Part 2 of my review of the debate between William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg: On Rosenberg's objections to the moral argument based on confusions about divine command theories with theistic voluntarism

As far I could see, some of the people in the audience in the debate between Craig and Rosenberg were college students, professors of several disciplines, scholars and other intelligent, educated people. This created a high-level intellectual enviroment there that I enjoyed a lot.

In my right side, I had a young (beautiful and extremely smart) student of biology, who said to me that she was an agnostic with sympathies to Buddhism. In the left side, I had a scholar (a professor in anthropology or something like that) who claimed to be an "open-minded atheist". Other people whom I saw there were students of philosophy, sociology, physics and law, coming from other universities and from Purdue too.

I greatly enjoyed the enviroment and the conversations there.

Sadly, Rosenberg's performance didn't matched the intellectual level of the audience. He was extremely unprepared for the debate, and it is my impression that he disappointed even many atheists in the audience. (In fact, I suspect that Rosenberg himself agrees that he lost the debate). In twitter, during the debate, I read phrases coming from online atheists like "I'm hearing that an atheist is being trashed in a debate about God at Purdue" and so forth. 

As an example of Rosenebeg's bad performance, let's to see Rosenberg's objection to the moral argument for God's existence. 

Craig's moral argument was:

1)Objective moral values and duties exist.

2)If God doesn't exist, objective moral values and duties don't exist.

3)Therefore, God exists.

Besides the cosmological argument, this argument is one of the most often misunderstood by atheists. (In fact, they seem chronically and irrestibly incapable of understanding it).

 

The second premiss asserts an ontological connection between God and moral values and duties. Note that the specific way in which the connection works is not specified in the argument and could have many forms. It doesn't say that moral values and duties exist because God chooses or wills them.

Perhaps God creates human nature with intrinsic features (like consciousness, free will, rationality, potentiality for the afterlife, etc.) which, in turn, give rise to objective value or moral properties. (In this case, moral values are ultimately created and dependent on God's creation, as the ultimate creator of everything besides himself, but not created as a bunch of God's commands, but as supervenient properties emerging from the human nature created by God. This was Thomas Aquinas' position, for example).

But atheists, typically, understand the argument in its most crude and unsophisticated form (the form proper of the simplistic atheistic mindset), namely, as claiming that God, on purely arbitrary grounds, decided such a things like "Don't kill each other", "Don't rape children", "Don't abuse other people" and so forth. In the literature, this position is known as theistic moral voluntarism. As far I know, NO defender of the moral argument in the history of philosophy (with the exception of William of Ockham and his followers) has ever defended this version of the moral argument.

Most defenders of the moral argument are NOT theistic voluntarists: they don't think (and in fact, energically reject, that morality depend on God's arbitrary commands. Rather, they argue that God, as the most perfect personal being, IS  by nature the good. God's perfect and holy nature determines and define the paradigm of the good).

One powerful reason to think that moral values and duties cannot exist in a naturalistic worldview is that morality is a phenomenon related essentially to persons. Therefore, if the universe has an intrinsic moral dimension, it implies that it has intrinsic person-relative properties. But naturalism is a radically impersonalistic worldview: the physical world is purely mechanical, blind, non-personal. On naturalism, "persons" are mere accidents,  by-products of biological evolution. Hence, it is hard to see how such impersonalistic worldview could plausibly ground intrinsic personal properties (like rationality, consciousness, moral values, moral responsability, etc.) as part of the fabric of reality.

Philosophers who have reflected in depth about the implications of naturalism (including Rosenberg, as we will see) understand this. For example, naturalist philosopher Keith Augustine (who wrote his master thesis on the nature of naturalism) comments:

But ethics does not come into play in the history of the universe until very recently--when Homo sapiens appeared. It is possible that moral laws have existed since the Big Bang, but that they could not manifest themselves until sentient beings arose. However, such a view implies that there is some element of purposefulness in the universe--that the universe was created with the evolution of sentient beings "in mind" (in the mind of a Creator?). To accept the existence of objective moral laws that have existed since the beginning of time is to believe that the evolution of sentient beings capable of moral reasoning (such as human beings) has somehow been predetermined or is inevitable, a belief that is contrary to naturalistic explanations of origins (such as evolution by natural selection) which maintain that sentient beings came into existence due to contingent, accidental circumstances. If objective moral laws are part of the natural universe (not part of some supernatural realm), then the universe cannot be unconscious--it must be, in some unknown sense, sentient. Few naturalists would want to accept such a nonscientific pantheistic conclusion... But given that moral subjectivism is just as logically viable as moral objectivism and that moral objectivism is implausible if a scientific naturalism is true, I think that there is a good case for the nonexistence of objective moral values

As Augustine comments, "ethics" is not an intrinsic part of the universe, but something which appeared very recently in history. Moreover, even thought it is logically possible that moral laws existed even in the moment of the Big Bang, such view implies that the evolution of human being was directed in a way which matched such laws (which suggests some kind of cosmic mind which organized and was actively controlling the whole biological process... but such cosmic mind, powerful intelligent designer who guided human evolution to make it match the putative moral laws existing from the Big Bang,  is precisely what GOD is, among other things, supposed to be!).

Naturalism cannot countenance the existence of any "mind" as an intrinsic part of the universe. "Mind" is, given naturalism, an biological phenomenon connected with a PHYSICAL brain. This is why naturalists reject the afterlife or survival of consciousness, and are materialists regarding the mind-body problem.

Contemporary atheistic naturalists fully understand all of this.

But what was Rosenberg's reply to the above argument by Craig?

He argued that Craig's argument was refuted by Plato, who asked: Is the good good because God chooses it, or God chooses it because it is good?

As philosopher Glenn Peoples argues in this podcast,  the objection is one of the worst arguments in the history of thought. And contemporary atheists make it even worst.

For example, note that it is NO part of Craig's argument the claim "moral values and duties depend on God's CHOICES". Craig is NOT arguing for theistic voluntarism. The premise simply state that moral values and duties depend ontologically on God (and it could be the case that moral values depend on God's holy nature, as Craig claims; or God's creation of human nature which determine certain objective values for humans, as Thomas Aquinas claimed; or on God's choices, as William of Ockham and theistic voluntarists claimed).

Note that even we could argue for Craig's premise based on Augustine's argument above. Since Augustine is claiming that a necessary condition for the existence of moral values is the property of being conscious and sentient, and God is an infinite and most perfect sentient and conscious being (who is, in addition, the creator of the whole of reality), then God is the ultimate ground of moral values which are binding to finite conscious and sentient beings like human beings (created by God).

All of these possibilities of the way in which God could ground moral values are bypassed by Roseneberg. He only knows of the most simplistic forms of theistic voluntarism. But other forms of theistic meta-ethics, which are not volutntaristic, are wholly ignored by him.

This fact alone showed that Rosenberg was philosophically unprepared to the debate, and made easy for Craig to refute him.

So, Rosenberg's claim that Craig's argument was refuted by Plato is simply false, since Craig's version of the moral argument is a post-Platonic, non-voluntaristic formulation of the moral argument. Plato only refuted theistic voluntarism of Greek polytheism, not other forms of theistic meta-ethics.

INCONSISTENCY OF ROSENBERG'S POSITION ON MORALITY

In a attempt of scoring a rhetorical point (which was useless, as showed by the official vote results of the debate), Rosenberg asked us to think of any moral norm, for example (the examples are mine):

-Don't kill atheists for fun

-Don't rape nor abuse atheist women (a moral norm whose consistent acceptation or recognition by some atheists is in doubt, as suggested by "skepchick" Rebecca Watson).

Then, Rosenberg asks us to think if God's existence or non-existence is relevant to the correction of the above moral norms. (The purpose of Rosenberg's point seems to be that, even if you don't believe in God, you're likely to agree with the above moral norms. Therefore, God is irrelevant to the moral correction of such norms).

But note that Rosenberg's own position in his book "The atheist's guide to reality" and his other published work is MORAL NIHILISM, that is, he emphatically DENIES that the above moral norms are objectively correct.

