A fictional dialogue between a survivalist/dualist and a materialist/skeptic (part 5)

This is part 5 of my "fictional dialogues" between a materialist and survivalist.

Materialist: Let's discuss another of my objections against the survivalist position.

Survivalist: Fine.

Materialist: There is another kind of empirical evidence that, in my view, completely demolish your survivalist position, and strongly support the productive hypothesis.

Survivalist: Which is that?

Materialist: Split brain patients. In those cases, we find the generation of two centers of consciousness after severing the corpus callosum (commissurotomy) connecting the two cerebral hemispheres.

It has been recognized even for researchers sympathetic to the paranormal and even by dualists. For example, in his book "Evolution of the Brain", dualist John Eccles concedes "There is remarkable evidence in favour of a limited self-consciousness of the right hemisphere"(p. 210).

This cases are evidently incompatible with dualism and survivalism.

Survivalist: I disagree.

First, there is not good evidence that split brain patients present "two centers of consciousness", it's only one of the interpretations of the data.

In his paper "Personal Identity and Survival" (Journal of Philosophy, 1988), philosopher John Robinson commented: "It seems that we must regard the commissurotomy patient as a single subject of experience and action who has perceptual experiences localized in each of his two hemispheres… the commissurotomy patient may have perceptual experiences localated in each hemisphere but these experiences are not conscious ones-- there is nothing it is like to have these experiences. The experimental evidence suggest that a unattended hemisphere supports nonconscious experiences (of which, in normal circunstances, a normal subject could ordinarily become conscious) and not an independent stream of consciousness" (emphasis added. Pp. 319-326)

In his book Philosophy of Mind, philosopher of mind Edward Feser argues "The behaviour of "split-brain" patients is no less a subject to interpretation, interpretation that can reflect the enthusiastic theorizing of the researcher as much as the objective facts. To begin with, the two hemispheres of the brains of such patients are not completely disconneted -- there are other connections between the helves that remain undisturbed, and thus there are no grounds for insisting that the halves must be associated with different "minds". Furthermore, under ordinary conditions, such patients behave more or less normally, or at least not in a way that suggest that more than a single mind occupies their bodies. It is only in contrived experimental contexts that they can made to exhibit remarkable behaviour, and even then that behaviour is by no means obviously best interpreted as involving a "division" of the mind. Many researchers hold instead that such behaviour, when examined carefully, amounts to little more than a variation on the awkwardness, failure of co-ordination, or general cognitive malfunctioning that can result from any serious injure to the brain, or an exaggeration of the absent-mindedness or inconherence that we all exhibit" (p. 28)

By the way, it's interesting that you constantly say that your naturalist epistemology and metaphysics accept only "proven facts" (except, "casually", the fact of remote viewing, which according to skeptic Richard Wiseman is "proven") and "uncontroversial evidence", but at the same time you appeal to the controversial cases of split brain patients to support your case.

You're skeptical of parapsychology because the evidence and its proper interpetation is controversial, but you have no problem in invoking the controversial notion of "two centers of consciousness" as if it is a proven fact. It's evident you accept controversial cases and evidence when they support your materialistic beliefs.

This casts doubts on your intellectual credibility, honesty, objectivity and rationality.

Materialist: Ad hominem.

Survivalist: No, I'm not saying your arguments are false or wrong because your credibility is not sound or because you're biased; my point is that you're inconsistent and employ a double standard to support your case. And this is evidence of dishonesty, lack of objectivity and ideological bias.

Materialist: So what? Even if I'm dishonest, my arguments could be right.

Survivalist: Right. And this why I've addressed all your arguments.

Materialist: Then why do you mention my credibility or lack of this? You attempt to discredit me.

Survivalist: No, you're discrediting yourself with your incompatible arguments and double standards. And this is the reason the only people who believe in you are the people biased to your position or who follow your ideology (and even I could mention a well known metaphysical naturalist who doesn't believe in the yout strong "mind-brain dependence" thesis and defend his own idiosyncratic and naturalism-inconsistent thesis that the "mind-pattern" is separable of the biological brain and, therefore, he's sympathetic to the idea that the "mind-pattern" can continue to exist after biological death and be immortal inside of a computer).

But hey, I don't want to keep talking about this, let's to return to the split-brain patients.

Materialist: Fine.

Survivalist: Let's suppose, for the sake of the conversation, that actually two centers of consciousness exist in split-brain patients. What's your point?

Materialist: My point is that in that case is clear that the brain is producing two centers of consciousness and this confirm the production hypothesis.

