The mataphysics of necessity: Ontology and conceptual distinctions

An interesting topic in metaphysics is the concept of necessity. Without any pretension of being exhaustive, in this post I'll comment on some of the main elements and kinds of necessity.

Kinds of necessity:

1-Logical, formal or conceptual necessity: This kind of necessity refers to truth-values of propositions, and have not (or doesn't need) to have any ontological commitments. They're truth in virtue of the concepts being used in the proposition.

For example, "bachelors are unmarried men" is necessarily true, in virtue of the concept of "bachelor". But note that this proposition doesn't say anything about the objective existence of bachelors. The proposition is true regardless of the existence of any bachelor.

For example: In classical theism, "God is omniscient" is necessarily true, in virtue of the concept of God. Again, this proposition tells us nothing about the objective existence of God. The proposition is true even if God doesn't exist.

For example: "2+2=4". This mathematical proposition is conceptually true (given Peano's axioms, the rules of inference of standard aritmethics and the concepts of "2", "+" and "4"), even if  numbers don't exist objectively.

Note that all of these propositions don't need to have any ontological commitments. Metaphysically, they are all subjective, in the sense of being mind-dependent (they depend for their existence on the concepts used by a mind. No mind --> no concepts --> no proposition --> no truth-values).

Since all the above necessarily true propositions don't imply the objective existence of the entities being mentioned in the proposition, then it follows that if such entities exist objectively, the question of "what explains these entities?" still makes sense.

For example, despite of "bachelors are unmarried men" being (conceptually) necessarily true, it doesn't explain why the hell bachelors exist at all. In fact, the existence of bachelors is (metaphysically, see below) contingent.

2-Metaphysical or ontological necessity: This kind of necessity refers to the existence of objects. Some object X is ontologically necessary if it couldn't not to exist. With some qualifications, they don't have anything to do with the concepts being used in propositions. They don't depend for their existence on the contents of the mind.

Philosophers specialized in metaphysics have realized that necessarily existing beings (e.g. God or numbers, if they exist) must have, in virtue of their necessity, at least the following two features:

-Eternity: they could not have a beginning nor end

-Indestructibility: They cannot be destroyed, otherwise they could have an end and hence could become non-existent. (This is why, Victor Stenger's "metaphysical pizza" reply against the ontological argument is clearly stupid, self-contradictory and embarassing, and only shows Stenger's intellectual limitation to understand propertly philosophical concepts).

Both properties are essential to necessity, not accidental. Lacking one of them implies that the being in question is not necessary, but contingent.

 

 Some implications:

Some important implications follow the above distinction:

1-Conceptually necessary truths don't have (or don't need to have) ontological commitments. This means that if a given conceptual truth is necessarily true, it doesn't mean that the entities posed by the propositions exist objectively.

For example, "triangles have three angles" is necessarily true, even if not triangle exists at all. And the existence of physical triangles in the world could be purely contingent and in need of further explanation (e.g a triangle on the sand requires of the existence of sand, which is a purely contingent phenomenon explained by natural sciences).

2-Some conceptually necessary truths could pose entities which exist in a metaphysically necessary way. 

For example "God is omniscient" is conceptually and necessarily true, but it doesn't tell us if God exists or not. But, if God exists, then it exists necessarily. So the proposition is both "conceptually necessary" and poses an entity which exists necessarily.

3-If an object is not eternal, it is not necessary.

In all the history of thought, atheism has hold that the universe is eternal and necessary and hence without a cause. 

The problem for atheism is that contemporaty cosmology tells us that the universe began to exist 13.798±0.037 billions of years ago. Therefore, the universe is not eternal. Therefore, the universe is contingent and it needs some kind of explanation of "why does it exist?" like any other contingent being.

This is why some contemporary atheists are prepared to say that the universe began to exist from "nothing", in order to avoid theism.

4-Metaphysical truths don't need to be conceptually necessary:

For example, "whatever begins to exist has a cause" seem to be metaphysically necessary, since its denial implies the coming into being "out of nothing", which seems to be impossible (except for atheists).

However, such proposition is not conceptually necessary, i.e. it doesn't derive its truth-value from the concepts being used in the proposition.

For example, "an actual infinite cannot exist in the concrete world" is not a conceptually necessary truth. But, given the absurd and physically impossible consequences that it has if it were instantiated in the real concrete world, it seems to be metaphysically impossible.

5-Only a necessary being could be the ontological ground for other metaphysically necessary beings.

In other words, necessary entities cannot be ultimately grounded (metaphysically) in contingent beings.

So, if moral values exist necessarily, they cannot be grounded in the physical universe (because it is contingent). This is why atheists tend to hold either the non-existence of such values (the most likely and consistent position given atheism), or to hold that such values exists contingently as an emergent property of matter (something which no natural science supports, since natural science have not discoveried any moral property in physical matter and all the laws of matter have nothing to do with morals nor other personal properties whatsoever).

But a necessarily existing personal being, like God, could ground the existence of necessary moral values (e.g. if God is the "Good", as classical theism holds, moral values must exists eternally and necessarily. God's nature implies them). But not all of morals need to be necessary. God could create them contingently too (e.g. specific moral laws for specific universes, in the same way that physical laws are created for specific universes or realms of existence). Both possibilities are open, provided that God exists and creates universes.

Since moral values are connected to persons, if morals are metaphysically necessary, then persons are metaphysically necessary too. This metaphysically necessity of persons (at least one person) is precisely what theism holds, and what atheism historically has denied and continue to deny (for contemporary metaphysical atheism, persons are not basic to reality, but later by products of a more fundamental non-personal reality, like quantum particles, fields, wave functions, etc. or in the case of some Eastern atheistic worldviews, "impersonal consciousness", "all-pervading energy", Deepak Chopra's "impersonal intelligence" and so forth).

