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume famously argued: "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it" (Emphasis in blue added)

Philosopher Kennett Merrill, in his Dictionary of Hume's philosophy, explains Hume's idea: This “inconceivable deduction” is often described as the impossibility of inferring a normative (e.g., a moral or ethical) conclusion from wholly factual premises. It is not necessary that the words is and ought or their negatives literally occur in the argument.

Thus, the following argument illustrates the sort of inference that Hume is taken to proscribe: “Stalin was responsible for the deaths of millions of persons who had committed no serious crime or no crime at all, and certainly no capital crime. Further, Stalin knew that these people were innocent. Therefore, Stalin was an evil man.” First, a point about terminology. When Hume speaks of a deduction, he means any sort of ratiocinative inference, whether it be deductive (in the contemporary sense of logically necessary) or inductive (= probabilistic).

It is a mistake to interpret Hume as restricting what he calls deduction to arguments whose conclusions follow (or are claimed to follow) necessarily from their premises by strict entailment. He clearly means to include arguments based on causal reasoning, all of which fall short of demonstration. He first argues at some length that moral distinctions do not consist in relations that are “the objects of science” (or, alternatively, “can be the objects of knowledge and certainty”); namely, resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number (THN, 70 and 468; 1.3.1.2 and 3.1.1.26). He goes on to “the second part of [his] argument” (THN, 468; 3.1.1.26; italics are in Hume’s text), which is to show that morality does not consist in any matter of fact that can be discovered by the understanding (causal reason, in this case). Taken together, the two parts of Hume’s argument purport to prove that morality is not an object of reason, either demonstrative reason or (probabilistic) causal reason.

Since reason “exerts itself” in only the two ways just mentioned—i.e., from demonstration or probability; from the abstract relations of our IS/OUGHT • 155 ideas or the relations of objects revealed in experience—it follows that moral distinctions are not based on rational inference at all". (Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy, pp.155-156)

This impossibility of logically (deductively or inductively) inferring ought statements from factual statements have been known in philosophical circles, and for good reasons, as Hume's Guillotine. (Carrier's argument is straightforwardly an easy prey of Hume's Guillotine.)

As we have seen, Carrier conflates the purely instrumental and causal idea of means-to-ends connection, with the ethical problem of VALUE (which is an intrinsically normative concept) and normative statements (which don't describe any actual state of affairs in the external world and hence are not empirically testable).

4-After being cut by Hume's Guillotine, the head-less Carrier says "And several scientists are doing exactly that. More and more we are accumulating evidence that living by the Golden Rule is essential to our happiness."

But that argument assumes that happiness is the actual valuable end of human beings.

However, happiness is a subjective feeling, and what causes happiness to you not necessarily causes happiness to me.

A same fact could be a cause of happiness to a person and unhappiness to another.

For example, if the AWARE study on NDEs produces a positive result, spiritual persons will be very happy because science has validated their beliefs, and they'll share this great news with family members and friends. Their hopes of an afterlife will be ratified.

However, the same fact will cause a very strong and painful cognitive dissonance in atheistic materialists, metaphysical naturalists, pseudo-skeptics and all the members of infidels.org and the secular web (Carrier included). They'll see their worldview destroyed (again) by the evidence, and the predictable negative emotions (including intense unhappiness) will cause that they begin a PR campaign on the internet to discredit the research, to cast doubts on the researchers, to undermine the results, etc. (here you can include all the well-known methods used by pseudo-skeptics to suppress evidence against their worldview and to keep alive the self-delusion that they're rational and free-thinkers.)

The point is that assuming happiness is the only (or most important) criterion of value is highly debatable and questionable.

5-Carrier's simplistic thinking is evidenced by this comment: "Once we realize that “is” we derive the consequent “ought”: if we want to be the happiest we can be in the circumstances we are actually in, we ought to live by the Golden Rule"

And what if we disagree with that "is"? What if, contrary to Carrier's simplistic ideas, we agree with Rosemberg? What's the "ought" derived of the acceptation of Rosemberg's argumentation? What if the "is" that we happen to agree is that an afterlife exist?

Carrier assumes that his ideas are philosophically evident and unproblematic.

6-Carrier at least recognize the ontological subjectivity and relativity of morality in a naturalistic worldview: "It could have been otherwise, had we evolved differently."

