Sliding Doors movie and the main argument for atheism: The Problem of Evil objection against God's existence

The main and most powerful argument for atheism is the so-called "Problem of Evil": roughly and in its logical version, this argument says that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with God's attributes of omnipotence and perfect goodness, because such a good powerful God could make disappear any evil and suffering if He wanted it. (If He couldn't, He wouldn't be omnipotent. But if He could but he doesn't want it, then his perfect goodness is non-existent).

You have to keep in mind that even if the logical version of the problem of evil were solid, it wouldn't be a proof for atheism. At most, it would be a proof against the traditional theistic understanding of God (as a God who is active in the world). But it left untouched a God as conceived by deists like former atheist philosopher of religion Antony Flew. In this interview, when asked about the problem of evil, the deist Flew answered: "For the deist, the existence of evil does not pose a problem because the deist God does not intervene in the affairs of the world."

So, the problem of evil falls short as a proof for atheism.

Moreover, as consequence of the works of philosophers like Alvin Plantinga (see specially his seminal book "God, Freedom and Evil"), the logical version of the problem of evil has been widely rejected by contemporary philosophers of religion. 

As William Rowe, who's a prominent atheist philosopher of religion and defender of atheism, comments: "Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God." (William L. Rowe, ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979). Emphasis in blue added)

As consequence, atheist philosophers have developed the so-called "evidential" problem of evil, namely, the view that, granted the logical compatibility between God's attributes and the existence of evil, the latter makes improbable the existence of God (i.e. the existence of evil is empirical evidence against God's existence). This is the main argument of atheists today.

An obvious problem with this argument is that, according to classical theism, God's existence is necessary (hence, not a matter of probability calculus which only applies properly to contingent beings and events, i.e. beings and events which could or couldn't fail to exist or occur, and precisely for this reason their existence can be "probable" or "improbable" given a certain background). Therefore, if God's existence is even possible (i.e. logically possible given the existence of evil), then he must to exist (i.e. the notion of a possible necessary being failing to exist is logically incoherent). This is why the atheist concession that evil is compatible with God's existence is a major concession against atheism. In my opinion, this is the primary shortcoming of this version of the problem of evil.

But my purpose in this post is not to discuss the arguments for and against the evidential problem of evil. 

Rather, I want to suggest the watching of the movie Sliding Doors, which highlights one of the most common defenses that theists have against the evidential version of the problem of evil, namely, the view that God could have morally sufficient reasons to allow evils in the world.

Many theists (like William Lane Craig, see below), trying to meet the challenge of the evidential version of the problem of evil in its own merits, arguing that God could have moral reasons to allowing evils in the world, but that the theist doesn't need to know them (after all, how could any of us to know God's full reasons for any divine action, decision or permission? Perhaps we can know some things about God, like his existence, main attributes, some of his purposes and so forth, but pretending to know in detail the specific contents, desires and plans of an infinite, omniscient and perfect mind seems to be impossible for infinite and imperfect beings like us).

The movie Sliding Doors doesn't refer to religion, or to the debate of theism and atheism. The movie tells the story of a woman  whose life could take different directions depending on whether or not she catches a train. 

This movie is relevant for reflections about God allowing evils because, given human beings' free will, each alternative choice by every individual person in a specific set of circunstances could have wholly different effects (individually and above all collectively), and some of these effects could be desired by God as part of his large plan or providence for the humankind. So, a natural tragedy (e.g. as the events occured in Japan some time ago) could trigger human decisions which, in the future, will cause a state of affairs which is part of God's overall plan.

One could still ask why God, being omnipotent, allows such natural disasters in order to reach his desired ends. Couldn't he simply use other, less dramatic or tragic means, to reach his ends? This is what we don't know: onmipotence means the faculty of bringing about any metaphysically possible state of afairs, but it is not clear that, given free will (of human beings and other advanced beings: aliens, afterlife spirits, angels or demons if they exist, inter-dimensional intelligences, etc.) God could bring about his ultimate ends, without violating and destrying the free will of his creations.

For example, some ufologists who accept the existence of extraterrestial beings suggest, based on the evidence of contactees, that some aliens are responsible of certain natural disasters or "casual" tragedies in order to cause pain and suffering on human beings (supposedly, some negative alien races absorb the energy of negative human emotions like hatred, anger, panic, fear, envy, etc.). If this is the case, then even some natural evils are a product of free will (e.g. of advanced non-human beings).

Obviously God could simply destroy everything that exists, including any creature endowed with free will and consciousness; but such a action would seem less "good" than allowing certain finite evils in order to, eventually, cause greater goods and an expansion of consciousness and universal armony.

In any case, it is obvious that we're entering an extremely speculative territory here. We simply don't know why God allows such a thing. The point is that the atheist problem from evil, while convincing for atheists, is hardly convincing for theists or even (I dare to say) agnostics with an open mind about God's existence.

In addition to Plantinga's book recommended above, I've found very useful William Lane Craig's distinction between the "emotional problem of evil" and the "intellectual problem of evil", which he discusses, for example, in the following lecture:

I strongly recommend to think about Craig's arguments, Plantinga's sophisticated treatment of the problem of evil, and watching the movie Sliding Doors with this topic about free will, the evil and God's omnipotence in mind.