LivesOn and virtual life after death: When your heart stops beating, you'll keep tweeting! New Twitter APP will allow tweeting from the afterlife... REALLY?

The human desire for survival of consciousness and fear of death is so strong, despite the atheist propaganda for materialism and personal extinction after death, that now a new APP for twitter exists which allow dead people keep tweeting after death... obviously NOT literally, but "virtually". The add is known as LIVESON.

According to this website:

You might think your online fans will lose interest when you kick the bucket, but an upcoming app says it will let you keep tweeting from beyond the grave. 

LivesOn will host Twitter accounts that continue to post updates when users shed this mortal coil. 

Developers claim the app's artificial-intelligence engine will analyze your Twitter feed, learn your likes and syntax, and then post tweets in a similar vein when you're gone. 

You'll become an AI construct, a proverbial ghost in the machine. 

Obviously, such technology is sheer delusion. If there is not life after death in any literal sense, then the whole app becomes a kind of "game", a kind of online delusion. 

The whole point of twitter is the possibility of communicating with others (real, living agents). Reading their tweets, replying to them, allowing other people to know our views, etc. 

But what is the point of keep reading, let's say Michael Jackson's tweets, if he doesn't exist anymore? It is astonishing that grown, sane, rational adults will follow with interest a dead person's tweets, when such tweets come actually from a insentient, purely mechanical computer, not from a real person. More ridiculous will be retweet them or even reply to them. Sheer technology-induced self-deception, only possible in a highly secularized, anti-spiritual society.

This is a symptom of the currently fashionable, technologically based materialistic secularism, which tries to fill the spiritual vacuum created by the contemporary materialistic-atheistic-naturalistic worldview with the same religious hopes for immortality and life after death (which make full sense in a theistic worldview, but not in a purely atheistic one), even if such hopes are purely illusory or based on a computer, as in this case.

Sometimes, technology tends to make people a little bit stupid and incapable of hard, critical, rational thinking and serious, honest, fruitful seeking for true spiritual enlightment.

If there is life after death (as I happen to believe), we don't need to fool ourselves using an app like this (except for fun).

More on Ken Wilber's metaphysics: Problems related to the philosophy of mathematics, the concept of God, the Big Bang and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

In a previous post, I've commented on some problems that I think Wilber's metaphysics pose to the notion of survival of consciousness.

But I think Wilber's metaphysics is also at variance with the existence of entities which, if they exist, don't fit well with Wilber's metaphysics. A couple of examples:

1-Mathematical entities (numbers, sets, etc.): If they exist objectively (either in the strong Platonistic sense, or as divine ideas in God), then it is hard to see how Wilber's metaphysics could account for it.

If such objects like numbers exist, presumibly they are perfect, changeless, immaterial entities... how could such entities be explained in terms of holons and evolutionary development? Just think about it: Imagine that the number 0 exist objectively. Now, how exactly such object is a holon which has evolved progressively in a development process? What are the lower and higher holonic structures of such object?

If such object exists, it seems an immutable, perfect, changeless object, not sensitive to change (and hence, not sensitive to evolution or regression). 

It is not clear exactly where such objects, if exist, would fit in Wilber's metaphysics. In this point, Wilber's only consistent position would be a kind of strong anti-realism in the philosophy of mathemathics.

2-God: In the classical theistic tradition, God is a personal being, who is spiritual, immaterial, ommipotent, perfect and so forth.

But in Wilber's metaphysics, such classical concept of God is hard to find. If God is perfect, He already possess all of His essential properties at maximal degree. As consequence, He cannot evolve (i.e. change in a better, progressive way), because He is already perfect. 

Note that if we accept that God is evolving, we are accepting that God is NOT perfect in a given time, because in such time He lacks an essential property that He will have in a later time. This concept would be the concept of an imperfect, but always evolving God, which is at variance with classical theism.

Also, since He's subject to evolutionary process, such God is a contingent entity, not a necessary one. He's more like a physical object, an highly advanced extraterrestial being, than a necessary, fully perfect being which is the ground of reality.

So, Wilber's metaphysics seem to imply atheism regarding the classical concept of God as a personal, perfect immaterial being.

The Big Bang and the concept of God implied in the Kalam Cosmological Argument in tension with Wilber's metaphysics: 

As I've argued in several posts, the evidence for the absolute beginning of the universe poses a massive problem for naturalists, because such beginning cries for an explanation which, given the nature of the case, cannot be a natural explanation (because precisely is the beginning of nature itself which is the issue at stake).

Some leading atheists have fully understood this, and in order to avoid theism, they have used as their last card the view that the universe began to exist from "absolutely nothing at all", and that "there is not reason at all" for the universe's absolute coming to existence. "Nothinhness" becomes the ultimate God-stopper and the last refuge of atheism.

It is obvious why some atheists take such implausible, obscurantistic and irrational view. The absolute beginning of the universe implies that its cause is:

-Immaterial: because the whole of matter is created in the Big Bang.

-Spaceless: because space is created in the Big Bang.

-Timeless: because physical time itself is created in the Big Bang.

-Changless (at least without the universe):  since change implies time, and the cause in question is timeless.

-Extremely powerful: because the cause is creating the universe without any material cause (=creatio ex nihilo), which plausibly only an omnipotent being could do.

-Personal:  Since the only two plausible candidates for a cause possessing all the above attributes are abstract objects (like numbers), or immaterial spirits. Since abstract objects are not causally efficacious (e.g. the number 3 by itself doesn't cause anything... even thought your belief about the number 3 does), the only alternative seems to be immaterial spirits.

So, we're left (as plausible causes of the universe) with the existence of a powerful single immaterial spirit (God), or with a plurality of immaterial spirits who are extremely powerful and even omnipotent (polytheism or a pluralitiy of mini-gods). By Ockham's razor, postulating one single cause = one single God (which suffices to produce the effect) is simpler than postulating an arbitrary number of immaterial causes, it follows that it is more reasonable to postulate one single God as the creator of the universe, than postulating an arbitrary number of mini-gods or God-like spirits.

But such view of God, being timeless and changeless, doesn't fit well with Wilber's evolutionary metaphysics. 

Moreover, Wilber's basic concept that all holons have the property of being simultaneously "part/whole", cannot apply to God. If a perfect God is a holon, exactly what is the "whole" in regards to which such God is a "lower" or "smaller" part?

