Atheist Tom Clark, who's the Director of the Center for Naturalism, wrote an online article entitled "Maximizing Liberty", where you can read:
"In a deterministic universe, we understand that a criminal's career is not a matter of an unconditioned personal choice, but fully a function of a complex set of conditions, genetic and enviromental, that interact to produce the offender and his proclivities. Had we been in his shows in all respects, we too would have followed the same path, since there is no freely willing self that could have done otherwise as causality unfolds. There is no kernel of independent moral agency -- we are not, as philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices, including choices to rob, rape, or kill"
I think that if metaphysical naturalism is true, then Clark's point is fully correct.
We can use a deductive argument in order to see Clark's insights:
1-If naturalism is true, then determinism is true
2-Naturalism is true
3-Therefore, determinism is true
4-If determinism is true, then there is not free will
5-Therefore (given 3 and 4), there are not free will.
6-If there are no free will, then human beings cannot decide freely their choices (including choices to rob naturalists, stigmatize atheists, rape pseudosketics, be ethical, destroy science or respect rationality)
7-Therefore (given 5 and 6), human beings cannot decide freely their choices (including choices to rob naturalists, stigmatize atheists, rape pseudosketics, destroy science or respect rationality).
Note the actual implications of metaphysical naturalism. If naturalism is true, then moral decisions cannot be justified in any normative sense, since such actions (moral decisions) are so fully determined by physical causes as any other physical phenomenon. Moral responsability is therefore destroyed.
If an insane individual decided to rape an atheist, such individual was fully determined to do that as the individual which decided to respect the same atheist. From a deterministic and physical point of view, they're wholly equivalent (in the sense that both decisions were physically fully determined). Arguing that the former was "moral" and the latter "inmoral" is misleading, because there is not point in talking about morality regarding agents that are not free moral agents at all, since (as Clark says) "There is no kernel of independent moral agency... "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices" In other words, physical circunstances DETERMINE you (and your choices); hence, you cannot escape from them. You're a slave of the circunstances (including the circunstances that determine "morality" or "inmorality").
Note that in this view atheists are atheists, not because atheism is true (which is a epistemological, semantical, factual and normative matter), but because as a matter of fact (in a deterministic universe) atheists couldn't freely decide otherwise. By their personal circunstances, they're inescapably determined to be atheists. The same would apply to theists, agnostics, pantheists, etc.
The obvious question is: If my beliefs are a matter determined entirely by the particular circunstances of my life, how the hell am I justified to think that such beliefs are true? If naturalism is true, the CAUSE of such beliefs is not their truth, but the purely physical circunstances (in my brain and enviroment) which fully determined on me such beliefs.
If circunstance X determined my belief Y, then the cause of belief Y wasn't necessarily Y being true, but rather the fact that X determined it (regardless of the truth value of Y).
Note that it doesn't mean that, if naturalism is true, my beliefs are false. Perhaps they're false, perhaps they're true; but the point is that the cause of such beliefs is not a matter of respecting rationality (which is normative) or any epistemological duty, but a matter of physical determinism. It clearly leads us into skepticism regarding the truth and rationality of our beliefs.
The above implies the following:
1-If you have independent reasons to think that beliefs are not only a matter of physical determinism, but a matter ruled in part by normative considerations and duties (e.g. respect for logic norms and empirical evidence, etc.), then you're justified to think that determinism (and therefore, naturalism) is false.
2-If you think that free will exist and that moral agency is not exclusively determined by your circunstances, then you have to think that naturalism is false.
Reflection hard about this questions and ask yourself: In my life, do I believe and act as whether determinism (and hence naturalism) is false? If true, then you're for all the practical purposes an anti-naturalist.
Secondly, think about the foundations of your beliefs. Do your beliefs are rationally justified? If true, then you're rationally justified to conclude that naturalism is false.
Naturalism (when consistently followed in its implications) is, ultimately, self-defeating. Hence, it's irrational to believe it.
"In a deterministic universe, we understand that a criminal's career is not a matter of an unconditioned personal choice, but fully a function of a complex set of conditions, genetic and enviromental, that interact to produce the offender and his proclivities. Had we been in his shows in all respects, we too would have followed the same path, since there is no freely willing self that could have done otherwise as causality unfolds. There is no kernel of independent moral agency -- we are not, as philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices, including choices to rob, rape, or kill"
I think that if metaphysical naturalism is true, then Clark's point is fully correct.
We can use a deductive argument in order to see Clark's insights:
1-If naturalism is true, then determinism is true
2-Naturalism is true
3-Therefore, determinism is true
4-If determinism is true, then there is not free will
5-Therefore (given 3 and 4), there are not free will.
6-If there are no free will, then human beings cannot decide freely their choices (including choices to rob naturalists, stigmatize atheists, rape pseudosketics, be ethical, destroy science or respect rationality)
7-Therefore (given 5 and 6), human beings cannot decide freely their choices (including choices to rob naturalists, stigmatize atheists, rape pseudosketics, destroy science or respect rationality).
Note the actual implications of metaphysical naturalism. If naturalism is true, then moral decisions cannot be justified in any normative sense, since such actions (moral decisions) are so fully determined by physical causes as any other physical phenomenon. Moral responsability is therefore destroyed.
If an insane individual decided to rape an atheist, such individual was fully determined to do that as the individual which decided to respect the same atheist. From a deterministic and physical point of view, they're wholly equivalent (in the sense that both decisions were physically fully determined). Arguing that the former was "moral" and the latter "inmoral" is misleading, because there is not point in talking about morality regarding agents that are not free moral agents at all, since (as Clark says) "There is no kernel of independent moral agency... "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices" In other words, physical circunstances DETERMINE you (and your choices); hence, you cannot escape from them. You're a slave of the circunstances (including the circunstances that determine "morality" or "inmorality").
Note that in this view atheists are atheists, not because atheism is true (which is a epistemological, semantical, factual and normative matter), but because as a matter of fact (in a deterministic universe) atheists couldn't freely decide otherwise. By their personal circunstances, they're inescapably determined to be atheists. The same would apply to theists, agnostics, pantheists, etc.
The obvious question is: If my beliefs are a matter determined entirely by the particular circunstances of my life, how the hell am I justified to think that such beliefs are true? If naturalism is true, the CAUSE of such beliefs is not their truth, but the purely physical circunstances (in my brain and enviroment) which fully determined on me such beliefs.
If circunstance X determined my belief Y, then the cause of belief Y wasn't necessarily Y being true, but rather the fact that X determined it (regardless of the truth value of Y).
Note that it doesn't mean that, if naturalism is true, my beliefs are false. Perhaps they're false, perhaps they're true; but the point is that the cause of such beliefs is not a matter of respecting rationality (which is normative) or any epistemological duty, but a matter of physical determinism. It clearly leads us into skepticism regarding the truth and rationality of our beliefs.
The above implies the following:
1-If you have independent reasons to think that beliefs are not only a matter of physical determinism, but a matter ruled in part by normative considerations and duties (e.g. respect for logic norms and empirical evidence, etc.), then you're justified to think that determinism (and therefore, naturalism) is false.
2-If you think that free will exist and that moral agency is not exclusively determined by your circunstances, then you have to think that naturalism is false.
Reflection hard about this questions and ask yourself: In my life, do I believe and act as whether determinism (and hence naturalism) is false? If true, then you're for all the practical purposes an anti-naturalist.
Secondly, think about the foundations of your beliefs. Do your beliefs are rationally justified? If true, then you're rationally justified to conclude that naturalism is false.
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