In his most recent book, the Moral Landscape, atheist Sam Harris proposes a defense of moral realism based on science. For many, Harris' book is a good defense of the idea that objective moral values can be grounded independent of any trascendent reality (e.g. God).Regardless of the actual value of Harris' book, I'll prove here that the above idea is false and misleading. Harris DOES NOT defend objective moral values at all; he only defends objective (i.e. scientific) explanations of the moral experience and beliefs of human beings.
Before we examine this in more detail, let's to clarify a couple of questions:
What does it mean "objective" in an ontological sense? Ontology refers to the things that exist in reality and to the study of the foundation of such things.
If I say that X is objective (ontologically), I'm saying that X exists independently of our minds. An example is the existence of the moon. If the moon exists objectively (ontologically), it means that its actual existence is independent of our beliefs and minds. Even if all the human race were destroyed, the moon would continue to exist, because the moon doesn't depend for its existence on our subjective existence.
Now, the fundamental question regarding moral values is: Do moral values exist objectivelly (in the ontological sense)? Or are they just ideas created by our minds? If moral values exist objectively, then moral objectivism and realism is true; but if moral values are just ideas in our minds, then such values are ontologically subjetive (because they depend for their existence on our minds).
An unicorn, for example, is an entity which is subjectively existing (i.e. it exists in the mind of some children or mad persons. In other words, it's a subjective fact that unicorns exist in the mind of certain people), but it doesn't exist objectively (i.e. as an actual entity, existing independently of our minds).
Now, does Harris believe that moral values exist objetively (in the ontological sense)?
Let's see:
In his book, he writes: "Many people are also confused about what it means to speak with scientific “objectivity” about the human condition. As the philosopher John Searle once pointed out, there are two very different senses of the terms “objective” and “subjective.” The first sense relates to how we know (i.e., epistemology), the second to what there is to know (i.e., ontology). When we say that we are reasoning or speaking “objectively,” we generally mean that we are free of obvious bias, open to counterarguments, cognizant of the relevant facts, and so on. This is to make a claim about how we are thinking. In this sense, there is no impediment to our studying subjective (i.e., first-person) facts “objectively.”
For instance, it is true to say that I am experiencing tinnitus (ringing in my ear) at this moment. This is a subjective fact about me, but in stating this fact, I am being entirely objective: I am not lying; I am not exaggerating for effect; I am not expressing a mere preference or personal bias. I am simply stating a fact about what I am hearing at this moment. I have also been to an otologist and had the associated hearing loss in my right ear confirmed. No doubt, my experience of tinnitus must have an objective (thirdperson) cause that could be discovered (likely, damage to my cochlea). There is simply no question that I can speak about my tinnitus in the spirit of scientific objectivity—and, indeed, the sciences of mind are largely predicated on our being able to correlate firstperson reports of subjective experience with third-person states of the brain. This is the only way to study a phenomenon like depression: the underlying brain states must be
distinguished with reference to a person’s subjective experience.
However, many people seem to think that because moral facts relate to our experience (and are, therefore, ontologically “subjective”), all talk of morality must be “subjective” in the epistemological sense (i.e., biased, merely personal, etc.). This is simply untrue. I hope it is clear that when I speak about “objective” moral truths, or about the “objective” causes of human well-being, I am not denying the necessarily subjective (i.e., experiential) component of the facts under discussion. I am certainly not claiming that moral truths exist independent of the experience of conscious beings—like the Platonic Form of the Good —or that certain actions are intrinsically wrong.
I am simply saying that, given that there are facts— real facts—to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice."
Comments:
1-Harris explicitly concedes that he's not defending moral (ontological) objectivism. On the contrary, he's defending moral subjectivism.
As consequence, Harris' position doesn't deny the argument that, if moral values are objective, then God exists. So the moral argument for God's existence is not affected at all by Harris' position (even if such position were correct).
2-Harris correctly distinguishes between objectivity (in the ontological sense) from objectivity (in epistemological sense), and he's defending the view that epistemological objectivity is not affected by (ontological) subjectivity, because we can study subjective facts (like pain, depression, illusions, etc.) in scientifically objective terms.
But it's irrelevant, since what is at stake is the actual (ontological) existence and foundation of moral values, not if we're able to explain objectively why people have illusions and false beliefs.
For example, let's suppose that we're discussing about God's existence. A theistic neuroscientist says that "there are divine facts" and that neuroscience can explain God's existence.
When pressed to explain what he means, he says: Well, the overwhelming majority of human beings believe in the existence of God. This is a subjective fact. And neuroscience can explain precisely what mechanisms in the brain produces such subjective divine fact. Therefore, science can tell us something about God: that God exists.
I ask the readers of this blog (specially the atheistic readers): Do you consider the above explanation of the imaginary theistic neuroscientist a good argument for the existence of God based on neuroscience?
Evidently not. What our imaginary theistic neuroscientist is doing is offering an (objective) neuroscientific explanation of our BELIEFS and even EXPERIENCES about God. But how the hell does it show that God exists (objectively, as an actual metaphysical reality)?
Even if the theistic neuroscientist were right that neuroscience can explain, in detail, the parts of the brain and the neural mechanisms that produce our belief in God and even that cause mystical or spiritual experiences related with such divine being, it still leaves open the (ontological) question about the objective existence of such being.
No atheist would accept that a (objective) neuroscientific explanation of our subjetive experiences and beliefs about God would prove God's actual existence. So, why should we accept that moral values do exist just because neuroscience can explain our moral experience and beliefs?
At most, Harris has shown that neuroscience can explain our moral experience and beliefs, not that such moral beliefs and experience have an ontologically objective referent or reality to which they correspond.
3-Harris' use of "moral truths" is misleading, in the same way thay calling "divine truths" is misleading when applied to the subjective experience and beliefs that many religious person claim to have regarding God. No atheist would accept that the subjective experience of a religious man (e.g. his vision of Jesus) is a "divine truth". The atheist would argue that such man is delusional, because such vision doesn't correspond to any spiritual objective reality at all. And the same atheist would argue that talking about "divine truths" is false and misleading, because God doesn't exist (therefore, there cannot be literally any divine truth at all; at most, we can have scientific truths about the "God delusions" by religious believers. But such beliefs don't have anything intrinsically and objectively "divine").
Likewise, talking of "moral truths" (when moral values don't exist at all) is clearly misleading. If there is not ontologically objective moral values, then there is not objective moral truth. Just truths about people's delusions and subjective experiences/beliefs regarding (an imaginary) morality.
Harris, who's a very unsophisticated philosopher (see my post about him here), is either fooling himself into the belief that he's provided a scientific justification for "moral truths", or he's intentionally misleading the public, specially the materialistic atheistic readers, who tend to lack the proper cognitive functioning in order to see his inconsistencies.
We can summarize Harris' position like this: He's offering an epistemologically objective (scientific) explanation of human beings' subjective moral experience and beliefs (improperly called "moral truths" when mixed with arbitrary definitions about "good" and assumptions about humans' "well being"). As such it leaves open the more interesting philosophical (ontological) question: Do moral values exist objectively in the ontological sense? Do the subjective experiences and beliefs of human beings correspond to an objectively existing moral realm, or as Michael Ruse says "Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory."?
Harris' position fully supports Ruse' conclusion.
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