As I said, the problem with Wilber's metaphysics is that it is monistic, not dualistic. And form a monistic perspective, it is very hard to explain the whole diversity of everything that exists, because some entities (like God, mathematical objects, etc. seem to be ontologically different and non-reducible to a single principle common with material systems). Matter and Consciousness seems to be radically different kinds of entities, not two expressions or manifestations of a single entity.

In classical theism, God is the creator of everything which exists outside himself, including the material world. But the latter, even though God's creation, is NOT God himself (nor has any of God's essential properties). So, a kind of metaphysical dualism is implied.

But in Wilber's system, one single entitiy expresses itself (not "creating" something in addition to itself) through a bunch of wholly different manifestations, from sub-atomic particles to personal minds.

I don't think Wilber's monism is absurd nor obviously false. It could be true. But I find the metaphysical dualism of classical theism, specially in the lights of the Big Bang and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, to be more plausible.

Internet Tough Guys, online warriors, internet badass and online streetfighters

 

 

In a previous post, I commented on some atheistic and "skeptical" bastards and cowards who attacked and threatened atheist girl Rebecca Watson (aka SkepChick). I suggested that these kinds of individuals deserve to receive a good deal of butt-kicking in person in order to learn a lesson of respect. They are cowards who are not capable of giving women the respect they deserve.

But such case of atheistic misbehaviour and insanity only highlights a major problem which expresses itself beyond the atheistic sects and pervades the online world: the existence of so-called "internet tough guys", "internet badass", "online samurais and warriors" and so forth, namely, individuals with serious personal, emotional and psychological problems who use internet to portrait themselves as "tough guys" who love to bully others.

Internet provides large room for anonymity, and this single fact allows psycho-pathological individuals to express their own negativity. Incapable of keeping such behaviour in the real, extra-online world (because in all probability they would have their butt kicked and had legal problems), they manifest their real "self" when they're in front of a computer.

Amazingly, I've seen this kind of behaviour in websites in English, German, Spanish and others from several countries. Apparently, such kind of "online badass" exists across the world.

I'm sure this topic deserve detailed examination from the scientific community, because it is a wholly new phenomenon, made possible only by the existence of internet.

Ken Wilber's metaphysical theory of holons, the afterlife and survival of consciousness and his book Sex, Ecology and Spirituality

Ken Wilber is regarded by many, in New Age (and alternative spiritualities) circles, as the world's greatest living philosopher. And by his critics, as the world's greatest fake philosopher. My current opinion is that Wilber is a brilliant, intelligent, honest and extremely erudite man, with many interesting philosophical insights, even though I strongly disagree with most of his ideas (many of which are not original... many of them come from philosophers like Hegel, Plotinius and others, which doesn't undermine Wilber's own original contributions).

In this post, I'd like to comment briefly on Wilber's metaphysical theory of "holon" and its connection with survival of consciousness. My contention is that such theory (at least as explained in his major scholarly work Sex, Ecology and Spirituality or SES) is at variance with the possibility of survival of consciousness. I don't mean that such notions are straightforwardly incompatible, only that they're in tension, waiting for more elaboration and articulation from Wilber's metaphysics.

In SES, one of Wilber's essential metaphysical concepts is that the Kosmos is hierarchically structured, that is, things are arranged hierarchically, with their specific position in the hierarchy determined by their particular level of developmental advance. So, for example, atoms aggregate into molecules, molecules into cells, cells into biological organisms (please keep in mind this example, because it will be necessary for the discussion below). Each new stage in the evolutionary process “transcends and includes” what came before it and exhibits new emergent properties. So, for example cells include atoms, but "trascend" them in the sense that they have new emergent properties (e.g. metabolism).

Beginning from the Big Bang, things have evolved progressively into more complicated arrangements which create new emergent properties as the developmental process progressively unfolds.

In this point, we confront a problem, namely, the problem of the existence of "emergent properties".  Some philosophers and scientists have argued that emergent properties don't exist, except in the phenomenological-macrophysical level (that is, our sense perception interprets certain things as having emergent properties like solidity or roughness and other macroscopic properties, when in fact they don't have them).

Physicist Marco Biagini comments:

Also the concept of a macroscopic rigid and compact object is only an optical illusion, and not a physical entity. The image of the object we see is in fact only an approximate representation of the real physical object. No object exist in nature as we see it; solid objects appear to us as if they were uniformly filled with motionless matter, while they are only sets of rapidly moving particles; matter is concentrated in a very small fraction of the space occupied by the solid object, mostly in the atomic nuclea, and it has no uniform distribution as it appears to us. The laws of physics establish that the possible properties of every particle or molecule are the same, that is the property of exchange energy with other particles or photons, and the property of movement; these are the properties of every quantum particle, and no aggregate of quantum particles can have new properties. Therefore, no real macroscopic properties exist. The macroscopic properties quoted by materialists, are not objective properties of the physical reality, but they are only abstractions or concepts used to describe our sensorial experiences; in other words, they are ideas conceived to describe or classify, according to arbitrary criteria, a given succession of microscopic processes, and these ideas exist only in a conscious and intelligent mind. Therefore, the macroscopic property, being only an abstraction, presupposes the existence of consciousness. It is obvious that consciousness cannot be considered a macroscopic property of the physical reality, because the macroscopic property itself presupposes the existence of consciousness. We have then a logical contradiction. No entities which existence presupposes the existence of consciousness can be considered as the cause of the existence of consciousness

I'm not sure whether Biagini is correct about the non-existence of macrophysical properties, but his arguments deserve careful examination. In any case, my point is that if emergent properties are not objective (but a function of our phenomenological constitution), then one of the basic pillars of Wilber's metaphysics collapses.  Wilber's position needs further defense in terms of contemporary physics and the relevant discussions in metaphysics.

But let that pass. Let's assume, for the argument's sake of this post, that emergent properties exist objectively.

Another key concept in Wilber's metaphysics is that the things so arranged in the Kosmos are simultaneously a part and a whole; a part in regards to some larger whole, and a whole in regards to its smaller parts. For example, cells are a part in regards to biological organisms; but are a "whole" in regards to their smaller parts (e.g. molecules). Wilber calls this "part/whole" property of every thing in the Kosmos HOLON (following the term coined by Arthur Koestler).

