Showing posts with label survival of consciousness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label survival of consciousness. Show all posts
Friday, December 28, 2012
Sunday, April 17, 2011
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
Henry Stapp and his paper entitled Compatibility of contemporary physical theory with personal survival
Stapp (left) and Jeffrey Schwartz (right)Professional quantum physicist and researcher Henry Stapp wrote an interesting paper entitled Compatibility of contemporary physical theory with personal survival, in which he discusses if quantum mechanics is compatible or not with the possibility of an afterlife.
Stapp concludes (contrary to the propaganda of materialistic ideologues) that nothing in contemporary physics precludes the possibility of an afterlife. In other words, the best and more foundamental of our scientific theories, namely quantum mechanics, is compatible with the existence of survival of consciousness.
For Stapp (who's an open mind skeptic of survival of consciousness), if an afterlife exists or not, is a matter of scientific research and evidence. But there is not an a priori scientific reason to exclude the physical possibility of an afterlife.
Links of interest:
-My comments on Stapp's book Mindful Universe.
-Other papers by Stapp here.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Interview with philosopher and writer Chris Carter
This is an interview for my blog with philosopher and author Chris Carter about consciousness, philosophy and parapsychology. Carter is author of the books Parapsychology and The Skeptics, and Science and the Near Death Experience (recently released). Enjoy.
1)Chris, tell us a something about your background?
I’m Canadian, but I was educated in England, at Oxford University, in both economics and philosophy. I currently teach internationally.
My first book, Parapsychology and the Skeptics, was primarily concerned with understanding why a substantial minority of the scientific community has been vehemently denying the existence of psychic abilities such as telepathy for well over a century.
My second book, which has just been released, is titled Science and the Near Death Experience, and deals with the mind-body relationship, and what the near-death experience (NDE) can tell us about that.
2)Do you think a basic training in philosophy is useful to weigh and evaluate the evidence and controversy about parapsychology and the afterlife?
Yes, of course. But most philosophers simply ignore the evidence. Like the so-called skeptics, their thinking is wedded to an out-moded worldview based upon classical physics, which has been known to be fundamentally incorrect for almost a century. The irony here is that they think they are being very scientific in their thinking.
Psychologists and philosophers tend to be the most closed-minded in their thinking on these topics. Physicists and physicians tend to be the most open-minded. But there are exceptions, of course. Many philosophers, such as Curt Ducasse and William James in the past, and Neal Grossman and Robert Almeder today, have written extensively on these issues.
3) Most books on parapsychology present and discuss the experimental evidence for psi. In your book Parapsychology and the Skeptics, in addition to discussing the evidence for psi and examining the criticisms against it, you adopt an original approach: You examine the background assumptions of the debate, and argue that the controversy is not primarily about evidence, but about the interpretation of it. Why did you decide to approach this problem in this way?
Well, as I said earlier, I was concerned with understanding why a substantial minority of the scientific community has been vehemently denying the existence of psychic abilities such as telepathy for well over a century. At first glance, this may seem very puzzling: Reports of psychic abilities date back to the dawn of history, and come from cultures all over the world. Surveys also show that most working scientists accept the possibility that telepathy exists, and many leading scientists have endorsed and supported psychical research.
Essentially, I argue that this debate is not primarily about evidence. It’s not even about the interpretation of evidence, as most so-called skeptics simply ignore the evidence. When they can’t ignore it, they dismiss it. When they can’t dismiss it, they try to suppress it. The problem is that the evidence conflicts with their preconceived opinions.
It is important to remember that the deniers are defending an out-moded world view in which psychic phenomena are simply not allowed to exist. Most of the deniers and phony-skeptics are militant atheists or secular humanists. If they conceded the existence of psychic abilities, then materialism - one of the main pillars of their opposition to religion and superstition - would crumble. Hence, their dogmatic denial of the evidence.
4) In your first book, you discuss the philosophy of science of Karl Popper and its relevance for evaluating the scientific status of parapsychology. Do you think Popper's thinking has been correctly understood? What are the main misrepresentations of Popper's ideas, in your opinion?
Popper is one of the very few philosophers whose work is praised by working scientists. His work on the philosophy of science – which I summarize in a chapter in my first book – is a masterpiece of thought. However, I have never read a single criticism of his work which was not based on a misunderstanding of it.
Popper’s basic premise is that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must be testable. That is, it must make predictions that are capable of being falsified in principle. One criticism which you will find again and again in the literature is that the principle of falsification is not itself capable of being falsified. So there! But what these critics do not understand is that the principle of falsification is not meant to be a scientific theory. That is, it is not a conjecture that attempts to explain a relationship between empirical facts. Rather, it is a methodology that provides a program of action which enables science to learn from its mistakes, and thereby progress.
Falsification is a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science, and not a criterion of meaning. Popper never maintained that philosophical ideas or theories are meaningless; they are just not capable of being tested.
5) In your first book you mention that, in forthcoming books, you'll address and examine critically the evidence for life after death. Can you tell us something more about your forthcoming books on the afterlife?
Well, as I said earlier, my second book, which has just been released, is titled Science and the Near Death Experience. It deals with the mind-body relationship, and what the NDE can tell us about that. There is an extensive discussion of the NDE, and a comparison of NDEs from different cultures around the world. It turns out that here is a lot of cross-cultural similarity between Western and Eastern reports, and between reports from modern civilizations and from tribal cultures such as the Maori and Native American.
In my new book I also deal with all of the alternative explanations: oxygen deprivation, carbon dioxide poisoning, and so on. Ultimately, none of these materialistic explanations holds up.
6) In your excellent article "Does Consciousness depend on the Brain?" you argue that the transmission theory of consciousness is a better explanation than the productive theory. But some people say that, from a scientific point of view (even from a Popperian stance) the productive theory is better because it is in principle falsifiable. But the transmission theory doesn't seem easy to refute since that it is consistent with all the facts and with any imaginable fact, making it untestable. What do you think of this objection?
In the first place, the production theory – the idea that the brain produces the mind – has been convincingly falsified by the evidence. And holding on to a falsified belief is the antithesis of scientific thinking – it is ideological thinking.
But we need to be more clear here on what we mean by “theory,” and what we mean by “fact.” For instance, gravity is a fact of nature, yet we have theories of how gravity works. Similarly, evolution appears to be a historical fact – after all, there is the fossil record. Yet we also have theories of how evolution works.
