Edward Feser, Thomism and Intelligent Design (ID): An outsider's opinion

In his blog, philosopher Edward Feser has argued what he considers are the main reasons why Thomists are critic of intelligent design (or ID), and why Aquinas' Fifth way is incompatible with Paley's style design arguments.

This is a philosophical question of interest. This post assumes (for the argument's sake) the existence of God as understood in classical theism.

I'm an "outsider" in regards to Thomism and ID, so I'll summarize the point of disagreement as far I understand it:

Aquinas' fifth way assumes an immanent teleology which is radically at variance with ID's mechanistic conception of nature.

This implies that if Aquinas' metaphysics is right, ID's metaphysics is false and hence a non-starter (for the same reason, the reverse also would be true; if ID is true, Aquinas' metaphysics is false and the fifth way would be a non-starter).

The theological implication is this: Aquinas' fifth way leads to the God of the classical theism, while the "designer" of ID doesn't lead to such God. Therefore, Christians shouldn't use the design argument as an argument for the Christian God's existence.

This is as I understand the essential of the Thomism vs. ID debate.

Now, I have a question: Is essential to ID a mechanistic conception of nature? (Note that I'm not asking whether Paley or most contemporary ID's defenders assume a mechanistic conception of nature; what I'm asking is whether such mechanistic view is ESSENTIAL to ID).

Why couldn't the God of classical theism to create a teleological world as Thomists think AND additionally, in specific domains and for specific purposes (like the fine tuning of the universe or in biology in order to favour certain structures which favours the creation of humans) also to impose "from outside" a form of specified complexity which conforms to an independently given patter (which is Demski's criteria for ID)?

I see no reason to think that God (being omnipotent) cannot do that.

Particularly, assuming immanent teleology, I see no reason to think that God (which is a spiritual and wholly free onmipotent being) cannot decide to act in certain cases like an external designer or architect (e.g. in the case of the Universe's fine tuning) imposing such design wholly from "outside".

Granted, Thomists will reply that in such case, the design argument doesn't prove the full divine attributes of the designer. But this is besides the point, since most arguments of contemporary natural theology, individually considered, don't pretend to prove all of God's attributes as understood by classical theism. Most of such arguments prove some of God's attributes. (This is why most natural theologians present arguments for God's existence as a cumulative case). So, this objection is not fatal to design arguments.

Thomists will reply that the problem for ID is even worst: such design argument is not only incomplete to prove God's existence, but that it leads to a God or designer wholly different than the God of classical theism. But this objection assumes that the God of classical theism is incapable of acting like an external designer (which imposes from outside certain forms of specified complexity for specific divine purposes like the creation of human beings) IN ADDITION to acting as a creator of nature with immanent teleology (which is the basic premise of Aquinas' fifth way).

In other words, the objection seems to assume that the God of classical theism is caught in a dilemma: either he creates nature with the property of immanent teleology; or he creates through the external imposition of intelligence over a purely mechanistic and non-teleological nature.

I don't see any reson to think this dilemma is a true one, specially for God. In my opinion, God could:

1-Create nature with essentially teleological properties (in the full Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of teleology) and;

2-Create, from "outside" and for specific divine purposes (e.g. the creation of human beings on the planet Earth) certain designs (like the fine tuning of the Universe, or certain biological structures) which satisfies Demski' criteria of specified complexity which conforms to an independently given pattern.

In conclusion, I think intelligent design is not per se incompatible with Thomism; which is incompatible with Thomism are the metaphysical premises that as a matter of contigent (historical) fact, most ID's defeders (like Paley) have taken for granted; but such premises are not essential to ID; and therefore ID is not essentially incompatible with Aquinas' immanent teleology essential to the Fifth way.

Just an outsider's opinion.