In an interesting post by the author of the blog Also Thinking Subversively, he defends two contentions about agency (in reply to my earlier post):
1-Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)
2-Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed.
I disagree with both accounts and I'll explain why.
First, let's to take 1 (Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)).
I think this is incorrect. Moral facts are not "about" nothing, since "facts" are states of affairs (or change of them) in the real world.
The only way I can make sense of the author's use of the word "fact" is in the sense of a "true proposition" (which can be "about" something). But even in this case, it is not clear that "moral facts" are facts about agency.
Note that the author specifies that moral facts are "not solely about agency", but this is ambiguous. Is he saying that moral facts are about agency and, in some cases, agency + somehting else? Or is he saying that moral facts could be about something else which lacks agency? If the former, then agency is essential to the concept of moral facts (as the author understand it). If the latter, then agency is not essential to the concept of moral facts.
I think that if we understand the author as defending the former (agency is essential to moral facts), then his view is plausibly false: Earthquakes, Tsunamis, diseases, etc. are considered "natural evils", but they're not caused by any agency at all. Therefore, the proposition "Cancer in babies is bad" is not a fact about any agency at all, but about a very common unconcious biological process independent of any agency at all.
Replying that agency is implied after all because the receptor of such evil is an agent won't help, since babies are not agents (and evil even exists in that case).
So, it's highly disputable that "moral facts" are facts about agency (or at least, that agency is essential to moral facts. At most, agency is essential to moral responsability).
Regarding 2 (Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed), I think the author is conflating a proposition with its referent (and this confusion is caused by the author's use of the word "fact").
For example, when we say that evolution is a "fact", we're not saying that facts about evolution would be so even if no evolution would happen. What we're saying is that evolution is TRUE.
If author's use of the word "fact" seems to refer to the meaning of the word or statement in question (regardless of whether the referent of such statement is instantiated or not). But this trivializes the discussion and change the topic.
We could say, using the word "fact" as the author does, that "facts about God" would be so even if no God actually exists. But in this case, what we're saying is that the meaning of words and propositions about God would be such and such, regardless of whether God exists or not. And this is correct but irrelevant, because what we want to know in a debate about God is if such God exists OBJECTIVELY or not. This is not a discussion about semantics, but about ontology.
This confusion between semantics and ontology is more evident in the author's following statement (in reply to my argument that agency doesn't exist by itself):
Facts about agency itself (apart from actual agents) are not facts about any sort of substance, but facts about the concept of agency... Facts about a concept are facts about what would be the case if the concept were instantiated. But such facts will be true even in the absence of their instantiation. (emphasis in blue added)
If it's true, then the author is arguing about semantics of agency, not about the ontology of agency (which is what we're talking about in the debate about naturalism and objective moral values).
To make this point clear, imagine the following dialogue:
Atheist: God doesn't exist.
Theist: Why do you think that?
Atheist: Because God is omnipotent and good and, however, he cannot eliminate the evil in the world. So, he's not omnipotent or not good, and in both cases he doesn't exist.
Theist: The statement is "God is good" is a objective fact about God
Atheist: No, it is not an objective fact because it doesn't refer to any actual objective reality (God)
Theist: It's an objective fact, because it's a fact about the concept of God (and this fact is independent of whether God exists or not)
Atheist: But then your response is about semantics, about the concept of God. And this is irrelevant to my point, because my original contention was that God doesn't exist. This is a metaphysical claim, a claim about the nature of reality. And if you're a theist, you have to believe that God exists objectively, not only that concepts about God are correct or wrong.
Theist: I think God exists objectively because our concepts about God are objective.
Atheist: But you're using "objective" in a misleading way. Your concept of "objective" conflate semantics with ontology, and the ontological problem of God's existence is trivialized by you when you refer to the objectivity of the concept of God (which is a semantical problem)
(This dialogue is fictional but this is useful to make the point: when talking about objective moral values in naturalism, we're talking about the ontological foundation of such values given the premises of naturalism. We're not talking about concepts of values, but about their objective reality in the world.)
A more evident proof of the author's serious confusion between semantics and ontology is this example of his:
"You can see this principle more clearly when you turn to imaginary beings: werewolves do not exist, but even so there are facts about werewolves."
