Stephen E. Braude is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department at the University of Maryland Baltimore County. He is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Scientific Exploration.
Showing posts with label Consciousness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Consciousness. Show all posts
Friday, March 11, 2011
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
Henry Stapp and his paper entitled Compatibility of contemporary physical theory with personal survival
Stapp (left) and Jeffrey Schwartz (right)Professional quantum physicist and researcher Henry Stapp wrote an interesting paper entitled Compatibility of contemporary physical theory with personal survival, in which he discusses if quantum mechanics is compatible or not with the possibility of an afterlife.
Stapp concludes (contrary to the propaganda of materialistic ideologues) that nothing in contemporary physics precludes the possibility of an afterlife. In other words, the best and more foundamental of our scientific theories, namely quantum mechanics, is compatible with the existence of survival of consciousness.
For Stapp (who's an open mind skeptic of survival of consciousness), if an afterlife exists or not, is a matter of scientific research and evidence. But there is not an a priori scientific reason to exclude the physical possibility of an afterlife.
Links of interest:
-My comments on Stapp's book Mindful Universe.
-Other papers by Stapp here.
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Science and out of body experiences by physicist Dr Thomas Campbell
Physicist and author Thomas Campbell giving a keynote speech at the Monroe Institute's 22nd Professional Seminar.
Campbell was one of the original consciousness explorers at The Monroe Institute (TMI) in Virginia in the 1970s and the explorer identified as "TC Physicist" in Bob Monroe's book Far Journeys. Campbell, working alongside electrical engineer Dennis Mennerich, discovered what is now known as Hemi-Sync, the binaural-beat approach to inner exploration that came to be almost synonymous with TMI.
As Bob Monroe's protégé, Campbell worked in the TMI lab and participated in explorer sessions as a subject. He was one of the first trainers and finished his tenure at TMI as an advisory-board member.
Using his mastery of the out-of-body experience as a springboard, he dedicated his research to discovering the outer boundaries, inner workings, and causal dynamics of the larger reality system. In February of 2003, Campbell published the My Big TOE trilogy, which represents the results and conclusions of his scientific exploration of the nature of existence. This overarching model of reality, mind, and consciousness merges physics with metaphysics, explains the paranormal as well as the normal, places spirituality within a scientific context, and provides direction for those wishing to personally experience an expanded awareness of All That Is.
My Big TOE speaks to each individual reader about his or her innate capabilities. Readers will learn to appreciate that their human potential stretches far beyond the limitations of the physical universe. The acronym TOE is a standard term in the physics community that stands for Theory Of Everything and has been the Holy Grail of that community for fifty years. My Big TOE delivers the solution to that scientific quest at the laymans level with precision and clarity.
Campbell was one of the original consciousness explorers at The Monroe Institute (TMI) in Virginia in the 1970s and the explorer identified as "TC Physicist" in Bob Monroe's book Far Journeys. Campbell, working alongside electrical engineer Dennis Mennerich, discovered what is now known as Hemi-Sync, the binaural-beat approach to inner exploration that came to be almost synonymous with TMI.
As Bob Monroe's protégé, Campbell worked in the TMI lab and participated in explorer sessions as a subject. He was one of the first trainers and finished his tenure at TMI as an advisory-board member.
Using his mastery of the out-of-body experience as a springboard, he dedicated his research to discovering the outer boundaries, inner workings, and causal dynamics of the larger reality system. In February of 2003, Campbell published the My Big TOE trilogy, which represents the results and conclusions of his scientific exploration of the nature of existence. This overarching model of reality, mind, and consciousness merges physics with metaphysics, explains the paranormal as well as the normal, places spirituality within a scientific context, and provides direction for those wishing to personally experience an expanded awareness of All That Is.
My Big TOE speaks to each individual reader about his or her innate capabilities. Readers will learn to appreciate that their human potential stretches far beyond the limitations of the physical universe. The acronym TOE is a standard term in the physics community that stands for Theory Of Everything and has been the Holy Grail of that community for fifty years. My Big TOE delivers the solution to that scientific quest at the laymans level with precision and clarity.
