Crispin Wright on the moral, semantic and psychological implications of naturalism and ontological materialism

I've mentioned that many, perhaps most, metaphysical naturalists and materialists don't like to make explicit the full logical implications of their worldview, because in such case it becomes obvious that their ideology is irrational and self-defeating. They get nervous when you press them to draw the exact implications of their position, and carefully avoid making any explicit predictions (on concrete metaphysical topics entailed) by their ideology.

When exceptionally, they make some prediction entailed by their worldview, and you refute it or question it, they assert that naturalism doesn't entail any such predicition (what refutes the previous position) or appeal to other naturalists who think otherwise about such prediction (without realizing that naturalism, if it's true, cannot entail logically inconsistent implications. This is a clear example of how a monumental faith in naturalism can overpower rationality and critical thinking).

Morever, some metaphysical naturalists and materialistic pseudo-skeptics are professional propagandists for atheism and, therefore, act like lawyers in a court of law in defense of materialism, naturalism and (its ethical corollary) "secular humanism". They don't have the intellectual, emotional and professional equanimity to search the truth; rather, their purpose is to defend their ideology against any possible objection.

As their main existential and emotional motivation is atheism (they want atheism to be true), they try to leave all the possibilities open to naturalism, even is such possibilities are logically inconsistent with each other or (more importantly) with naturalism itself.

Fortunately, there are a few honest metaphysical naturalists out there. They're truth seekers who are not interested in propaganda for atheism or materialism, but in a true inquiry into naturalism itself, and in its metaphysical implications. They're not afraid of critially examining their own position (see for example the book Naturalism in Question as an example of this. And read philosopher David MacArthur's paper on the skeptical implications of naturalism)

One of these naturalist philosophers is Crispin Wright. In his contribution to the book Conceivability and Possibility, Wright writes:

"A central dilemma in contemporary metaphysics is to find a place for certain anthropocentric subject-matters—for instance, semantic, moral, and psychological—in a world as conceived by modern naturalism: a stance which inflates the concepts and categories deployed by (finished) physical science into a metaphysics of the kind of thing the real world essentially and exhaustively is. On one horn, if we embrace this naturalism, it seems we are committed either to reductionism: that is, to a construal of the reference of, for example, semantic, moral and psychological vocabulary as somehow being within the physical domain—or to disputing that the discourses in question involve reference to what is real at all. On the other horn, if we reject this naturalism, then we accept that there is more to the world than can be embraced within a physicalist ontology—and so take on a commitment, it can seem, to a kind of eerie supernaturalism". (p. 401. Emphasis in blue added)

Let's to comment this in detail.

1-As a consistent naturalist (and an honest truth seeker and philosopher, not an ideologue or propagandist), note that Wright doesn't believe that naturalism is neutral regarding metaphysical questions about semantics, moral and psychological matters. He fully realizes that naturalism, as a metaphysical position, HAS actual implications for all of these questions.

2-Based on point 1, Wright realizes that contemporary metaphysics faces a dilemma, caused in part because naturalism is the widely accepted metaphysical position and, at the same time, there is not an obvious or clear place for certain phenomena and properties (that Wright calls anthropocentric subject-matters: semantic, moral and psychological properties) in a purely physicalist world (a world where purely physical and material causes are operative) entailed by naturalism.

Note that it's not a sort of argument from ignorance. The argument is not that we ignore or don't know or lack evidence on how to place moral and similar properties in a physicalist ontology and thereby naturalism is false. Rather, the argument is that if naturalism is true, then a physicalist ontology has to be true; and a physicalist ontology by definition EXCLUDES non-physical entities or phenomena. Therefore, if moral or psychological properties are non-physical (=not fully reducible to physical processes or entities), naturalism is false.

3-As consequence, Wright realizes that, if naturalism is true, then reductionism to the physical follows. Moral, psychological and semantic properties are, somehow, "physical", because non-physical entities and properties cannot have a place in purely physicalist ontology. This is entailed logically by naturalism.