Note that the author conflates facts about werewolves themselves (which is ontological/factual and empirical question) with facts about the CONCEPT of werewolves (a semantical question). If facts about a factual entity X were purely conceptual, then they could be known a priori, independent of any empirical research. But empirical research is need precisely because facts about real entities of the world cannot be known a priori (even if we handle, a priori, concepts of such entities)
So, the author's fundamental mistake is the conflation of concepts with their referents, identifying facts about concepts with facts about the corresponding referents.
My main interest is not about semantics, but about ontology. My point is that, ontologically speaking, objective moral values don't exist if naturalism is true (and this ontological point is independent of the concepts of agency or any other concept. My argument is not about concepts, but about the objective reality of its referents and its ontological foundation in reality).
So, I repeat and confirm my previous statement: "Agency doesn't exist by itself, but only in particular individuals or persons. The author reifies "agency" as if it were a kind of ontologically existent substance with independent existence. But agency is not a substance, it's a property of agents (therefore, it cannot exist in the absence of agents themselves)" (Note the ontological, not semantical, point of my argument: My argument is that if agents doesn't exist, then agency either, because the latter is a property of the former. And no naturalist would accept properties existing by themselves, floating in the air, regardless of the physical/material substances that hold them)
In another topic, the author also disagrees with my statament: "A moral obligation implies a person who's the receptor of such obligation, but it also implies the existence of an author or authority who commands such laws or obligations on us. (For example, the laws of USA are commanded by the political authority of USA and are directed and imposed to USA citizens)"
The author's objection is this: "It's true enough that an obligation is always owed by someone to someone, though under some accounts, this can be the same person. What I'm not convinced of is that it needs to be specifically commanded"
Let me say something in reply:
1-The author agrees with me that an obligation is always owned by someone to someone. So, this point is out of discussion.
2-He comments that under some accounts, this can be the same person.
3-He's not convinced that an obligation needs to be specifically commanded. I agree with it, but it's irrelevant: the point is that an obligation only is such in the case it's commanded by an authority. If we know such authority or not is irrelevant: that's relevant is that the nature of an obligation depends on an authority capable of commanding it over us.
In moral semantics and logically, an obligation has the form of a command or prescription. It's an order.
For example: "You shall expose pseudoskeptics and other charlatans" is not an factual assertion about states of affairs in the real world, but a prescription for action. It's a command to behave in certain ways regarding pseudoskeptics.
Compare the above obligation with the following statament: "Pseudoskeptics are charlatans". The latter is a factual assertion, not a prescription. Such factual claim says something (true or false) about pseudoskeptics, but it doesn't prescribe anything to any person. It asserts something factual.
But obligations have the logical form of a command, not of a factual proposition. (A methodological consequence of this is that obligations are not true nor false; at most they can be binding or not binding in a moral sense, but not true or false because they don't describe any factual state of affairs in the external world)
The author doesn't seem to understand the crucial aspect of the question. He believes that obligations can exist in a descriptive form alone, or that facts by themselves are morally obligatory. He says:
For example, I have an obligation to each and every person not to steal from them (except under extenuating circumstances). Does that obligation really need to be commanded by an entity (i.e. god or a government) to which I owe an obligation to obey its commands?
Yes, otherwise it is not an obligation at all. At most, it would be a subjective feeling based on taste and preferences (e.g. certain feelings of empathy or love for other people, or the fear that if we steal them, they will do the same to us). But in this latter case, this is not an objective obligation, only a belief based on personal beliefs, indoctrination, taste and convention.
Think about it: Why does the author believe that he has an obligation to refrain of stealing? When pressed, he'll probably reply: "Because, except under some circunstances, stealing is bad"
Such reply assumes that stealing is (ontolologically) objectively bad (not bad only from a personal point of view). But how does such objective fact is constitutive of an obligation for me? Why should I refrain from stealing, even if I concede that it is bad? Why am I obligated to do the good instead of the evil, and not viceversa? WHY, exactly?
The author seems to believe that moral facts are, by themselves, morally binding and obligatory. But WHY? And HOW could such facts have a moral authority over me in order to make me a passive subject of objective moral obligation?