Friday, February 26, 2010
Richard Carrier on Alex Rosenberg article The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality (Part 4)
Let's to examine another of atheist Richard Carrier's objections to Alex Rosenberg's essay on the actual and consistent implications of the naturalistic worldview.
Carrier's objection 6 is this:
(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..
Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:
1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".
But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.
Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)
Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)
It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.
2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."
But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.
But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).
For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.
The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.
Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.
More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).
The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).
Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).
This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".
3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."
What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).
As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)
This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)
Carrier's objection 6 is this:
(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..
Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:
1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".
But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.
Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)
Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)
It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.
2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."
But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.
But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).
For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.
The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.
Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.
More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).
The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).
Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).
This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".
3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."
What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).
As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)
This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)
TO BE CONTINUED...
Part 1 of this series here.
Monday, February 15, 2010
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences by Jeffrey Long and Paul Perry
I'm currently reading the book "The science of near-death experiences" by oncologist Jeffrey Long and Paul Perry.
I think this book is an important contribution to the NDEs literature.
In the website of Time magazine, you can read an interesting interview with Dr.Long.
Some excerpts of the interview with Dr.Long:
How do you respond to skeptics who say there must be some biological or physiological basis for that kind of experience, which you say in the book is medically inexplicable?
There have been over 20 alternative, skeptical "explanations" for near-death experience. The reason is very clear: no one or several skeptical explanations make sense, even to the skeptics themselves. Or [else ]there wouldn't be so many.
You say this research has affected you a lot on a personal level. How?
I'm a physician who fights cancer. In spite of our best efforts, not everybody is going to be cured. My absolute understanding that there is an afterlife for all of us — and a wonderful afterlife — helps me face cancer, this terribly frightening and threatening disease, with more courage than I've ever faced it with before. I can be a better physician for my patients.
I think this book is an important contribution to the NDEs literature.
In the website of Time magazine, you can read an interesting interview with Dr.Long.
Some excerpts of the interview with Dr.Long:
How do you respond to skeptics who say there must be some biological or physiological basis for that kind of experience, which you say in the book is medically inexplicable?
There have been over 20 alternative, skeptical "explanations" for near-death experience. The reason is very clear: no one or several skeptical explanations make sense, even to the skeptics themselves. Or [else ]there wouldn't be so many.
You say this research has affected you a lot on a personal level. How?
I'm a physician who fights cancer. In spite of our best efforts, not everybody is going to be cured. My absolute understanding that there is an afterlife for all of us — and a wonderful afterlife — helps me face cancer, this terribly frightening and threatening disease, with more courage than I've ever faced it with before. I can be a better physician for my patients.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
A brief comment on Frank Visser essay New Light on the Near-Death Experience
A reader brought to my attention an article on near-death experiences written by Frank Visser, founder of the website integralworld.net, a site dedicated to exploring philosopher Ken Wilber's theories and ideas.
I'll limit my post to Visser's comment on parapsychology, because I think Visser' opinion is misleading:
I'll limit my post to Visser's comment on parapsychology, because I think Visser' opinion is misleading:
"Parapsychology exists for over a century, but unfortunately after all these decades it cannot supply any well-established results. What is more, among those who study this field there are - in military terms - two groups: the hawks and the doves, or the sceptics and the believers. The believers state that the evidence for the paranormal is "overwhelming", and that those who after all these years still doubt it are members of the dogmatic Church of Science, are afraid of a paradigm shift, etc. On the other hand, sceptics state that the so-called evidence is shaky, often has a strong anecdotal flavor and does not hold up to scrutiny.