Note that this is exactly the same conclusion of another naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg. Regarding morality, Rosenberg writes: "If there is no purpose to life in general, biological or human for that matter, the question arises whether there is meaning in our individual lives, and if it is not there already, whether we can put it there. One source of meaning on which many have relied is the intrinsic value, in particular the moral value, of human life. People have also sought moral rules, codes, principles which are supposed to distinguish us from merely biological critters whose lives lack (as much) meaning or value (as ours). Besides morality as a source of meaning, value, or purpose, people have looked to consciousness, introspection, self-knowledge as a source of insight into what makes us more than the merely physical facts about us. Scientism must reject all of these straws that people have grasped, and it’s not hard to show why. Science has to be nihilistic about ethics and morality. There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon" (emphasis in blue added)

Regarding psychological properties and consciousness "Nevertheless, if the mind is the brain (and scientism can’t allow that it is anything else), we have to stop taking consciousness seriously as a source of knowledge or understanding about the mind, or the behavior the brain produces. And we have to stop taking our selves seriously too. We have to realize that there is no self, soul or enduring agent, no subject of the first-person pronoun, tracking its interior life while it also tracks much of what is going on around us. This self cannot be the whole body, or its brain, and there is no part of either that qualifies for being the self by way of numerical-identity over time. There seems to be only oneway we make sense of the person whose identity endures over time and over bodily change. This way is by positing a concrete but non-spatial entity with a point of view somewhere behind the eyes and between the ears in the middle of our heads. Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us. But of course Scientism can explain away the illusion of an enduring self as one that natural selection imposed on our introspections, along with an accompanying penchant for stories. After all it is pretty clear that they solve a couple of major design problems for anything that has to hang around long enough to leave copies of its genes and protect them while they are growing up" (emphasis in blue added)

Regarding semantic properties and beliefs: " It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs"(emphasis in blue added)

Like Rosenberg, Wright fully recognizes that naturalism, being a picture of the entire world (a worldview) is not and cannot be neutral regarding metaphysical problems about moral, psychological and semantic matters. Naturalism has to have implications for all of these fields; implications that if are proved false, would falsify naturalism.

I suspect that the latter point is what naturalist propagandists are afraid of. As they're true believers and they WISH that naturalism and atheism be true, they carefully and smartly avoid making explicit the implications of naturalism for concrete areas of inquiry. With this strategy, they avoid that the implications of naturalism be fully and rigurously known and examined.

This is why they prefer to write debunking articles about creationism, God, afterlife or parapsychology, instead of critically and objectively working out the full implications of their actual position and testing the implications with the relevant evidence and philosophical arguments.

They don't want to know the truth, except it if confirms naturalism. They are not intellectually nor emotionally prepared to reject naturalism if the evidence or philosophical arguments force them to do it. It's a sophisticated method of self-delusion and a silly way to avoid cognitive dissonance.

4-Wright concedes that the acceptation of non-physical properties or entities would imply the denial of naturalism and, therefore, provide evidence for "supernaturalism" (he calls it "eerie supernaturalism")

Note that Wright is not talking about a specific religion or God, but simply about a worldview which is incompatible with the implications of naturalism, and therefore can be called "supernaturalism" (beyond the limits of nature). If such supernaturalism entails a specific form of theism, is another (important) question, but it is not the point relevant for Wright's argument.

His point is that naturalism has clear implications that need to be true if naturalism is right. But if the implications are false, then naturalism is false, and some kind of "supernaturalism" has to be right.

If naturalism were false...

What you would expect if naturalism is false? I submit that IF naturalism were false, then we would expect:

1-That consciousness cannot be explained by materialism (because consciousness is not material). And for the time being, everybody agrees that there is not (materialistic) explanation at all of consciousness.

2-That consciousness, intention and mental states are causally efficacious (as seen in placebo effect, biofeedback and psychokinesis). And this is what we found both in our daily life and in some psi experiments:





3-That consciousness, not being reducible to the brain, survives after death (as suggested by some cases of near-death experiences and afterlife literature in general).

