In a previous post, I've commented on some problems that I think Wilber's metaphysics pose to the notion of survival of consciousness.
But I think Wilber's metaphysics is also at variance with the existence of entities which, if they exist, don't fit well with Wilber's metaphysics. A couple of examples:
1-Mathematical entities (numbers, sets, etc.): If they exist objectively (either in the strong Platonistic sense, or as divine ideas in God), then it is hard to see how Wilber's metaphysics could account for it.
If such objects like numbers exist, presumibly they are perfect, changeless, immaterial entities... how could such entities be explained in terms of holons and evolutionary development? Just think about it: Imagine that the number 0 exist objectively. Now, how exactly such object is a holon which has evolved progressively in a development process? What are the lower and higher holonic structures of such object?
If such object exists, it seems an immutable, perfect, changeless object, not sensitive to change (and hence, not sensitive to evolution or regression).
It is not clear exactly where such objects, if exist, would fit in Wilber's metaphysics. In this point, Wilber's only consistent position would be a kind of strong anti-realism in the philosophy of mathemathics.
2-God: In the classical theistic tradition, God is a personal being, who is spiritual, immaterial, ommipotent, perfect and so forth.
But in Wilber's metaphysics, such classical concept of God is hard to find. If God is perfect, He already possess all of His essential properties at maximal degree. As consequence, He cannot evolve (i.e. change in a better, progressive way), because He is already perfect.
Note that if we accept that God is evolving, we are accepting that God is NOT perfect in a given time, because in such time He lacks an essential property that He will have in a later time. This concept would be the concept of an imperfect, but always evolving God, which is at variance with classical theism.
Also, since He's subject to evolutionary process, such God is a contingent entity, not a necessary one. He's more like a physical object, an highly advanced extraterrestial being, than a necessary, fully perfect being which is the ground of reality.
So, Wilber's metaphysics seem to imply atheism regarding the classical concept of God as a personal, perfect immaterial being.
The Big Bang and the concept of God implied in the Kalam Cosmological Argument in tension with Wilber's metaphysics:
As I've argued in several posts, the evidence for the absolute beginning of the universe poses a massive problem for naturalists, because such beginning cries for an explanation which, given the nature of the case, cannot be a natural explanation (because precisely is the beginning of nature itself which is the issue at stake).
Some leading atheists have fully understood this, and in order to avoid theism, they have used as their last card the view that the universe began to exist from "absolutely nothing at all", and that "there is not reason at all" for the universe's absolute coming to existence. "Nothinhness" becomes the ultimate God-stopper and the last refuge of atheism.
It is obvious why some atheists take such implausible, obscurantistic and irrational view. The absolute beginning of the universe implies that its cause is:
-Immaterial: because the whole of matter is created in the Big Bang.
-Spaceless: because space is created in the Big Bang.
-Timeless: because physical time itself is created in the Big Bang.
-Changless (at least without the universe): since change implies time, and the cause in question is timeless.
-Extremely powerful: because the cause is creating the universe without any material cause (=creatio ex nihilo), which plausibly only an omnipotent being could do.
-Personal: Since the only two plausible candidates for a cause possessing all the above attributes are abstract objects (like numbers), or immaterial spirits. Since abstract objects are not causally efficacious (e.g. the number 3 by itself doesn't cause anything... even thought your belief about the number 3 does), the only alternative seems to be immaterial spirits.
So, we're left (as plausible causes of the universe) with the existence of a powerful single immaterial spirit (God), or with a plurality of immaterial spirits who are extremely powerful and even omnipotent (polytheism or a pluralitiy of mini-gods). By Ockham's razor, postulating one single cause = one single God (which suffices to produce the effect) is simpler than postulating an arbitrary number of immaterial causes, it follows that it is more reasonable to postulate one single God as the creator of the universe, than postulating an arbitrary number of mini-gods or God-like spirits.
But such view of God, being timeless and changeless, doesn't fit well with Wilber's evolutionary metaphysics.
Moreover, Wilber's basic concept that all holons have the property of being simultaneously "part/whole", cannot apply to God. If a perfect God is a holon, exactly what is the "whole" in regards to which such God is a "lower" or "smaller" part?
As I said, the problem with Wilber's metaphysics is that it is monistic, not dualistic. And form a monistic perspective, it is very hard to explain the whole diversity of everything that exists, because some entities (like God, mathematical objects, etc. seem to be ontologically different and non-reducible to a single principle common with material systems). Matter and Consciousness seems to be radically different kinds of entities, not two expressions or manifestations of a single entity.
In classical theism, God is the creator of everything which exists outside himself, including the material world. But the latter, even though God's creation, is NOT God himself (nor has any of God's essential properties). So, a kind of metaphysical dualism is implied.
But in Wilber's system, one single entitiy expresses itself (not "creating" something in addition to itself) through a bunch of wholly different manifestations, from sub-atomic particles to personal minds.
I don't think Wilber's monism is absurd nor obviously false. It could be true. But I find the metaphysical dualism of classical theism, specially in the lights of the Big Bang and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, to be more plausible.
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