Thomistic-Aristotelian (T-A for short) metaphysics (the metaphysics which underlies classical theism) defends the existence on immanent teleology (i.e. inherent purpose or finality in material objects) which pervades the physical world (both animate and inanimate matter). A defense of this position can be read in this paper by philosopher David Oderberg (see also Oderberg's book "Real Essentialism" and Edward Feser's book "The Last Superstition"). This teleological metaphysics underlies Thomas Aquinas' fifth way to prove God's existence.
After the rise of modern philosophy, Aristotelianism was considered false and outdated, and substituted by the so-called "mechanical" philosophy, according to which "purposes" or teleology is NOT inherent in matter. Matter is a pure mechanical, non-teleological, blind substance which operates by deterministic laws of nature which have no purposes at all. The mechanical philosophy is essential in contemporary naturalism and materialism (which are metaphysics hostile to any view of objective "purposes", ends, finalities and so forth. Any purpose, if exists, is purely subjective, i.e. an illusion of consciousness).
According to T-A, the theory of intelligent design is basically wrong, for several metaphysical and theological reasons:
1-ID theory assumes a mechanistic understanding of nature, which is wrong.
2-Given 1, ID concedes too much to naturalism and hence is vulnerable to purely mechanistic-naturalistic alternatives of life (e.g. Darwinism).
3-ID postulates design from "outside" (as a designer who imposes design to a matter which essentially mechanical and non-teleological). But AT postulates teleology "inside" matter itself, not from outside.
4-Given point 3, ID theory, when employed as an argument for God' existence, is wrong-headed, because the kind of designer which such theory postulates is at variance with the God of classical theism. The God of classical theism has constructed a world which is teleological, not a blind and mechanical world which needs divine interventions of specific design in order to produce God's purposes.
After some time having some sympathies with the above argumentation, I currently disagree with the above 4 objections, but I only will discuss some of them.
First, I don't think it is essential to ID theory to assume a mechanistic metaphysics. It is true that the main defenders of ID (from Paley to Demski) seems to assume such metaphysics, but this fact alone doesn't imply that ID itself is essentially committed to that view. This fact could be understood as a strategy: it is strategically useful to ID theists to take for granted (for the argument's sake) the mechanistic understanding of the world, because such view is the dominant one in contemporary thinking. Hence, if you can show that ID applies, even if the mechanistic view is taken for granted, then theists will have defeat the naturalist under his own metaphysical assumptions.
Therefore, at least for debating purposes, ID theorists can concede mechanism to their naturalistic opponents, and argue from this that ID applies and support theism.
Secondly, even if we assume A-T metaphysics, it is not clear that point 4 above follows. Even if the world is intrinsically teleological, it doesn't exclude God's particular interventions or specific designs for specific purposes (e.g. consider Jesus' resurrection. If God caused it, then clearly it is an intervention from God who imposed design on Jesus' earthly body in order to transform it into a new, powerful, spiritual, immortal body, presumibly to vindicate Jesus' authoritative and exclusivistic teachings about God's Kingdom and his self-perception of being the Son of God, which caused the Jewish accusations of blasphemy and his eventual crucifixion. If it is the case, then this which clearly satisfies any sensible definition of "intelligent design". Or consider God's creation of an universe fine-tuned for life. Is it not an example of "intelligent design" of the universe in which intrinsic teleology cannot apply because no physical matter/energy at all existed before the universe' s creation?)
Thus, intrinsic teleology doesn't preclude God's particular interventions on specific moments. Hence, point 4 doesn't follow.
But my interest here is another: Is the Darwinian evolutionary theory compatible with A-T? I think it is compatible, but I'm not sure that a purely teleological understanding of the world will suffice to make Darwinism plausible under T-A metaphysics alone (without external design).
Philosopher H.O. Mounce (after explaining the concepts of "form" in Aristotelianism) comments: "the change from one species to another involves a change in form, which requires a series of so-called co-ordinated changes, not an accumulation of small changes occurring at ramdom. In short, the forms are fixed" ("Morality and Religion", in Philosophy of Religion: a Guide to the Subject, ed. Brian Davies, p. 268)
By "form", Mounce understands the Aristotelian concept as something which defines what a thing IS. Now, if as Mounce says, the "forms" are FIXED (in God's mind), then it is hard to see how the purely Darwinian process, which is largely produced by chance (e.g. random mutations) is plausible under T-A metaphysics without external design, because even if the physical world is teleological, it doesn't look clear that such teleology will produce precisely the kind of entities corresponding to the forms fixed in God's mind. It seems that the actualization of such forms (specially theistic-relevant ones like the actualization of human beings, which is central at least in Christian theism) requires some kind of external intervention from God in order to actualize the previously fixed form in God's mind.
I'm not arguing that such a thing is impossible. I'm simply saying that it is not easy to see, at least not for me.
In other words, if A-T and Darwinism are both true, then this conjunction is more likely given ID than in abscence of it, because the chance aspect posed by Darwinism seems to make unlikely the actualization of the (previously fixed form in God's mind) human beings, which is essential to classical theism. (Note that Darwinism poses a conjuntion of chance plus neccesity, not chance alone... but the chance aspect is extremely important and even primary, since the source of variation, namely, random mutations are created by chance. Natural selection only operates AFTER such mutations, and the organisms generated by them, have occured, in order to discard the ones not fit to survival and reproduction. So, properly speaking natural selection is not a creative mechanism, but a discarding mechanism).
But perhaps we have misunderstood what "chance" means in evolutionary theory. According to philosopher William Lane Craig (who is not an A-T metaphysician) "According to [biologist Francisco] Ayala, when the evolutionary biologist says that the mutations that lead to evolutionary development are random, the meaning of the word “random” is not “occurring by chance.” Rather it means “irrespective of their usefulness to the organism.” Now this is hugely significant! The scientist is not, despite the impression given by popularizers on both sides of the divide, making the presumptuous philosophical claim that biological mutations occur by chance and, hence, that the evolutionary process is undirected or purposeless. Rather he means that mutations do not occur for the benefit of the host organism. If we take “random” to mean “irrespective of usefulness to the organism,” then randomness is not incompatible with direction or purpose. For example, suppose that God in His providence causes a mutation to occur in an organism, not for the benefit of the organism, but for some other reason (say, because it will produce easy prey for other organisms that He wants to flourish or even because it will eventually produce a fossil that I will someday find, which stimulates my interest in palaeontology, so that I embark upon the career God had in mind for me). In such a case, the mutation is both purposeful and random."
If Craig is correct, then there is a wide misunderstanding of the concept of "chance" as properly used in evolutionary biology, and part of my above argument will need modifications. However, even in this case, God's particular (intelligent) interventions and designs are not excluded, and the T-A metaphysician cannot appeal to Darwinism as an argument which tends to undermine ID theory.
ID is not undermined neither by intrinsic teleology nor by evolutionary theory (the latter understood under the principles of mechanical philosophy).
ID is not undermined neither by intrinsic teleology nor by evolutionary theory (the latter understood under the principles of mechanical philosophy).
In conclusion, the hostility that some T-A philosophers show against ID theory seems to me to be unjustified and misguided.
Finally, watch this debate between Francisco Ayala, one of the world's leading evolutionary biologists, and philosopher William Lane Craig about the viability of ID theory in biology:
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