Sometimes, I have the idea that this could in large part be a matter of temperament. Some people are completely at home with the idea that ultimately everything can be reduced to matter (the materialist is philosophically an extravert); others attribute reality to their subjective feelings and thoughts (they are the philosophical introverts). May be there is a psychological for this fruitless battle between sceptics and believers, which frustrates the progress of this discussion. Both rationalize their emotional choice with ad hoc arguments, which make them feel comfortable. I myself am a dove who is very much interested in what hawks come up with... "
Some comments:
1-It's simply false that parapsychology cannot supply any well established results.
Whoever has read the best literature on parapsychology, in particular Dean Radin's books (The Conscious Universe and Entangled Minds) or Chris Carter's book Parapsychology and the Skeptics, will know that some of the result of parapsychology (like experiments in remote viewing) are well established according to the accepted criteria of science.
And this fact is agreed even by professional skeptics and debunkers. For example, professional debunker of parapsychology Richard Wiseman has recently conceded: "I agree that by the standards of any other area of science that remote viewing is proven, but begs the question: do we need higher standards of evidence when we study the paranormal? I think we do.
"If I said that there is a red car outside my house, you would probably believe me.
"But if I said that a UFO had just landed, you'd probably want a lot more evidence.
"Because remote viewing is such an outlandish claim that will revolutionise the world, we need overwhelming evidence before we draw any conclusions. Right now we don't have that evidence."
As I argued at long in this post, Wiseman is not questioning the scientific quality and results of the research on remote viewing, but rejecting the evidence on purely philosophical grounds. Noetic scientist Dean Radin has commented Wiseman's position: "Thus, a prominent skeptic agrees that (1) the study of remote viewing is an area of science, which should thoroughly obviate the skeptical epithet of "pseudoscience" once and for all. And (2) that when judged against prevailing scientific standards for evaluating evidence, he agrees that remote viewing is proven. The follow-on argument that this phenomenon is so unusual that it requires more evidence refers not to evidence per se, or even to scientific methods or practice, but to assumptions about the fabric of reality" (emphasis in blue added)
Professional writer Michael Prescott has a similar opinion about Wiseman's view: "But why exactly is remote viewing an "outlandish claim"? I think this is what begs the question, to use Wiseman's phrase.
His argument is a variation on the old saw that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." There is some truth to this, but the trouble is, who can agree on what constitutes an extraordinary claim?
In a world where consciousness is restricted to the brain, remote viewing would indeed be extraordinary and outlandish. But in a world where consciousness can operate independent of the brain, remote viewing is exactly the kind of thing we would expect to see. We would also expect to see reports of out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, telepathy, precognition, apparitions, and after-death communication. And we do! In fact, such things have been reported for thousands of years all over the world and are taken for granted by billions of people today, just as they were by most of our ancestors.
So there may be nothing extraordinary or outlandish at all about any of these phenomena. They only appear that way to those who start with the assumption that such things just don't happen" (emphasis in blue added)
And Wiseman is not the only prominent skeptic/debunker who concedes that some of the findings of parapsychology are technically correct from a scientific point of view while simultaneously tries to reject or undermine the evidence on philosophical grounds. Some years before Wiseman's concession, professional skeptic and debunker Ray Hyman conceded too that a particular research program on remote viewing had not flaws. In this technical paper, Hyman wrote: "The SAIC experiments are well-designed and the investigators have taken pains to eliminate the known weaknesses in previous parapsychological research. In addition, I cannot provide suitable candidates for what flaws, if any, might be present." (emphasis added).
If you respect the rule that you have to follow the argument and evidence where it leads, you're rationally forced to accept that the available scientific evidence of SAIC experiments in favor of remote viewing is good enough to support the existence of this phenomenon.
But as a professional debunker and member of CSICOP, Hyman is not allowed to do that. He needs to find any excuses to cast doubts on the results, even if the excuses are empirically unjustified and unproven. And Hyman found that clever excuse: "Just the same, it is impossible in principle to say that any particular experiment or experimental series is completely free from possible flaws. An experimenter cannot control for every possibility--especially for potential flaws that have not yet been discovered." (emphasis added)
How could you refute Hyman's skepticism based upon "potential flaws that have not yet been discoveried"? This kind of "skeptical" argument would apply to virtually any kind of scientific claim supported by evidence, provided you want to disbelieve it.
