Philosopher David Macarthur (who is not a supernaturalist or paranormalist) has written an interesting paper entitled "Naturalism and Skepticism" where he argues that naturalism implies skepticism or, at least, the naturalist replies to the charge of skepticism are very weak. (Philosophical Skepticism, for the purposes of this post, is the view that we can't know any proposition or statement. It's doubt about the possiblity of knowledge. Don't confuse the term "skepticism" as used in this post, with pseudoskepticism, which is the ideological materialist view that the paranormal doesn't exist, the belief that scientific orthodoxy is almost always right (except when the ideas of orthodoxy put pressure on materialistic atheism, like the big bang theory which suggest a beggining of the universe and, therefore, the possibity of "God" as the uncaused cause or unmoved mover) and, as a corollary of these beliefs, the organized debunking as part of the apologetic strategy of atheistic materialism.)
Some philosophers, like Alvin Plantinga, have defended the view that naturalism + evolutionary theory entails skepticism (=doubt about any proposition). If naturalism is right and Darwinian evolution too, and given that the latter favors adaptative behaviour (not true beliefs), then we have no reason to think our cognitive faculties are reliable to produce authentic knowledge. And this includes our knowledge of naturalism itself; therefore, naturalism is self-defeating.
Charles Darwin shared the essence of Plantinga's argument when he wrote: "With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" (Letter to William Graham, July 3rd, 1881)
A basic objection to Plantinga's argument has been that rationality and true beliefs have adaptative value beucause they help to survival; therefore, it's plausible that natural selection would favor true beliefs over false beliefs.
One of the problems with this objection (there are others) is that it's inconsistent with the materialistic view that consciousness is nonefficacious. If rationality and true beliefs (which only exist in the subjective mind of the man) have adaptative value, it's because they have some effect on biological survival; and therefore, they're causally efficacious to improve the chances of survival.
But if materialism is true, and consciousness and mental states are causally nonefficacious (only epiphenomena of neurological processes; mere "illusions"), then mental states and consciousness (i.e. illussions) couldn't cause any difference regarding adaptation and biological survival; because they have no actual causal efficacy on the real world. Therefore, the objection to Plantinga's argument is at variance with the premises of consistent materialism about the causal efficacy of consciousness and its contents.
There are other problems with the common objections to Darwin/Plantinga's argument, but it's a matter I'll discuss in another moment.
Professor Macarthur takes a different approach. His thesis doesn't appeal to the conjuntion of naturalism + evolutionary theory to argue against naturalism; rather, he appeals to the own premises of natualism and the actual practiques of "naturalists" to make his case.
He defines naturalism like this: "Naturalism, understood broadly as the view that the account of nature provided by the natural sciences is our only guide as to what genuinely, or unproblematically, exists and/or to what is genuinely, or unproblematically, known, is widely popular within contemporary analytic philosophy"
This is the view of many (perhaps, most) naturalists.
I've argued elsewhere that naturalism, when implying determinism, destroy normativity and therefore make impossible morality, science and rational inquiry, because these fields are guided by normative ideals. A similar objection is made by Macarthur "Belief is not simply an attitude of taking-true, however. If belief were merely taking-true then it could not be distinguished from other attitudes of taking-true such as assuming or hypothesizing or entertaining. Belief is distinguished from these attitudes by being governed by the norm of truth rather than, say, pragmatic norms. As David Velleman puts it: “An attitude’s identity as a belief depends on its being regulated in a way designed to make it track the truth.”65 To believe involves a commitment to its being the case that one’s truth-taking is regulated by what is in fact true"
Some philosophers, like Alvin Plantinga, have defended the view that naturalism + evolutionary theory entails skepticism (=doubt about any proposition). If naturalism is right and Darwinian evolution too, and given that the latter favors adaptative behaviour (not true beliefs), then we have no reason to think our cognitive faculties are reliable to produce authentic knowledge. And this includes our knowledge of naturalism itself; therefore, naturalism is self-defeating.
Charles Darwin shared the essence of Plantinga's argument when he wrote: "With me, the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" (Letter to William Graham, July 3rd, 1881)
A basic objection to Plantinga's argument has been that rationality and true beliefs have adaptative value beucause they help to survival; therefore, it's plausible that natural selection would favor true beliefs over false beliefs.
One of the problems with this objection (there are others) is that it's inconsistent with the materialistic view that consciousness is nonefficacious. If rationality and true beliefs (which only exist in the subjective mind of the man) have adaptative value, it's because they have some effect on biological survival; and therefore, they're causally efficacious to improve the chances of survival.
But if materialism is true, and consciousness and mental states are causally nonefficacious (only epiphenomena of neurological processes; mere "illusions"), then mental states and consciousness (i.e. illussions) couldn't cause any difference regarding adaptation and biological survival; because they have no actual causal efficacy on the real world. Therefore, the objection to Plantinga's argument is at variance with the premises of consistent materialism about the causal efficacy of consciousness and its contents.