Something similar could be said of mathematical objects (numbers, sets, etc.) but, in contrast with morals, numbers don't seem to be essentially connected with persons, except for the fact that numbers seem to be the contents of some mind.

So, if numbers exist objectively, the following conclusion of mathematician Elliot Benjamin, PhD, seems to be reasonable:

Well if it were the case that numbers and mathematics did exist in some kind of objective/ontological sense, then perhaps this would give us some evidence for some kind of intelligent being who designed the universe--I suppose you can call it God. For the astounding logic involved in higher mathematics is staggering virtually beyond comprehension, with a phenomenal level of mental acrobatics involved in the highest mathematical realms.

This would lead us into a complex mathematical argument for God's existence (there are several of them), which is not the purpose of this post (see, however, this post).

In future posts we'll continue discussing the problems of necessity.

Graham Oppy on the actual infinite and the Kalam argument, conditionals and the instantation in reality of abstract objects.

Secular philosopher Graham Oppy, whose views on the kalam argument I discussed in a previous post, is author of an interesting book on the infinite, as this concept plays a role in mathematics and cosmological arguments for God's existence.

In the kalam cosmological argument, it is argued that an actual infinite (i.e. a collection or set composed by a infinite numbers of parts) cannot be instantiated in the concrete world (e.g. in the physical world). If this argument is sound (and I think it is) it implies that the universe is not past eternal, because a past eternal universe would be composed by an infinite number of past events, and such infinite cannot exist.

This implies the absolute beginning of the universe (note that this argument, developed in medieval times, is wholly independent of the current scientific-cosmological evidence for the universe's beginning). So both scientific and philosophical considerations support the universe's absolute beginning.

In the kalam argument, it is shown that the existence of an actual infinite in the concrete world would produce absurd and physically impossible situations. A leading defender of the argument, William Lane Craig, comments:

Take, for example, Hilbert's Hotel, a product of the mind of the great German mathematician David Hilbert. Let us first imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full. There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4, and so on, out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant, and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there are now no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest's name to the register and gave him his keys—how can there not be one more person in the hotel than before?...  suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one fewer person in the hotel? Not according to the mathematicians! Suppose the guests in rooms # 1, 3, 5 ... check out. In this case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians, there are no fewer people in the hotel! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any fewer people in the hotel.

Craig's argument is basically a reductio ad absurdum of the existence of the actual infinite in the concrete world.

In the universe of purely conceptual discourse of mathematicians, the actual infinite is a perfectly a logical concept, you're just playing with a bunch of concepts and trying to reason logically about such concepts. But when you try to make it instantiated in the concrete, physical reality, outside of the conceptual realm of mathematics, the actual infinite produces clearly impossible and absurd situations as the ones mentioned above by Craig.

Now, Oppy (who is a sophisticated secular philosopher) understands perfectly the argument and its absurd implications.

To my astonishment, Oppy's reply to it is... to accept such absurd consequences!

Oppy says that we have to "outsmart" the proponent of the argument, that is, "to embrace the conclusion of one's opponent's reductio ad absurdum argument".

But surely this is wrong. If you accept the conclusion of your opponent's reductio ad absurdum argument, then you're accepting that you position was soundly refuted, since it is the main function of any successful reductio ad absurdum, specially in mathematics. (In fact, it is hard to think in a more sound and convincing form of refutation than an reductio ad absurdum argument).

No mathematician would say "Well, you have provided a sound reductio ad absurdum of my argument, and I fully accept and embrace it. Therefore, my argument is right!"

Only an atheist philosopher would dare to suggest something like that, just on behalf of having the upper hand in a debate and trying to appear to be right (to himself) in the face of contrary evidence and sound logical refutation.

By "embracing" the conclusion of the opponent's reductio, Oppy means to accept that if an actually infinite numbers of things exist in the concrete, extra-conceptual world, the absurd situations mentioned by Craig would happen and we should expect and accept them.

Such reply is shocking coming from a philosopher of Oppy's intellectual stature. 

Obviously, if an actual infinite exists, then such absurd situations should be expected. This is simply to repeat the conditional "If an actual infinite number of things exist in the real world, then absurd consequences result"

But the conditional is not in dispute (in fact, such conditional is precisely what the proponent of the kalam is arguing for!). What is in dispute is the antecedent of such conditional, namely, the existence of an actual infinite in the real world.

Simply embracing the conclusion of the argument does nothing to show that the antecedent is possible and hence that such absurd situations can be factually instantiated in the real world.

That a philosopher of Oppy's level of sophistication and erudition have defended such mathematically, metaphysically and logically implausible objection to the kalam argument, reinforces our confidence in the soundness of the kalam as a good argument for the universe's absolute beginning, and hence for God's existence.

Contemporary atheists not just are disposed to accept that "the universe came from nothing", but alternatively also that the universe is composed of an infinite number of past events which, if true, would imply the existence of an actual infinite with its absurd and impossible (and never observed!) consequences in the real world.

It is hard to think about a position which requires more faith than this, and which is more contrary to logic and evidence.

Atheists are prepared to accept ANY position, if it provides them with a apparent escape or way out for not accepting God's existence.

In addition to psychological factors, I suspect that spiritual factors play a role and some religious traditions (from several perspectives) have alerted about it.

For example, in the New Testament, in Matthew 13: 10-13, when asked for his continuous use of parables to convey his teachings, Jesus explained:

And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why speakest thou unto them in parables?

¹¹ He answered and said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given.

¹² For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.

¹³ Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.

Did Jesus perhaps know in advance that certain kind of persons (the ones who are fully committed to reject any evidence for God) won't hear, and hence to such persons no correct or straightforward or unambiguous explanation and information about God should be given?