4-That believing in materialism (which is false) only can be done by faith or, at least, by partially irrational factors And this is why materialist William Lycan has expressed: "Being a philosopher, of course I would like to think that my stance is rational, held not just instinctively and scientistically and in the mainstream but because the arguments do indeed favor materialism over dualism. But I do not think that, though I used to. My position may be rational, broadly speaking, but not because the arguments favor it: Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for materialism. And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by them. My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not proportion my belief to the evidence." (emphasis in blue added)

If arguments for materialism and dualism both fail, then a neutral or agnostic position would be the rational choice. But believing in materialism when the arguments for it don't work, and rejecting dualism when the objections to it fail, it's irrational. (We survivalist, including dualists and others accept psi phenomena and afterlife evidence that warrant our rational choice in favor of some kind of metaphysical dualism, even if we concede, for the argument's sake, Lycan's point that the traditional or standard philosophical arguments for dualism do fail)

The next point (a complement of this) could explain why materialists accept materialism, even if it is not the rational choice.

5-That naturalism and materialism, being false, only can be believed and motivated at the bottom by irrational factors (fears, double standards, prejudices or even obsessions and delusions). And this is what naturalist philosophers like Thomas Nagel has realized: "I believe that this is one manifestation of a fear of religion which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life... My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world"

If you change "religion" by "supernaturalism", you'll see that Nagel is referring to the same topic than Wright. Nagel is not referring to religion as an social instituion or dogma, but to the existence of supernatural (nonphysical) phenomena.

6-That empirical evidence for phenomena prima facie incompatible with naturalism and materialism would exist. And this is why we find, for example:

7-That the evidence for such phenomena be rejected, by rhetoric and irrational arguments, by materialists and professional debunkers (and this is exactly what we found).

8-That true believers in materialism and naturalism will defend many other obviously absurd and false beliefs, without realizing it. (In fact, if they are not able to see the fallacies and incoherences of the materialistic position, it's perhaps because their minds don't function properly. So it's not surprising that they also will believe in and defend many other ridiculously false, irrational and self-destructing beliefs) And this is exactly what we found, for example:

I could mention another 10 or 20 facts, phenomena, evidence or arguments that exist and we'd expect to exist if naturalism were false. But this post is already too long and I think I made my point clear.

Vinstonas Wu: Why James Randi, Michael Shermer and the CSICOPers are not Real Skeptics

This is a interesting recent article by Vinstonas Wu on pseudo-skeptics.

Why Randi, Shermer and the CSICOPers are not Real Skeptics

Randi, Shermer and the CSICOPers are highly selective with their skepticism. Not only do they not question their own beliefs, but they never challenge or apply skepticism to the status quo. Instead, they have a fanatical allegiance to it, evidenced by their behavior. A true skeptic examines all sides, including his own. But pseudoskeptics only point their skepticism at what they don't believe in, which everyone else does too. So what makes them different than anyone else then? Only one thing: The SIDE they're on. In this case, they are on the side of authority, orthodoxy and materialism. That is why their skepticism and critical examination is ONLY directed at anything and anyone that challenges the status quo, but NEVER at the status quo itself. In essence, that makes them "establishment defenders" (or establishment whores), not real skeptics.

That is why you will never see James Randi, Michael Shermer or the CSICOP crowd apply any skepticism, criticism or condemnation toward orthodoxy or establishment. They hold that side to be blameless and infallible, not overtly, but by their selective skepticism. And they take on faith anything that the establishment says as true, without the need for evidence or critical inquiry. You can see this in ALL their publications, writings, interviews and speeches. Thus they are the farthest thing from objectivity, logic, freethinking, unbiased mindsets, or true skepticism, for they hold the programmed mentality that "authority = truth".

Now, is that the mark of a freethinker, truth seeker, or true skeptic? I don't think so.

This is why not only are they against all validity of the paranormal, but also against all claims of conspiracy as well, which are not even paranormal in nature. In their view, anyone that challenges the system or the agenda of the elite, is automatically discredited, regardless of whether their claims are true, credible or backed by evidence. And this includes former high ranking government officials as well.