The author confuses his personal beliefs on morality (e.g. "Stealing is bad, don't do it") with an ontologically objective and existing order/realm of moral obligations. How does he know that his moral beliefs are true, or have any objective foundations? And if he knows such thing, are such objective foundations more compatible with naturalism than with supernaturalism? (This is the original point of discussion)
The author says "It would seem to me that this renders the concept of obligation circular: in order to explain why I have an obligation to you not to steal from you, I have to appeal to an obligation I owe to somebody else. But how do I then explain why I have that obligation? Why am I obligated to the authority to obey its commands? Surely not just because they commanded it"
The reason why you're obligated is because you're under the command and power of an authority above you. Otherwise, you're not objectively obligated to anything even if you subjectively feel such obligation.
Why am I obligated to respect civil contracts? Because if I break such contracts, the Goverment will punish me (e.g. making me pay much money, in court, due to breaking the civil law). The Goverment has the force or power to impose on me a certain way to act and behave. He's an authority over me and its commands are therefore obligatory for me (in a legal, not moral, sense).
Why are little children obligated to do whatever their parents says? Because they have authority over them. Parents can, using physical means if necessary, force on their little children their commands.
Now, try to imagine an obligation NOT based on any authority whatsoever. Just imagine me saying to the author "Author of the blog Also Thinking Subversively, You shall wash my car everyday!. And also I command you read my blog and agree with everything what I say!"
Obviously, the author will laugh and reply: "Why the hell am I obligated to do that? Who are you to command me that?" You're not an authority over me, so your commands are worthless"
Replying that in cases of moral obligations is different because we don't need to know the authority to tell us what to do because we know that certain actions are obligatory, is irrelevant. Because the argument is not that we need to know the authority in order to know the obligations; the argument is that an actual authority is need in order to ground the objective reality of such obligations (otherwise such obligations are purely subjective and illusory). And this is so, regardless of whether we know the identity of such authority or not.
If we have reasons to think that such authority doesn't exist, then no moral obligation is objectively valid, and our moral intuitions would be illusory or false. This is why naturalist Keith Augustine, consistently realizing the implications of naturalism (one of such implications is precisely the non-existence of any cosmic or transcendent authority), argues: "Admitting that moral laws are man-made is equivalent to acknowledging that ethical rules are arbitrary and therefore human beings are not obligated to follow them"
Keith is not saying that some people doesn't believe, sincerely and subjectively, that certains actions are morally right or wrong. Nor he's deying that some people (like the author) believe in moral obligations regardless of any authority. What's refuting is the ontological basis for the objectivity of such moral beliefs. Given naturalism, there is not plausible reason to think that moral obligations are objectively binding; and given that they're man-made, human beings are not (in any ontologically relevant moral sense) objectively obligated to follow them (even if by purely subjective factors, like indoctrination or prejudices, they feel actually obligated).
For this reason, philosopher of biology and naturalist Michael Ruse has said: "I appreciate that when somebody says 'Love they neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless, . . . such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory"
Again, Ruse is not denying that certain people subjectively believes in moral obligations like "Love they neighboor as thyself", or "Don't rape babies" or "Don't steal other people's objects". His point is ontological: Given naturalism, WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVE AND REAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SUCH BELIEFS?
Respectful, I'd suggest the author to critically examine the ontological implications of naturalism, and then comparing such implications with his own beliefs. If he concludes that naturalism is false, then some version of supernaturalism HAS to be true. Therefore, we cannot exclude in advance the existence of some cosmic, creative, intelligent or trascendent supernatural authority over us which grounds moral values and moral obligations, and commands them (perhaps not explicitly, but in the form of moral intuitions, as part of our spiritual nature) on us.
Also, I'd suggest the author to discern carefully the actual terms of the debate: what's at stake are two things:
1-Are moral values and moral obligations objective? (that is, not purely subjective beliefs)
2-If the answer to 1 is YES, then another question is posed: such objective moral realm, provide evidence for or against naturalism? (that is, if naturalism were true, we would expect, plausibly, that such moral realm would exist and would be known by morally free, concious, rational agents in order to freely adapt their behaviour and actions to such normative moral realm? Does that make (plausible) sense in naturalism/ontological materialism?)