Perhaps Visser needs to have a better familiarity with the best evidence provided by parapsychology and how this evidence has made that prominent professional skeptics like Wiseman and Hyman concede the scientific quality of the research and the evidence, so they can reject them only on purely rhetorical and philosophical grounds.
I'd suggest to Visser to watch carefully these videos by Dean Radin:
2-In his essay, Visser points out: "Sometimes, I have the idea that this could in large part be a matter of temperament. Some people are completely at home with the idea that ultimately everything can be reduced to matter (the materialist is philosophically an extravert); others attribute reality to their subjective feelings and thoughts (they are the philosophical introverts). May be there is a psychological for this fruitless battle between sceptics and believers, which frustrates the progress of this discussion. Both rationalize their emotional choice with ad hoc arguments, which make them feel comfortable. I myself am a dove who is very much interested in what hawks come up with..."
Even though I think Visser is largely right about the psychological foundation of the controversy on parapsychology (I've discussed this aspects, as manifested in materialistic pseudo-skeptics in this post, although something similar could exist in some believers in psi too), Visser fails to stress the function that ideology by itself plays in this controversy.
The key to understand systematic and organized opposition to and debunking of psi research is IDEOLOGICAL. The ideology in question is ontological materialism, or more specifically, metaphysical naturalism.
This worldview IMPLIES that something like psi (and a fortiori, survival of consciousness like suggested by some cases of NDEs, mediumship and other lines of evidence) doesn't and cannot possibly exist. It's a matter of logical entailment. The premises of metaphysical naturalism imply the non-existence of certain phenomena and entities (like "souls" and, as consequence, such nonexistent souls cannot affect matter like in psychokinesis, or survive after death, like suggested by mediumship and some cases of NDEs).
Many people fails to understand this simple point, and thereby they're impressed or surprised by the existence of organized pseudoskepticism or militant debunking. Astute observers, however, if they understand the nature of metaphysical naturalism, would easily predict the existence of organized debunking, because the latter is the consequence of the former (more specifically, the public and theoretical defense of the metaphysical naturalistic worldview IMPLIES the attack, refutation, discreditation, invalidation and debunking of the evidence for psi and survival, because this evidence destroys, demolishes, refutes the naturalist worldview. Therefore, committed and self-proclaimed defenders of naturalism will be, NECESSARILY, debunkers and disbelievers of psi phenomena or any other claim inconsistent with naturalism).
A coherent metaphysical naturalist is not intellectually free to accept psi or survival evidence while being naturalist. If he's a believer in naturalist, he MUST be a disbeliever in psi and survival. (and the intensity or force of the belief in the truth of naturalism is proportional to the force and intensity of the disbelief in psi and survival)
As I said, Visser seems to be aware of this, but his essay doesn't stress the key importance of this philosophical factor. Psychology is important to understand why certain people are metaphysical naturalists; but by itself, psychology give us no philosophical and theortical tools to understand the implicit philosophical assumption that forces the use of the arguments and rhetoric of people like Hyman or Wiseman to reject valid evidence for psi.
If you want to objectively and philosophically confront the arguments of pseudo-skeptics, appealing to their psychology will be insufficient (it only explains their irrationality, their arrogance and delusions of feeling themselves as "brights", and their weird obsessions with creationism and God). You need theoretical, conceptual and philosophical tools to fully know and understand the kind of philosophical and ideological assumptions that colors these people's perspectives and arguments. Only philosophy can provide these tools.
3-Visser's comment on the emotional factor determining and influencing the positions about parapsychology is like a red herring that distracts us from the best evidence for psi.
When Visser asserts that psi research cannot suply us with well-established results, he's falling to the rhetoric and propaganda of mainstream pseudo-skeptics.