Who knows...

Stephen Braude on the nature of physical laws, Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanations and the location problem for naturalism

Philosopher Stephen Braude explains the proper function and domain of physical laws:

"The laws of physics (including conservation laws) strictly speaking apply only to impersonal or mechanical forces, i.e. to physical systems and interactions abstracted from the realm of intention". 

The realm of "intention" is the realm of mind, which (at least in its rational expression) is a property of persons. 

But according to metaphysical naturalism, "persons" are not basic to reality, but just late and derivative byproducts of the evolution of impersonal or mechanical physical forces. The basic elements of reality are purely impersonal or mechanical.

Granted this basic premise of naturalism, then the existence of personal properties becomes a problem.

Prominent naturalist philosopher John Searle understands the problem:

how do intentional phenomena and consciousness fit into a world made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force?

Obviously if our world is "entirely" made up of impersonal forces and entities, exactly where we can ground the existence of intentional phenomena, consciousness and other personal properties (like moral values, moral responsability, etc.)?

Note that is not simply the personal opinion of Searle, but a real and serious problem implied by the basic premises of naturalism itself. That many naturalists don't realize this (or don't want to see it, because they are not open to other worldviews) is their problem...

Consider another fully consistent naturalist, Alex Rosenberg:

Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us... There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon

Consider naturalist Richard Dawkins:

Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing a damaged component, either in hardware or software... Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution

Try to put yourself in the shoes of naturalists. It is obvious that if you begin with a purely and entirely physical world (which is purely mechanical and impersonal) you will be forced to end up with purely physical, mechanical and impersonal reconstruction of reality, which don't allow for any personal feature.

      Physical facts  ------------------> more physical facts.

No moral values, no moral responsability, no free will, no consciousness, no rationality, no mind, no intentionality, no conceptual framework, no spiritual realm, etc. seem to fit confortably with such worldview.

This is the decisive metaphysical adventage of theism. This worldview begins with and it is grounded upon a spiritual PERSON (God) and end up with personal, spiritual properties (spirits, afterlife, intentional phenomena, consciousness,  etc.) which fit nicely and are to expected to exists if such worldview were correct.

This is why we have arguments for God's existence based on all the above personal features of reality. (The argument from consciousness, the argument from morality, the argument from intentionality and so forth. All of these arguments have in common to argue for God's existence based on the evidence of personal properties in a physical world).

And this is why the objections against such arguments are superficial, based on an improper understanding of the deeper metaphysical problems of any impersonalistic worldview (e.g. the Euthyphro's Dilemma used by atheists to object the moral argument is, in my opinion, one of the worst and more superficial arguments in the history of philosophy. I've commented about this argument here).

Note, by the way, that the problem of naturalists also exist for any other worldview which is impersonalistic (like some Easter philosophies which talks about "impersonal consciousness", whatever they mean). Like naturalism, these philosophies tend to be skeptical or dimissive of personal properties as actual, trascendent realities (e.g. when they say that we live in a "world of duality, in which evel and good are illusions which exist only in appearence in this world". Note that it is what Richard Dawkins more or less says too!).

Clearly, there is an intellectual pressure for proponents of impersonalistic worldviews to explain away these personal properties and somehow undermine them because they realize that such personal features don't fit nicely or comfortably into an impersonalistic worldview (naturalistic or not).

Again, in theism, a person (God) produces, at his image, other persons (human beings, aliens beings if they exists, spiritual beings, etc.), which share, limitedly but essentially, some of His basic personal properties. In theism, persons comes from the Person, minds from the Mind, intrinsic moral worth from the Perfect Goodness itself (=God).

Infinite Person (God)--------------------> finite persons
Infinite Consciousness (God)--------> finite consciousness
Perfect Good itself (God) ----------> intrinsic moral worth
Perfect Freedom (God)----------> limited but actual free will

Not one of the above properties exist nor can be found in the physical world itself, and naturalists are philosophically committed (whether they realize it or not) to deny, or cast serious doubts on the objective existence of these personalistic properties.

These properties is precisely what we would expect to find if theism were true, but not if naturalism were true (this counterfactual insight underlies the whole argument...).

Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanation

According to philosopher of science Richard Swinburne, there are two kinds of explanations used in science and common sense: personal explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of the intentions of a person) and scientific explanations (e.g. explanations in terms of mechanical or impersonal forces).

For example, evolution is explained in terms of a mechanical process, namely, natural selection operating on random mutations. This is a kind of scientific explanation. No "person" is involved in the explanation.

But there are also personal explanations (e.g. used in social science and daily life). For example, if you ask me why I wrote this post, I'll reply with a personal explanation: I wrote it because I wanted to share metaphysical insights by Braude and Swinburne about the nature of reality and how they affect our assessment of the evidence for theism vs the alternatives.

My intention is the ultimate explanation of the coming into being of this post.

Note that the above personal explanation only makes sense if you understand my intention (or if you suspect that I have other, hidden intentions).

But if you remove any intentional process whatsoever as an explanation of this post, then the coming into being of this post becomes wholly inexplicable. A sheer mistery.

Swinburne's insight and the Big Bang Cosmology

If we agree with Swinburne that there are only two kinds of explanations (I'd like to call them, personalistic explanations and impersonalistic explanations, which are mutually exhaustive), then you're in position to understand why atheists are prepared to say that the universe "came from nothing".

In the case of the absolute beginning of the unverse, the scientific (impersonalistic) explanation is not possible, because there cannot be in principle any physical explanation of the coming into being of the whole physical universe itself. 

Since the impersonalistic explanation is not possible in this case, the only possible explanation is the personalistic one: The universe came into being by the intention and power of a person (or bunch of persons), which naturalism cannot accept at all. So, they prefer to say that the universe came "from nothing".