For those of you who have followed the work of Randi, Shermer or CSICOP, ask yourself this: Have you ever seen them criticize anything of the establishment, including crimes, murders, lies, conspiracies, evil plots, etc?

I'll bet not.

Consider the following documented facts and let me ask you:

Do they ever speak out against the senseless killings in the Iraq War for power and profit?

Nope.

Do they ever admit that the US Navy was wrong to fake the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 (which has now been exposed) which resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese, making the war and their deaths a FRAUD?

Nope.

Are they outraged with the fact that the CIA has been involved in drug trafficking for many years, which even some in the mainstream media have reported? Or the CIA assassinations of foreign leaders who refused to abide by US policy?

Nope.

Are they outraged that the EPA lied after 9/11 that the air was safe to breathe, which caused thousands of First Responders to develop cancer from the toxic air and slowly die?

Nope.

Are they outraged that upper levels of government have concocted secret plots to sacrifice innocent lives to stage terrorist activities and blame it on others to start wars, such as Operation Northwoods and Operation Dirty Trick? (Google them for more info)

Nope.

Do they speak out against the thousands of people that die from pharmaceutical drugs every year?

Nope.

But will they go ballistic if ONE person allegedly dies from alternative treatment such as homeopathy?

You betcha!

So, what does it say about them then if they have no problem with lies and evil plots that result in the death of millions, yet have a big problem with the death of a few if alternative medicine is involved?

It tells you that they are one sided with an axe to grind, rather than fair, honest or objective. They are fanatical defenders of establishment and orthodoxy, holding that side to be blameless. As such they are totally blind to the faults of authority, or deliberately ignore them at least. Their critical thinking and skepticism can ONLY be directed at anything AGAINST the establishment, and NEVER at anything FROM the establishment.

Tell that to the pseudoskeptics. And when they deny it, challenge them to produce a publication from a media skeptic or skeptic organization that openly condemns or criticizes the above crimes of the establishment (elite or shadow government, whatever you want to call it). When they come up empty handed, then you've got them. From that point, it does not matter if they continue in their denial, for the facts speak for themselves.

Now, is that true skepticism to you? Is that objectivity, logic and science? Is that the mark of a freethinker independent of authority or bias? Or is that fanaticism from a programmed mind who has given up his intellect to become an intellectual slave of authority?

You tell me.

A REAL skeptic is able to apply skepticism to ALL SIDES, including their own. They do not hold one side to be blameless and the other to be always wrong, like the Randis, Shermers and CSICOPers do. Fanatics are always one-sided, independent free thinkers aren't.

The ability to independently assess all sides, including your own, is the mark of a true freethinking at a higher level of consciousness. These folks clearly do not fit the bill.

You gotta remember that "actions speak louder than words". Anyone can claim to be a skeptic or critical freethinker. But if their ACTIONS do not show the hallmark of one, then they aren't. And by their actions, the Randis, Shermers and CSICOPers aren't.

-----

Jime's comment: In general, pseudo-skeptics are ideologues and propagandists for the mainstream orthodoxy, because current orthodoxy is materialistic and, therefore, support the pseudo-skeptics' ideology and the atheistic faith. What motivates pseudo-skeptics is a monumental uncritical faith in materialism and naturalism (and a hatred and hostility to everything related to God, religion or spirituality in general), and they hold to that faith even in the few cases where orthodoxy is contrary to it (for example, the big bang is accepted by mainstream science as the best supported theory about the universe' origin. But many pseudo-skeptics, specially the propagandists for atheism, realizing that an absolute beginning of the universe suggest a possible non-physical and trascendental cause of it (and therefore, makes plausible the idea of God), have intented to reject the absolute beginning of the universe and speculate, without any evidence at all, about multiverses. They WANT to believe in multiverses, even if such theory has not empirical support at all. This is more evidence of the ideological nature of pseudo-skepticism and materialistic atheism and specially of the evident self-delusion of these individuals who see themselves as rational, free-thinkers and "brights".