As shows the examples of Wiseman and Hyman mentioned above, informed professional skeptics have not refuted the best evidence for psi. Their skepticism is entirely based on a priori philosophical reasons and assumptions, not in scientific evidence as such.
Any neutral observer would understand that the opposition to some of the best psi results is not evidence based, but worldview-based.
This is why I consider Vesser's essay misleading regarding the specific point of the current status of parasychology and the actual nature of the controversy about it. However, his essay is very interesting and worth reading.
Some comments:
1-It's simply false that parapsychology cannot supply any well established results.
Whoever has read the best literature on parapsychology, in particular Dean Radin's books (The Conscious Universe and Entangled Minds) or Chris Carter's book Parapsychology and the Skeptics, will know that some of the result of parapsychology (like experiments in remote viewing) are well established according to the accepted criteria of science.
And this fact is agreed even by professional skeptics and debunkers. For example, professional debunker of parapsychology Richard Wiseman has recently conceded: "I agree that by the standards of any other area of science that remote viewing is proven, but begs the question: do we need higher standards of evidence when we study the paranormal? I think we do.
"If I said that there is a red car outside my house, you would probably believe me.
"But if I said that a UFO had just landed, you'd probably want a lot more evidence.
"Because remote viewing is such an outlandish claim that will revolutionise the world, we need overwhelming evidence before we draw any conclusions. Right now we don't have that evidence."
As I argued at long in this post, Wiseman is not questioning the scientific quality and results of the research on remote viewing, but rejecting the evidence on purely philosophical grounds. Noetic scientist Dean Radin has commented Wiseman's position: "Thus, a prominent skeptic agrees that (1) the study of remote viewing is an area of science, which should thoroughly obviate the skeptical epithet of "pseudoscience" once and for all. And (2) that when judged against prevailing scientific standards for evaluating evidence, he agrees that remote viewing is proven. The follow-on argument that this phenomenon is so unusual that it requires more evidence refers not to evidence per se, or even to scientific methods or practice, but to assumptions about the fabric of reality" (emphasis in blue added)
Professional writer Michael Prescott has a similar opinion about Wiseman's view: "But why exactly is remote viewing an "outlandish claim"? I think this is what begs the question, to use Wiseman's phrase.
His argument is a variation on the old saw that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." There is some truth to this, but the trouble is, who can agree on what constitutes an extraordinary claim?
In a world where consciousness is restricted to the brain, remote viewing would indeed be extraordinary and outlandish. But in a world where consciousness can operate independent of the brain, remote viewing is exactly the kind of thing we would expect to see. We would also expect to see reports of out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, telepathy, precognition, apparitions, and after-death communication. And we do! In fact, such things have been reported for thousands of years all over the world and are taken for granted by billions of people today, just as they were by most of our ancestors.
So there may be nothing extraordinary or outlandish at all about any of these phenomena. They only appear that way to those who start with the assumption that such things just don't happen" (emphasis in blue added)
And Wiseman is not the only prominent skeptic/debunker who concedes that some of the findings of parapsychology are technically correct from a scientific point of view while simultaneously tries to reject or undermine the evidence on philosophical grounds. Some years before Wiseman's concession, professional skeptic and debunker Ray Hyman conceded too that a particular research program on remote viewing had not flaws. In this technical paper, Hyman wrote: "The SAIC experiments are well-designed and the investigators have taken pains to eliminate the known weaknesses in previous parapsychological research. In addition, I cannot provide suitable candidates for what flaws, if any, might be present." (emphasis added).
If you respect the rule that you have to follow the argument and evidence where it leads, you're rationally forced to accept that the available scientific evidence of SAIC experiments in favor of remote viewing is good enough to support the existence of this phenomenon.
