My blog is highly critical of contemporary atheism and its ideological-philosophical roots: scientific materialism and metaphysical naturalism. However, as an exception, I think atheist writer and leading philosopher of biology Alex Rosenberg deserves a defense in this blog.
As I've discussed in several posts, naturalist philosopher of biology Alexander Rosenberg has written what, in my opinion, is the most philosophically coherent and scientifically informed defense of metaphysical naturalism and atheism published so far. I strongly urge my readers, whatever their theological persuasion (atheists, agnostics, theists, spiritualists, etc.) to get a copy of Rosenberg's book and read it carefully. (Moreover, Rosenberg's book is NOT technical, and it is very easy to read and understand). You won't get a more consistent and easy-to-understand defense of naturalism.
Rosenberg's book has been widely misunderstood by some naturalists. His basic premise is that "scientism" (the worldview revealed by the best and most reliable findings of natural science) implies a series of naturalistic beliefs which, if taken seriously and consistently, provide us with clear scientific answers to philosophical topics like "Is there a purpose in the universe?" or "Do objective moral values exist?" or "Do Free Will exist?".
Naturalists who have misunderstood Rosenberg tend to be wishful thinkers who are unable to see, clearly, the implications of their own naturalism. They accept a bunch of naturalistic pressupositions (e.g. mind-body materialism, physical determinism, the causal closure of the physical world, non-teleology, blind natural selection, purely mechanistic explanations, etc.), but avoid their logical implications for topics like consciousness, free will, morality, purposes in the universe, human behaviour, etc. because they find them unpalatable (this is not surprising given Jime's Iron Law). But Rosenberg has guts: He explicilty accepts the full implications of the premises of naturalism and has the courage to live according to them.
Let's to mention a devastating example:
According to Rosenberg "No chunk of matter... can just by itself be about another chunk of matter... without a mind to interpret the first chunk of matter as being about the second chunk" (p.43. Emphasis in the original).
Note that such view is not an arbitrary opinion by Rosenberg. It is in fact what every serious scientific naturalist think, since naturalism interprets matter in a non-teleological way (i.e. as something not aimed to a particular end or purpose). In other words, matter (as discoveried by physical science) doesn't have any teleological or "purpose-oriented" properties. All properties of physical matter are mechanical, blind, non-teleological ones determined ENTIRELY by the corresponding physical laws. Period.
Now, if you are thoughful and deep enough like Rosenberg about the implications of such premise, you're in position to see why Rosenberg is right about his conclusions and their critics are demostrably wrong:
1-The mechanical view of matter implies that, in principle, it is impossible that any kind of purpose, end or design can exist in the material world. Physical matter simply doesn't work like that. Science shows that a chunk of matter can never (by physical reasons) be "about" any other chunk of matter. Both chunks of matter are connected exclusively by brute, blind mechanical-physical laws, with not "purpose" or "intention" about anything at all.
No scientific naturalist can sensibly to reject that view, because it is what natural science tells us about matter: there is not teleology nor purposes in matter.
But what does it imply? This view implies that, if our consciousness is reduced (or somehow caused) by the brain, then the common belief that our thoughts are "about" something is impossible and literally false. They're metaphors and illusions (perhaps useful fictions for certain purposes), not factual realities.
2-That view also rules out free will in a libertarian sense. The mind being totally dependent on the physical brain (a brain which functions entirely by mechanical, blind laws of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology) rules out (as a matter of necessity, not merely of accident) any autonomous "will" which can choose something for independent reasons or purposes. Such a thing doesn't exist. What any "will" chooses is, ultimately, determined by the brain (which in turns is determined by non-personalistic and deterministic physical laws). Hence, the "will" far from being "free" is actually determined as any other piece of material thing.
Any serious scientific naturalist cannot reject this, because it would imply that "the will" is a nonphysical entity which escapes the determination of physical laws, which is impossible and absurd if naturalism is true.
3-Point 2 discards actual moral responsability. This implication is unpalatable for many naturalists, but this is what their position actually implies (just think about it objectively).
Since what you do is what the physical laws determine that you will do, you are not free to do otherwise. (If you were free from such laws, then it would imply that your "will" is independent of the physical laws controlling the brain, which is impossible if naturalism is true).
4-Since physics fix all the facts about the universe, and physics shows that matter has not moral properties, it follows that the belief in objective moral values is literally false. At most we have a bunch of subjective beliefs about morality, but such beliefs are factually and objectively false (moreover, at the bottom, there is not such beliefs either, because in point 1 we saw that no piece of matter is "about" anything, hence not brain process connected with belief is actually about anything either).
Note that it is not a refutation to Rosenberg to reply that we are strongly convinced that moral values exist in the same way that 2+2=4 is true or that a married bachelor is a contradiction. Rosenberg would reply that your personal psychological convictions are irrelevant to science: Hard physics (which is not based on subjective convictions or self-evident beliefs, but in objective physical facts, some of which are counterintuitive) shows that physical matter has not room for moral properties at all. Not only such values have never been scientifically observed by the rigurous methods of natural science, but that the known and proven physical laws positively rules out such moral entities and properties in our physical universe. (Moreover, while mathematics, including formal truths like 2+2=4 are part of the theoretical structure of science, moral values are not part of theoretical science nor of matter nor of physical laws).
So far, we have seen that some of Rosenberg's conclusions DO follow logically and inescapably from his uncontroversial premise about physics. Natualists simply cannot accept the physicalist premise, and then fight hard trying to avoid the conclusions because they don't like it. If you're an intellectually serious and rational naturalist who accept that natural science actually reveals, or will reveal, everything that exists, you have to follow the above current evidence (contained in the physicalist premises) to wherever it leads. And the premise that matter is non-teleological, non-designed, non-mental, non-intentional and has not person-relative moral properties is firmly rooted in the current scientific understanding of the physical world.