Scientific theories are not speculation about isolated facts; they are tentative explanations about how certain facts fit together. When Isaac Newton proposed that a planet and the sun are attracted by a gravitational force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, he proposed a relation between masses and distances—a relation that of course became celebrated as the Newtonian theory of gravity.
So, the question is: do the facts seem to indicate that the brain produces the mind? Or on the contrary, do they seem to indicate that the brain works as a receiver-transmitter for the mind? I argue in my new book that an examination of all of the evidence indicates the latter. The evidence is not consistent with production, but is consistent with transmission. In other words, it seems to be a fact that the brain works as a receiver-transmitter. A scientific transmission theory would propose to explain how the brain works this way. There have been several such theories, most due to brain scientists such as John Eccles, or to physicists such as Henry Stapp and Evan Harris Walker. To the extent that these transmission theories are testable, they are scientific theories. And Walker’s theory makes several testable predictions – it is not, as you put it, “consistent with any conceivable fact.”
So, in a nutshell, that objection is based upon a common misunderstanding of what a scientific theory really is, and so confuses fact with theory.
7) Do you think the super-ESP hypothesis is a reasonable alternative explanation for the evidence suggesting an afterlife?
No, I don’t think ESP or the hypothetical super-ESP can explain the best cases. I deal with this issue in considerable depth in my third book, which I intend to release within the next two years.
8) Do you see any contradiction between reincarnation and evolutionary biology? Reincarnation seems to suggest a spiritual path parallel to the evolutionary process; but evolution being a purposeless and blind process, it seems implausible that there is exist an independent spiritual line corresponding to such evolutionary process.
Well, the key phrase here is “evolution being a purposeless and blind process.” That is an assumption, not a fact. It is an assumption that is based on a materialistic, atheistic worldview. Darwin himself could never fully believe this. If the facts strongly suggest or even indicate the reality of reincarnation, then it is pointless to say that “it seems implausible” given a certain assumption. That is dogmatic, a priori thinking. And by the way, I also deal with this issue in my third book.
9) Do you think that some cases of NDEs provide evidence for the survival hypothesis?
Yes, I deal with this at length in a full chapter of my new book Science and the Near Death Experience.
10) Do you think quantum mechanics is relevant for the discussion on consciousness, parapsychology and the afterlife?
Yes, of course! The problem with most of the so-called skeptics is that their worldview is based upon classical physics, which has been know to be fundamentally flawed since the early years of the twentieth century. As I said before, most of the deniers are psychologists and philosophers, not physicists. For instance, prominent deniers Ray Hyman, Richard Wiseman, and Susan Blackmore are all psychologists. Many prominent quantum physicists, such as David Bohm and Nobel prize winner Brian Josephson, have repeatedly stated that nothing in quantum mechanics rules out psychic abilities.
I have a whole chapter in my new book Science and the Near Death Experience called “Physics and Consciousness” which deals with this issue.
11) Some critics say that contemporary science is essentially naturalistic and secular; and has no room for supernatural, religious or quasi-religious concepts like the "soul", "reincarnation", "afterlife" or "God"? What do you think of this point of view?
Well, there are a lot of loaded terms in that question – “naturalistic”, “supernatural”, “quasi-religious.” By the way, when you read or hear criticisms that contain a lot of loaded terms such as “supernatural” and “quasi-religious,” that’s a good sign that you are dealing with a sophist.
If there is good evidence for reincarnation or the afterlife, then it is unscientific to ignore or deny that evidence. If they exist, then they are part of nature, and are not “supernatural.” The history of science shows that our view of what nature contains has been enlarged and expanded again and again; that is called scientific progress.
David Bohm defined the main characteristic of the scientific attitude as “openness to evidence.” The writer David Marshall wrote recently: “The best scientist -- or theologian -- is not someone who shouts 'heresy!' when he hears strange views, but one who listens carefully and responds with reason and evidence. When it comes to ultimate questions, 'openness to evidence' is the definition that counts."
12) In addition to your book (and forthcoming books), what books or literature on philosophy, parapsychology and the afterlife would you recommend to the readers of this interview?
I would recommend physicist Nick Herbert’s very entertaining book Elemental Mind. It’s a great introduction to the implications of the new physics for the mind/body problem.
13) Something else you would like to add to end the interview?
Yes. I would briefly like to say something about materialism and science. Materialists sometimes claim that the successes of modern science have been due to a materialistic outlook. But this is nonsense. The three men most responsible for the scientific revolution – Galileo, Kepler, and Newton – were not materialists. One of the reasons Galileo recanted his views is because he feared the Church would excommunicate him. Newton spent the last years of his life writing books on theology.
Materialism is an ancient philosophy that basically asserts that everything has a material cause, and it dates back at least to Democritus. It was thought to gain support from the physics of Isaac Newton, although Newton himself did not agree with this, and instead endorsed the dualism of Rene Descartes. It was the eighteenth century philosophes, such as Diderot and Voltaire, who spread the doctrine of materialism and mechanism, with the intention of combating the religious fanaticism and superstition common in their time.
The success of modern science has not been due to any particular philosophy of the relationship between mind and body, but rather to the principle of empirical hypothesis testing. Materialism as a scientific hypothesis makes two bold and admirable predictions: psychic abilities such as telepathy do not exist; and we will find no convincing evidence that the mind can operate without a properly functioning brain. But both of these predictions have been violated again and again, by evidence that stands up to the most severe critical scrutiny. Hence, it is unscientific to continue to believe in materialism. Those who do so today are either ignorant of the evidence, or have ideological motivations to dismiss it.
By the way, those who are interested in my new book Science and the Near Death Experience can learn more about it on Amazon, or by visiting the website of Inner Traditions publishers.
Links of interest:
-Website of Carter's new book Science and the Near-Death Experience.
-Chris Carter's article "Does consciousness depend on the brain?"
-Chris Carter's interview in Alex Tsakiris' podcast (here).
-Physicist Henry Stapp's recent paper "Compatibility of contemporary physical theory with personal survival"
-Read William James' lecture "Human Immortality"
-Read philosopher C.J. Ducasse's book "A critical examination in the belief in an afterlife"
-My other "subversive interviews"
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Science and the Near-Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death by Chris Carter
This book hasn't been released yet, but it's available for Pre-Order in Amazon.com.