There are other problems with the common objections to Darwin/Plantinga's argument, but it's a matter I'll discuss in another moment.
Professor Macarthur takes a different approach. His thesis doesn't appeal to the conjuntion of naturalism + evolutionary theory to argue against naturalism; rather, he appeals to the own premises of natualism and the actual practiques of "naturalists" to make his case.
He defines naturalism like this: "Naturalism, understood broadly as the view that the account of nature provided by the natural sciences is our only guide as to what genuinely, or unproblematically, exists and/or to what is genuinely, or unproblematically, known, is widely popular within contemporary analytic philosophy"
This is the view of many (perhaps, most) naturalists.
I've argued elsewhere that naturalism, when implying determinism, destroy normativity and therefore make impossible morality, science and rational inquiry, because these fields are guided by normative ideals. A similar objection is made by Macarthur "Belief is not simply an attitude of taking-true, however. If belief were merely taking-true then it could not be distinguished from other attitudes of taking-true such as assuming or hypothesizing or entertaining. Belief is distinguished from these attitudes by being governed by the norm of truth rather than, say, pragmatic norms. As David Velleman puts it: “An attitude’s identity as a belief depends on its being regulated in a way designed to make it track the truth.”65 To believe involves a commitment to its being the case that one’s truth-taking is regulated by what is in fact true"
Note that Macarthur correctly points out the normative character of beliefs. They're not simply "facts" of the world, but that they include a normative criterion, the norm of truth which regulates what we SHOULD believe or disbelieve given certain pieces of evidence or arguments.
But if truth-taking is regulated by a normative requirement (not by a fatalistic and deterministic natural process of cause-effect), then it entails some kind of freedom to choose between correct decisions (i.e choosing the truth instead of the falsehoods) and incorrect ones.
If you behaviour and thinking is fatalistically determined by physical causes beyond of your control, which is the role played by normativity there? Would you criticize a crazy man for making the wrong decision? Obviously not, but why? Beucase he's not free to discern and choose the correct from the incorrect. His behaviour is not up to him in the sense he can't freely do the correct decision. His behaviour is enterily and fatalistically determined by his insanity.
In the context of a consistent naturalist wordlview, free will and norms would be only illusions, with not actual ontological place in a natural world (if naturalism is true). But note that it includes norms that regulates rationality too and, therefore, the normative pressure to assume naturalism as a rational and true position. Therefore, naturalism cannot account easily or consistently for the normativity that should force us, rationally, to accept naturalism as the most plausible position. It gives us not actual reason (which is a normative epistemic notion) to accept naturalism as true.
It undermines its own epistemological foundation.
Social philosopher and libertarian economist Ludwig von Mises has a similar opinion about naturalism or materialism (understood broadly as a metaphysical position): "It is useless to argue with the supporters of a doctrine that merely establishes a program without indicating how it could be put into effect. What can be done and must be done is to disclose how its harbingers contradict themselves and what consequences must result from its consistent application.
If the emergence of every idea is to be dealt with as one deals with the emergence of all other natural events, it is no longer permissible to distinguish between true and false propositions. Then the theorems of Descartes are neither better nor worse than the bungling of Peter, a dull candidate for a degree, in his examination paper. The material factors cannot err. They have produced in the man Descartes co-ordinate geometry and in the man Peter something that his teacher, not enlightened by the gospel of materialism, considers as nonsense. But what entitles this teacher to sit in judgment upon nature? Who are the materialist philosophers to condemn what the material factors have produced in the bodies of the "idealistic" philosophers.
It would be useless for the materialists to point to pragmatism's distinction between what works and what does not work. For this distinction introduces into the chain of reasoning a factor that is foreign to the natural sciences, viz., finality. A doctrine or proposition works if conduct directed by it brings about the end aimed at. But the choice of the end is determined by ideas, is in itself a mental fact. So is also the judgment whether or not the end chosen has been attained. For consistent materialism it is not possible to distinguish between purposive action and merely vegetative, plant-like living.
Materialists think that their doctrine merely eliminates the distinction between what is morally good and morally bad. They fail to see that it no less wipes out any difference between what is true and what is untrue and thus deprives all mental acts of any meaning. If there stands between the "real things" of the external world and the mental acts nothing that could be looked upon as essentially different from the operation of the forces described by the traditional natural sciences, then we must put up with these mental phenomena in the same way as we respond to natural events. For a doctrine asserting that thoughts are in the same relation to the brain in which gall is to the liver, it is not more permissible to distinguish between true and untrue ideas than between true and untrue gall." (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)
The consequences that must result from a rigurously consistent application of materialism and naturalism have been discussed in many parts of my blog, for example in this post on "Secular Humanism" (the ethical system logically implied in naturalism and materialism).
Read the paper of Macarthur and draw your own conclusions.
Links of interest:
-David Macarthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"
-Alvin Plantinga's paper "Evolution and Naturalism"
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