1-Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)
2-Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed.
I disagree with both accounts and I'll explain why.
First, let's to take 1 (Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)).
I think this is incorrect. Moral facts are not "about" nothing, since "facts" are states of affairs (or change of them) in the real world.
The only way I can make sense of the author's use of the word "fact" is in the sense of a "true proposition" (which can be "about" something). But even in this case, it is not clear that "moral facts" are facts about agency.
Note that the author specifies that moral facts are "not solely about agency", but this is ambiguous. Is he saying that moral facts are about agency and, in some cases, agency + somehting else? Or is he saying that moral facts could be about something else which lacks agency? If the former, then agency is essential to the concept of moral facts (as the author understand it). If the latter, then agency is not essential to the concept of moral facts.
I think that if we understand the author as defending the former (agency is essential to moral facts), then his view is plausibly false: Earthquakes, Tsunamis, diseases, etc. are considered "natural evils", but they're not caused by any agency at all. Therefore, the proposition "Cancer in babies is bad" is not a fact about any agency at all, but about a very common unconcious biological process independent of any agency at all.
Replying that agency is implied after all because the receptor of such evil is an agent won't help, since babies are not agents (and evil even exists in that case).
So, it's highly disputable that "moral facts" are facts about agency (or at least, that agency is essential to moral facts. At most, agency is essential to moral responsability).
Regarding 2 (Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed), I think the author is conflating a proposition with its referent (and this confusion is caused by the author's use of the word "fact").
For example, when we say that evolution is a "fact", we're not saying that facts about evolution would be so even if no evolution would happen. What we're saying is that evolution is TRUE.
If author's use of the word "fact" seems to refer to the meaning of the word or statement in question (regardless of whether the referent of such statement is instantiated or not). But this trivializes the discussion and change the topic.
We could say, using the word "fact" as the author does, that "facts about God" would be so even if no God actually exists. But in this case, what we're saying is that the meaning of words and propositions about God would be such and such, regardless of whether God exists or not. And this is correct but irrelevant, because what we want to know in a debate about God is if such God exists OBJECTIVELY or not. This is not a discussion about semantics, but about ontology.
This confusion between semantics and ontology is more evident in the author's following statement (in reply to my argument that agency doesn't exist by itself):
Facts about agency itself (apart from actual agents) are not facts about any sort of substance, but facts about the concept of agency... Facts about a concept are facts about what would be the case if the concept were instantiated. But such facts will be true even in the absence of their instantiation. (emphasis in blue added)
If it's true, then the author is arguing about semantics of agency, not about the ontology of agency (which is what we're talking about in the debate about naturalism and objective moral values).
To make this point clear, imagine the following dialogue:
Atheist: God doesn't exist.
Theist: Why do you think that?
Atheist: Because God is omnipotent and good and, however, he cannot eliminate the evil in the world. So, he's not omnipotent or not good, and in both cases he doesn't exist.
Theist: The statement is "God is good" is a objective fact about God
Atheist: No, it is not an objective fact because it doesn't refer to any actual objective reality (God)
Theist: It's an objective fact, because it's a fact about the concept of God (and this fact is independent of whether God exists or not)
Atheist: But then your response is about semantics, about the concept of God. And this is irrelevant to my point, because my original contention was that God doesn't exist. This is a metaphysical claim, a claim about the nature of reality. And if you're a theist, you have to believe that God exists objectively, not only that concepts about God are correct or wrong.
Theist: I think God exists objectively because our concepts about God are objective.
Atheist: But you're using "objective" in a misleading way. Your concept of "objective" conflate semantics with ontology, and the ontological problem of God's existence is trivialized by you when you refer to the objectivity of the concept of God (which is a semantical problem)
(This dialogue is fictional but this is useful to make the point: when talking about objective moral values in naturalism, we're talking about the ontological foundation of such values given the premises of naturalism. We're not talking about concepts of values, but about their objective reality in the world.)
A more evident proof of the author's serious confusion between semantics and ontology is this example of his:
"You can see this principle more clearly when you turn to imaginary beings: werewolves do not exist, but even so there are facts about werewolves."
