Stephen Braude on the nature of physical laws, Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanations and the location problem for naturalism

Philosopher Stephen Braude explains the proper function and domain of physical laws:

"The laws of physics (including conservation laws) strictly speaking apply only to impersonal or mechanical forces, i.e. to physical systems and interactions abstracted from the realm of intention". 

The realm of "intention" is the realm of mind, which (at least in its rational expression) is a property of persons. 

But according to metaphysical naturalism, "persons" are not basic to reality, but just late and derivative byproducts of the evolution of impersonal or mechanical physical forces. The basic elements of reality are purely impersonal or mechanical.

Granted this basic premise of naturalism, then the existence of personal properties becomes a problem.

Prominent naturalist philosopher John Searle understands the problem:

how do intentional phenomena and consciousness fit into a world made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force?

Obviously if our world is "entirely" made up of impersonal forces and entities, exactly where we can ground the existence of intentional phenomena, consciousness and other personal properties (like moral values, moral responsability, etc.)?

Note that is not simply the personal opinion of Searle, but a real and serious problem implied by the basic premises of naturalism itself. That many naturalists don't realize this (or don't want to see it, because they are not open to other worldviews) is their problem...

Consider another fully consistent naturalist, Alex Rosenberg:

Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us... There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon

Consider naturalist Richard Dawkins:

Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing a damaged component, either in hardware or software... Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution

Try to put yourself in the shoes of naturalists. It is obvious that if you begin with a purely and entirely physical world (which is purely mechanical and impersonal) you will be forced to end up with purely physical, mechanical and impersonal reconstruction of reality, which don't allow for any personal feature.

      Physical facts  ------------------> more physical facts.

No moral values, no moral responsability, no free will, no consciousness, no rationality, no mind, no intentionality, no conceptual framework, no spiritual realm, etc. seem to fit confortably with such worldview.

This is the decisive metaphysical adventage of theism. This worldview begins with and it is grounded upon a spiritual PERSON (God) and end up with personal, spiritual properties (spirits, afterlife, intentional phenomena, consciousness,  etc.) which fit nicely and are to expected to exists if such worldview were correct.

This is why we have arguments for God's existence based on all the above personal features of reality. (The argument from consciousness, the argument from morality, the argument from intentionality and so forth. All of these arguments have in common to argue for God's existence based on the evidence of personal properties in a physical world).

And this is why the objections against such arguments are superficial, based on an improper understanding of the deeper metaphysical problems of any impersonalistic worldview (e.g. the Euthyphro's Dilemma used by atheists to object the moral argument is, in my opinion, one of the worst and more superficial arguments in the history of philosophy. I've commented about this argument here).

Note, by the way, that the problem of naturalists also exist for any other worldview which is impersonalistic (like some Easter philosophies which talks about "impersonal consciousness", whatever they mean). Like naturalism, these philosophies tend to be skeptical or dimissive of personal properties as actual, trascendent realities (e.g. when they say that we live in a "world of duality, in which evel and good are illusions which exist only in appearence in this world". Note that it is what Richard Dawkins more or less says too!).

Clearly, there is an intellectual pressure for proponents of impersonalistic worldviews to explain away these personal properties and somehow undermine them because they realize that such personal features don't fit nicely or comfortably into an impersonalistic worldview (naturalistic or not).

Again, in theism, a person (God) produces, at his image, other persons (human beings, aliens beings if they exists, spiritual beings, etc.), which share, limitedly but essentially, some of His basic personal properties. In theism, persons comes from the Person, minds from the Mind, intrinsic moral worth from the Perfect Goodness itself (=God).

Infinite Person (God)--------------------> finite persons
Infinite Consciousness (God)--------> finite consciousness
Perfect Good itself (God) ----------> intrinsic moral worth
Perfect Freedom (God)----------> limited but actual free will

Not one of the above properties exist nor can be found in the physical world itself, and naturalists are philosophically committed (whether they realize it or not) to deny, or cast serious doubts on the objective existence of these personalistic properties.

These properties is precisely what we would expect to find if theism were true, but not if naturalism were true (this counterfactual insight underlies the whole argument...).

Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanation

According to philosopher of science Richard Swinburne, there are two kinds of explanations used in science and common sense: personal explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of the intentions of a person) and scientific explanations (e.g. explanations in terms of mechanical or impersonal forces).

For example, evolution is explained in terms of a mechanical process, namely, natural selection operating on random mutations. This is a kind of scientific explanation. No "person" is involved in the explanation.

But there are also personal explanations (e.g. used in social science and daily life). For example, if you ask me why I wrote this post, I'll reply with a personal explanation: I wrote it because I wanted to share metaphysical insights by Braude and Swinburne about the nature of reality and how they affect our assessment of the evidence for theism vs the alternatives.

My intention is the ultimate explanation of the coming into being of this post.

Note that the above personal explanation only makes sense if you understand my intention (or if you suspect that I have other, hidden intentions).

But if you remove any intentional process whatsoever as an explanation of this post, then the coming into being of this post becomes wholly inexplicable. A sheer mistery.

Swinburne's insight and the Big Bang Cosmology

If we agree with Swinburne that there are only two kinds of explanations (I'd like to call them, personalistic explanations and impersonalistic explanations, which are mutually exhaustive), then you're in position to understand why atheists are prepared to say that the universe "came from nothing".

In the case of the absolute beginning of the unverse, the scientific (impersonalistic) explanation is not possible, because there cannot be in principle any physical explanation of the coming into being of the whole physical universe itself. 

Since the impersonalistic explanation is not possible in this case, the only possible explanation is the personalistic one: The universe came into being by the intention and power of a person (or bunch of persons), which naturalism cannot accept at all. So, they prefer to say that the universe came "from nothing".

So, naturalists only have two choices: Either deny the evidence for the absolute beginning of the physical world, or either to claim that it comes from "nothing". Both alternatives have been (as expected) defended by some atheists.

Since the absolute beginning of the physical unverse implies that the only possible explanation is that the universe came from a person (God) or a bunch of person (e.g. a kind of polytheism = multiple god-like spiritual entities = multiple very powerful spiritual persons), the whole question is if theism or polytheism is true. By Occkam's razor the former is simpler than the latter, hence theism seems to be the best explanation.

The atheist reply "the universe came from nothing" is not just absurd and obscurantistic but in addition question-begging too, since it assumes (don't prove) that persons are not basic to reality and hence that theism cannot be a possible explanation at all. 

This shows that atheism is, for many people, a commitment of the will which has nothing to with the evidence, science or rationality.