So, naturalists only have two choices: Either deny the evidence for the absolute beginning of the physical world, or either to claim that it comes from "nothing". Both alternatives have been (as expected) defended by some atheists.

Since the absolute beginning of the physical unverse implies that the only possible explanation is that the universe came from a person (God) or a bunch of person (e.g. a kind of polytheism = multiple god-like spiritual entities = multiple very powerful spiritual persons), the whole question is if theism or polytheism is true. By Occkam's razor the former is simpler than the latter, hence theism seems to be the best explanation.

The atheist reply "the universe came from nothing" is not just absurd and obscurantistic but in addition question-begging too, since it assumes (don't prove) that persons are not basic to reality and hence that theism cannot be a possible explanation at all. 

This shows that atheism is, for many people, a commitment of the will which has nothing to with the evidence, science or rationality.

The problem of assumptions and pressupositions on the Historical Jesus research

Everybody have assumptions, bias and preconceptions. We're all influenced by culture, philosophical assumptions, emotional drivens and so forth. Psychology has shown that beyond any doubt, and common sense supports it too.

The function of "assumptions" is to provide a framework to understand and interpret the evidence (and sometimes, what counts as evidence or not is even determined by the assumptions).

Now the question to comment in this post is not the existence of assumptions, but rather how certain accumptions block our searching for the truth, blocking the acceptance of evidence, or begging the question regarding the topic under investigation.

For example, in psychic research, the materialistic assumption that psi and ESP cannot happen (or are extremely improbable) works as a blocking and question-begging assumption, namely, it interfers with the proper assesment and objective recognition of such phenomena, in the sense that the evidence for it will be interpreted in a way consistent with the assumption, or even worst, not recognized as evidence in the first place.

Present evidence for telepathy, the skeptic will say that the evidence is flawed (even if the flaw cannot account for the overwall results, or even if the flaw is purely imaginary).

Present evidence for remote viewing, the skeptic will say the same and imply that the researchers are biased due to their sympathies to the paranormal.

Present evidence in which not flaw has been detected by the skeptic, he will say that "it is not impossible" that in the future some flaw will appear...

Present evidence which would convince any scientist of any other area of science, and the skeptic will say that the evidence in this case is insufficient because "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence".

In these cases, what is operating is a set of assumptions which override the evidence,  or explain it away. The assumptions imply setting the evidential standards so high, that no reasonable or realistic evidence could be ever produced to their satisfaction.

I've discoveried exactly the same regarding the historical Jesus studies. In fact, in this field, the assumptions and prejudices tend to be more obvious and more egregious. Not even in parapsychology I've seen such amazing working of blocking and question-begging assumptions like in the historical Jesus studies.

Let's to comment in a couple of them:

Assumption 1: The Gospels were written by deceivers and people who constantly were inventing fictional stories about Jesus (stories which nothing, or just a little bit, have to do with him)

This assumption derives, mainly (but not exclusively) from atheism. Wishful thinking also plays a role here.

Contemporary liberal scholarship is, as a rule, philosophically driven by a form of atheism known as metaphysical naturalism.  The liberal Jesus Seminar makes this assumption explicit and straighforward:

the Christ of creed and dogma . . . can no longer command the assent of those who have seen the heavens through Galileo’s telescope. The old deities and demons were swept from the skies by that remarkable glass. Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo have dismantled the mythological abodes of the gods and Satan, and bequeathed us secular heavens (preface of The Five Gospels, p. ix-x, xiii. Emphasis in blue added).

The assumption here is that science makes theism (the existence of God) false and hence the belief in God cannot be accepted. This is straighforwadly an atheistic assumption.

Atheism implies that miracles (understood as special divine interventions) cannot  happen. Since the Gospels are full of miracles, it follows that such stories are fictional. Hence, the Gospels are historically unreliable because they were written by writers who constantly were mading up and writing down false, supernaturalistic fantasies in them.

Note that the conlusion "the Gospels are historically unreliable" derives, in the above argument, directly from the atheistic assumptions applied methodologically on the miracles and other stories in the Gospels.

Drop such assumption, and the whole question-begging result is unwarranted, and you will be free to investigate with Gospels' evidence with a open-critical mind, without any blocking assumption which begs the question in one direction or another.

Note, by the way, that assuming the truth of theism doesn't beg the question regarding the historical Jesus and Gospels, because theism only guarantees the possibility of miracles, but it doesn't imply that any miracle claim is factual (let alone that the Gospels miracles actually happened). 

The advantage of the theist is that he's open to follow the evidence wherever it leads: If it leads to the actual occurence of a given miracle, the theist will accept it, since his worldview allows for such event. If the evidence doesn't support the miracle claim, the theist should reject such specific miracle claim (rejection which doesn't conflict with theism either, since theism doesn't imply that every miracle claim is true).

There is a widespread misconception according to which, if one is a theist, then one is obligated to accept every miracle claim. This is false. The theist is not obligated to accept any miracle claim in the same way which a parapsychologist who accepts the paranormal is not obligated to accept any psychic claim, or that a phycisian who accepts that viruses produce diseases is not obligated to accept the claim that all new diseases are viral.

Atheism, on the other hand, precludes in advance the possibility of any miracle being actual, and only allows as true and valid the evidence contrary to the occurence of miracles. This is why atheistic assumptions (like the Jesus Seminar's) egregiously begs the question against miracles, tend to exaggerate the possible problems of the Gospels as historical sources (problems which are common to any ancient historical document) and hence tends to create unwarranted skepticism about the possibility of the Historical Jesus being actually like portrayed in the Gospels.

Common reply:

I've been shocked with the answers provided by people sympathetic to the Jesus Seminar, when confronted with the above argument.

