At one time, famous philosopher Bertrand Russell believed in the existence of objective moral values. After some criticisms and reflection, he realized that if metaphysical naturalism is true, then objective moral values cannot exist (other ideas followed Russell's realization of the implications of metaphysical naturalism. See for example this post.)
Having realized this, Russell wrote:
"...ethics arises from the pressures of the community on the individual. Man . . . does not always instinctively feel the desires which are useful to his herd. The herd, being anxious that the individual should act in its interests, has invented various devices for causing the individual’s interest to be in harmony with that of the herd. One of these . . . is morality" (Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p.124. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that, if Russell is right, morality is purely an expression of the pressures of the community on us. Therefore, if the pressures are different, then morality also is different, because morality as such doesn't refer to an objectively existent realm or reality of intrinsic values, but that is the product of (we can say) "peer pressure".
And I submit that, if naturalism were true, then Russell's view is basically correct.
In other posts, I've mentioned that hardcore metaphysical naturalists, metarialistic atheists and pseudo-skeptics are individuals of a typical and obvious herd-like mindset, where the herd in question is the the handful of comitted and organized atheists who are obsessed with the idea of convincing the rest the world (i.e. 97% of the world population) that atheism is true, that parapsychology is bunk and the afterlife doesn't exist. And this is done in the name of "science".
Like in a herd of wolves, they tend to follow and be absolutely submitted to the will and power of a leader which tells them what to do and think. In the case of pseudo-skeptics, naturalists and materialists, the leader in question is science (more exactly, orthodox scientific authorities or the scientific establisment). As consequence of this herd mentality, they are intellectually unable to have an independent opinion or belief inconsistent with the consensus of the scientific authorities. They're essentially incapable of free thinking and independent thought (they're the secular equivalent of the religious dogmatist). They need the approval of mainstream scientific authorities, in order to have a personal opinion about whatever topic. Whatever evidence is incompatible with such consensus, the pseudo-skeptic will reject and dismiss it on purely a prori grounds (in the few cases of a posterior research, this is performed not to seek the truth, but as a debunking exercise of the anomalous information in question, because the aim is to protect the consensus of the scientific orthodoxy which is essential to the pseudo-skeptical belief system)
Marcello Truzzi, original member of the leading pseudo-skeptical organization CSICOP and hence an "insider", realized this:
The second common approach is what critics usually call the debunkers' approach. This is the main attitude of the orthodox scientific community towards anomaly claims. It is characterized by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP). "Whatever is claimed is nothing but ... something else." Seemingly anomalous phenomena are denied first and sometimes investigated only second. Like the Fortean the debunker is not concerned with the full explanation. Whereas the Fortean types don't want explanations, the debunkers don't need them as they believe they have already them.
The above is an empirical observation, which whoever is familiar with professional pseudo-skepticism will know that it is demostrably true. But it's a purely psychological and sociological fact. The knowledge of it is useful in order to know the sociology of professional pseudo-skepticism and the very particular psychology of its followers, ideologues and propagandists (so-called metaphysical naturalists, secular humanists, "brights", philosophical materialists, apologists of atheism, etc.)
In principle, the above has nothing to do with Russell's philosophical realization about morality. The latter is a purely philosophical insight, derived of a study of the consistent logical implications of the naturalistic worldview. This implication is independent of the psychology of pseudo-skeptics and materialists.
In a purely physical world (if it's all what exists as naturalism and materialism imply), there is not space for objectively existing normative properties like values (properties which, in contrast with physical properties, are not accesible to empirical observation nor are explainable in terms of materialism, precisely because they're not physical. This is why materialists have a tremedous pressure to define such values in terms of natural or physical properties, mainly psychological ones, like pleasure, desires, happiness, etc.).
On the other hand, even if an objective realm of moral value were consistent with naturalism, it is extremely unlikely that given a purely evolutionary process (which is largely random), we're equiped to grasp such moral realm, specially when such realm is, in naturalism, causally non-efficacious (since it is not physical) and hence incapable of having direct influence or effect on the organism and enviroment in order to be detected in the process of natural selection (note that this implies that our cognitive faculties couldn't be selected in the evolutionary process for their reliability to grasp or detect such non-physical moral realm, since such realm couldn't have any effect in our behaviour). Moreover, given naturalism and conceding for the argument's sake that our cognitive faculties developed by natural selection enable us to grasp such moral realm, how are we going to explain, ontologically, that a purely physical brain can grasp (or be in touch or interaction with) such non-physical realm of normative properties?
This is why a naturalists, if consistent, have to reject the objectivity of moral value, and accept moral subjetivism (in its relativistic implications). Moral values would be a projection of human ideas, which are essentially the product of evolution, herd pressure and cultural indoctrination.
But if you have good reasons to think that objective moral values do exist, and that certain actions or behaviours (like torturing a baby for pleasure alone, or raping animals for fun) are intrinsically bad and wrong (and not just a matter of herd pressure, personal taste or shared cultural fashion), then you have a powerful reason to reject metaphysical naturalism, and the moral poverty implied by it.
