One of the problems of evolutionary naturalism (=metaphysical naturalism + natural selection) is that it doesn't explain the origin of the reliability of our cognitive faculties to produce true beliefs. Even worst, it gives a defeater (roughly, a belief that refutes or undermine another belief) to the basic belief (shared by naturalists and non-naturtalists alike) that our mental faculties are reliable (i.e. that they produce mostly true beliefs)
(Note that in this context, "reliable" means "able to produce mostly true beliefs" (reliable doesn't mean "perfect" or infallible mental functioning))
The reason is that natural selection (if correct) favors only adaptive behaviour (behaviour that helps the organism to survive and reproduce), but that mechanism, by itself, doesn't imply or entail the favoring of mostly true beliefs and rationality in order to survive and reproduce (in fact, plants and animals like lions, birds, bats and worns have survived through natural selection too, but these animals are not rational nor have mostly true beliefs. So rationality and reliable cognitive faculties to know the truth are not necessary conditions to survive and reproduce under the natural selection mechanism. Therefore, given the fact of the biological survival of human beings, we cannot infer the rationality nor reliability of our minds to know the truth).
In a footnote of his excellent book The Last Superstition, Thomist philosopher Edward Feser briefly explains this problem (note that Feser is not a defender of Inteligent Design; in fact he's a critic of it, as you can read in this Feser's post):
It might be suggested that true beliefs have greater survival value, so that natural selection would favor them and thus ensure that our thought process are reliable. But there are two problems with this reply. First, there is no reason to think that true belief always have greater survival value; there might be some truths that it would be dangerous for us to know, so that natural selection shapes our minds in such way that we are kept from believing them. Secondly, even if true beliefs did always have greater survival value, there is still no way that natural selection could favor them. For a belief's truth or falsity is tied up with its meaning, and as we have seen, on the materialist's account meaning plays no causal role whatsoever in any of our thought processes. Hence truth and falsity can play no causal role either. That entails in turn that when our behaviour is caused by our beliefs, truth or falsity of the beliefs plays no role in causing it. And since natural selection could weed out false beliefs only by weeding out the behavior caused by them, it follows that it cannot weed out false beliefs (p. 288. Emphasis in blue added)
The above argument is based on the naturalist's own premises, not on the premises of "intelligent design", theism or "creationism" (or whatever other red herring that naturalist ideologues try pose to avoid the objection and cause confusion). In fact, Charles Darwin himself realized this problem (in a intuitive, crude and philosophically unsophisticated way):
"With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been devel-oped from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"(Letter to William Graham, July 3, 1881)
So, note that this objection is not based on a religious axe to grind or idiosyncratic hostility to naturalism (an hostility which could be justified given the naturalism's immoral, irrational, negative and anti-spiritual character). It's based on the own premises of naturalism plus natural selection. And this is why some naturalists themselves have recognized it.
But let's to return to Feser's argument:
Meaning, being a conceptual property of beliefs and propositions, is as such non-physical, and therefore cannot be causally efficacious on the physical world if materialism and naturalism are true (since that a basic principle of naturalism is the causal closure of the physical world, and the belief that NO non-physical cause can affect the physical world). Therefore, meaning as such is INVISIBLE to natural selection, so the meaning of a proposition (which is a necessary condition to makes it true or false) cannot be selected or favored by natural selection. So it's false and self-refuting (to naturalists) to claim that natural selection favors true beliefs over false beliefs.
If you see a naturalist claiming that natural selection favors true beliefs in virtue of their conceptual, propositional and semantic contents (i.e. in virtue of their having meaning) , you'll know for sure he's an ignorant, a charlatan or an ideologue (or all of these things together). If he explicitly or implicitly accepts that concepts (and their meanings) are causally efficacious on the physical world (e.g. efficacious to cause certain biological behaviors), then he's admitting that non-physical causation exists (and therefore, that the causal closure of the physical world and naturalism ARE false). And if he says that what causes behaviours is not the concepts and meaning as such, but their brain correlates (i.e. brain processes), then he cannot claim that natural selection favored true beliefs as such, i.e. in virtue of their meaning and propositional content (because true beliefs are conceptual and dependent on meaning, not on physical processes qua physical processes).
Reflective and honest naturalists have realized some of these problems. An example is naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg, who arguing about naturalism and its justification of the ontological status of "beliefs" (and hence of true beliefs), wrote: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs"
Note that Rosenberg's solution is to reject the existence of beliefs! (instead of rejecting naturalism!). But if beliefs don't exist, then the belief "naturalism is true" is non-existent too and being non-existent, cannot be true!; therefore, "believing" that naturalism is true is self-refuting. Moreover, if beliefs don't exist, then they cannot be causally efficacious; therefore, they cannot have any effect on survival and thereby cannot be selected by natural seleciton.