The author is philosopher Chris Carter, who as most of my readers know, wrote one of the best current books on parapsychology in print and an absolute must read (entitled Parapsychology and the Skeptics).
As promised in his previous book, Carter now turns his focus and sharp mind to the examination of the evidence for near-death experiences and the debate surrounding it in his newest book Science and Near-Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death.
According to the description of it in Amazon.com, this book:
• Explains why near-death experiences (NDEs) offer evidence of an afterlife and discredits the psychological and physiological explanations for them
• Challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death
• Examines ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and many from tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori
Predating all organized religion, the belief in an afterlife is fundamental to the human experience and dates back at least to the Neanderthals. By the mid-19th century, however, spurred by the progress of science, many people began to question the existence of an afterlife, and the doctrine of materialism--which believes that consciousness is a creation of the brain--began to spread. Now, armed with scientific evidence, Chris Carter challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death and shows how near-death experiences (NDEs) may truly provide a glimpse of an awaiting afterlife.
Using evidence from scientific studies, quantum mechanics, and consciousness research, Carter reveals how consciousness does not depend on the brain and may, in fact, survive the death of our bodies. Examining ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori, he explains how NDEs provide evidence of consciousness surviving the death of our bodies. He looks at the many psychological and physiological explanations for NDEs raised by skeptics--such as stress, birth memories, or oxygen starvation--and clearly shows why each of them fails to truly explain the NDE. Exploring the similarities between NDEs and visions experienced during actual death and the intersection of physics and consciousness, Carter uncovers the truth about mind, matter, and life after death.
As any of the readers of Carter's previous book will know, he's a readable, thoughful and careful writer, and his Oxford-trained philosophical skills allow him to examine every argument in a rigurous, informed, philosophically sophisticated and objective way, without attacking any straw men.
Given Carter's excellent previous book, I'm sure his lastest one will be another masterpiece and, above all, an important and original philosophical and scientific contribution to the debate about the afterlife and near-death experiences.
An excerpt of this book can be read here.
The author is philosopher Chris Carter, who as most of my readers know, wrote one of the best current books on parapsychology in print and an absolute must read (entitled Parapsychology and the Skeptics).
As promised in his previous book, Carter now turns his focus and sharp mind to the examination of the evidence for near-death experiences and the debate surrounding it in his newest book Science and Near-Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death.
According to the description of it in Amazon.com, this book:
• Explains why near-death experiences (NDEs) offer evidence of an afterlife and discredits the psychological and physiological explanations for them
• Challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death
• Examines ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and many from tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori
Predating all organized religion, the belief in an afterlife is fundamental to the human experience and dates back at least to the Neanderthals. By the mid-19th century, however, spurred by the progress of science, many people began to question the existence of an afterlife, and the doctrine of materialism--which believes that consciousness is a creation of the brain--began to spread. Now, armed with scientific evidence, Chris Carter challenges materialist arguments against consciousness surviving death and shows how near-death experiences (NDEs) may truly provide a glimpse of an awaiting afterlife.
Using evidence from scientific studies, quantum mechanics, and consciousness research, Carter reveals how consciousness does not depend on the brain and may, in fact, survive the death of our bodies. Examining ancient and modern accounts of NDEs from around the world, including China, India, and tribal societies such as the Native American and the Maori, he explains how NDEs provide evidence of consciousness surviving the death of our bodies. He looks at the many psychological and physiological explanations for NDEs raised by skeptics--such as stress, birth memories, or oxygen starvation--and clearly shows why each of them fails to truly explain the NDE. Exploring the similarities between NDEs and visions experienced during actual death and the intersection of physics and consciousness, Carter uncovers the truth about mind, matter, and life after death.
As any of the readers of Carter's previous book will know, he's a readable, thoughful and careful writer, and his Oxford-trained philosophical skills allow him to examine every argument in a rigurous, informed, philosophically sophisticated and objective way, without attacking any straw men.
Given Carter's excellent previous book, I'm sure his lastest one will be another masterpiece and, above all, an important and original philosophical and scientific contribution to the debate about the afterlife and near-death experiences.
An excerpt of this book can be read here.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Keith D. Wood on G.M. Woerlee and Steven Novella skeptical critiques of NDEs
Keith D. Wood has written some criticisms of recent skeptical attempts to explain NDEs in materialistic terms alone.
You can read Wood's critique of Gerald Woerlee in this link.
Wood's critique of Steven Novella's skeptical opinions on NDEs can be read here.
Alex Tsakiris has commented on Novella's views "Dr. Novella isn’t just a little bit wrong, he’s completely at odds with the large body of published research on near-death experience… the science of researchers we’ve interviewed like, Dr. Jeffrey Long, Dr. Peter Fenwick, Dr. Penny Sartori and others like Dr. Bruce Greyson and Dr. Sam Parnia and Dr. Michael Sabom, Dr. Pim Van Lommel, and many, many others all point in the opposite direction"
You can read Wood's critique of Gerald Woerlee in this link.
Wood's critique of Steven Novella's skeptical opinions on NDEs can be read here.
Alex Tsakiris has commented on Novella's views "Dr. Novella isn’t just a little bit wrong, he’s completely at odds with the large body of published research on near-death experience… the science of researchers we’ve interviewed like, Dr. Jeffrey Long, Dr. Peter Fenwick, Dr. Penny Sartori and others like Dr. Bruce Greyson and Dr. Sam Parnia and Dr. Michael Sabom, Dr. Pim Van Lommel, and many, many others all point in the opposite direction"
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Science and out of body experiences by physicist Dr Thomas Campbell
Physicist and author Thomas Campbell giving a keynote speech at the Monroe Institute's 22nd Professional Seminar.
Campbell was one of the original consciousness explorers at The Monroe Institute (TMI) in Virginia in the 1970s and the explorer identified as "TC Physicist" in Bob Monroe's book Far Journeys. Campbell, working alongside electrical engineer Dennis Mennerich, discovered what is now known as Hemi-Sync, the binaural-beat approach to inner exploration that came to be almost synonymous with TMI.
As Bob Monroe's protégé, Campbell worked in the TMI lab and participated in explorer sessions as a subject. He was one of the first trainers and finished his tenure at TMI as an advisory-board member.