In this article by Rosenberg (please, read it carefully several times), he wrote:

There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon. So, if scientism is to ground the core morality that every one (save some psychopaths and sociopaths) endorses, as the right morality, it’s going to face a serious explanatory problem. The only way all or most normal humans could have come to share a core morality is through selection on alternative moral codes or systems, a process that resulted in just one winning the evolutionary struggle and becoming “fixed” in the population. If our universally shared moral core were both the one selected for and also the right moral core, then the correlation of being right and being selected for couldn’t be a coincidence. Scientism doesn’t tolerate cosmic coincidences. Either our core morality is an adaptation because it is the right core morality or it’s the right core morality because it’s an adaptation, or it’s not right, but only feels right to us.  It’s easy to show that neither of the first two alternatives is right.  Just because there is strong selection for a moral norm is no reason to think it right. Think of the adaptational benefits of racist, xenophobic or patriarchal norms. You can’t justify morality by showing its Darwinian pedigree. That way lies the moral disaster of Social Spencerism (better but wrongly known as Social Darwinism). The other alternative—that our moral core was selected for because it was true, correct or right–is an equally far fetched idea.  And in part for the same reasons. The process of natural selection is not in general good at filtering for true beliefs, only for ones hitherto convenient for our lines of descent. Think of folk physics, folk biology, and most of all folk psychology. Since natural selection has no foresight, we have no idea whether the moral core we now endorse will hold up, be selected for, over the long-term future of our species, if any.

This nihilistic blow is cushioned by the realization that Darwinian processes operating on our forbearers in the main selected for niceness! The core morality of cooperation, reciprocity and even altruism that was selected for in the environment of hunter-gatherers and early agrarians, continues to dominate our lives and social institutions. We may hope the environment of modern humans has not become different enough eventually to select against niceness. But we can’t invest our moral core with more meaning than this: it was a convenience, not for us as individuals, but for our genes. There is no meaning to be found in that conclusion.

Bingo!!!!!

Consider the following phrases by Rosenberg above:

-In a world in which physics fixes all the facts there is NO ROOM for independently existing norms or values

-The strong selection for a moral norm is not reason to think it is right

-We can't invest our moral code with more meaning that this: it was a convenience, not for us as individuals, but for our genes...

Is this the same man who is arguing for moral norms being right independently of God? If such norms are not independent of physicalism (because physicalism implies that norms don't exist objectively nor are right), why are they independent of God (whose existence falsifies physicalism, and being an omnipotent personal being, is the most plausible ground of such normative properties? Why exactly is physicalism more important and powerful than God regarding the validity of person-relative phenomena like morality?

According to Rosenberg's explicit position, there is NOT reason to think that strong natural selection of a moral norm (like "Don't kill atheists for fun") are right. They can FEEL right to us, but this subjective fact about human emotions doesn't make them objectively right.

Can you see Rosenberg's straightforward inconsistency? On one side, he says that in a world in which physics fixes all the facts (i.e. in a purely physicalist, and hence atheistic,world) there is not place for a "right" morality. They're pure inventions of humans, which are useful to us and were shaped by evolution.

On the other hand (and denying his own position) he claims in the debate that moral norms are right, regardless of God.

I ask truth-seekers out there:  how could a physicalist (atheistic) worldview to have nihilistic implications for morality, but a worldview based on a wholly perfect, holy and rational God (which is incompatible with physicalism) to be irrelevant to morality? Roseberg is giving to physicalism a power which is lacking in an omnipotent God (which is absurd).

Rosenberg, who is a moral nihilist, was forced to argue AGAINST moral nihilism just in order to contradict Craig. But Rosenberg himself is not believing in his own position in the debate.

When I saw such misleading sophism, I told the girl in the right "Read this" (I gave her the above online citation by Rosenberg on which he denies the validity of morality), and she replied "I can't believe that he's arguing for a view that is incompatible with his scientism, he's damaging his own case". I told her: "I've read, studied and heard carefully all of Craig's published debates, and some of Rosenberg's published works, and believe me, Craig's going to destroy Rosenberg tonight".

As an experienced debater, Craig correctly exposed such inconsistency quoting Rosenberg's own published work in which he defends moral nihilism and denies the objective existence and validity of moral norms. 