Richard Carrier on Alex Rosenberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 4)

Let's to examine another of atheist Richard Carrier's objections to Alex Rosenberg's essay on the actual and consistent implications of the naturalistic worldview.

Carrier's objection 6 is this:

(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..

Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:

1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".

But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.

Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)

Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)

It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.

2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."

But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.

But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).

For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.

The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.

Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.

More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).

The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).

Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).

This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".

3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."

What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).

As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)

This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)

TO BE CONTINUED...

Part 1 of this series here.

Part 2 of this series here.

Part 3 of this series here.

Rupert Sheldrake: What if Telepathy Really Happens?

Alan Crossley on the physical mediumship of Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.

Alan Crossley talks about his experiences of materialisation seances with Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.

Intelligent design: Is it viable? Debate bewteen William Lane Craig vs. Francisco Ayala

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Opening Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Rebuttal Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Closing Arguments from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Intelligent Design: Is It Viable? - Question and Answer Session from Campus Crusade for Christ at IU on Vimeo.

Richard Carrier on Alex Rosenberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 3)

This is part 3 of my critical analysis of naturalist and atheist Richard Carrier's objections to naturalist Alex Rosember's essay on the actual implications of a consistently assumed metaphysical naturalist worldview.

Given that Carrier's objection 3 is about morality, and my previous post on Carrier addressed that aspect, I'll skip it and examine the objection 4 and 5.

Carrier's objection 4 is this:

(Objection 4) When it comes to cognitive science (as some have noted here already) Alex succumbs to a common error: trusting scientists to be good philosophers. Alex mistakenly follows the error of Libet in confusing our perception of ourselves, with our actual selves. Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision. Once you abandon the fallacy of conflating the two, Alex’s conclusions from Libet’s experiment no longer follow. Philosophers long ago settled this issue: even if determinism prevails, free will exists in the compatibilist sense, which is the only kind of free will anyone would ever really want. Science has never proved otherwise.

Let's to examine this objection in parts.

1- Carrier says "Alex mistakenly follows the error of Libet in confusing our perception of ourselves, with our actual selves"

Carrier's reply assumes (without any argument) that perception of ourselves is different of our selves. But, if naturalism is true, what's the difference between them? What's the "self" without any conscious perception of the "self"? What's the referent of that conscious perception, but the conscious perception itself?

2-Carrier says "Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision. Once you abandon the fallacy of conflating the two, Alex’s conclusions from Libet’s experiment no longer follow"

Carrier's reply misrepresents Rosemberg's point. What Rosemberg said is "Then there is the fact, discovered by Libet, that actions are already determined by your brain before you consciously decide to do them!"

Note that Rosemberg's point is about the implications of determinism (as apparently shown by Libet's experiments) to free will.

Even though I disagree with the common interpretations surrounding Libet's experiment, Rosemberg's point is that if the deterministic interpretation is true, then free will is a mere illusion. It doesn't actually exist, because your choice was already determined by your brain.

Carrier's reply miss the point. When he says "Just because it takes your brain about a fifth of a second to generate a model of what you just did (and thus represent it as a coherent conscious experience), doesn’t mean it wasn’t you who just made that decision", he's arguing against a straw man.

Rosemberg is not saying that Libet's experiment implies that we don't make our decisions. His point is that our conscious decisions (made by us) is DETERMINED by previous processes in our brain. And therefore, it implies that free will is illusory, because our "choice" is fully determined in advance (hence, it's not actually free).

Claiming that we did the choice is irrelevant, if our choice was determined in advance by factors not dependent on us. Let's to see that in a diagram:

Cause ----> Cause -----> Cause ----> Cause (Jime's choice)-----> Cause ----> Cause (ad infinitum).

Note that "Jime's choice" is a link of a impersonal and deterministic causal chain, and that choice is fully DETERMINED by all the previous causes (1,2...) which are not dependent on me.