Using his mastery of the out-of-body experience as a springboard, he dedicated his research to discovering the outer boundaries, inner workings, and causal dynamics of the larger reality system. In February of 2003, Campbell published the My Big TOE trilogy, which represents the results and conclusions of his scientific exploration of the nature of existence. This overarching model of reality, mind, and consciousness merges physics with metaphysics, explains the paranormal as well as the normal, places spirituality within a scientific context, and provides direction for those wishing to personally experience an expanded awareness of All That Is.
My Big TOE speaks to each individual reader about his or her innate capabilities. Readers will learn to appreciate that their human potential stretches far beyond the limitations of the physical universe. The acronym TOE is a standard term in the physics community that stands for Theory Of Everything and has been the Holy Grail of that community for fifty years. My Big TOE delivers the solution to that scientific quest at the laymans level with precision and clarity.
Campbell was one of the original consciousness explorers at The Monroe Institute (TMI) in Virginia in the 1970s and the explorer identified as "TC Physicist" in Bob Monroe's book Far Journeys. Campbell, working alongside electrical engineer Dennis Mennerich, discovered what is now known as Hemi-Sync, the binaural-beat approach to inner exploration that came to be almost synonymous with TMI.
As Bob Monroe's protégé, Campbell worked in the TMI lab and participated in explorer sessions as a subject. He was one of the first trainers and finished his tenure at TMI as an advisory-board member.
Using his mastery of the out-of-body experience as a springboard, he dedicated his research to discovering the outer boundaries, inner workings, and causal dynamics of the larger reality system. In February of 2003, Campbell published the My Big TOE trilogy, which represents the results and conclusions of his scientific exploration of the nature of existence. This overarching model of reality, mind, and consciousness merges physics with metaphysics, explains the paranormal as well as the normal, places spirituality within a scientific context, and provides direction for those wishing to personally experience an expanded awareness of All That Is.
My Big TOE speaks to each individual reader about his or her innate capabilities. Readers will learn to appreciate that their human potential stretches far beyond the limitations of the physical universe. The acronym TOE is a standard term in the physics community that stands for Theory Of Everything and has been the Holy Grail of that community for fifty years. My Big TOE delivers the solution to that scientific quest at the laymans level with precision and clarity.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Alan Crossley on the physical mediumship of Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.
Alan Crossley talks about his experiences of materialisation seances with Helen Duncan and Alec Harris.
Friday, February 12, 2010
Friday, January 29, 2010
Thursday, January 21, 2010
A fictional dialogue between a survivalist/dualist and a materialist/skeptic (part 7)
This is part 7 of my fictional dialogues between a survivalist and a materialist:
Materialist: I'd like to discuss the epistemological support of your survival belief. My thesis is that, even if survival exists, it's irrational to believe in it, because "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", and the evidence for survival (which is an extraordinary claim) is not extraordinary. Therefore, your belief in survival is not justified.
Note that my claim is not about the existence or non-existence of survival (even though I think it doesn't exist), but about the rational justification of your belief in survival.
Survivalist: Interesting.
Given that the basic premise of your argument is the epistemic principle that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", I'll have to address this principle, because if that principle is misapplied, your whole argument collapses.
First, I'd like to concede that, in general, such principle is reasonable. You'd expect that a stronger claim be supported by a stronger evidence. But in that case, intellectual honesty demands that, in advance, you specify that would you accept as "extraordinary" evidence; otherwise, it leaves room for arbitrary dismissing of positive evidence for the claim that you want to reject (and pseudo-skeptics, rarely if ever, specify in advance and unambiguously what evidence for survival or psi would they accept)
But that principle is not absolute, that is, it has epistemic limitations for a truth-seeker and we can't be uncritical regarding it:
1)The world and its phenomena are not intrinsically ordinary or extraordinary; they're only ordinary and extraordinary regarding our background knowledge or our worldview, not in themselves. For example:
-The claim "Flu is caused by a virus" is considered ordinary for most people, because most people already accepts it as correct. But in 12th century, such claim would be considered ridiculous and extraordinary. (But note that viruses have always caused flu and thereby the claim "Flu is caused by a virus" has been always true, regardless of whether we consider such claim, and the evidence for it, as ordinary or extraordinary!)
-The claim "Stones falls from the sky" is currently considered ordinary by people who are familiar with meteorites; but such claim was considered ridiculous, false and extraordinary many years ago.
-The claim that ordinary macroscopic objects like chairs, balls and shoes are composed mostly of empty space and are not "compact" or "solid" in the common sense (which is true according our best current scientific theory: quantum physics) would be considered false and extraordinary in the 15th century. But despite this, such claim is true.
Materialist: But you're conflating the existence of a phenomenon with the rationality of the belief in it. What's at stake is the criteria for testing a claim (an epistemological problem), not the actual existence of the phenomenon (an ontological problem).
Survivalist: You missed my point. My whole point is to show that the concepts of extraordinary or ordinary are not an INTRINSIC property of specific claims, but a RELATIVE (=context dependent) property of them.
My above historical and factual examples show that the claims for the existence of a phenomenon is not intrinsically ordinary or extraordinary; and this implies that considerations about a claim being extraordinary or ordinary is not intrinsic to the claim itself or the methods to testing it, but that it's a property dependent on a BACKGROUND assumption (theoretical, metaphysical, etc.).
In other words, the claim "Stones falls from the sky" is not, intrinsically and by itself, ordinary or extraordinary. It's ordinary or extraordinary only regarding some context of knowledge which functions as a background to compare such claim with. This explains why such claim was considered extraordinary many years ago and it's considered ordinary in current times.
The claim is the same, but the jugdement of it as extraordinary or ordinary is not an intrinsic absolute property of such claim, but a relative property of it according to some background or context of knowledge.
Your fallacy consist in (explicitly or, mostly, implicitly) assuming materialism and metaphysical naturalism as the background and, from there, asserting that survival or psi is extrarodinary (and you're right that IF materialism and naturalism are right, THEN survival is "extraordinary" or, perhaps, even impossible; but the truth or falsehood of materialism is precisely part of what's at stake, so you're begging the question against the survivalist when you implicitly assume that materialism is true to argue that a claim of survival is extraordinary!)