By the way, if "there are no beliefs", how the hell can natural selection favors (nonexistent) true beliefs over (nonexistent) false beliefs? It would be impossible, since that "nonexistent" entities , properties or traits cannot be selected at all.
At least Rosenberg is honest enough to recognize these problems implied by naturalism (even if his "solution" is absurd and obviously self-refuting). But any position that implies a self-refutation is, by that reason, FALSE. Therefore, if Rosenberg is right, naturalism is false.
In contrast with Rosenberg and other honest naturalists, naturalist ideologues try to hide these serious (and fatal, in my opinion) problems, in order to cause the public image that naturalism is rational (and to convince themselves that they're rational too). It's part of a PR strategy to spread atheism, materialism and pseudo-skepticism as an anti-spiritual worldview. It's also a clever and efficacious way of self-delusion caused by wishful thinking.
Note that these problems have been pointed out by both naturalists and non-naturalists alike (see the book Naturalism in Question for a discussion by naturalists themselves of the flaws of naturalism), even though (as expected) Christian philosophers have dedicated more time to explain and develop these intrinsic problems of the naturalist ideology.
For example, Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has explained in this brief video why naturalism is irrational (or more specifically, why to believe in naturalism is irrational) based on Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism:
You can read Plantinga's critical paper on naturalism in this Christian website.
Another argument against naturalism (different from Plantinga's, but based on the naturalism's premises too) is this paper by naturalist David MacArthur's entitled "Naturalism and Skepticism"
It's essential that you keep in mind that all of these arguments are based on the basic premises of naturalism itself, not on religious premises (and this is why naturalists like Rosenberg or MacArthur have defended arguments like those, because they fully realize the logical implications of naturalism and, not being strongly committed to a lawyerly defense of naturalism or its public image, they're not afraid of critically and honestly discussing the problems and implications of this worldview)
So, if you're an atheist, an agnostic, a pantheist or a Christian theist or are a believer in any other belief-system, and provided you're a TRUTH SEEKER, you can fully understand these arguments on their own merits and see the problems they actually pose to naturalism (It's up to you to decide if they're convincing or not)
Don't waste your time discussing these matters with ideologues, professional lawyers/propagandists for naturalism and faith-based uncritical believers in naturalism, they cannot be moved by reason or logic, nor want to.
Seek the truth for its own sake, not to convince ideologues.
(Note that in this context, "reliable" means "able to produce mostly true beliefs" (reliable doesn't mean "perfect" or infallible mental functioning))
The reason is that natural selection (if correct) favors only adaptive behaviour (behaviour that helps the organism to survive and reproduce), but that mechanism, by itself, doesn't imply or entail the favoring of mostly true beliefs and rationality in order to survive and reproduce (in fact, plants and animals like lions, birds, bats and worns have survived through natural selection too, but these animals are not rational nor have mostly true beliefs. So rationality and reliable cognitive faculties to know the truth are not necessary conditions to survive and reproduce under the natural selection mechanism. Therefore, given the fact of the biological survival of human beings, we cannot infer the rationality nor reliability of our minds to know the truth).
In a footnote of his excellent book The Last Superstition, Thomist philosopher Edward Feser briefly explains this problem (note that Feser is not a defender of Inteligent Design; in fact he's a critic of it, as you can read in this Feser's post):
It might be suggested that true beliefs have greater survival value, so that natural selection would favor them and thus ensure that our thought process are reliable. But there are two problems with this reply. First, there is no reason to think that true belief always have greater survival value; there might be some truths that it would be dangerous for us to know, so that natural selection shapes our minds in such way that we are kept from believing them. Secondly, even if true beliefs did always have greater survival value, there is still no way that natural selection could favor them. For a belief's truth or falsity is tied up with its meaning, and as we have seen, on the materialist's account meaning plays no causal role whatsoever in any of our thought processes. Hence truth and falsity can play no causal role either. That entails in turn that when our behaviour is caused by our beliefs, truth or falsity of the beliefs plays no role in causing it. And since natural selection could weed out false beliefs only by weeding out the behavior caused by them, it follows that it cannot weed out false beliefs (p. 288. Emphasis in blue added)
The above argument is based on the naturalist's own premises, not on the premises of "intelligent design", theism or "creationism" (or whatever other red herring that naturalist ideologues try pose to avoid the objection and cause confusion). In fact, Charles Darwin himself realized this problem (in a intuitive, crude and philosophically unsophisticated way):
"With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been devel-oped from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"(Letter to William Graham, July 3, 1881)
So, note that this objection is not based on a religious axe to grind or idiosyncratic hostility to naturalism (an hostility which could be justified given the naturalism's immoral, irrational, negative and anti-spiritual character). It's based on the own premises of naturalism plus natural selection. And this is why some naturalists themselves have recognized it.