As a rule, their response is purely emotional and defensive. For example,  they will tell you that "conservative" also have faith commitments or assumptions.

If they were intellectually serious people, they would realize that the faith commitments and assumptions of "conservatives" do NOTHING to justify the assumptions and prejudices of "liberals" nor to refute the argument that such liberal assumptions beg the question. How exactly the faith commitments of a priest justifies the Jesus Seminar's naturalistic (and hence question-begging) approach to the historical Jesus?

Suppose that I write a post in which I expose the question-begging assumptions of a materilistic skeptic (like that I've done here). Does it make sense to reply "Well, but you say nothing about the assumptions or prejudices of Chris Carter or Dean Radin, who are biased in favor of the paranormal"?

No intellectually serious person would argue like that. If a person argues like this, you would suspect that he's an intellectually dishonest person, or simply someone absolutely blinded by his emotions and prejudices and who's reacting on a purely emotional level.

If my argument about the skeptic's prejudices (and how they seriously affect the assesment of the evidence) is correct, it is absolutely irrelevant that other people (let's say, Dean Radin or Chris Carter) have bias and pressupositions too, because the latter doesn't justify the former, and the my critique of skeptics don't rest on the lack of bias or assumptions by parapsychologists.

It's like defending oneself from the charge of murder, saying in the judicial process "Well, Mr.Judge, you're biased too, the guy in front of my home is also a murder and you do nothing about it!".

Even if you were right, and the guy in front of your home is a criminal, and the Judge is biased, this doesn't NOTHING to refute the charges against you.

With such stupid "defense", you probably would end in jail.

I'm extremely dissapointed of people like that. Shame of them.

Assumption 2: The assumption 1 overrides over the criteria of authenticity when they support Christology

Another way of formulating this assumption is like this: The criteria of authenticity ONLY can be accepted when they support non-Christological traditions.

For example:

The criterion of multiple attestation is accepted when it supports non-Christological traditions (e.g. Jesus' historical existence which is attested in several, independent sources). But the same criterion will be rejected by liberals when it supports Christological traditions (e.g. that Jesus was born in Bethelhem, which supports that he was the Messiah predicted by the Old Testament).

Also, the example of the empty tomb. The empty tomb is not itself Christological, but since the resurrection claim implies the empty tomb (it is therefore part of the evidence for the resurrection), some scholars have tried to attack it in order to deny the resurrection.

Although accepted by most scholars ((including by many atheist and other anti-Christian scholars) due to the strengh of the historical evidence for the empty tomb, a few of them (mainly liberals) reject it as an invention by Mark, despite of passing the criterion of multiple attestation (in addition to other criteria like embarassment).

So, many liberal scholars don't apply the criteria consistently, but inconsistently in order to reach anti-Christian conclusions.

The key and secret to understand liberal scholarship in general is to understand exactly its philosophical and ideological rejection of Christology. The criteria of authenticity are then misused (in particular ways, depending on the scholar) to fit this agenda.

Common reply:

A common answer for the above objection is that, even if a tradition passes the criteria of multiple attestation, it "could" be invented by the Church by different, independent persons who share the same beliefs about Jesus.  (Alternatively, it is formulated like this: "It was very easy for the chruch to create that").

The fallacy of this answer is obvious: The "could" and "it is very easy" responses are NOT historical evidence. They're NOT criteria of historicity. They're sheer speculations. Then, how the hell such mere speculations may be overriding force over the historical criteria, like the criterion of multiple attestation?

Even if the same tradition "could" be invented by persons who shared faith in Jesus, it doesn't imply that such invention actually happened. Simply believing in something doesn't make you a deceiver or cheater.

Historians don't work with mere speculations or  sheer possibilities, but with concrete evidence which makes a given possibility more likely than not.

But the underlaying motive for the skeptic is to block or avoid all the evidence which supports the distinctive Christian view of Jesus (Christology). This is pure wishful thinking and intellectually dishonest ideology. That's all. (Compare with the skeptics Martin Gardner or James Randi's creative scenarios of how a psychic "could" cheat the experimenters, or how it was "easy" for a magician to fool the investigators or how the psychic investigators are unreliable because they are believers in psi... even if not such evidence for fraud or deception or technical flaws exists in the specific experiments!)

Certainly, that a magician "could" cheat under certain experimental conditions don't make any particular psychic (in the same conditions) to be a fraud. This is not evidence at all for the claim that given psychic is a fraud. (In the same way, that a given tradition about Jesus "could" be invented doesn't make it an actual, proven invention).

Mere possibility is not evidence, and many liberals use such gambit as a question-begging criterion on non-historicity.

The real problem here is the contemporary ideology of naturalistic atheism. I'm sorry to be so blatant, but I do believe this: When atheistic ideologues put their dirty hands on a given topic (specially on a topic which is in tension with atheism and naturalism) we tend to see pure disaster (recent example: the atheists "take" on Sheldrake in Wikipedia)

Atheists work fine in areas in which atheism is not in question (e.g. computer science, law, medicine, etc). But don't put them in positions in which they must "assess" topics in which atheism is challenged, otherwise...

If Shaldrake is constantly mistreated and misrepresented by atheists in what is supposed to be an innocent online "encyclopedia", you can imagine that atheists would do with the Historical Jesus... the number one, public historical enemy of atheism around the world.

Assessing the A Course in Miracles (ACIM) with the Historical Jesus liberal methodology and the "seven pillars of scholarly wisdom" employed by the Jesus Seminar

"Beware of finding a Jesus entirely congenial to you"

The Five Gospels, p. 5 

I'm a critic of the Jesus Seminar, and my comments about it may be seen in some of the articles about the historical Jesus published in this blog.