2)Another problem and limitation of your "extraordinary..." principle, is that in many cases, everybody (including pseudo-skeptics) accepts an extraordinary claim based on completely ordinary evidence.
For example, the claim "Two planes have struck the Twin Towers in NYC the same day" is an extraordinary claim according to the background knowledge of the accidents and cultural history of NYC. But the evidence for it was pretty ordinary (videos, testimonies, TV news, etc.) .
In fact, almost each person (including the materialistic pseudo-skeptics) accepted the above extraordinary claim after watching videos like these:
No pseudo-skeptic (even the very common irrational ones) would reject the evidential value of such videos and say "I'm rational and skeptic, videos proves nothing. I want scientific, reproducible, doble blind laboratory studies providing evidence for your extraordinary claim about two planes crashing in the twin towers at the same day" or "I don't accept your evidence, because videos can be tricked!")
Actually, they accept this extraordinary claim based on ordinary evidence because such claim doesn't conflict with the pseudo-skeptic's materialist, atheist and metaphysical naturalist ideology, nor it's contrary to the scientific orthodoxy or establisment. So, it's entirely inside of scope of the pseudo-skeptic's ideological belief system.
Another example: Well-known TV presenter and expert in wild animals Steve Irwin was killed by a stingray some years ago.
The claim "Steven Irwin was killed by a stingray" is antecedently improbable and extraordinary according to the following criteria:
-He was a first rate hands on expert dealing with wild animals (including stingrays).
-More importantly, according to the scientific knowledge about stingrays, these animals are not violent or aggressive. According to this website on stingrays: "Stingrays spend the majority of their time inactive, partially buried in sand, camouflated from predatory sharks and larger rays. Stingrays are carnivores. They feed at night and eat crabs, shrimps, worms, small bottom dwelling fish. Many rays have jaw teeth to crush mollusks. Stingrays cannot see their prey. They use the sense of smell and electro-receptors to detect it. When threatened, their primary reaction is to swim away. However, if attacked, stingrays will use their barbed stinger" (emphasis added).
As a matter of fact, it's so monumentally improbable that a stingray will attack (let alone kill) any person, that in aquariums and marine zoos, children are enabled to play with stingrays, as you can watch in this video:
In fact, in certain places, it's common that divers and other people happily swin along stingrays, feed them, play and have fun with them without any rationally justified worry of being "attacked" by them (precisely because an attack by them is monumentally improbable), as you can see in these videos:
Since that Irwin wasn't a normal person dealing with animals but an EXPERT in wild animals and, moreover, he wasn't attacking the stingray, it's even more monumentally improbable that the stingray would attack him. And therefore, the claim that it did it is antecedently improbable and very, very, extraordinary.
But even if we accept (for the argument's sake) that Irwin attacked it (he didn't), it's still improbable that the stingray's attack would kill him, since that 1)Irwin is an expert in animals; and 2)It's extraordinarily rare that a human being, when exceptionally attacked by a stingray, be killed by it.
Regarding 2, according to this article published in the Washinton Post entitled "How deadly are stingrays", the author writes: " The animal's barbed tail delivers venom that causes excruciating pain, but it almost never kills. Several different figures for the number of recorded stingray-related fatalities have surfaced in the media, ranging from "about 30" worldwide, to "fewer than 20," to "only 17."
Note that stingrays' "almost never kills" and the fatalities caused by it are extraordinarily rare. In other words, it's possible that a stingray can kills, but it's IMPROBABLE (according to the scientific information we have about the behaviour of such animals and the number of deaths caused by them: only 17 in the moment of Irwin's death!).
However, the evidence of the extraordinary claim "Steve Irwin was killed by a stingray" was pretty ordinary (a video recording it, testimonies of a friend of Irwin and the autopsy).
No materialistic pseudo-skeptic would argue that he doesn't believe such claim because it's a extraordinary claim and the evidence is ordinary. He won't say "I don't accept such claim because videos proves nothing. Moreover, the witness is a friend of Irwin, and this make him biased. The supposed video was never published and so it cannot be studied; the pathologist who made the autopsy was a friend of Irwin and was biased too, and I need a replication of the autopsy by independent skeptical pathologists, etc." )
Given that "Irwin was killed by a stingray" is a claim that doesn't conflict with the pseudo-skeptic's ideology, the pseudo-skeptic accepts such extraordinary claim based on ordinary evidence. (But you could be sure that if pseudo-skeptics, for ideological reasons, would think that it's impossible that a stingray can kill someone, they would employ all the above excuses and many others)
Logical consistency would demand that pseudo-skeptics employ the "extraordinary claim/evidence" principle in each case, but they only apply it to reject evidence for psi, afterlife or other unconventional claim that is incompatible with atheistic materialism and metaphysical naturalism (and in general, with the pseudo-skeptic's beliefs in whatever topic).
Materialist: Again, I think you're conflating many things here.
Firstly, your example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not a extraordinary claim, because planes can crash against building and it's not a supernatural event inconsistent with known natural laws. The same is valid to your example on Irwin and stingrays.
Take for example someone who wins the lottery. Many people think it's improbable and extraordinary, but actually and as a matter of necessity SOMEONE has to win it.
Secondly, you're conflating the concept of "extraordinary" in everyday or common sense with the concept of extraordinary in scientific sense.
Survivalist: You're wrong.
First, you creates a straw man when you assert that my claim about the 9/11 is not extraordinary because "planes can crash against buildings". But it's not the claim I'm making.
My claim is "Two planes have struck the Twin Towers in NYC the same day", and this IS an antecedently improbable claim.
To see that, just imagine that you're in a shopping store and someone besides you, casually, say to you "Look, did you know that this morning a big meteorite just fell to the White House, destroyed it and killed the president of U.S?
Would you believe in such claim based on that casual testimony alone? Probably not, because you'd expect an event like that would cause a worldwide disorder, and you see no sign of it, except the claim of the such person.
"Meteorites falling on Earth" is a ordinary claim according to our current scientific knowledge, but "A big meteorite destroying the White House and killing the U.S. President" is an extraordinary claim and antecedently improbable given the known social effects of meteorites that often fall on Earth.
Your example of winning the lottery is a good one, because it shows your confusion. The unspecific claim "Someone won the lottery" is ordinary and probable according to our knowledge of how lottery functions.