Consistent with this holonic metaphysics, Wilber argues that the mind (the individual mind like yours or mine) is a property of the brain; the brain is constituted by cells; cells by molecules; and molecules by atoms; atoms by sub-atomic particles, etc. As consequence, the mind is a higher and more developed state of the evolution of material holons like cells or atoms.

Here is where I think we can see a problem in Wilber's metaphysics for the possibility of an (unembodied) afterlife.

Note that Wilber's view so far is very similar to emergent materialism. The mind is a emergent property of the brain, not an (ontologically) independent entity. At first glance, given this premise, the mind couldn't survive the destruction of the biological brain. Therefore, survival of consciousness cannot exist.

If the mind is a holon (like everything else), then by definition it "includes and trascends" aspects of lower holons (like cells, molecules, etc.). But in such case, it's evident that the mind cannot exist after the destruction of the biological brain, because it would imply that the holonic structure underlying and supporting the mind doesn't exist anymore. If it is claimed that the mind can exist in absence of the lower holonic structure, then it becomes a kind of independent and self-subsistent holon (which is self-contradictory given the Wilberian concept of holon), or that it is not a holon anymore (which contradicts Wilber's evolutionary holonic metaphysics).

In the examples mentioned by Wilber, the lower structures of a given holon exist simultaneously to the holon. A cell, for instance, includes molecules and trascends them, but molecules exist simultaneously to cells and hence a cell cannot exist without molecules. Likewise, if the human mind include a material structure (like brain cells, etc.) and trascends it (with emergent properties like rationality or free will), then it implies that the human mind cannot exist in the absence of the brain.

Hence, the more reasonable and consistent conclusion of Wilber's metaphysics would seem to be that, once you have destroyed the lower structure (e.g. the cells), the higher structure (e.g. the brain) is destroyed. On parity of reasoning, the destruction of the brain would imply the extinction of the mind, as emergent materialists consistently realize.

The problem with Wilber's holonic metaphysics is that it is monistic, not dualistic. He postulates one single reality as ontologically fundamental, which expresses itself through progressive evolutionary process in a holonic-fashion. It doesn't make room (at least not comfortably) to basic metaphysical entities like a personal God, or to ontologically distinct entities like mathematical objects (if they exist objectively) or immaterial souls. (Note, by the way, that in the case of mathematical objects, if they exist, presumibly they are perfect, unchangless entities... how could such entities be explained in terms of holons and evolutionary development? Also, in the case of God, if He's a perfect being, it seems impossible that He's a Holon constituted by lower holons which progressively creates new entities in an evolutionary process. A perfect being cannot "evolve", since He's already perfect, He possess all his essential properties to a maximal degree).

Wilber's holon theory is useful to understand material systems (their constitution and evolution), but (in my opinion) not to understand spiritual matters, which are ontologically different and seem to obey wholly different metaphysical principles.

In conclusion:

Wilber's metaphysics of holons don't seem to provide a good theoretical framework to understand survival of consciousness in any of its standard forms (specially in unembodied forms).

If, for example, reincarnation exists, it is hard to see how Wilber's theory could consistently explain it.  How exactly a fully developed mind (that "includes and trascends" atoms and molecules of a particular biological brain) could be attached to a wholly new and independent body and brain when reincarnation happens? In this case, the mind would be previous to the new brain that supports it, which destroys the whole concept of holon in the terms argued by Wilber. (This becomes more evident in cases of "regressive reincarnations", namely, when a human being is reincarnated into lower animals, as some believers in reincarnation suggest).

Ironically, a kind of bodily immortality like the resurrection would seem, at first glance, to be compatible with Wilber's metaphysics, since in the Christian view, the "resurrection" entails the existence of a previous physical body. So, a transformed body (the resurrection body) could be considered as an holon which "trascend and include" the previous physical body (i.e., it includes the same body, and trascends it in the sense of providing it with new emergent properties, for example making it spiritually fit for immortality or immune to disease or decay).

In any case, I think Wilber's metaphysics (widely read and sympathetically accepted by many New Age believers, and fans of the paranormal) is not in home (at least not comfortably) with the idea of survival of consciousness, specially of consciousness existing in an unembodied state (e.g. as suggested by some cases of NDEs).

Misconceptions about contemporary Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) and the theory and science of self-defense and hand-to-hand combat

A positive side of the of "new passion" for Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) is that the training methods have been improved. Also, the uselfulness of wrestling and ground fighting has been stressed and "re-discoveried", in contrast with the view of many "traditional" martial artists who typically ignored grappling methods for hand-to-hand combat.

But the emergence of contemporary MMA has a negative side too, and in this post I'm going to discuss some of these problems:

1-In the simplistic, over-enthusiast and superficial mentality of some people (specially in USA), MMA is the ultimate form of street self-defense.

This is false. MMA is a SPORT, and as such the mean, dirty realities of the streets (multiple opponents, weapons, etc.) are not covered by the typical training methods of MMA.

The defenders of MMA argue that all the tecniques of MMA (thai kicks, elbows, ground grappling, etc.) are useful to self-defense. 

True, they're useful to self-defense, but it doesn't mean that MMA is the ultimate form of self-defense, let a alone a self-defense art. (A baseball bat could be useful to self-defense too, but it doesn't make baseball a self-defense sport or art).

2-In contrast with the early no-holds-barred tournaments (e.g. The early UFCs, the early World Vale Tudo championship, the early International Vale Tudo Championship) which allowed virtually every possible empty hand technique (in the early UFCs, groin strikes or eye gouge were the only restrictions... but a violation of such restrictions wouldn't disqualify the figther, so in a sense they were "allowed"... in fact in the UFC 1, Gerard Gordeau bite Royce Gracie's ear and he wasn't disqualified), contemporary MMA tournaments don't allow every possible technique, incluidng "dirty techniques", but only the safest of them.

MMA is now like boxing, only that a wider repertory of techniques is allowed.

But for "old school" followers of  real Vale Tudo fights like me, contemporary MMA is fun, but not serious fighting at all. Just a nice sport to watch and train.

3-But even the "old school" Vale Tudo fighting was not wholly equivalent to street self-defense. They were real fighting, the more close you can get to a real street fight between seasoned figthers of different styles, but not properly a self-defense situation like most cases of street attacks.

4-Another negative effect of contemporary MMA is the misleading impression that traditional martial arts styles are worhtless. 