As consequence, the public clearly realized that Rosenberg was affecting a position that himself regards as false (i.e. as fully incompatible with scientism and the view that physics fixes all the facts), and castigated him in the voting.

I attended the debate with a tablet in which I had full citations of his own book and online articles, and I took notes of Rosenberg's bad arguments. My intention was to wait until the Q/A part of the debate, and confront his arguments in the debate with his own arguments published in his book. 

But his performance was so bad and inept, that I decided not to put more pressure on him. There is not point in making people to look bad, specially in front of high-level scholars and college professors.

Rosenberg's own performance sufficed to destroy his own philosophical credibility (at least, regarding matters of philosophy of religion), as the vote results proved.

Full video of the debate between American philosophers and scholars William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg on the topic Is Faith in God Reasonable? at Purdue University

This debate was widely expected by the scholarly circles in the United States, because both philosophers are very influential in the field of analytic philosophy.

Rosenberg is a widely read and well-known philosopher of science, social sciences and biology. Craig is a world's leading philosopher of religion and theologian, who has worked a lot on philosophy of science too (specially in philosophy of physics and cosmology).

I attended personally and enjoyed that debate, but I was strongly disappointed by Rosenberg's performance, which was very bad as you can watch for yourself and as the post-debate vote results showed.

This debate will be published in a scholarly book called Is Faith in God Reasonable?, which will include contributions by world' leading atheist and theist philosophers, with responses by Craig and Rosenberg.

I look forward to read that book!.

Read the first part of my review of this debate here.

Enjoy.
 

Review of the debate between Alex Rosenberg and William Lane Craig (Part 1): The pseudoscience and bad philosophy of Alex Rosenberg: atheistic misrepresentations of philosophy and quantum mechanics on behalf of atheism

In his debate with William Lane Craig (which you can download in audio here and the Q/A here), atheist philosopher Alex Rosenberg was badly beaten according to the official vote results (votes coming from the audience, judges and online viewers). I didn't expect a different result, but since Rosenberg is a philosopher of science, I expected a more sustantive, challenging and fruitful discussion of the scientific matters related to some of Craig's typical arguments for God's existence (specially about the kalam argument, which is based heavily on scientific cosmology and physics).

In his opening speach, sadly Rosenberg exposed himself as someone philosophically and scientifically unprepared to this kind of high-level discussion. 

As I will prove in this post, Rosenberg crudely MISREPRESENTED both philosophy and science.

On Philosophy:

Like most village and popular atheists, Rosenberg misrepresented the causal principle of the cosmological argument as positing (in Rosenberg's literal words) that "everything that exists must have a cause" (and falsely attributed such principle to the arguments of Aquinas and Aristotle). You can hear that misrepresentation in the minute 38:20 of the debate. (By the way, and just for philosophers, Rosenberg conflates the principle of sufficient reason with the principle of causality. The latter can be considered a species of the former, but they are not identical. I was astonished by Rosenberg's confusion about this).

Rosenberg is clearly ignorant of the fact that neither Aquinas nor Aristotle (nor any other sophisticated defender of the cosmological argument, for that matter) has EVER argued that "everything that exists must have a cause". 

As philosopher Edward Feser comments: 

In fact, not one of the best-known defenders of the Cosmological Argument in the history of philosophy ever gave this stupid “everything has a cause” argument—not Plato, not Aristotle, not al-Ghazali, not Maimonides, not Thomas Aquinas, not John Duns Scotus, not G.W. Leibniz, not Samuel Clarke, not Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, not Mortimer Adler, not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne. And not anyone else either, as far as I know. Perhaps... you think that when trying to refute some of history’s greatest minds, a good strategy would be to attack an argument none of them ever defended" (emphasis in blue added)

William Lane Craig (who wrote his PhD dissertation in philosophy about the history of the cosmological argument) comments:

No version of the cosmological argument has ever contended that everything has a cause. According to the kalam version we are considering, everything that begins to exist has a cause. Since God is eternal, He requires no cause, whereas the universe, which began to exist, does... These objections are so flimsy that one cannot help but wonder who it is that they are meant to refute... What philosopher of religion or natural theologian in the history of thought is supposed to be susceptible to these objections?