But as a professional debunker and member of CSICOP, Hyman is not allowed to do that. He needs to find any excuses to cast doubts on the results, even if the excuses are empirically unjustified and unproven. And Hyman found that clever excuse: "Just the same, it is impossible in principle to say that any particular experiment or experimental series is completely free from possible flaws. An experimenter cannot control for every possibility--especially for potential flaws that have not yet been discovered." (emphasis added)
How could you refute Hyman's skepticism based upon "potential flaws that have not yet been discoveried"? This kind of "skeptical" argument would apply to virtually any kind of scientific claim supported by evidence, provided you want to disbelieve it.
Perhaps Visser needs to have a better familiarity with the best evidence provided by parapsychology and how this evidence has made that prominent professional skeptics like Wiseman and Hyman concede the scientific quality of the research and the evidence, so they can reject them only on purely rhetorical and philosophical grounds.
I'd suggest to Visser to watch carefully these videos by Dean Radin:
2-In his essay, Visser points out: "Sometimes, I have the idea that this could in large part be a matter of temperament. Some people are completely at home with the idea that ultimately everything can be reduced to matter (the materialist is philosophically an extravert); others attribute reality to their subjective feelings and thoughts (they are the philosophical introverts). May be there is a psychological for this fruitless battle between sceptics and believers, which frustrates the progress of this discussion. Both rationalize their emotional choice with ad hoc arguments, which make them feel comfortable. I myself am a dove who is very much interested in what hawks come up with..."
Even though I think Visser is largely right about the psychological foundation of the controversy on parapsychology (I've discussed this aspects, as manifested in materialistic pseudo-skeptics in this post, although something similar could exist in some believers in psi too), Visser fails to stress the function that ideology by itself plays in this controversy.
The key to understand systematic and organized opposition to and debunking of psi research is IDEOLOGICAL. The ideology in question is ontological materialism, or more specifically, metaphysical naturalism.
This worldview IMPLIES that something like psi (and a fortiori, survival of consciousness like suggested by some cases of NDEs, mediumship and other lines of evidence) doesn't and cannot possibly exist. It's a matter of logical entailment. The premises of metaphysical naturalism imply the non-existence of certain phenomena and entities (like "souls" and, as consequence, such nonexistent souls cannot affect matter like in psychokinesis, or survive after death, like suggested by mediumship and some cases of NDEs).
Many people fails to understand this simple point, and thereby they're impressed or surprised by the existence of organized pseudoskepticism or militant debunking. Astute observers, however, if they understand the nature of metaphysical naturalism, would easily predict the existence of organized debunking, because the latter is the consequence of the former (more specifically, the public and theoretical defense of the metaphysical naturalistic worldview IMPLIES the attack, refutation, discreditation, invalidation and debunking of the evidence for psi and survival, because this evidence destroys, demolishes, refutes the naturalist worldview. Therefore, committed and self-proclaimed defenders of naturalism will be, NECESSARILY, debunkers and disbelievers of psi phenomena or any other claim inconsistent with naturalism).
A coherent metaphysical naturalist is not intellectually free to accept psi or survival evidence while being naturalist. If he's a believer in naturalist, he MUST be a disbeliever in psi and survival. (and the intensity or force of the belief in the truth of naturalism is proportional to the force and intensity of the disbelief in psi and survival)
As I said, Visser seems to be aware of this, but his essay doesn't stress the key importance of this philosophical factor. Psychology is important to understand why certain people are metaphysical naturalists; but by itself, psychology give us no philosophical and theortical tools to understand the implicit philosophical assumption that forces the use of the arguments and rhetoric of people like Hyman or Wiseman to reject valid evidence for psi.
If you want to objectively and philosophically confront the arguments of pseudo-skeptics, appealing to their psychology will be insufficient (it only explains their irrationality, their arrogance and delusions of feeling themselves as "brights", and their weird obsessions with creationism and God). You need theoretical, conceptual and philosophical tools to fully know and understand the kind of philosophical and ideological assumptions that colors these people's perspectives and arguments. Only philosophy can provide these tools.