Now, here is where my argument about "personalistic" vs "impersonalistic" worldviews becomes relevant.
Rosenberg's naturalism is what we would expect given a worldview based on impersonalistic premises. In the case of naturalism, such premises are matter and the physical laws controlling it. In principle, such things (matter and physical laws) don't include any "personalistic" entities nor properties like persons, intentionality, rationality, spiritual beings, consciousness, free will, objective moral values, etc. The latter entities simply don' fit well nor comfortably in an impersonalistic worldview (it applies too to many Eastern worldviews which, while claiming to be spiritualistic and non-materialistic, are based on impersonal principles too. Such impersonalistic principles simply cannot ground personalistic entities or properties, except as illusions, metaphors or lucky accidents... note the coincidence with naturalism!).
Now, in the case of personalistic worldviews (e.g. theism), the existence of persons (and their properties) are senior, basic, essential and intrinsic part of reality. The reality is, at a very fundamental level, PERSONAL (i.e. grounded ultimately in a Person = God). Therefore, such personalistic worldviews not only countenance such things like consciousness, the afterlife or moral values, but that IMPLY them.
This is why you have an argument for God's existence based on all of these entities or properties, but not a comparable argument for naturalism based on them, because naturalism doesn't require the existence of such strange things or phenomena nor can ground them comfortably. (Failing to understand this insight underlies the typical and simplistic atheist objections to the moral argument, like the objection "Are you saying that only believers in God are good?" or "Moral laws don't require God in the same way that mathematical laws or scientific laws don't require him" or the most common so-called Euthyphro Dilemma "Is the good good because God wills it, or God wills it because it is good?". All of these objections misconstrue the metaphysical nature underlying the moral argument, and such misconstruction is rooted in the atheists' unability to understand the deep metaphysical relevant differences of theism, as a personalistic worldview capable of comfortably grounding person-relative properties, versus naturalism, as a impersonalistic one, incapable of making such foundation, at least not easily, predictably and comfortably).
Let's put this in a more formal way (but not one hard to understand):
Let's to call "T" is the hypothesis that theism is true. And "N" the hypothesis that naturalism is true.
If T is true, then persons (and their properties) are essential, because it is a personalistic worldview. This worldview implies:
-The existence of consciousness, since persons are conscious agents.
-The existence of intentionality, since persons are intentional agents (i.e. they act with ends or purposes in mind, for example "I'm going to read Jime's blog" is a purpose in the mind of people who intentionally want to read my blog).
-The existence of free will, since persons (having an inmaterial or spiritual souls) are not determined by physical causes. They're self-determined, at least for a large extent.
-The existence of moral values, since some kind of normativity, standard and moral order has to exist objectively and be followed if any positive spiritual progress (or regress) is to be made (not surprinsingly, from Jesus to many other spiritual teachers, a large part of their teachings concern moral content and information linked to spiritual evolution or even salvation. Obviously, this makes sense if reality is constituted in such a way that certain objective norms and the moral order entailed by them is an objective part of reality grounded in the person ultimately responsible of such reality, namely God in the case of theism).
Note that the hypothesis T implies all the above features (and many others no mentioned here):
T ------ > P (where "P" stand for "person-relative properties" and "----->" stands for "implies").
This is why any evidence for a"P" is evidence for T.
Consider N, the hypothesis that naturalism is true. This implies:
-The existence of matter
-The existence of physical laws controlling that matter
-The non-existence of teleology, design or purpose in the universe.
-The existence of evolution of matter by random chance and necessity of physical laws.
-The causal closure of the physical world according to which every physical event which is caused is caused by a physical cause (i.e. nonphysical causation is impossible).
Keep in mind that the above features are essential features of naturalism, not merely accidental ones. They have to exist IF naturalism is true. Whatever evidence for these features is evidence for naturalism.
N--------> Np (where "Np" stand for "natural and mechanical impersonalistic properties").
Note that P (personal properties) are not predicted not implied by naturalism. Perhaps naturalism is compatible with them, but they are not implied by naturalism in the same way that they are implied and necessitated by theism. This is why the existence of person-relative properties is clear evidence for theism, but not for naturalism (even if, for the argument's sake, we can concede that such properties are compatible with naturalism)
Consider this example: the existence of evolution is evidence for naturalism (because naturalism implies it), but not by theism. Theism, as such, can be compatible with evolution but it doesn't imply it in the same way in which naturalism does. So, if all what we have is the evidence for evolution (and no other feature of reality like consciousness for example), naturalism would be superior to theism, because evolution is necessary in naturalism but only accidental on theism (God could prescind of evolution and create everything without such mechanism).
Now you're in position to see why naturalists fight to dismiss or misrepresent ANY evidence of person-relative properties (consciousness, putative paranormal phenomena, the objectivity of normativity, intelligent design, and so forth). They intuitively realize that if you accept these person-relative phenomena, the evidence for theism will overcome the evidence for naturalism. Their purpose is trying to reduce everything to impersonalistic and mechanistic explanations (e.g. consciousness to blind brain processes; putative paranormal events to frauds and psychological delusions; intelligent design to Darwinian processes, etc.)
Also, you're in position to see why the existence of extraterrestial life (specially of intelligent aliens), if such evidence were available, supports theism over naturalism (because in theism, you would expect an universe with persons and spiritual beings, but in naturalism such thing is extremely unlikely). So, it is not surprising to see "skeptics" (i.e. naturalistic debunkers of the paranormal) to attack ufology as a "pseudoscience".
You need to understand the underlying metaphysical beliefs of naturalism in order to fully understand their behaviour and debunking actions.
Rosenberg's book is the best book explaining the actual, consistent metaphysical implications of naturalism.
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