This is simply false, as anyone who knows the history of martial arts could attest. Styles such as traditional jiu-jitsu, or some styles of Kung Fu (including the Chin Na arsenal) are BATTLE-TESTED. They were used in WARS, against opponents who tried to kill you, not in rings or octagons with a referee.

The defenders of MMA tend to pose the following objection: Such supposedly "battle-tested" styles were beaten when they were faced with modern mixed martial artists.

The objection is unconvincing: Even if it were the case, how exactly that objection refute the claim that such styles were battle-tested and proven effective? Suppose that a master of Chin Na is faced with Mike Tyson in a Vale Tudo tournament, and Tyson gives him a pounding. How exactly such evidence refutes the claim that Chin Na is battle-tested and effective in streetfighting situations? At most, it proves that in certain contexts (or against certain kinds of opponents, like a powerful boxer like Tyson), such style is hard to apply. But it doesn't refute the efficacy of Chin Na in other contexts (e.g. for disarming a guy with a knife, or escaping a strangle hold, or submitting a violent but untrained street attacker).

The believer in MMA conflates the lack of efficacy in a certain contexts with the lack of efficacy in ALL contexts.

Using the same logic, take a leading champion of MMA and make him to face (using swords) a traditional Samurai in a life or death combat. In all probability, the Samurai would kill him. Does it make MMA non-efficacious? Obviously not, it only shows that in certain contexts (e.g. in a fight with weapons) MMA is limited and other styles are superior.

However, it is true that some traditional martial arts use forms of training which are not very realistic (and hence the techniques are not trained in a way which could be used against a non-resisting opponent, specially a trained one), and MMA has helped to realized that.

All the above problems and misunderstandins have been caused, in my opinion, by a lack of theoretical reflection and sytematization of the THEORY OF HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT. In the martial arts community, at least in America and with some exceptions, there are not philosophers or theoreticians of martial arts or combat.

We need to develop a sophisticated theory of hand-to-hand combat, clearifying key concepts, drawing subtle and intelligent distinctions, and (obviously) testing such concepts and theories with empirical evidence (e.g. police reports of street fighting, careful observation and analysis of early Vale Tudo matches, etc.)

This research is worth pursuing for any person interested in martial arts and the science of hand-to-hand combat.

In future posts, I'll discuss some of these things in more detail.

Antonio Piñero: Blog Cristianismo e Historia. A comment on Piñero's misuses of the criteria of authenticity about a Son of God saying in Matthew 11:27

In my opinion, Antonio Piñero is one of the most competent, honest and erudite liberal New Testament scholars that I've ever read. I have great respect for Professor Piñero's scholarship.

However, like most liberal scholars, sadly Piñero misuses the criteria of authenticity in order to deny High-Christological traditions about Jesus (i.e. that Jesus didn't considered himself to be the Son of God in any literally divine sense).

In this case, the misuses in question consists in IGNORING that a given tradition passes the criteria of authenticity PLUS assuming that the mere presence of high-Christological elements in a tradition proves its falsehood.

Before providing the evidence for my contention, you have to keep in mind that liberal scholarship on the Historical Jesus works under the influence of this major criterion:

If a tradition about Jesus supports the distinctively Christian, high Christological (divine) view of Jesus, then it must be considered non-historical, the product of a later Christian invention, even if such tradition passes positively the criteria of authenticity. 

The evidence that I'm going to provide is a telling and fine example of the working of this criterion.

EVIDENCE

You'll remember that, as I argued in this post, some of Jesus' sayings imply his exclusivistic self-perception regarding salvation and as the only or exclusive Son of God.

In his interesting blog "Cristianismo e Historia" published in Spanish (all the translations to English in this post are my own), Antonio Piñero addresses one of these sayings, in particular Mattew 11: 27: "All things have been committed to me by my Father. No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him."

What are Piñero's objections to the authenticity of this saying?

He says:

In first place, this is a passage which is very similar to the theology of the Fourth Gospel, so at a first glance it is extremely suspect: Such theology is very late; it is developed around 60-70 years after Jesus' death. Therefore, it is highly improbable that that it can be attributed  to the Historical Jesus. According to the opinion of most interpreters, it is an invention, after the death of the master, by the primitive community which (through the lips of a Christian prophet who spoke in the name of Jesus) put such words in the lips of Jesus when he still lived on Earth.

Pilñero then proceds to quote several scholars, including Geza Vermes, who agree with his opinion.

Keep in mind that  Piñero's argument is essentially that the saying in question is NOT authentic. But what evidence support such conclusion? None, only the assumption that being similar to the Fourth Gospel, it cannot be authentic.

But most important is the evidence which Piñero failed to mention.

Let's see that evidence:

1-Piñero doesn't mention that the saying in question is a Q saying, and hence is very early. Therefore, it passes positively the criterion of date (Cf. Luke 10: 22). As consequence, it refutes Piñero's claim that it reflects a "very late" theology. 

The high-Christological  theological elements about Jesus are already present in "Q". (By the way, if this early Q saying is "very similar" to the theology of the Gospel of John, then one could argue that the theology of John was, basically, Jesus' own). Piñero's argument cuts both ways!.

2-Piñero doesn't mention either that the saying also passes positively the criterion of dissimilarity. It is unlikely that the Church invented this saying because it says that the Son is unknowable—"no one knows the Son except the Father" (what would exclude Jesus' own followers from knowing him), but for the Church we can know the Son. Therefore, it is dissimilar to the early Church's belief that the Son can be known by human beings.

3-Piñero doesn't mention that, as Joachim Jeremias showed, the saying goes back to an Aramaic original, which passes positively the criterion of authenticity known as "Semitisms" (i.e. traces in the narrative of Aramaic or Hebrew linguistic forms), and hence it is likely to be authentic. (See discussion in The Prayers of Jesus, by Joachim Jeremias, pp. 45-46).

As seen, the saying in question passes positively THREE criteria of authenticity and therefore, on purely historical grounds, is very likely to be authentic. This is very good historical evidence for Jesus' self-perception as the only Son of God. In words of Reginald H. Fuller, Jesus "was certainly conscious of an unique Sonship to which he was privileged to admit others" (The Foundations of New Testament Christology, p. 115)

But note carefully that Piñero's view that such saying is "very similar" to the theology of the Gospel of John suffices to conclude, against all of the above positive evidence, that such saying is NOT authentic! And this despite that the saying passes positively THREE criteria of historical authenticity!