Survivalist: But what's in stake is not if two centers of consciousness can exist; what's at stake is if consciousnes is ontologically dependent of the brain, i.e. if consciousnes only can exist in a brain and not with independence of it.

Materialist: But the existence of two centers of consciousness refutes the dualist conception of an unitary self (and therefore, the idea of personal survival).

Survivalist: No, it only refute the idea that individual consciousness (or the "self") is essentially and always indivisible, not that consciousness can survive death, or that it cannot have again its unity after the destruction of brain.

By the way, classical Cartesian dualism is not the only position consistent with an afterlife. William James, for example, wasn't a substance Cartesian dualist.

Materialist: But it's irrelevant. If a so essential component of consciousness like a "self" is made to "split" into two centers due to a brain modification, then we have strong evidence that the brain produces consciousness.

Survivalist: False. The evidence only confirms that the functioning of consciousness, even in essential aspects like the unity of the self, is functionally dependent of the brain (so long consciousness and the brain are connected, or more exactly, so long consciousness is "embodied"). But it doesn't settle the philosophical debate about the nature of consciousness and its ontological dependence.

I agree that "two centers of consciousness" is consistent with the production hypothesis; but it's consistent with the transmission hypothesis too (even though, it would strongly undermine dualism as classically conceived, at least, as far the permanent and constant unity of the self is concerned)

Materialist: Your position is forced. You're desperately trying to make the evidence consistent with your position.

Survivalist: False. As I said, the interpretation of the evidence is controversial. It hasn't been clearly showed that "two stream of consciousness" actually exist in split-brain patients. I'm only assuming the existence of two centers of consciousness for the sake of the conversation.

Second, to explain the mind-body connection, your hypothesis has to account not only for "two centers of consciousness" (provided they exist), but to paranormal and afterlife evidence too. And the production hypothesis can't do this job.

Thus, contrary to your false claim about me, I'm trying to make sense of all of the evidence, not only of the evidence that support the production hypothesis.

This is the basic and obvious difference between you and me. You only count the evidence that favor your position and from there you beg the question against the survivalist position to make the latter seem as implausible or antecendently very improbable.

But contrary to you, I'm interested in explaining the whole of the evidence, not only that part that favor my position.

Materialist: You're employing a double standard too. If you don't accept the evidence for two centers of consciousness because it's controversial, then why do you accept the evidence for parapsychological phenomena, which is controversial too? It's an example of double standard.

Survivalist: This is false. I don't accept or reject a piece of evidence based on whether it's controversial or uncontroversial, but according to if the evidence is good or reasonable as a whole. As consequence, being "uncontroversial" is not a requirement of my methodology to find the truth.

But accepting controversial evidence to support your case IS incompatible with your epistemology, because it's based on the acceptation of "proven facts" or "uncontroversial evidence". So, if you're consistent, you cannot appeal to controversial evidence to support your case.

On the other hand, it's false that parapsychology is controversial in the same sense that split brain patients cases is. First, the best parapsychology findings are not controversial for professional parapsychologists; the only people who reject the evidence are a tiny minority of "skeptical-materialistic" researchers and magicians whose atheistic worldview conflict with the data (and even inside this group, positive concessions in favor of psi phenomena has been done, for example by Wiseman). And the large scientific community reject the evidence in part because the current hegemonic materialistic paradigm and in part by ignorance of the evidence (for explanations of the first factor, see these honest concessions by materialist philosophers and thinkers like John Searle, William Lycan and Thomas Nagel; for the second factor, simply read the curriculum and courses that most scientists take in colleges and universities: you won't see anything related to parapsychology or psi research. Most professional scientists have not read or studied in depth the best evidence for psi phenomena)

This is not valid for split-brain patients, where the controversy is between the own materialistic neuroscientists themselves, not between materialists and nonmaterialists. So the controversy has not obvious ideological components, but it's intrinsic to the nature of the evidence found.

Materialist: I disagree with everthing that you have said so far.

Survivalist: Fine. I'm not a dogmatist, and I don't believe I have the monopoly of the truth. I'm simply trying to make sense of all the relevant evidence, and figure out the best plausible explanation.

Materialist: I'm not a dogmatist either; I only think your arguments are wrong and your evidence weak.

Survivalist: I think something similar of your arguments and your biased interpretation of the evidence.

But let's to address more objections to my position.

Materialist: Good... but in another moment, it's late.

Survivalist: Fine. Think about this conversation. See you later.

TO BE CONTINUED...


Previous parts of this dialogue:

-Part 1

-Part 2

-Part 3

-Part 4