But that a specific person (let's say, Jime Sayaka or any of the readers of my blog) will win the lottery is antecedently improbable and extraordinary. What's the probability that YOU will win the lottery for a prize of one million dollars if you play it tomorrow? Do you think it's probable that specifically YOU, out of the thousand of people participating in the lottery, will win it? Obviously, not, you're fully aware that it's a very improbable that you will win it, EVEN if "someone" surely will win it.
This is why you conflates a general, ordinary and probable claim (like "planes can crash against building" or "someone will win the lottery") with specific, extraordinary and antecedently improbable claims (like "Two planes crashed the same day against the Twin Towers" or "Jime Sayaka will win the lottery")
Regarding your argument that my example about planes in NYC is not extraordinary because it doesn't violates any natural law, it's simply irrelevant, because I'm examining the claim "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", not the claim "Supernatural claims require extraordinary evidence".
Extraordinary is not equivalent to "supernatural" or events that violate natural laws. A claim could be considered "extraordinary" (according to certain criteria) even if it's consistent with natural laws (see my above examples, all of which are consistent with natural laws.)
Your fallacy consists in conflating extraordinary with supernatural (at most, the latter is a species of the former). I'm discussing the former in general, not the latter in particular.
Finally, your distinction of "extraordinary" in common sense and in science implicitly supports my point that "extraordinary" or "ordinary" are context-dependent (i.e. what's extraordinary in common sense could be ordinary in scientific sense), not an intrinsic absolute property of any given claim.
And this destroys your application of that principle against the belief in survival. You can only argue that the claim "survival exist" is extraordinary if you beg the question against the survivalist, that is, assuming that science proves or support materialism over survivalism; and your most important argument for it is the "dependence of mind on the brain" which (as I've proved in our previous dialogues) is question begging because you're explicitly or implicitly interpreting "dependence" in a materialistic sense alone and exclusively (that is, as "productive dependence", when what's at stake is precisely the kind of mind-brain dependence, if productive or transmissive).
Materialist: Even if you were right (and I don't think so) you have not proved that a claim like "survival exists" is probable or ordinary.
Survivalist: So what? I'm arguing against your objection that such claim is improbable, not making a positive case for its probability (which I think could be done).
Materialist: And you have not posed any better alternative that the principle that I'm defending.
Survivalist: Again, my purpose here is to show that your epistemological objection against my survivalist belief fails, not to make a treatise of epistemology or posing alternative rules to the one defended by you.
In any case, I propose the following rule: Claims (ordinary or extraordinary) require SUFFICIENT evidence (where "sufficient" is not determined by archair thinking or mainstream prejudices but only in a case-by-case empirical basis and according to the specific conditions of the claims in question and the probatory methods at hand. Given a specific claim and certain conditions specified in advance, we can know, also in advance, what would count as sufficient evidence for it. )
But I have no time to defend this epistemogical rule in this moment.
I just want to add that Marcello Truzzi, who originally coined the principle "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", when discoveried that pseudo-skeptics used such rule to raise the bar and move the goal posts (to reject any positive evidence presented in favor of psi, survival or any other unconventional claim that pseudo-skeptics don't want to accept), tried to refute his own principle.
According to this website: "I might note here that it was Marcello, not Carl Sagan, who coined the often-misattributed maxim "Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence." In recent years Marcello had come to conclude that the phrase was a non sequitur, meaningless and question-begging, and he intended to write a debunking of his own words. Sad to say, he never got around to it." (emphasis in blue added)
Sadly, Truzzi died prematurely, and we'll never know what his refutation of that principle would be like. Possibly, Truzzi had defended a very qualified version of such principle (like I've done in this dialogue) making explicit its limitations and problems, possibly would stress the abuses and misapplications of it by professional pseudo-skeptics.
Materialist: I don't agree with Truzzi.
Survivalist: I do, but we could discuss this in another moment.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
-Part 6
Materialist: I'd like to discuss the epistemological support of your survival belief. My thesis is that, even if survival exists, it's irrational to believe in it, because "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", and the evidence for survival (which is an extraordinary claim) is not extraordinary. Therefore, your belief in survival is not justified.
Note that my claim is not about the existence or non-existence of survival (even though I think it doesn't exist), but about the rational justification of your belief in survival.
Survivalist: Interesting.
Given that the basic premise of your argument is the epistemic principle that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", I'll have to address this principle, because if that principle is misapplied, your whole argument collapses.
First, I'd like to concede that, in general, such principle is reasonable. You'd expect that a stronger claim be supported by a stronger evidence. But in that case, intellectual honesty demands that, in advance, you specify that would you accept as "extraordinary" evidence; otherwise, it leaves room for arbitrary dismissing of positive evidence for the claim that you want to reject (and pseudo-skeptics, rarely if ever, specify in advance and unambiguously what evidence for survival or psi would they accept)
But that principle is not absolute, that is, it has epistemic limitations for a truth-seeker and we can't be uncritical regarding it:
1)The world and its phenomena are not intrinsically ordinary or extraordinary; they're only ordinary and extraordinary regarding our background knowledge or our worldview, not in themselves. For example:
-The claim "Flu is caused by a virus" is considered ordinary for most people, because most people already accepts it as correct. But in 12th century, such claim would be considered ridiculous and extraordinary. (But note that viruses have always caused flu and thereby the claim "Flu is caused by a virus" has been always true, regardless of whether we consider such claim, and the evidence for it, as ordinary or extraordinary!)
-The claim "Stones falls from the sky" is currently considered ordinary by people who are familiar with meteorites; but such claim was considered ridiculous, false and extraordinary many years ago.
-The claim that ordinary macroscopic objects like chairs, balls and shoes are composed mostly of empty space and are not "compact" or "solid" in the common sense (which is true according our best current scientific theory: quantum physics) would be considered false and extraordinary in the 15th century. But despite this, such claim is true.
Materialist: But you're conflating the existence of a phenomenon with the rationality of the belief in it. What's at stake is the criteria for testing a claim (an epistemological problem), not the actual existence of the phenomenon (an ontological problem).
Survivalist: You missed my point. My whole point is to show that the concepts of extraordinary or ordinary are not an INTRINSIC property of specific claims, but a RELATIVE (=context dependent) property of them.