Note that not even the "benefit of doubt" is given to this tradition. NO. The saying, having high-Christological elements, cannot be authentic. Period. To the hell with the criteria of authenticity!!!!!!

This evidence shows clearly and irrefutably that, for liberal scholars like Piñero, the criteria of authenticity are irrelevant when they support a high-Christological view of Jesus. The mere presence of a high-Christological theology suffices to conclude that a given Jesus' tradition was an invention, regardless of the contrary,  positive historical evidence for the tradition.

Again (I'm being intentionally redundant!): It is crucial to understand that liberal scholarship works under the assumption that any tradition in which Jesus is seen as divine is an invention of the Chruch and has to be false and non-historical. Positive historical evidence for such tradition is irrelevant and doesn't count.

The liberal, anti-Christian assumption against high-Christology OVERRIDES any contrary, positive historical evidence for high-Christological traditions.

As I argued in another post, this reminds me of the position of "skeptics" of parapsychology: negative evidence in psi experiments count against psi. But positive evidence is irrelevant, insufficient (because "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence") and has to be explained away with any conceivable speculation about the researchers' incompetence or credulity, undetected or unknown experimental flaws, magician's tricks which were bypassed by the researchers' controls and so forth.

Clearly, what is operative here is not an unbiased reading of the evidence, but an extremely biased approach to the evidence which fully guarantees that a certain position (in the case of Jesus, the high-Christological traditions; in the case of parapsychology, the true paranormal elements) is false, unreliable and cannot be accepted.

In another post, I've discussed another example of Piñero's misuse (actually, an egregious omission) of the criteria of authenticity on behalf of anti-Christian assumptions.

In summary, the evidence discussed in this post support my contention that liberal scholarship works with this assumption:  If a tradition about Jesus supports the distinctively Christian, high Christological (divine) view of Jesus, then it is non-historical and was the product of a later Christian invention, even if such tradition passes positively the criteria of authenticity. 

I'll provide more solid evidence of liberal scholars' misuses of the criteria of authenticity in future posts.

On God's infinite love... and infinite justice? New Age Spirituality's wishful thinking-based concept of God and self-deception about the historical Jesus

 God is widely assumed by everyone to be a perfect being. He is supposed to be the greatest conceivable being, with maximal properties (like maximal knowledge, maximal goodness, etc.).

Reading the works of New Age revisionisms of Jesus, I've found a curious emphasis on God's infinite love over other divine attributes (including over infinite justice), and this is used as an argument for the claim that God's punishment doesn't exist. 

You have to keep in mind the full context in which New Age revisionism works: They are appealing mostly to people who have been religiously injured during childhood, specially people who have suffered intense feelings of guilty and fear related to traditional Christian concepts like the hell, the final judgment and so forth. I've observed very carefully this again and again in many cases in USA, and I infer the same phenomenon applies to other countries.

This emotional injury and wound tend to predispose the injured believer to be strongly sympathetic to alternative sources of information about Jesus (radical liberal views, new age views, mystical sources about Jesus, etc.) which tell precisely what the believer wants and needs to hear, namely, that doctrines like the hell, sin, final judgment are false, that they are pure inventions of the Church in order to gain control of believers, that they are not doctrines rooted in the Historical Jesus himself.

Critique of the New Age view about God's punishment

Regardless of whether God punishes or not (I don't know), what it is true is that God's infinite love doesn't exclude God's punishment, since the latter is a function of JUSTICE, not of love.

When a criminal commits a crime, he is punished by society. This has nothing to do with "love", it is a pure function of justice. It would be extraordinarily unjust that the crimes of people like Hitler or Bin Laden were ignored by society... or by God.

If God is a perfect being, we would expect not just infinite love, but infinite justice too. A perfect being cannot be morally indifferent. Morality implies condemming evil acts and actions, and praising good deeds, people and actions.

The New Age revisionisms tend to create an unbalance between God's love and justice, in which only love counts. But why exactly God's love destroys God's justice? In a moral world of free agents, in which objective moral values exist, some kind of moral accountability for our actions would seem to be appropiate. Otherwise, morality would be just an illusion without any spiritual effects, and moral indifference would be a kind of divine virtue, which is absurd.

No rational and sane person would be morally indifferent to rapists of babies, child pornography or serial killers. Morally, they're bad persons and we want some kind of (moral) reprobation and legal measures against them. We want them to be in jail and to be morally castigated by society. We agree that some of their civil rights (e.g. freedom) be removed from them.

Likewise, no rational person would be morally indifferent to good people who do good actions. We admire and support such people, they are "good". We want the best for them, and even support their cause.

The point is that, besides cases of mentally ill or criminal people, most people are sensible to what is good and evil. Wer're NOT morally indifferent. And such moral awareness is translated into specific actions regarding the moral or immoral deed or person in question.

Now, if God exists and is a perfect being, why exactly such God should be morally indifferent? Why Hitler's evil deeds would be indifferent for God? Why is God's moral indifference an attribute of a perfect being like God? Why does God's infinite love imply moral indifference?

In some works of New Age revisionisms about Jesus, you can see a Jesus who portrays a God who is pure, infinite love, but God's infinite JUSTICE doesn't appear anywhere and is almost never addressed or mentioned. Apparently, love overrides justice (as whether they were incompatible divine attributes).

But a God who is not just, who is indifferent to cosmic justice regarding evils, is not a perfect being. He's morally indifferent.

The obsession of some New age believers with God's love, which bypasses his infinite justice, actually destroys the moral perfection of God.

The scholarly evidence for Jesus in the earliest sources contradict New Age revisionisms about Jesus and God's moral indifference

Believers in New age revisionisms about Jesus (who in general are people strongly prejudiced against Christianity and hence eager to believe that Christianity is false) either wholly ignore the scholarly evidence about the historical Jesus, or selectively choose only the passages which apparently support their view of Jesus and God.

They mention, for example, the evidence in Q (the earliest document about Jesus's sayings). But as I commented in this post, Q itself portraits a Jesus who is strongly judgmental, morally severe and discriminatory (in the sense of punishing moral evils and discriminating and excluding evildoers) and who perceives himself as someone with exclusive the authority of making moral reprobations of others and conditioning their ultimate spiritual fate to their personal response to himself.