In other words, the moral system of human is relative to the evolution of humans; therefore, if we had evolved differently, perhaps we would have a different morality. It means that morality doesn't refer to something external and objective to human beigns, but to something dependent on human beings and thereby ontologically dependent on them.

However, Carrier doesn't draw all the logical consequences and implications of such assumption. This is evidence that Carrier is not a logically coherent metaphysical naturalist.

Consistent metaphysical naturalists like Dawkins or Rosemberg realize that naturalism implies moral subjetivism and relativism. As has powerfully argued consistent naturalist Keith Augustine: "I think there is a certain degree of plausibility among atheists in the view that without some kind of transcendental intelligence in the universe, there can be no objective moral laws.

Moral laws are maxims which tell sentient beings that certain actions are to be deemed moral or immoral. But how could such laws exist in the absence of any mind or sentience in the universe at all? Are moral laws objective in the way that laws of nature are? They do not seem to be, for few would argue that "murder is wrong" existed in some Platonic realm of ideas when galaxies were forming over ten billion years ago and there was no sign life or consciousness anywhere in the universe. The use of the word "law" implies an objective existence of unchanging moral maxims independently of sentience. Yet it appears that there can be nothing objective about so-called "moral laws", because it seems absurd on its face to say that maxims which tell sentient beings that certain actions of sentient beings are moral or immoral could exist in the absence of sentience.

It seems to me that all ethical codes must ultimately be man-made, and thus there could be no objective criteria for determining if human actions are right or wrong. Admitting that moral laws are man-made is equivalent to acknowledging that ethical rules are arbitrary and therefore human beings are not obligated to follow them" (Emphasis added)

In my opinion, IF naturalism is true, THEN Keith's powerful argument for moral subjectivism is irrefutable. But it implies that if objective moral values exist, then naturalism is false (therefore, if you agree that objective moral values exist, you have a powerful reason to reject metaphysical naturalism and secular humanism)

Richard Dawkins has realized this point too. In the same interview mentioned above, he said: "I couldn't, ultimately, argue intellectually against somebody who did something I found obnoxious. I think I could finally only say, "Well, in this society you can't get away with it" and call the police.

I realise this is very weak, and I've said I don't feel equipped to produce moral arguments in the way I feel equipped to produce arguments of a cosmological and biological kind. But I still think it's a separate issue from beliefs in cosmic truths."

Dawkins, realizing that science cannot deal with ethics, and assuming metaphysical naturalism to be true, draws the obvious conclusion: morality is relative and subjective, it's a matter of taste of society and individuals.

Consistent with Dawkins and Keith Augustine, naturalist Rosemberg argues: "There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon. So, if scientism is to ground the core morality that every one (save some psychopaths and sociopaths) endorses, as the right morality, it’s going to face a serious explanatory problem.

The only way all or most normal humans could have come to share a core morality is through selection on alternative moral codes or systems, a process that resulted in just one winning the evolutionary struggle and becoming “fixed” in the population. If our universally shared moral core were both the one selected for and also the right moral core, then the correlation of being right and being selected for couldn’t be a coincidence. Scientism doesn’t tolerate cosmic coincidences. Either our core morality is an adaptation because it is the right core morality or it’s the right core morality because it’s an adaptation, or it’s not right, but only feels right to us. It’s easy to show that neither of the first two alternatives is right. Just because there is strong selection for a moral norm is no reason to think it right. Think of the adaptational benefits of racist, xenophobic or patriarchal norms. You can’t justify morality by showing its Darwinian pedigree. That way lies the moral disaster of Social Spencerism (better but wrongly known as Social Darwinism). The other alternative—that our moral core was selected for because it was true, correct or right–is an equally far fetched idea. And in part for the same reasons. The process of natural selection is not in general good at filtering for true beliefs, only for ones hitherto convenient for our lines of descent. Think of folk physics, folk biology, and most of all folk psychology. Since natural selection has no foresight, we have no idea whether the moral core we now endorse will hold up, be selected for, over the long-term future of our species, if any."(emphasis in blue added)

Instead of begging the question, Carrier would have to refute Dawkins, Rosemberg and Keith's powerful naturalism-consistent arguments before he can defend his own moral speculations as the best ones.

And he can't, because metaphysical naturalism has exactly and demostrably the implications that Dawkins, Keith and Rosemberg (and many other naturalists) have explained.

I'll address Carrier's other objections in another posts.

TO BE CONTINUED...

Part 1 of this series here.