Rosenberg, like internet atheists and sophomoric undergraduates, is wholly ignorant of this. This is absolutely unacceptable in a trained philosopher, specially one who writes about God and debate in an university in front of a bunch of people about the reasonabelness of faith in God.

I attended to the dabate at Purdue University and in the moment in which I heard these misrepresentations by Rosenberg, all the respect that I felt for him (because his book on atheism is an honest, straightforward explanation of naturalistic "scientism and its implications") was gone instantaneously. I don't have intellectual respect for Rosenberg anymore (even if I still would recommend his book on atheism).

Rosenberg seems to be a nice guy (even though he was sometimes rude in the debate), but as a philosopher, I don't have respect for him anymore, and I doubt I'll read anything written by him again.

On Science:

But in addition to misrepresenting philosophy; Rosenberg also misrepresented science, specially physics and quantum mechanics.

Even though in the debate Craig didn't presented the Kalam Cosmological Argument in its standard formulation (but a similar argument), Rosenberg attacked precisely the standard formulation of the kalam argument that Craig has used in other debates (so, Rosenberg actually attacked a straw man).

But even  Rosenberg's objections to the standard formulation of the kalam were inept.

In order to refute the causal principle (= whatever begins to exist has a cause), Rosenberg mentions (in minute 38:48) examples of spontaneous quantum events (e.g. the emission of certain quantum particles), for example two uranium atoms, wholly identical, in which one of them produces an alpha particle and the other doesn't. From this evidence, Rosenberg deduces (falsely and with astonishing lack of sophistication and insight) that science has refuted the causal principle.

Now, to philosophers and truth-seekers out there: How exactly such quantum events refute Craig's causal principle Whatever BEGINS to exist has a cause? Is not the alpha particle (in Rosenberg's example) caused to exist precisely by the alpha decay of the atom in question? Is not the alpha decay of atoms which produce or cause the emission of the alpha particle in question?

Let's see the evidence:

According to this scientific website:

The reason alpha decay occurs is because the nucleus has too many protons which cause excessive repulsion. In an attempt to reduce the repulsion, a Helium nucleus is emitted. The way it works is that the Helium nuclei are in constant collision with the walls of the nucleus and because of its energy and mass, there exists a nonzero probability of transmission

Is not the presence of too many protons the CAUSE of the excessive repulsion and, as consequence, the emission of the particle?

In another website:

What causes some radionuclides to emit alpha particles?  Alpha-decay occurs mainly in the radioactive decay of the heavier elements, particularly in those members of the natural decay series heavier than lead (atomic number 82), such as uranium and thorium. Alpha-particles are emitted with one of a few discrete energies characteristic of the radionuclide from which they were emitted. These energies can be used to identify the radionuclide involved.  Alpha-decay occurs when the ratio of neutrons to protons in the nucleus is low. For example: Polonium-210 has 126 neutrons and 84 protons, a ratio of 1.50 to 1. Following radioactive decay by the emission of an alpha particle, the ratio becomes 124 neutrons to 82 protons, or 1.51 to 1.

According to the relevant article in wikipedia:

In contrast to beta decay, the fundamental interactions responsible for alpha decay are a balance between the electromagnetic force and nuclear force. Alpha decay results from the Coulomb repulsion[2] between the alpha particle and the rest of the nucleus, which both have a positive electric charge, but which is kept in check by the nuclear force

Is not the alpha decay consequence and effect of the fundamental  causal interactions between the electromagnetic force and the nuclear force?. Does not such alpha decay result from a cause known as the Coulomb repulsion between the alpha particle and the rest of the nucleus? 

If so, then how does the hell the alpha decay and the emission of alpha particles is evidence against the principle what whatever BEGINS to exist has a cause?

Rosenberg fundamentally misunderstand physics and science, on behalf of atheism (in this case, on behalf of refusing to accept the causal principle).

Despite this, in minute 1:27: 53, Rosenberg confidently claims "I made the point that the principle of sufficient reason (Jime's correction: the principle of causality) is false, not just that it is not known to be true. It is plain out flat false and it is disconfirmed all over the galaxy... We know that alpha particles come to existence for not reason at all every moment in this room. Why should be assume that the universe is any different?"