Note that the author conflates facts about werewolves themselves (which is ontological/factual and empirical question) with facts about the CONCEPT of werewolves (a semantical question). If facts about a factual entity X were purely conceptual, then they could be known a priori, independent of any empirical research. But empirical research is need precisely because facts about real entities of the world cannot be known a priori (even if we handle, a priori, concepts of such entities)
So, the author's fundamental mistake is the conflation of concepts with their referents, identifying facts about concepts with facts about the corresponding referents.
My main interest is not about semantics, but about ontology. My point is that, ontologically speaking, objective moral values don't exist if naturalism is true (and this ontological point is independent of the concepts of agency or any other concept. My argument is not about concepts, but about the objective reality of its referents and its ontological foundation in reality).
So, I repeat and confirm my previous statement: "Agency doesn't exist by itself, but only in particular individuals or persons. The author reifies "agency" as if it were a kind of ontologically existent substance with independent existence. But agency is not a substance, it's a property of agents (therefore, it cannot exist in the absence of agents themselves)" (Note the ontological, not semantical, point of my argument: My argument is that if agents doesn't exist, then agency either, because the latter is a property of the former. And no naturalist would accept properties existing by themselves, floating in the air, regardless of the physical/material substances that hold them)
In another topic, the author also disagrees with my statament: "A moral obligation implies a person who's the receptor of such obligation, but it also implies the existence of an author or authority who commands such laws or obligations on us. (For example, the laws of USA are commanded by the political authority of USA and are directed and imposed to USA citizens)"
The author's objection is this: "It's true enough that an obligation is always owed by someone to someone, though under some accounts, this can be the same person. What I'm not convinced of is that it needs to be specifically commanded"
Let me say something in reply:
1-The author agrees with me that an obligation is always owned by someone to someone. So, this point is out of discussion.
2-He comments that under some accounts, this can be the same person.
3-He's not convinced that an obligation needs to be specifically commanded. I agree with it, but it's irrelevant: the point is that an obligation only is such in the case it's commanded by an authority. If we know such authority or not is irrelevant: that's relevant is that the nature of an obligation depends on an authority capable of commanding it over us.
In moral semantics and logically, an obligation has the form of a command or prescription. It's an order.
For example: "You shall expose pseudoskeptics and other charlatans" is not an factual assertion about states of affairs in the real world, but a prescription for action. It's a command to behave in certain ways regarding pseudoskeptics.
Compare the above obligation with the following statament: "Pseudoskeptics are charlatans". The latter is a factual assertion, not a prescription. Such factual claim says something (true or false) about pseudoskeptics, but it doesn't prescribe anything to any person. It asserts something factual.
But obligations have the logical form of a command, not of a factual proposition. (A methodological consequence of this is that obligations are not true nor false; at most they can be binding or not binding in a moral sense, but not true or false because they don't describe any factual state of affairs in the external world)
The author doesn't seem to understand the crucial aspect of the question. He believes that obligations can exist in a descriptive form alone, or that facts by themselves are morally obligatory. He says:
For example, I have an obligation to each and every person not to steal from them (except under extenuating circumstances). Does that obligation really need to be commanded by an entity (i.e. god or a government) to which I owe an obligation to obey its commands?
Yes, otherwise it is not an obligation at all. At most, it would be a subjective feeling based on taste and preferences (e.g. certain feelings of empathy or love for other people, or the fear that if we steal them, they will do the same to us). But in this latter case, this is not an objective obligation, only a belief based on personal beliefs, indoctrination, taste and convention.
Think about it: Why does the author believe that he has an obligation to refrain of stealing? When pressed, he'll probably reply: "Because, except under some circunstances, stealing is bad"
Such reply assumes that stealing is (ontolologically) objectively bad (not bad only from a personal point of view). But how does such objective fact is constitutive of an obligation for me? Why should I refrain from stealing, even if I concede that it is bad? Why am I obligated to do the good instead of the evil, and not viceversa? WHY, exactly?
The author seems to believe that moral facts are, by themselves, morally binding and obligatory. But WHY? And HOW could such facts have a moral authority over me in order to make me a passive subject of objective moral obligation?