This Q saying (Mattew 7:21-23 and Luke 13:24-27) is telling:

 In Mattew 7:21-23:

Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. ²² Many will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name and in your name drive out demons and in your name perform many miracles?’ ²³ Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!

Luke 13:24-27:  

 
Make every effort to enter through the narrow door, because many, I tell you, will try to enter and will not be able to. ²⁵ Once the owner of the house gets up and closes the door, you will stand outside knocking and pleading, ‘Sir, open the door for us.’ “But he will answer, ‘I don’t know you or where you come from.’ ²⁶ “Then you will say, ‘We ate and drank with you, and you taught in our streets.’ ²⁷ “But he will reply, ‘I don’t know you or where you come from. Away from me, all you evildoers!

The whole point of this Q saying is the strong moral reprobation, spiritual discrimination and severe judgment of certain kind of people. The whole point is that certain people will be saved and others (the "evildoers", note the reference to "evil" and hence to the moral aspect of the saying) won't. For the latter, the door is closed.

Note that "closing the doors" of salvation in God's kingdom is a punishment infinitely more important and severe than any imaginable earthly punishment (e.g. jail), because in the case of Jesus it is our whole spiritual fate which is at issue. If Jesus is right and we choose the wrong ways (=wider doors, instead of the narrow one), we won't enter God's kingdom, which is equivalent to the ultimate spiritual destruction.

Any earthly punishment, even the severest ones, pale in comparison with the spiritual punishment implied in Jesus' warnings. Clearly, Jesus' God is NOT morally indifferent: the evildoers won't enter God's kingdom.

This kind of Q saying causes strong cognitive dissonance to people who believe that Q provides a Jesus similar to the New Age versions. It doesn't.

Assuming for the argument's sake that the Jesus' teaching in Q is true, the New Age sources about Jesus provide a very dangerous, deceptive and misleading portrait of Jesus, which will tend to confuse a bunch of people of good will, pushing them into spiritual destruction.

You can find unpalatable this kind of Jesus' sayings (which, being in the early source Q, it is likely to be authentic according to modern standards of authenticity). What you cannot do is to misrepresent the evidence, and to claim that the Jesus in Q is similar to the "soft", "God doesn't punish", "Punishment is an human invention and God is beyond that", "be happy, buddy", "everything is an illusion", "consciousness is everything" New Age versions of Jesus. This is false and dangerously misleading.

Certainly, the best scholarly evidence and most reliable, early sources about the Historical Jesus clearly show that Jesus wasn't morally indifferent regarding to the fate of evildoers. And it doesn't refute God's infinite love... only testifies about God's infinite justice.

Question begging assumptions in liberal scholarship about the Historical Jesus: Examples of Rudolf Bultmann, John Dominic Crossan and Marcus Borg

A very common and working assumption in the works of liberal New Testament scholars is the belief that either 1)God doesn't exist (atheism); or 2)If He exists, he doesn't intervene in the physical world.

These assumptions are philosophical (specially, metaphysical), not historical. Historians, qua historians, cannot say that God doesn't exist, or that if He exists, He doesn't intervene in the world. How could a historian to know such a thing? How could any science to say such a thing? 

When researching the life of Jesus, we're examining the life of a man who, supposedly, was divine is the broadest sense of the word. His life was filled with miracles (e.g. walking on water, turning water into wine, instantaneous spiritual healings of incurable diseases, etc.), teachings about God's kingdom, resurrection, etc.

Given the above two liberal assumptions, it is clear that they are massively question begging against the traditional view of Jesus, because they imply, in advance, that such portrait of Jesus is false, non-factual, non-historical. 

Note very carefully that such conclusion derives from the two assumptions, not from the research. Even before you sit on the table to examine the evidence for the historical Jesus, you will leave out the possibility of the traditional view of Jesus being true if you accept the above two assumptions. Your assumptions will, largely, determine your conclusions (conclusions which, in advance, are anti-Christian)

Consider the following examples:

Rudolf Bultmann, a very influential liberal theologian, comments:

Man's knowledge and mastery of the world have advanced to such an extent through science and technology that it is no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view of the world. (New Testament and Mythology, p. 4)

Instead of such supernatural worldview filled with spirits, miracles and so forth, Bultmann thinks the proper, scientific worldview shows that:

The modern conception of human nature as a self-subsistent unity [which is] inmune from the interference of supernatural powers (ibid, p.7)

So, according to Bultmann, "science and technology" shows that supernatural powers don't intervene in human nature. But think again: How could science and technology to show such a thing? If God exists, then it cannot discarded that He could intervene in human nature in certain, specific cases. How could science to rule out such a thing? How could technology (e.g. iphones or tablets or laptops or laser beams or robots or blue rays or F-16 crafts) to be relevant to conclude that God cannot do such things? How exactly the highly advanced technology of my Samsumg Galaxy III smartphone refutes the possibility of God's intervention in the world? How exactly such physical objects of contemporary technology imply that an omnipotent, spiritual God couldn't intervene in human affairs?

Obviously, if we accept that Bultmann is right, then Jesus' resurrection or turning water into wine are non-starters. But in this case, their putative non-historicity is not a matter of evidence or research, but of a priori philosophical stipulation which determines, in advance, which facts could be historical or not.

In the introduction to the Five Gospels, the Jesus Seminar says:

The contemporary religious controversy turns on whether the world view reflected in the Bible can be carried forward into this scientific age and retained as an article of faith . . . . the Christ of creed and dogma . . . can no longer command the assent of those who have seen the heavens through Galileo’s telescope  

The Christ of creed and dogma is the divine view of Jesus. Now, how exactly is such view logically incompatible with Galileo's telescope? Why exactly such view of Jesus cannot command assent of people who accept Galileo's telescope?

For the argument's sake, let's suppose that the Christ of creed and dogma is true. Suppose that God exists, incarnated himself in Jesus, and as consequence Jesus was divine. On the maximal authority provided by divinity, Jesus understably provided an authoritative exclusivistic message for salvation and, in confirmation of his teachings and divine identity, he was resurrected from the dead by God (who was Jesus incarnated anyway). Suppose, for the argument's sake, that all of this is true.

Now, how exactly such view is logically incompatible with observing a bunch of stars and galaxies through Galileo's telescope? Why exaclty a person who accept such account about Jesus cannot accept, in the same time, the uselfulness of Galileo's telescope to watch the stars, asteroids and other physical objects in the universe? Where is the logical inconsistency between both accounts? The Jesus Seminar doesn't say. They assume that readers will uncritically accept such prejudices without asking probing and critical questions about the evidence or argumentation that warrants such views.