3-Visser's comment on the emotional factor determining and influencing the positions about parapsychology is like a red herring that distracts us from the best evidence for psi.
When Visser asserts that psi research cannot suply us with well-established results, he's falling to the rhetoric and propaganda of mainstream pseudo-skeptics.
As shows the examples of Wiseman and Hyman mentioned above, informed professional skeptics have not refuted the best evidence for psi. Their skepticism is entirely based on a priori philosophical reasons and assumptions, not in scientific evidence as such.
Any neutral observer would understand that the opposition to some of the best psi results is not evidence based, but worldview-based.
This is why I consider Vesser's essay misleading regarding the specific point of the current status of parasychology and the actual nature of the controversy about it. However, his essay is very interesting and worth reading.
Another good essay by Visser is this entitled "Three models of Immortality", which I hope to comment in another moment.
Friday, January 15, 2010
The ESP Enigma: The Scientific Case for Psychic Phenomena by Diane Hennacy Powell, M.D.
This book is an excellent resource for scientific discussion of the evidence for ESP.
Diane Hennacy Powell, a Johns Hopkins-trained neuroscientist, competently and brillantly examines and discusses the scientific evidence supporting the reality of psi phenomena, and the meaning and implications of this evidence to understand, on rational grounds, the nature of consciousness.
It's refreshing to see an objective discussion of a controversial topic like psi research in the competent hands of a rigurous and highly trained professional scientist like Dr.Powell.
The Time magazine (certainly, not a friend of parapsychology) published an neutral interview with Dr.Powell that you can read here.
One excerpts of the interview with her on William James and consciousness: "He believed consciousness is not just what's happening to the neurons in the brain. The brain is our instrument in focusing and organizing our consciousness. Just like a prism will take a white light with all these different frequencies and separate it so you can see the different colors of the spectrum. Rather than us experiencing everything that's happening all at once, our brain focuses us on the here and the now. It uses our sensory organs as guides as to what we should be focusing on. Experiments have shown that most psychic experiences occur when are sensory organs are muted, like when we're dreaming or having a near-death experience"
Diane Hennacy Powell, a Johns Hopkins-trained neuroscientist, competently and brillantly examines and discusses the scientific evidence supporting the reality of psi phenomena, and the meaning and implications of this evidence to understand, on rational grounds, the nature of consciousness.
It's refreshing to see an objective discussion of a controversial topic like psi research in the competent hands of a rigurous and highly trained professional scientist like Dr.Powell.
The Time magazine (certainly, not a friend of parapsychology) published an neutral interview with Dr.Powell that you can read here.
One excerpts of the interview with her on William James and consciousness: "He believed consciousness is not just what's happening to the neurons in the brain. The brain is our instrument in focusing and organizing our consciousness. Just like a prism will take a white light with all these different frequencies and separate it so you can see the different colors of the spectrum. Rather than us experiencing everything that's happening all at once, our brain focuses us on the here and the now. It uses our sensory organs as guides as to what we should be focusing on. Experiments have shown that most psychic experiences occur when are sensory organs are muted, like when we're dreaming or having a near-death experience"
Read this interesting article by Dr.Powell on Twin Telepathy.
Thursday, December 24, 2009
David Hume, causality or causation, the mind-body problem, immortality and the afterlife
Some materialists and metaphysical naturalists have argued that the concomitant variation between consciousness and the brain (i.e. mental states correlate and change with brain states) proves, or strongly support the thesis that, the brain "causes or produces" the mind. Therefore, after death, the mind will dissapear.