The author confuses his personal beliefs on morality (e.g. "Stealing is bad, don't do it") with an ontologically objective and existing order/realm of moral obligations. How does he know that his moral beliefs are true, or have any objective foundations? And if he knows such thing, are such objective foundations more compatible with naturalism than with supernaturalism? (This is the original point of discussion)
The author says "It would seem to me that this renders the concept of obligation circular: in order to explain why I have an obligation to you not to steal from you, I have to appeal to an obligation I owe to somebody else. But how do I then explain why I have that obligation? Why am I obligated to the authority to obey its commands? Surely not just because they commanded it"
The reason why you're obligated is because you're under the command and power of an authority above you. Otherwise, you're not objectively obligated to anything even if you subjectively feel such obligation.
Why am I obligated to respect civil contracts? Because if I break such contracts, the Goverment will punish me (e.g. making me pay much money, in court, due to breaking the civil law). The Goverment has the force or power to impose on me a certain way to act and behave. He's an authority over me and its commands are therefore obligatory for me (in a legal, not moral, sense).
Why are little children obligated to do whatever their parents says? Because they have authority over them. Parents can, using physical means if necessary, force on their little children their commands.
Now, try to imagine an obligation NOT based on any authority whatsoever. Just imagine me saying to the author "Author of the blog Also Thinking Subversively, You shall wash my car everyday!. And also I command you read my blog and agree with everything what I say!"
Obviously, the author will laugh and reply: "Why the hell am I obligated to do that? Who are you to command me that?" You're not an authority over me, so your commands are worthless"
Replying that in cases of moral obligations is different because we don't need to know the authority to tell us what to do because we know that certain actions are obligatory, is irrelevant. Because the argument is not that we need to know the authority in order to know the obligations; the argument is that an actual authority is need in order to ground the objective reality of such obligations (otherwise such obligations are purely subjective and illusory). And this is so, regardless of whether we know the identity of such authority or not.
If we have reasons to think that such authority doesn't exist, then no moral obligation is objectively valid, and our moral intuitions would be illusory or false. This is why naturalist Keith Augustine, consistently realizing the implications of naturalism (one of such implications is precisely the non-existence of any cosmic or transcendent authority), argues: "Admitting that moral laws are man-made is equivalent to acknowledging that ethical rules are arbitrary and therefore human beings are not obligated to follow them"
Keith is not saying that some people doesn't believe, sincerely and subjectively, that certains actions are morally right or wrong. Nor he's deying that some people (like the author) believe in moral obligations regardless of any authority. What's refuting is the ontological basis for the objectivity of such moral beliefs. Given naturalism, there is not plausible reason to think that moral obligations are objectively binding; and given that they're man-made, human beings are not (in any ontologically relevant moral sense) objectively obligated to follow them (even if by purely subjective factors, like indoctrination or prejudices, they feel actually obligated).
For this reason, philosopher of biology and naturalist Michael Ruse has said: "I appreciate that when somebody says 'Love they neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless, . . . such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory"
Again, Ruse is not denying that certain people subjectively believes in moral obligations like "Love they neighboor as thyself", or "Don't rape babies" or "Don't steal other people's objects". His point is ontological: Given naturalism, WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVE AND REAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SUCH BELIEFS?
Respectful, I'd suggest the author to critically examine the ontological implications of naturalism, and then comparing such implications with his own beliefs. If he concludes that naturalism is false, then some version of supernaturalism HAS to be true. Therefore, we cannot exclude in advance the existence of some cosmic, creative, intelligent or trascendent supernatural authority over us which grounds moral values and moral obligations, and commands them (perhaps not explicitly, but in the form of moral intuitions, as part of our spiritual nature) on us.
Also, I'd suggest the author to discern carefully the actual terms of the debate: what's at stake are two things:
1-Are moral values and moral obligations objective? (that is, not purely subjective beliefs)
2-If the answer to 1 is YES, then another question is posed: such objective moral realm, provide evidence for or against naturalism? (that is, if naturalism were true, we would expect, plausibly, that such moral realm would exist and would be known by morally free, concious, rational agents in order to freely adapt their behaviour and actions to such normative moral realm? Does that make (plausible) sense in naturalism/ontological materialism?)
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