In this post, I'm not going to criticize the Jesus Seminar, but simply to apply the same liberal methodology, specifically the explicit working assumptions which the Jesus Seminar uses in assesing the 1st century Gospels, to the 20th century source known as A Course In Miracles (ACIM).

The purpose of this post is not to offend anybody, but to contribute to intellectual honesty in the study of the historical Jesus, providing examples of how wishful thinking, prejudices and methodological inconsistency is a serious problem for the searching of the truth, in this case regarding the Historical Jesus. Perhaps it will be an eye-opener to some...

In page 2 and following of the book The Five Gospels, the editors of the Jesus Seminar discuss what they consider to be the "Seven Pillars of Scholarly Wisdom", namely:

1-The distinction between the Historical Jesus, to be discoveried by historical investigation, and the Christ of faith which is part of the Christian creeds. (This distinction seems to be subtly question-begging, since it seems to assume that the Jesus of history is not the same Jesus of "faith". But how the hell do you know that in advance? After all, perhaps after you investigate carefully the evidence, you could find that the Jesus of history coincides with the so-called Jesus of faith... if it is the case or not, it is precisely what need to be investigated! However, charitably, we must to understand the Seminar' distinction as a purely methodological one, not implying any prior conclusion whatsoever.)

2-The priority of the synoptic Gospels (Mark, Matthew and Luke), which are closer to the historical Jesus, and the Gospel of John which poses a "spiritual" Jesus. (Note the implication: The "spiritual" Jesus "later" view and hence is not historical)

3-The recognition that Mark is prior to Matthew and Luke, and that both of these sources used Mark.

4-The identification of as an early "Q" as a common source of Mathew And Luke.

5-The view of an "eschatological Jesus" (that is a Jesus who spoke about Final Judgment and God's future intervention) is fictional. Jesus was a mere teller of stories and parables, not a eschatological prophet.

6-The contrast between oral culture and print culture (like our).

7-The assumption that the Gospels are not historical until proven historical. (=The Gospels are historically guilty until proven innocent. Let's call this the "uncharitable principle" of historicity).

Assessing the A Course in Miracles (ACIM) with the "7 pillars of scholarly wisdom" of the Jesus Seminar

In this analysis, we're going to employ exactly the same scholarly "pillars" of the Jesus Seminar, but this time applied exclusively to ACIM.

Let's begin from the last pillar to the first one:

7-The assumption that the ACIM is not historical until proven historical (=the uncharitable principle of historicity).

The Jesus Seminar operates on the uncharitable assumption that the Gospels are not historical until proven historical by the criteria of authenticity. Therefore, if some tradition about Jesus don't pass such criteria, it is assumed to be non-historical = fictional = later invention put back in Jesus'lips.

But what would happen if you apply exactly the same "pillar" to ACIM? What would you get?

Exactly, what historical evidence, which pass some methodological criteria of the Seminar, does exist for the claim that 20th century psychologist Helen Schucman's "inner voice" was Jesus himself (the same person of the historical Jesus studied by the Jesus Seminar) and not other spiritual entity, interdimensional or extraterrestial being or simply (more consistent with the Jesus Seminar skeptical and atheistic naturalism)  Schucman's imagination?

There is absolutely not evidence at all that Schucman's "inner voice" was the voice of Jesus himself.

Moreover, there are exist other 20th century paranormal sources which claim to come from Jesus and which provide information incompatible with ACIM. Hence, any defense of the reliability of ACIM has to explain why the other competing and conflicting 20th century sources of Jesus are false or unreliable.

Therefore, on the consistent application of the Jesus Seminar's 7th pillar (uncharitable principle), we have to conclude that ACIM doesn't contain any factual teaching coming from Jesus and it is purely fictional.

Unless the ACIM can be proven as coming from Jesus, the uncharitable principle requires to conclude that such extremely late source is false and unreliable.

6-The contrast between oral culture and print culture (like ours).

This pillars don't seem to be very much relevant, except for the fact that the ACIM was written in a print culture. However, the source of information for such writting was (supposedly) a spiritual being which provided no evidence of its existence, or claimed identity, and who appeared as a purely subjective "inner voice", and not as an objective, historically verifiable Jesus (see pillar 2). 

 
5-The realization that an "eschatological Jesus" (that is a Jesus who spoke about the "end of the world", and the events connected with it, like the Final Judgment and other things happening on the last days) is fictional. Jesus was a mere teller of stories, aphorisms and parables, not a eschatological teacher.

A Course in Miracles contains putative Jesus' teachings about the Last Judgment. In fact, an entire section of the ACIM is entitled "The Meaning of the Last Judgment".

Consider this teaching:

The Last Judgment is one of the most threatening ideas in your thinking.  This is because you do not understand it.  Judgment is not an attribute of God.  It was brought into being only after the separation, when it became one of the many learning devices to be built into the overall plan.  Just as the separation occurred over millions of years, the Last Judgment will extend over a similarly long period, and perhaps an even longer one.  Its length can, however, be greatly shortened by miracles, the device for shortening but not abolishing time.  If a sufficient number become truly miracle-minded, this shortening process can be virtually immeasurable.  It is essential, however, that you free yourself from fear quickly, because you must emerge from the conflict if you are to bring peace to other minds.  The Last Judgment is generally thought of as a procedure undertaken by God.  Actually it will be undertaken by my brothers with my help.  It is a final healing rather than a meting out of punishment, however much you may think that punishment is deserved.  Punishment is a concept totally opposed to right-mindedness, and the aim of the Last Judgment is to restore right-mindedness to you.  The Last Judgment might be called a process of right evaluation.  It simply means that everyone will finally come to understand what is worthy and what is not. (A Course in Miracles, chapter 2, The Separation and the Atonement)

Note very carefully that the ACIM's Jesus doesn't deny the existence of the Last Judgment, it only changes its meaning. ACIM explicitly asserts the Last Judgment existence and even uses the same exact Chrsitian theology words ("Last Judgment"). The whole passage of above is a ratification that the Last Judgment exists, even if its meaning is wholly different than the one commonly thought.