Therefore, my choice is actually an EFFECT (absolutely determined) of a previous causal chain, not an actually free and self-determined choice. So, saying that my choice is "free" because it was MY choice is a clear fallacy, a rhetorical sleigh of hand intented to fool unwary and unthinking people into the idea that determinism is actually compatible with free will.

If determinism is true, free will doesn't exist. (Only exist a causal chain whose one of the links- my choice- is arbitrarily called "free" by naturalists who don't want to reject determinism but don't dare to accept the full implications of their position)

3-Carrier asserts this falsehood "Philosophers long ago settled this issue: even if determinism prevails, free will exists in the compatibilist sense, which is the only kind of free will anyone would ever really want. Science has never proved otherwise"

This is simply false. Carrier presents the topic about free will as something that philosophers have already "settled". He misleads the readers into the thinking that "philosophers" have solved the free will debate and have agreed that free will exists in the compatibilist sense.

Readers familiar with the philosophical literature know that the free will problem hasn't been settled by philosophers. In fact, there are many positions (in addition to compatibilism) regarding the free will problem, and some philosophers even think the problem has no solution at all.

Again, Carrier begs the question against Rosemberg by assuming as truth one position (compatibilism) which is only one of the positions in the free will debate, and doing it without any argument.

As Rosemberg said in his reply to the commenters: "As for Libet, the aim of my appeal to his experiment, and to its vast number of replications, was to undermine our confidence in introspection as a source of reliable information about the mind, or anything else for that matter. I credit Libet with the conclusion that the consciousness of willing is no reason to suppose that willing is a conscious act of the mind. If my précis seemed to say more, that was overhasty of me. The point is when it comes to the nature of the mind and will, “never let your conscious be your guide.”

Scientism is physicalist—the physical facts fix all the facts. But it is not eliminativist about higher-level ontologies, provided that they are compatible with physics and supported by reliable empirical evidence. That means it must be eliminativist about free-floating designs and purposes, original intentionality and ethical values. It accepts higher level ontologies, so long as they play roles in our best (most predictive, transparent and unifying) explanations and theories. If some higher level ontology is incompatible with physics, then it cant do any of these things, since all the evidence for physical theory is evidence against them. Naturalists unwilling to eliminate so much must dispense with physics. And with it, they lose their most compelling argument for the hegemony of the higher-level process they really need—the one Darwin discovered." (emphasis in blue added)

Naturalists unwilling to eliminate what MUST be eliminated (if naturalism is true) are legion, because they're afraid that the implications of their position lead to obviously false, self-refuting or irrational results.

Naturalism leads unavoidably to irrational conclusions, but most naturalists, by self-delusion or intentionally, carefully avoid critically examining the full implications of naturalism, because doing such thing would destroy their position and undermine their faith on it. They prefer to spend their time in imaginary battles with creationists (thereby the well known obsession with creationism by most naturalists and materialistic atheists) instead of examining their own naturalistic position with critical rigour, honesty and objectivity.

As a rule, naturalists want to leave all the doors open (except the divine or spiritual door) to avoid making explicit predictions or implications of their worldview, and so cleverly avoid being refuted by contrary evidence or by philosophical arguments. This strategy allows that, whatever is the evidence or philosophical topic under discussion, naturalists can always, through ad hoc and post hoc modifications, force a compatibility with their naturalistic ideology. (If they specify in advance ALL the implications of their worldview, most people would realize the fallacies and self-refuting conclusions essentially implied by naturalism.)

Fortunately, honest naturalists like Rosemberg, Fodor, Nagel, MacArthur, and some others don't swallow that obvious fallacy. They have the courage to critically examine and make EXPLICIT the actual implications of naturalism and to face the ethical, moral, spiritual, social and intellectual consequences of that worldview.