As seen above, Rosenberg's view is scientifically false: Alpha particles don't come into existence from nothing. On the contrary, they come to existence from complex physical interactions in the tiny quantum scale. Without such quantum context and enviroment, no alpha particle (nor anything else, including the whole universe) could come into existence.

Out of nothing, nothing comes... and the quantum vacuum is NOT nothing.

In her contribution to the book "Laser Physics At The Limits", atheist physicist Astrid Lambrecht comments:

The quantum vacuum is the arena where fundamental physical processes take place, and is by no means a simple empty space where nothing never happens or a pure quantum abstract concept of quantum field theory... The state corresponds to the fundamental state of the electromagnetic field and is characterized by quantum fluctuations corresponding to mean energy of 1/2  hw per field mode. (p.197)

Atheist and world's leading cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin explains the same about the quantum vacuum:

William Lane Craig explains the same:

Can you see why Rosenberg was badly defeated by Craig in their debate? 

Atheists are forced to misrepresent science in order to defend atheism.

A final comment:

One of the virtues of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is that it shows that atheism is, as a rule, a commitment of the will, not a position based on evidence, let alone in science. When confronted with the kalam argument, even sophisticated atheist philosophers like Quentin Smith are ready to say that the universe came from "nothingness". Once they have conceded this point, it is obvious that they will accept any explanation (including "Nothingness", which is the most telling possible example of a NON-explanation) as an alternative to God. (By the way, this exposes the hypocresy of atheists who complain that their disbelief is based on that there is no evidence for God. What evidence would they accept, if "nothingness" is better than God?).

Atheism is, for many leading defenders o it, a commitment of the will.

Review of Alex Rosenberg's book An Atheist's Guide to Reality (part 1): The atheist mindset

Prominent philosopher of science and biology, professor Alex Rosenberg has written an excelent book in defense of naturalistic atheism (his book is "excellent", not because his conclusions are true or plausible, but because they're consistent with the premises of metaphysical naturalism. So, if naturalism were true, I'm sure that Rosenberg's conclusions would be true too). In this sense, we have to praise Rosenberg's intellectual honesty and courage in following the implications of the premises of metaphysical naturalism wherever they lead.

In the part 1 of this review, I just want to do general remarks about Rosenberg's book, leaving a more in depth critical examination of his arguments for upcoming posts. The purpose of part 1 of this review is to sketch what I consider is one aspect the typical hard-core atheist mindset: arrogance + complex of intellectual superiority + solid ignorance of theism.

Like with so many others book by atheists, the first impression that you'll receive of Rosenberg's book is its "smater than you" arrogant tone with condescending and patronizing remarks about people who disagree with atheism.

Take for example this comment (in which he mentions the great questions of life like the existence of purpose in the Universe, or the existence of God or free will and so forth):

People who believe in religion are particularly adept at avoiding the answers. This is not a book for them. This is a book for those who want to face up to the real answers to these questions. It's a book for people who are comfortable with the truth about reality. This is a book for atheists. (preface viii)

I know of no religious believers who are adept at "avoiding the answers". Rather, they provide answers in terms of God's action on the world, in order to make sense of the origin and fine tuning of the universe, the origin of consciousness, the rationality of our minds, the existence of objective moral values, putative afterlife experiences (like NDEs) and so forth. They try to make sense of our human experience and the universe as a whole in terms of a spiritual cause which trascends the purely material universe.

So, Rosenberg's characterization of "people who believe in religion" is demostrably false, a crude caricature based on atheistic prejudices (which is unworthy of a serious scholar like Rosenberg).

Note that, from the beginning, not just atheism is assumed to be true, but that atheists are considered to be in a superior intellectual position than theists regarding the truth.

I wasnt's surprised by this at all because, according to my experience, most hard-core atheists are strongly deluded into the belief that they're intellectually superior than non-atheists. Their self-perception is one of intellectual superiority. This explains their typical arrogance.