By the way, in the Gospels, the phrase "Last Judgment" is, as far I know, never put in Jesus' lips!. However, ACIM put in Jesus' lips precisely such expression. (In this point, at least regarding the uses of such Christian terminology, the ACIM's Jesus seems to be more Christian theology influenced than the Gospels' Jesus).

How could a supporter of ACIM agree with the Jesus Seminar's skepticism about Jesus uttering such eschatological  teachings and expressions, and at the same time to give credibility to the ACIM's Jesus who, explicitly, uses the Christian phrase "Last Judgment"?

If according to the Jesus Seminar, the historical Jesus was absolutely non-eschatological and never thought nor taught anything explicit about the Last Judgment (whatever could such expression mean), why exactly we find the ACIM's Jesus using exactly the same theological expression and asserting its future, actual existence and even mode of operation?

If the Jesus Seminar were right that Jesus never thought anything about the Last Judgment, then why the ACIM's Jesus didn't mention that, clarifying explicitly that Christians put in his mouth such expression which he never uttered, instead of explicitly asserting, ratificating and trying to re-interpret what the expression Last Judgment means?

Again, the consistent application of the Jesus Seminar's non-eschatological Jesus as a pillar of scholarly wisdom implies that the ACIM's Jesus teachings which use eschatological expressions like the Last Judgment (even if devoid of any eschatological meaning) are fictional, false and contrary to the wisdom of scholars.

Note: The Jesus Seminar argues that Jesus was a mere teller of stories, aphorisms and parables. But if you read carefully the ACIM's Jesus, you will find that he almost never uses parables or aphorisms as particular modes of expression. On the contrary, such ACIM's Jesus enjoys providing categorical and dogmatic statements and long explanations about psychological, emotional and spiritual benefits of the new meanings and new interpretations of biblical expressions found in ACIM (biblical expressions which, according to the Jesus Seminar, Jesus never uttered!).

For any unbiased reader, it is clear that the Jesus Seminar's Jesus is a different person than the Jesus of ACIM, and that the ACIM's Jesus only have in common with the Seminar's Jesus the rejection of the Christian theology connected with Jesus (despite of ACIM's consistent use of the Christian theological expressions).

4-The identification of as an early "Q" as a common source of Mathew And Luke.

The Jesus Seminar accepts the hypothetical source "Q" as an early and reliable source of information about Jesus, and the traditions which don't belong to "Q" are seen as later, more unreliable traditions, specially if they pose more advanced theological concepts.

Now, consider this teaching in ACIM put in Jesus' lips:

The Son of God is part of the Holy Trinity, but the Trinity Itself is One. There is no confusion within Its Levels, because They are of one Mind and one Will.  This single purpose creates perfect integration and establishes the peace of God.  Yet this vision can be perceived only by the truly innocent 

Would the Jesus Seminar accept such teaching and expressions like "The Son of God" and the "Holy Trinity", as coming from the historical Jesus, if it were recorded in John's Gospel, or even in Mark, or even in Q? Obviously not.

But then why the hell a person who agree with the Jesus Seminar should accept such teaching as factual and coming from Jesus, when it comes from the extremely later, 20th century source like ACIM?

This grotesque double standard is unacceptable for any objective researcher about the life, teachings and identity of Jesus.This is a kind of slape to the face of serious researchers.

But let's that pass. From the perspective of the "pillars" mentioned by the Seminar, we have to note:

1-ACIM's Jesus teachings about the "Trinity" (and the expression "Holy Trinity") don't appear in Q. In fact, the expression "Holy Trinity" doesn't appear in any Gospel as something coming from Jesus' lips.

But ACIM puts such expression in Jesus himself.

2-If such expression doesn't appear in Q and doesn't pass any criterion of authenticity, then according to the Jesus Seminar, such teaching is fictional and false (remember pillar 7).

Therefore, in addition to the overall unreliaibility of the ACIM (due to the application of pillar 7), we have in this case additional specific reasons to reject ACIM's teaching about the Holy Trinity.

Again, the consistent application of the Jesus Seminar methodology is seriosuly damaging and destructive to the credibility of ACIM.

3-The recognition that Mark is prior to Matthew and Luke, and that both of these sources used Mark.

The topic of "priority" is very important to the Jesus Seminar. So, "Q" is seen as very early and hence reliable and John's Gospel as very later, and hence unreliable, even when all of such sources come from the 1st century.

Applying such view about "priority" and "reliaibility", what is the logical conclusion about the reliaibility of ACIM, which comes extremely late, namely in the 20th century?

From the "priority" perspective alone, is ACIM reliable?

2-The priority of the synoptic Gospels (Mark, Matthew and Luke), which are closer to the historical Jesus, and the Gospel of John which poses a "spiritual" Jesus. (Note the implication: The "spiritual" Jesus is not historical)

Note the Jesus Seminar's subtle implication that a "spiritual" Jesus is later and therefore not historical.

With that "pillar" in mind, consider the fact that the whole of ACIM was given through a spiritual channel, namely, the mental channeling received by Helen Schucman in the form of an "inner voice"!

The reliability of ACIM depends necessarily on the falsehood of the above "scholarly pillar", since the whole of ACIM assumes Jesus' post-mortem survival and the actual existence of spiritual ways of communication from post-mortem people to earthly people (e.g. channeling). In other words, the whole ACIM's Jesus is not just extremely late (20th century), but it is also a SPIRITUAL JESUS in the strongest sense of the word.