My above historical and factual examples show that the claims for the existence of a phenomenon is not intrinsically ordinary or extraordinary; and this implies that considerations about a claim being extraordinary or ordinary is not intrinsic to the claim itself or the methods to testing it, but that it's a property dependent on a BACKGROUND assumption (theoretical, metaphysical, etc.).
In other words, the claim "Stones falls from the sky" is not, intrinsically and by itself, ordinary or extraordinary. It's ordinary or extraordinary only regarding some context of knowledge which functions as a background to compare such claim with. This explains why such claim was considered extraordinary many years ago and it's considered ordinary in current times.
The claim is the same, but the jugdement of it as extraordinary or ordinary is not an intrinsic absolute property of such claim, but a relative property of it according to some background or context of knowledge.
Your fallacy consist in (explicitly or, mostly, implicitly) assuming materialism and metaphysical naturalism as the background and, from there, asserting that survival or psi is extrarodinary (and you're right that IF materialism and naturalism are right, THEN survival is "extraordinary" or, perhaps, even impossible; but the truth or falsehood of materialism is precisely part of what's at stake, so you're begging the question against the survivalist when you implicitly assume that materialism is true to argue that a claim of survival is extraordinary!)
2)Another problem and limitation of your "extraordinary..." principle, is that in many cases, everybody (including pseudo-skeptics) accepts an extraordinary claim based on completely ordinary evidence.
For example, the claim "Two planes have struck the Twin Towers in NYC the same day" is an extraordinary claim according to the background knowledge of the accidents and cultural history of NYC. But the evidence for it was pretty ordinary (videos, testimonies, TV news, etc.) .
In fact, almost each person (including the materialistic pseudo-skeptics) accepted the above extraordinary claim after watching videos like these:
No pseudo-skeptic (even the very common irrational ones) would reject the evidential value of such videos and say "I'm rational and skeptic, videos proves nothing. I want scientific, reproducible, doble blind laboratory studies providing evidence for your extraordinary claim about two planes crashing in the twin towers at the same day" or "I don't accept your evidence, because videos can be tricked!")
Actually, they accept this extraordinary claim based on ordinary evidence because such claim doesn't conflict with the pseudo-skeptic's materialist, atheist and metaphysical naturalist ideology, nor it's contrary to the scientific orthodoxy or establisment. So, it's entirely inside of scope of the pseudo-skeptic's ideological belief system.
Another example: Well-known TV presenter and expert in wild animals Steve Irwin was killed by a stingray some years ago.
The claim "Steven Irwin was killed by a stingray" is antecedently improbable and extraordinary according to the following criteria:
-He was a first rate hands on expert dealing with wild animals (including stingrays).
-More importantly, according to the scientific knowledge about stingrays, these animals are not violent or aggressive. According to this website on stingrays: "Stingrays spend the majority of their time inactive, partially buried in sand, camouflated from predatory sharks and larger rays. Stingrays are carnivores. They feed at night and eat crabs, shrimps, worms, small bottom dwelling fish. Many rays have jaw teeth to crush mollusks. Stingrays cannot see their prey. They use the sense of smell and electro-receptors to detect it. When threatened, their primary reaction is to swim away. However, if attacked, stingrays will use their barbed stinger" (emphasis added).
As a matter of fact, it's so monumentally improbable that a stingray will attack (let alone kill) any person, that in aquariums and marine zoos, children are enabled to play with stingrays, as you can watch in this video:
In fact, in certain places, it's common that divers and other people happily swin along stingrays, feed them, play and have fun with them without any rationally justified worry of being "attacked" by them (precisely because an attack by them is monumentally improbable), as you can see in these videos:
Since that Irwin wasn't a normal person dealing with animals but an EXPERT in wild animals and, moreover, he wasn't attacking the stingray, it's even more monumentally improbable that the stingray would attack him. And therefore, the claim that it did it is antecedently improbable and very, very, extraordinary.
But even if we accept (for the argument's sake) that Irwin attacked it (he didn't), it's still improbable that the stingray's attack would kill him, since that 1)Irwin is an expert in animals; and 2)It's extraordinarily rare that a human being, when exceptionally attacked by a stingray, be killed by it.
Regarding 2, according to this article published in the Washinton Post entitled "How deadly are stingrays", the author writes: " The animal's barbed tail delivers venom that causes excruciating pain, but it almost never kills. Several different figures for the number of recorded stingray-related fatalities have surfaced in the media, ranging from "about 30" worldwide, to "fewer than 20," to "only 17."
Note that stingrays' "almost never kills" and the fatalities caused by it are extraordinarily rare. In other words, it's possible that a stingray can kills, but it's IMPROBABLE (according to the scientific information we have about the behaviour of such animals and the number of deaths caused by them: only 17 in the moment of Irwin's death!).
However, the evidence of the extraordinary claim "Steve Irwin was killed by a stingray" was pretty ordinary (a video recording it, testimonies of a friend of Irwin and the autopsy).
No materialistic pseudo-skeptic would argue that he doesn't believe such claim because it's a extraordinary claim and the evidence is ordinary. He won't say "I don't accept such claim because videos proves nothing. Moreover, the witness is a friend of Irwin, and this make him biased. The supposed video was never published and so it cannot be studied; the pathologist who made the autopsy was a friend of Irwin and was biased too, and I need a replication of the autopsy by independent skeptical pathologists, etc." )
Given that "Irwin was killed by a stingray" is a claim that doesn't conflict with the pseudo-skeptic's ideology, the pseudo-skeptic accepts such extraordinary claim based on ordinary evidence. (But you could be sure that if pseudo-skeptics, for ideological reasons, would think that it's impossible that a stingray can kill someone, they would employ all the above excuses and many others)
Logical consistency would demand that pseudo-skeptics employ the "extraordinary claim/evidence" principle in each case, but they only apply it to reject evidence for psi, afterlife or other unconventional claim that is incompatible with atheistic materialism and metaphysical naturalism (and in general, with the pseudo-skeptic's beliefs in whatever topic).
Materialist: Again, I think you're conflating many things here.
Firstly, your example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not a extraordinary claim, because planes can crash against building and it's not a supernatural event inconsistent with known natural laws. The same is valid to your example on Irwin and stingrays.
Take for example someone who wins the lottery. Many people think it's improbable and extraordinary, but actually and as a matter of necessity SOMEONE has to win it.
Secondly, you're conflating the concept of "extraordinary" in everyday or common sense with the concept of extraordinary in scientific sense.