Note that no incompatibility exists even in the notion that God incarnated himself in Jesus. After all, as an omnipotent and immaterial spirit, God could assume a physical form. In fact, for theists, dualists and afterlife believers, human beings are souls or spirits or center of consciousness embodied, temporally, in a physical, biological body. If human spirits or souls could do such a thing (and even to be transferred from a body to another, like believers in reincarnation suggest), why couldn't an omnipotent God do it too? Exactly why not?

Unless you have a proof that God doesn't exist (atheism), you cannot rule out in advance what God could or couldn't do in specific cases (specially if we accept that such God, if exists, is omnipotent). Only God knows.

The working assumption behind the Jesus Seminar (like in Bultmann's case) is that "science" has made the theistic (supernaturalistic) worldview unacceptable. In other words, science has made acceptable only metaphysical naturalism. But naturalism is question begging against the divine view of Jesus. Therefore, the working naturalistic assumption of the Seminar largely settle the issue about the historicity of Jesus's divinity or resurrection long before they sit down on the table to examine the evidence (in fact, the evidence will be interpreted in the light of such assumption).

In the book the Last Week, John Dominic Crossan and Marcus Borg comment that Jesus' bodily resurrection:

"requires a 'supernatural interventionist' understanding of the way God relates to the world". (The Last Week, p.218-219 n18. Emphasis in blue added).

Well, yes but... SO WHAT? If God exists, He could "supernaturally" intervene whenever He wants. It cannot be ruled out a priori, and only can be settled on the grounds of the evidence. We cannot settle it a priori. (Imagine the extreme arrogance and egocentrism of deciding, a priori, what an omnipotent God could or not could do in his creation! )

In the case of Crossan and Borg, their hostility to "supernatural interventions" is purely ideological. Crossan is demostrably an atheist, and hence doesn't believe in the interventions of a non-existent God.

Borg is a religious pluralist and an atheist regarding the personal God of classical theism (as I proved here), but a theist regarding ambiguous, more or less panetheists concepts of God. But his religious pluralism prevents him to accept any intervention from God which could privilege Christianity.

In Borg word's, supernaturalistic intervention of God in the case of Jesus "tends to privilege Christianity" (Will the real Jesus please stand Up? p.127) and this cannot be accepted by a religious pluralist like him.

But note that atheism and religious pluralism are philosophical positions, not historical ones. They are based on metaphysical and theological beliefs about God or religion, not on the results or findings of any scientific or historical research.

These naturalistic and anti-Christian prejudices are translated into methodological rules, like the one that I discussed in this post. 

The major methodological rule of liberal scholarship seem to be this:

If a tradition about Jesus supports the distinctively Christian, high Christological (divine) view of Jesus, then it is non-historical and was the product of a later Christian invention, even if such tradition passes positively the criteria of authenticity.

The so-called "Criteria of authenticity" (which are very useful) are employed inconsistently and unproperly by liberal scholars in order to reach conclusions contrary to high-Christology. The overrriding criterion of NON-historicity is High Christology: If a tradition about Jesus supports the divine view about him, it is reputed to be false or non-historical. This negative criterion overrides the positive criteria of historicity.

In my life, I haven't seen a more fine example of strongly biased and prejudiced approach to a theoretical topic than the liberal approach to the historical Jesus.

The Historical Jesus research has been largely damaged by this approach.

Colin McGinn and the location problem of consciousness in a metaphysical naturalistic worldview

In the Mysterious Flame, atheist philosopher of mind Colin McGinn presses this question:

How can mere matter originate consciousness? How did evolution convert the water of biological tissue into the wine of consciouness? Consciousness seems like a radical novelty in the universe, not prefigured by the after-effects of the Big Bang, so how did it contrieve to spring into being from what preceded it? (pp.13-14)

This is a hard problem for naturalism, because in that worldview the universe is essentially material, and matter is not conscious. Consciousness is not a property of matter, as current physics has shown. As physicist Marco Biagini comments:

Quantum physics tells us nothing about consciousness, and this fact tells us much about the nature of consciousness: it tells us that consciousness is not a physical process.

But in theism, the fundamental reality, namely God, is pure consciousness (i.e. God is, among other things, a personal conscious being), a reason why in theism, consciousness is a necessary, not a contingent, feature of reality. The existence of consciousness it not a "radical novelty" in theism, but the essence, the basic principle and the underlying cause of the whole of reality.

This is why the existence of consciousness offers a very good argument for God's existence and against naturalism.

Note, by the way, that McGinn's questions include reference to the Big Bang as the event in which the physical reality begun, an event which cannot explain the eventual emergence of consciousness. But the Big Bang itself, understood as the beginning of nature, is inexplicable too in naturalism, and this is why a leading atheist philosophers like Quentin Smith has conceded that, on atheism, the most rational position is to think that universe "came from nothing, by nothing and for nothing... We should instead acknowledge our foundation in nothingness and feel awe at the marvellous fact that we have a chance to participate briefly in this incredible sunburst that interrupts without reason the reign of non-being ." (Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Comsology. P.135. emphasis in blue added)

Agnostic philosopher Anthony Kenny comments:

A proponent of the Big Bang theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the universe came from nothing and by nothing  (The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of God's Existence, p. 66)

Given that for naturalism the existence of nature is the ultimate reality, the coming into being of such reality is itself inexplicable. Such explanation only can come from a cause which trascends the physical reality.

So, naturalism is incapable of explaining both the Big Bang as consciousness; both facts which are in home in theism. This is why both of these facts are strong evidence for theism and against naturalism. 

Natrualist Alex Rosenberg has suggested that consciousness is not a source of information about itself:

if the mind is the brain (and scientism can’t allow that it is anything else), we have to stop taking consciousness seriously as a source of knowledge or understanding about the mind, or the behavior the brain produces... Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us.

Therefore, if consciousness provides us with a reliable source of information about ourselves, it follows that naturalism is false (as theism predicts).

Atheism is (in many cases at least) a commitment of the will, a deep existential decision or choice made by a person, not a position rooted on the evidence. This position is then rationalized, in order to make the atheist believer to think that his own position is rational or based on hard scientific evidence. Sheer self-delusion.