But let's to return to Feser's argument:
Meaning, being a conceptual property of beliefs and propositions, is as such non-physical, and therefore cannot be causally efficacious on the physical world if materialism and naturalism are true (since that a basic principle of naturalism is the causal closure of the physical world, and the belief that NO non-physical cause can affect the physical world). Therefore, meaning as such is INVISIBLE to natural selection, so the meaning of a proposition (which is a necessary condition to makes it true or false) cannot be selected or favored by natural selection. So it's false and self-refuting (to naturalists) to claim that natural selection favors true beliefs over false beliefs.
If you see a naturalist claiming that natural selection favors true beliefs in virtue of their conceptual, propositional and semantic contents (i.e. in virtue of their having meaning) , you'll know for sure he's an ignorant, a charlatan or an ideologue (or all of these things together). If he explicitly or implicitly accepts that concepts (and their meanings) are causally efficacious on the physical world (e.g. efficacious to cause certain biological behaviors), then he's admitting that non-physical causation exists (and therefore, that the causal closure of the physical world and naturalism ARE false). And if he says that what causes behaviours is not the concepts and meaning as such, but their brain correlates (i.e. brain processes), then he cannot claim that natural selection favored true beliefs as such, i.e. in virtue of their meaning and propositional content (because true beliefs are conceptual and dependent on meaning, not on physical processes qua physical processes).
Reflective and honest naturalists have realized some of these problems. An example is naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg, who arguing about naturalism and its justification of the ontological status of "beliefs" (and hence of true beliefs), wrote: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs"
Note that Rosenberg's solution is to reject the existence of beliefs! (instead of rejecting naturalism!). But if beliefs don't exist, then the belief "naturalism is true" is non-existent too and being non-existent, cannot be true!; therefore, "believing" that naturalism is true is self-refuting. Moreover, if beliefs don't exist, then they cannot be causally efficacious; therefore, they cannot have any effect on survival and thereby cannot be selected by natural seleciton.
By the way, if "there are no beliefs", how the hell can natural selection favors (nonexistent) true beliefs over (nonexistent) false beliefs? It would be impossible, since that "nonexistent" entities , properties or traits cannot be selected at all.
At least Rosenberg is honest enough to recognize these problems implied by naturalism (even if his "solution" is absurd and obviously self-refuting). But any position that implies a self-refutation is, by that reason, FALSE. Therefore, if Rosenberg is right, naturalism is false.
In contrast with Rosenberg and other honest naturalists, naturalist ideologues try to hide these serious (and fatal, in my opinion) problems, in order to cause the public image that naturalism is rational (and to convince themselves that they're rational too). It's part of a PR strategy to spread atheism, materialism and pseudo-skepticism as an anti-spiritual worldview. It's also a clever and efficacious way of self-delusion caused by wishful thinking.
Note that these problems have been pointed out by both naturalists and non-naturalists alike (see the book Naturalism in Question for a discussion by naturalists themselves of the flaws of naturalism), even though (as expected) Christian philosophers have dedicated more time to explain and develop these intrinsic problems of the naturalist ideology.
For example, Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has explained in this brief video why naturalism is irrational (or more specifically, why to believe in naturalism is irrational) based on Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism:
You can read Plantinga's critical paper on naturalism in this Christian website.
Another argument against naturalism (different from Plantinga's, but based on the naturalism's premises too) is this paper by naturalist David MacArthur's entitled "Naturalism and Skepticism"
It's essential that you keep in mind that all of these arguments are based on the basic premises of naturalism itself, not on religious premises (and this is why naturalists like Rosenberg or MacArthur have defended arguments like those, because they fully realize the logical implications of naturalism and, not being strongly committed to a lawyerly defense of naturalism or its public image, they're not afraid of critically and honestly discussing the problems and implications of this worldview)
So, if you're an atheist, an agnostic, a pantheist or a Christian theist or are a believer in any other belief-system, and provided you're a TRUTH SEEKER, you can fully understand these arguments on their own merits and see the problems they actually pose to naturalism (It's up to you to decide if they're convincing or not)
Don't waste your time discussing these matters with ideologues, professional lawyers/propagandists for naturalism and faith-based uncritical believers in naturalism, they cannot be moved by reason or logic, nor want to.
Seek the truth for its own sake, not to convince ideologues.
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