You'll have a purely ethical reason against metaphysical naturalism.
Think about it.
Having realized this, Russell wrote:
"...ethics arises from the pressures of the community on the individual. Man . . . does not always instinctively feel the desires which are useful to his herd. The herd, being anxious that the individual should act in its interests, has invented various devices for causing the individual’s interest to be in harmony with that of the herd. One of these . . . is morality" (Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p.124. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that, if Russell is right, morality is purely an expression of the pressures of the community on us. Therefore, if the pressures are different, then morality also is different, because morality as such doesn't refer to an objectively existent realm or reality of intrinsic values, but that is the product of (we can say) "peer pressure".
And I submit that, if naturalism were true, then Russell's view is basically correct.
In other posts, I've mentioned that hardcore metaphysical naturalists, metarialistic atheists and pseudo-skeptics are individuals of a typical and obvious herd-like mindset, where the herd in question is the the handful of comitted and organized atheists who are obsessed with the idea of convincing the rest the world (i.e. 97% of the world population) that atheism is true, that parapsychology is bunk and the afterlife doesn't exist. And this is done in the name of "science".
Like in a herd of wolves, they tend to follow and be absolutely submitted to the will and power of a leader which tells them what to do and think. In the case of pseudo-skeptics, naturalists and materialists, the leader in question is science (more exactly, orthodox scientific authorities or the scientific establisment). As consequence of this herd mentality, they are intellectually unable to have an independent opinion or belief inconsistent with the consensus of the scientific authorities. They're essentially incapable of free thinking and independent thought (they're the secular equivalent of the religious dogmatist). They need the approval of mainstream scientific authorities, in order to have a personal opinion about whatever topic. Whatever evidence is incompatible with such consensus, the pseudo-skeptic will reject and dismiss it on purely a prori grounds (in the few cases of a posterior research, this is performed not to seek the truth, but as a debunking exercise of the anomalous information in question, because the aim is to protect the consensus of the scientific orthodoxy which is essential to the pseudo-skeptical belief system)
Marcello Truzzi, original member of the leading pseudo-skeptical organization CSICOP and hence an "insider", realized this:
The second common approach is what critics usually call the debunkers' approach. This is the main attitude of the orthodox scientific community towards anomaly claims. It is characterized by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP). "Whatever is claimed is nothing but ... something else." Seemingly anomalous phenomena are denied first and sometimes investigated only second. Like the Fortean the debunker is not concerned with the full explanation. Whereas the Fortean types don't want explanations, the debunkers don't need them as they believe they have already them.
The above is an empirical observation, which whoever is familiar with professional pseudo-skepticism will know that it is demostrably true. But it's a purely psychological and sociological fact. The knowledge of it is useful in order to know the sociology of professional pseudo-skepticism and the very particular psychology of its followers, ideologues and propagandists (so-called metaphysical naturalists, secular humanists, "brights", philosophical materialists, apologists of atheism, etc.)
In principle, the above has nothing to do with Russell's philosophical realization about morality. The latter is a purely philosophical insight, derived of a study of the consistent logical implications of the naturalistic worldview. This implication is independent of the psychology of pseudo-skeptics and materialists.
In a purely physical world (if it's all what exists as naturalism and materialism imply), there is not space for objectively existing normative properties like values (properties which, in contrast with physical properties, are not accesible to empirical observation nor are explainable in terms of materialism, precisely because they're not physical. This is why materialists have a tremedous pressure to define such values in terms of natural or physical properties, mainly psychological ones, like pleasure, desires, happiness, etc.).
On the other hand, even if an objective realm of moral value were consistent with naturalism, it is extremely unlikely that given a purely evolutionary process (which is largely random), we're equiped to grasp such moral realm, specially when such realm is, in naturalism, causally non-efficacious (since it is not physical) and hence incapable of having direct influence or effect on the organism and enviroment in order to be detected in the process of natural selection (note that this implies that our cognitive faculties couldn't be selected in the evolutionary process for their reliability to grasp or detect such non-physical moral realm, since such realm couldn't have any effect in our behaviour). Moreover, given naturalism and conceding for the argument's sake that our cognitive faculties developed by natural selection enable us to grasp such moral realm, how are we going to explain, ontologically, that a purely physical brain can grasp (or be in touch or interaction with) such non-physical realm of normative properties?
This is why a naturalists, if consistent, have to reject the objectivity of moral value, and accept moral subjetivism (in its relativistic implications). Moral values would be a projection of human ideas, which are essentially the product of evolution, herd pressure and cultural indoctrination.
But if you have good reasons to think that objective moral values do exist, and that certain actions or behaviours (like torturing a baby for pleasure alone, or raping animals for fun) are intrinsically bad and wrong (and not just a matter of herd pressure, personal taste or shared cultural fashion), then you have a powerful reason to reject metaphysical naturalism, and the moral poverty implied by it.
You'll have a purely ethical reason against metaphysical naturalism.
Think about it.
Link of interest:
-Bertrand Russell's realizations on other consequences of metaphysical naturalism.
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