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Mary Jo Rapini: Is God Pink? Dying to Heal. A psychotherapist relates her near-death experience
Psychotherapist Mary Jo Rapini suffered a life-threatening brain aneurysm and while awaiting surgery, had a near-death experience. See her story on Discovery Health cable channel on Monday, January 4, 2010. A riveting speaker, Mary Jo has authored Is God Pink? Dying to Heal:
Man Actually Returns From the Dead After 3 Days
This is a true story of a Russian doctor who was hit and killed by a car, but returns from the dead after 3 days in the morgue. The coroner prepares the body for autopsy when he wakes up. Be SURE to watch Part 2 (second video), that's when it gets interesting.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Neuroscientist and skeptic Michael Persinger has found evidence suggestive of telepathy based upon quantum entanglement
In this interview for Skeptiko, neuroscientist Michael Persinger has said:
"What we have found, for example, is that if you place two different brains, two different people at a distance, you put a circular magnetic field around both. There’s a magnetic field going around like a coil, around both brains even at a distance. You make sure both coils are connected to the same computer which means they’re generating the same configuration of two different spaces.
If you flash a light in one person’s eye, even though they’re in a chamber that’s closed up, the person in the other room that’s receiving just the magnetic field now, they’re not aware of the light flashing or not, they will show similar changes in frequency in the room. And we think that’s tremendous because that maybe the first macro demonstration of a quantum connection or so-called quantum entanglement. "
Links of interest:
-Skeptic Richard Wiseman concedes that remote viewing is proven.
-Paper "Investigating paranormal phenomena: Functional brain imaging of telepathy"
-Paper "Investigating paranormal phenomena: Functional brain imaging of telepathy"
Thursday, December 10, 2009
A fictional dialogue between a survivalist/dualist and a materialist/skeptic (Part 6)
This is part 6 of my fictional dialogues between a survivalist and a materialist.
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Monday, November 23, 2009
Dinesh D'Souza and Life After Death: The Evidence
Author of several influential books on public policy, Dinesh D'Souza discussed his efforts researching the evidence for life-after-death. He drew from theories and trends in such fields as physics, biology, neuroscience, religion, psychology, and philosophy. While many of the scientists whose work he studied might be non-believers in an afterlife, he argued that he's put together "the big picture" which demonstrates the likely possibility of the survival of consciousness beyond death.
Noetic Sciences in 1998: Healing Studies
In this archival video from 1998, Dr. Marilyn Schlitz, Dr. Elisabeth Targ, and Dr. Garrett Yount describe pilot studies on distant healing and energy medicine
Bruce Lipton - The New Biology - Where Mind and Matter Meet
Recent advances in cellular science are heralding an important evolutionary turning point. For almost fifty years we have held the illusion that our health and fate were preprogrammed in our genes, a concept referred to as genetic determinacy. Though mass consciousness is currently imbued with the belief that the character of one's life is genetically predetermined, a radically new understanding is unfolding at the leading edge of science. Cellular biologists now recognize that the environment, the external universe and our internal physiology, and more importantly, our perception of the environment, directly controls the activity of our genes. This video will broadly review the molecular mechanisms by which environmental awareness interfaces genetic regulation and guides organismal evolution
Mystery of the Self, From Philosophy to Modern Day Science by San Pernia and Peter Fenwick
Horizon Research Foundation Presented:
Unravelling the Mystery of the Self - From Philosophy to Modern Day Science at Imperial College London, September 10, 2009.
The symposium consisted of an engaging discussions on the nature of the self by:
Dr Peter Fenwick, Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College, London and Dr Sam Parmia, Fellow in Pulmonary & Critical Care Medicine, Weill Cornell Medical Center, New York.
Joining them for a panelist discussion was:
Dr Christopher French, Professor of psychology at Goldsmiths College, University of London, is head of their Anomalistic psychology Research Unit which he founded in the year 2000 and Dr. Joan LaRovere, a Consultant in Paediatric Intensive Care and Director of the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit at the Royal Brompton Hospital in London
Near Death Experience of Renee Pasarow
Renee Pasarow was as a teenager when she had a NDE after she became unconscious following an allergic food reaction. Her NDE is unusual because it contains mystical elements such as an encounter with and immersion into the Sacred Light.
Visit Pasarow's website here.
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