As consequence, we shouldn't expect that atheists will be sensible to consciousness as a fact which is at variance with naturalism and in home with theism.

For many atheists, everything (including "Nothingness" or "not reason at all") is better than God.

There is not point in making such people to change their minds.

Part 3 of my review of the debate between William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg. On Craig's novel argument for God's existence based on the applicability of mathematics and Rosenberg's reply

Continuing with my series of posts reviewing the debate between Craig and Rosenberg, I'd like to comment in this post about Craig's novel argument for God's existence based on the applicability of mathematics. (As a matter of fact, this argument is not new at all; what is new is Craig's use of it in debating contexts. But in the history of thought, many scientists and philosophers have suspected that a strong connection exists between mathematics and God).

Before commenting on more detail on Craig's argument, let's to briefl clarify some questions:

Firstly, it is important to realize that Craig's argument is not based on the ontological existence of mathematical objects (like numbers or sets), but in the adequacy of mathematical formulations, laws, and theorems for the explanation and prediction of physical realities.

The argument for God from the ontological existence of mathematical objects is wholly another theistic argument. Roughly, this argument says that mathematical objects, if they exist objectively (and not just as a bunch of ideas in our minds), then they point out to a Cosmic, Infinite Mind in which such nonphysical, abstract objects are contained. Such cosmic mind would have created a world using such mathematical structures, which would explain why our mathematical theories match so beautifully the physical world.  (Note that a certain similarity with Craig's argument does exist).

In my opinion, this is a good argument, but a very complex one, because it requires to prove that mathematical objects exist objectively, and such proof requires addresing complicated issues in the philosophy of mathematics.

In any case, the overwhelming majority of people would probably agree that if such mathematical objects exist objectively, then a cosmic, infinite, perfect mind in which such extraordinary nonphysical objects are contained would exist too, and this is (among other things) what God is supposed to be. 

In my interview with mathematician Elliot Benjamin, who has a PhD in mathematics, when I asked him about this, he commented:

Well if it were the case that numbers and mathematics did exist in some kind of objective/ontological sense, then perhaps this would give us some evidence for some kind of intelligent being who designed the universe--I suppose you can call it God. For the astounding logic involved in higher mathematics is staggering virtually beyond comprehension, with a phenomenal level of mental acrobatics involved in the highest mathematical realms. But once again this is not an area that I can speak very knowledgably about, as I am both a pure mathematician and experiential philosoher (both very subjective worlds).

The naturalist, not believing in any "mind" whatsoever as a fundamental part of the fabric of reality, has not the mataphysical resources to explain the objective existence of mathematical objects. Like with the absolute beginning of the universe, the naturalist has to believe that such objects just exist "inexplicably", and that for "not reason at all" our purely contingent and finite material minds have evolved in a way in which we can grasp and manipulate such perfect non-physical (abstract) entities and their mysterious relations.

So, a good argument for God's existence can be developed from the objective existence of mathematical objects (if these objects do exist somehow beyond our finite minds).

Secondly, it is important to avoid confusing the existence (or non-existence) of mathematical objects with the truth-values of mathematical propositions, which are conceptual or formal truths.

For example, 2+2=4 is conceptually true (i.e. true given Peano's axioms and the rules of mathematical inference), but it tells us absolutely nothing about if such objects (like "2" or "+" or "4", or the propositions which include them) exist objectively or not.

Compare: The proposition "bachelors are unmarried men" is conceptually and  formally true (i.e. true in virtue of form of the proposition and the concepts contained in it; in fact it is a tautology, an analytical truth). But the truth of such proposition tells us absolutely nothing about whether bachelors exist objectively or not. (In fact, suppose that God refrained from creating an universe. In this case, if God himself define in his own mind "bachelors" as "unmarried men", the proposition "bachelors are unmarried men" would be true, given such concepts, even if not such entities like bachelors do exist objectively).

Compare: God is omnipotent. This proposition is true given the classical theistic concept of God. But such truth tells us nothing about if such God exists or not.

Compare: Evil is the negation of the good. This meta-ethical proposition seems to be true (and necessarily so), but it tells us nothing about if evil or good exists objectively.

People unfamiliar with philosophy tend to think that the truth of conceptual propositions (like 2+2=4) imply the objective existence of the entities in question. They conflate the semantic and conceptual properties of propositions with the metaphysical status of the referents in question. 

ON CRAIG'S ARGUMENT:

Craig's argument in the debate was this:

1-If God doesn't exist, the applicability of mathematics is a happy coincidence

2-The applicability of mathematics is not a happy coincidence

3-Therefore, God exists.

This argument is formulated in terms of Rosenberg's own published work. Clearly, Craig designed and formulated the arguments specifically to confront the arguments of Rosenberg's own version of naturalistic scientism. Since Rosenberg has argued that scientism cannot countenance "happy coincidences", it follows that either 1)He has to provide a scientistic explanation of the applicability of mathematics to the universe (in order to refute premise 1), or 2)Concede that naturalistic scientism is false (which was Craig's purpose).

Regarding 1, it is hard to see how Rosenberg's scientism, which is based on the fundamental principle that "physics fixes all the facts" can provide an explanation for the applicability of mathematics to the universe, since mathematics is conceptual and mathematical objects are nonphysical. As far I know, nothing in Roseneberg's work has provided an explanation of it. And it is hard to see how, given his own naturalistic premises, such account could be offered.

In fact, in the debate, Rosenberg's reply was to pose the existence of alternative mathematics, like non-Euclidean geometries. This is a very inept reply. Because the existence of non-Euclidean geometries don't refute the extraordinary applicability, power, uselfulness and beauty of other mathematical systems, and are the latter which suggests that the universe is constructed in a way which matches such the language of mathematics.

Even though Craig's argument is not based on the existence of mathematical objects, his argument seems assume that such objects, somehow, exist objectively, that is, the physical universe has intrinsic mathematical properties as part of its constitution which allows human beings to use the language of mathematics to describe it. This can be summarized in the phrase "Mathematics is the language of nature".

I think this is a good argument for God' existence, but it needs more elaboration  in terms of alternative theories in the philosophy of mathematics which Craig didn't provided in the debate.

 

Perhaps I'll provide some suggestions in the future on how to develop this argument, since I'm convinced that it is a powerful argument for God's existence (and one which has persuaded some world's leading scientists).