Carrier's objection 5 is this:

(Objection 5) Alex commits a similar fallacy when he says blindsight suggests we might have to reject the conclusion “that when you see a color you have a color experience.” To cut right to the chase: since neither he nor any scientist has ever had a conversation with the part of the brain cut off from the cerebral cortex in blindsight cases, neither he nor any scientist can claim to know whether that part of the brain does or does not experience color qualia. The evidence of split-brain patients, however, should lead us to predict that it does. Which puts Alex’s inference to the contrary back into the circular file. Nevertheless, apart from this objection and the last, all Alex says about the errors of folk psychology is quite correct. The actual facts are quite different in cognitive science (such folk notions often being as wrong as the facts have turned out to be in cosmology and biology and everything else we’ve thought about for the last few thousand years). He just draws the wrong conclusions from those facts

Let's to examine it in detail:

1- Carrier says that "Alex commits a similar fallacy when he says blindsight suggests we might have to reject the conclusion “that when you see a color you have a color experience.”

Here Carrier again misrepresents Rosemberg's actual argument. What Rosemberg said was "Neuroscience will eventually enable us to understand the mind by showing us how the brain works. But we already know enough about it to take nothing introspection tells us about the mind on trust. The phenomenon of blindsight—people who don’t have any conscious color experiences can tell the color of a thing—is enough to give us pause about the most apparently certain conclusion introspection insists on: that when you see a color you have a color experience."

Note that Rosemberg is not suggesting that we have to reject the conclusion that we have a color experience; his point is that we have to have a pause when considering what introspection tell us about the mind, because there is evidence (like the phenomenon of blindsight) that cast doubts on the reliability of introspection as a method to discover what's actually happening inside of our minds.

Even though I disagree with Rosemberg's point, I agree that Rosemberg is right IF naturalism is true and consciousness is an illusion. Would you take the contents of an illusion seriously or at face value? Would you trust the contents of your illusions?

As naturalist, professional skeptic and consciousness scholar Susan Blackmore has argued: "Different strands of research on the senses over the past decade suggest that the brave cognitive scientists, psychologists and neuroscientists who dare to tackle the problem of consciousness are chasing after the wrong thing. If consciousness seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed sights, sounds, feelings and thoughts, then I suggest this is the illusion.

First we must be clear what is meant by the term “illusion”. To say that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it seems to be―more like a mirage or a visual illusion. And if consciousness is not what it seems, no wonder it’s proving such a mystery."(emphasis added)

Note that Blackmore includes "sights" (and hence color perception) as part of the illusion.

Blackmore adds that by "illusion", she's not referring to something non-existent; rather, she's talking about something that is very different than what it SEEMS to be (like a mirage or visual illusion).

Therefore, if the contents of consciousness are illusory (in the sense mentioned by Blackmore), and color experience is part of that illusion, is not logical Rosemberg's argument that we shouldn't take the results of introspection at face value? Is not the right position (like Rosemberg argues) tot take a pause when considering the qualia (including color) contents of such illusory experience?

Instead of refuting Rosemberg's argument, Carrier misrepresents it and begs the questions against him.

2-Carrier says " To cut right to the chase: since neither he nor any scientist has ever had a conversation with the part of the brain cut off from the cerebral cortex in blindsight cases, neither he nor any scientist can claim to know whether that part of the brain does or does not experience color qualia. The evidence of split-brain patients, however, should lead us to predict that it does"

But it's irrelevant and misrepresent Rosemberg's point. Rosemberg's argument is not based on this or that part of the cerebral cortex having or lacking experience color qualia, but in the reliability of such experience given the illusory character or nature of consciousness (and hence of experience color qualia).

As Carrier cannot refute Rosemberg's argument in its actual and best formulation, he creates and refutes a straw man.

Unlike Rosemberg, Carrier doesn't want to draw the full implications of his naturalist position, because he perceives its self-refuting and irrational consequences. He accepts the premises of naturalism but carefully and uncritically avoid their implications.

At least, Rosemberg (and a growing number of reflective naturalists) has the intellectual courage to assume the actual implications of his position and to follow the (naturalistic) argument where it leads.

TO BE CONTINUED...

Part 1 of this series here.

Part 2 of this series here.