But then, how could a supporter of ACIM to agree with the Seminar's skepticism about certain Jesus traditions (e.g. in John), based upon the pillar Nº 2, and at the same time to skip entirely such pillar when giving credibility to ACIM?

The egregious double standard becomes evident in this case too.

The Seminar largely rejects the Jesus of John's Gospel because it is too "spiritual" and later than the synoptics. On parity of reasoning, the whole ACIM should be rejected too, since it is spiritual and (extremely) late too.

If the supporter of ACIM claims to reject such pillar, then John's Gospel traditions cannot be dismissed anymore on such restriction.

Methodological consistency works both ways, but some people agree with the Seminar and ACIM not for methodological reasons, but for ideological reasons.

1-The distinction between the Historical Jesus, to be discoveried by historical investigation, and the Jesus of Helen Schucman which is part of ACIM

Since historical evidence (even the truncated one accepted by the Seminar) about Jesus exists, and since there is not evidence that ACIM came from Jesus, the Seminar's distinction seems to apply perfectly in this case.

The Jesus of history is one. Helen Schucman's Jesus is another one.

Additional inconsistencies between the Seminar's Jesus and ACIM's Jesus

Consider this teaching, put in Jesus' lips, in ACIM:

"No man cometh unto the Father but by me" does not mean that I am in any way separate or different from you except in time, and time does not really exist.  The statement is more

meaningful in terms of a vertical rather than a horizontal axis.  You stand below me and I stand below God.  In the process of "rising up," I am higher because without me the distance between God and man would be too great for you to encompass.  I bridge the distance as an elder brother to you on the one hand, and as a Son of God on the other.  My devotion to my brothers has placed me in charge of the Sonship, which I render complete because I share it.  This may appear to contradict the statement "I and my Father are one," but there are two parts to the statement in recognition that the Father is greater.

And consider this another passage in ACIM (found in Lesson 61, which is titled I AM THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD):

I am the light of the world. That is my only function.  That is why I am here.

These passages (specially the sentences and expresions in blue) are astonishing, since ACIM ratifies the authenticity of traditions and expressions coming Jesus which the Jesus Seminar claims that Jesus never said and were put in his mouth by the evangelists.

Note that the ACIM' Jesus even defends the expression "I and my Father are one" (found in John 10:29-30) from the charge of contradiction, claiming that such contradiction is only apparent, and that the statement has two parts in recognition that the Father is greater!.

However, according to the Jesus Seminar (p.10): 

The words attributed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel are the creation of the evangelist for the most part, and reflect the developed language of John’s Christian community.

In this interview, liberal scholar Marcus Borg comments:

The first is that Lewis’ statement depends upon accepting John’s gospel as a historically factual account of how Jesus spoke: “I am the light of the world,” “Whoever has seen me has seen God,” “I and the Father are one.” Most mainstream scholars today would say that Jesus never made those claims for himself, that they are the post-Easter testimony or witness of the early church, and when one no longer thinks of Jesus making those claims for himself, then Lewis’ argument evaporates.

Now, if "mainstream scholars" say that Jesus NEVER made those claims, then why the hell the ACIM's Jesus ratifies precisely such claims, expand their meaning and even defends them from the charge of contradiction?

If Borg were right, is not the ACIM evaporated together with Lewis' argument?

If tradition A is found in John, and such tradition is false, then if ACIM repeats the same tradition, it follows that ACIM is providing a false information.

This is what methodological consistency demands. You cannot applaud the Seminar when it is denying the historicity of the Christological expressions of Jesus, but then agree when the ACIM's Jesus when it repeats exactly (and with the same words) the same expressions.

This is simply unworthy of serious people.

 Conclusions

 Obviously, the Jesus of the Seminar is NOT the same Jesus of ACIM. There are serious inconsistencies between what "mainstream scholars" claim that Jesus said and much of what ACIM puts in Jesus' lips.

The reason why some people sympathetic to ACIM (and other sources about the historical Jesus) are sympathetic to the Jesus Seminar is because they find in such liberal portraits a view of Jesus that they find palatable (i.e. a non-Christian view of Jesus). Moreover, since such views are defended by some "scholars", they appear to them to be serious and reliable conclusions about Jesus.

But when you examine carefully the methodology being employed, you will discover the reality behind such "conclusions".

Supporters of ACIM who agree with the Jesus Seminar don't do it for consistent methodological reasons. Methodological consistency has nothing to do with it.

As shown in this post, methodological consistency with the Jesus Seminar's "pillars" would be extremely destructive to ACIM, so they're forced to appeal to a DOUBLE STANDARD according to which the ACIM is saved from the extremely skeptical methodology of the Seminar.

Some of the "conclusions" of the Jesus Seminar are straightforwardly incompatible with some of the contents in ACIM, since the former denies the historicity of Jesus' words which the ACIM ratifies as authentic and even expand their meanings.

The reason behind such egregious inconsistency is psychological, ideological (and, if Jesus' teachings as recorded in the Gospels were theologically true, spiritual too).

Psychological, because in a deeper level, these people don't want a Jesus like the one portrayed in the Gospels. Such view of Jesus produces strong feelings of fear and guilty (specially, according to my personal observation, such feelings become intense regarding Jesus' references to the "hell" and rejection from God's kingdom), that they find repulsive and hence false (=emotional criterion of truth).

Ideological, because the psychological point above tends to cause a rationalization (in the intellectual level) in which anti-Christian versions of Jesus are seen more sympathetically, specially if they come from "scholars". This causes the double standards, which are necessary for such self-deluding rationalizations.

In future posts, I'll discuss specific cases of the Jesus Seminar's uses of the criteria of authenticity, its rejection of specific traditions, more inconsistences between the Jesus Seminar and ACIM and how the information of ACIM stands on the consistent application of such criteria.