Survivalist: You're wrong.
First, you creates a straw man when you assert that my claim about the 9/11 is not extraordinary because "planes can crash against buildings". But it's not the claim I'm making.
My claim is "Two planes have struck the Twin Towers in NYC the same day", and this IS an antecedently improbable claim.
To see that, just imagine that you're in a shopping store and someone besides you, casually, say to you "Look, did you know that this morning a big meteorite just fell to the White House, destroyed it and killed the president of U.S?
Would you believe in such claim based on that casual testimony alone? Probably not, because you'd expect an event like that would cause a worldwide disorder, and you see no sign of it, except the claim of the such person.
"Meteorites falling on Earth" is a ordinary claim according to our current scientific knowledge, but "A big meteorite destroying the White House and killing the U.S. President" is an extraordinary claim and antecedently improbable given the known social effects of meteorites that often fall on Earth.
Your example of winning the lottery is a good one, because it shows your confusion. The unspecific claim "Someone won the lottery" is ordinary and probable according to our knowledge of how lottery functions.
But that a specific person (let's say, Jime Sayaka or any of the readers of my blog) will win the lottery is antecedently improbable and extraordinary. What's the probability that YOU will win the lottery for a prize of one million dollars if you play it tomorrow? Do you think it's probable that specifically YOU, out of the thousand of people participating in the lottery, will win it? Obviously, not, you're fully aware that it's a very improbable that you will win it, EVEN if "someone" surely will win it.
This is why you conflates a general, ordinary and probable claim (like "planes can crash against building" or "someone will win the lottery") with specific, extraordinary and antecedently improbable claims (like "Two planes crashed the same day against the Twin Towers" or "Jime Sayaka will win the lottery")
Regarding your argument that my example about planes in NYC is not extraordinary because it doesn't violates any natural law, it's simply irrelevant, because I'm examining the claim "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", not the claim "Supernatural claims require extraordinary evidence".
Extraordinary is not equivalent to "supernatural" or events that violate natural laws. A claim could be considered "extraordinary" (according to certain criteria) even if it's consistent with natural laws (see my above examples, all of which are consistent with natural laws.)
Your fallacy consists in conflating extraordinary with supernatural (at most, the latter is a species of the former). I'm discussing the former in general, not the latter in particular.
Finally, your distinction of "extraordinary" in common sense and in science implicitly supports my point that "extraordinary" or "ordinary" are context-dependent (i.e. what's extraordinary in common sense could be ordinary in scientific sense), not an intrinsic absolute property of any given claim.
And this destroys your application of that principle against the belief in survival. You can only argue that the claim "survival exist" is extraordinary if you beg the question against the survivalist, that is, assuming that science proves or support materialism over survivalism; and your most important argument for it is the "dependence of mind on the brain" which (as I've proved in our previous dialogues) is question begging because you're explicitly or implicitly interpreting "dependence" in a materialistic sense alone and exclusively (that is, as "productive dependence", when what's at stake is precisely the kind of mind-brain dependence, if productive or transmissive).
Materialist: Even if you were right (and I don't think so) you have not proved that a claim like "survival exists" is probable or ordinary.
Survivalist: So what? I'm arguing against your objection that such claim is improbable, not making a positive case for its probability (which I think could be done).
Materialist: And you have not posed any better alternative that the principle that I'm defending.
Survivalist: Again, my purpose here is to show that your epistemological objection against my survivalist belief fails, not to make a treatise of epistemology or posing alternative rules to the one defended by you.
In any case, I propose the following rule: Claims (ordinary or extraordinary) require SUFFICIENT evidence (where "sufficient" is not determined by archair thinking or mainstream prejudices but only in a case-by-case empirical basis and according to the specific conditions of the claims in question and the probatory methods at hand. Given a specific claim and certain conditions specified in advance, we can know, also in advance, what would count as sufficient evidence for it. )
But I have no time to defend this epistemogical rule in this moment.
I just want to add that Marcello Truzzi, who originally coined the principle "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence", when discoveried that pseudo-skeptics used such rule to raise the bar and move the goal posts (to reject any positive evidence presented in favor of psi, survival or any other unconventional claim that pseudo-skeptics don't want to accept), tried to refute his own principle.
According to this website: "I might note here that it was Marcello, not Carl Sagan, who coined the often-misattributed maxim "Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence." In recent years Marcello had come to conclude that the phrase was a non sequitur, meaningless and question-begging, and he intended to write a debunking of his own words. Sad to say, he never got around to it." (emphasis in blue added)
Sadly, Truzzi died prematurely, and we'll never know what his refutation of that principle would be like. Possibly, Truzzi had defended a very qualified version of such principle (like I've done in this dialogue) making explicit its limitations and problems, possibly would stress the abuses and misapplications of it by professional pseudo-skeptics.
Materialist: I don't agree with Truzzi.
Survivalist: I do, but we could discuss this in another moment.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
-Part 6
Thursday, December 24, 2009
David Hume, causality or causation, the mind-body problem, immortality and the afterlife
Some materialists and metaphysical naturalists have argued that the concomitant variation between consciousness and the brain (i.e. mental states correlate and change with brain states) proves, or strongly support the thesis that, the brain "causes or produces" the mind. Therefore, after death, the mind will dissapear.
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Victor Zammit: Why Richard Dawkins is Wrong about the Afterlife
Thursday, December 10, 2009
A fictional dialogue between a survivalist/dualist and a materialist/skeptic (Part 6)
This is part 6 of my fictional dialogues between a survivalist and a materialist.
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Monday, November 23, 2009
Dinesh D'Souza and Life After Death: The Evidence
Author of several influential books on public policy, Dinesh D'Souza discussed his efforts researching the evidence for life-after-death. He drew from theories and trends in such fields as physics, biology, neuroscience, religion, psychology, and philosophy. While many of the scientists whose work he studied might be non-believers in an afterlife, he argued that he's put together "the big picture" which demonstrates the likely possibility of the survival of consciousness beyond death.
Near Death Experience of Renee Pasarow
Renee Pasarow was as a teenager when she had a NDE after she became unconscious following an allergic food reaction. Her NDE is unusual because it contains mystical elements such as an encounter with and immersion into the Sacred Light.
Visit Pasarow's website here.
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