For example, non-philosopher naturalist Richard Carrier wrote in his book "This book is only for sane, reasonable people" (Sense and Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism, p. 287), almost implying that non-naturalists (or people who disagree with Carrier's book) are somehow insane or irrational.

Also, remember Daniel Dennett's silly attempt to use "brights" as a label for atheists.

(By the way: This is why I enjoy so much when William Lane Craig kicks their butts in public debates and universities. Craig proves that atheists' self-perception of intellectual superiority is a pure self-delusion, without any objective ground on the reality. Even though I don't agree with all of Craig's views, I agree with his refutations of atheists and his exposing of them as irrational people)

They seem to live in a dream world where the (extremely few in number) atheistic people are superior than anyone else. I consider this elitistic personality trait an almost essential aspect of the hard-core atheistic minset and an interesting area of scientific research by experimental psychology.

For my surprise (since I've read several books on philosophy of science, economics and biology by Rosenberg), his knowledge of philosophy of religion and theology seems to be very superficial. In his typical atheist-arrogant and condescending prose, Rosenberg says:

Knowing the truth makes it hard not to sound patronizing of the benighted souls under religion's spell. So from time to time, some of the tone of much of what follows may sound a little smug. I fear I have to plead guilty to this charge, with mitigation. So far I can see, belief in God is on a part with belief in Santa Claus (preface XII).

The modest implication that Rosenberg (and atheists) "know the truth" about complex matters (many of which are metaphysical and hence beyond science proper) reminds me of the treatises of medieval religious dogmatists.

Also, saying that belief in God is on a part with belief in Santa Claus is an offense to prominent ancient, modern and contemporary thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig and (former atheistic apologist) Antony Flew, in addition to being an a slap to the face of the above 90% of people in Earth who reject atheism and embrace belief in God. (This sectarian, elitistic mindset is a direct consequence of the deluded self-perception of "knowing the truth" and being intellectually superior to anyone else who disagree with atheism)

Consider two of Flew's reasons for conversion from atheism to a version of theism: "There were two factors in particular that were decisive. One was my growing empathy with the insight of Einstein and other noted scientists that there had to be an Intelligence behind the integrated complexity of the physical Universe. The second was my own insight that the integrated complexity of life itself – which is far more complex than the physical Universe – can only be explained in terms of an Intelligent Source. I believe that the origin of life and reproduction simply cannot be explained from a biological standpoint despite numerous efforts to do so. With every passing year, the more that was discovered about the richness and inherent intelligence of life, the less it seemed likely that a chemical soup could magically generate the genetic code. The difference between life and non-life, it became apparent to me, was ontological and not chemical. The best confirmation of this radical gulf is Richard Dawkins' comical effort to argue in The God Delusion that the origin of life can be attributed to a "lucky chance." If that's the best argument you have, then the game is over. No, I did not hear a Voice. It was the evidence itself that led me to this conclusion." (emphasis in blue added).

Note that Flew's argument is not a God of the gaps argument in which he argues that God exists on the grounds of gaps in our knowledge. Rather, his argument is that our current knowledge provide EVIDENCE for the "intelligent source hypothesis" over the purely materialistic hypothesis.

Now, what the hell has to do Santa Claus with Flew's argument for God? Is Santa Claus a good candidate to explain the complex order of the universe and life?

Only a person with strong atheistic prejudices and extraordinary ignorance of philosophy of religion could claim that the "God hypothesis" is on a par with the "Santa Claus hypothesis" (and hence, that belief in the former is on a par with belief in the latter).

Reading that part of Rosenberg's book made me very dissapointed of him as a philosopher (because, as I've commented, his works in philosophy of science and other fields are very good).

Part 1 of this review only tried to give you a taste of what you will find in this book in terms of "tone" or prose.

In future posts, I expect to explain in detail why I think that Rosenberg's case is self-refuting.

Don't get me wrong. I urge my readers (atheists, agnostics or theists alike) to get a copy of Rosenberg's book and read it carefully.

You need to know which are the actual consequences of metaphysical naturalism, and I know of no other book which explains these consequences so consistently and rigurously as Rosenberg's.

And for the same reason, you need to know why sanity, morality, spirituality and rationality demands to refute and consistently debunk such doctrine.