Thinking Subversively: Constructive criticisms of my blog

I've just received a kind e-mail by "shiningwhiffle", the author of the new blog Also Thinking Subversively, a blog created to respond or comment, from a critical-constructive point of view, to some of my blog's posts. I think this is a great idea, because even though I defend my opinions with great conviction and in a straightforward, direct way, and I don't consider my opinions to be "the ultimate truth". I've been wrong in a number of topics in the past, so it is not impossible that I'm wrong in some topics right now or in the future.

So perhaps shiningwhiffle's new blog will bring a little bit of balance to the way I discuss the topics in my blog. (For the purposes of this post, I'll call shiningwhiffle simply as "the author", because it's easier to write)

I'd like to reply to the author's opening post on my lastest post on naturalism. The author's text is in blue, mine in normal black color.

I agree with Jime of Subversive Thinking much more than I disagree, but sometimes I feel he draws conclusions too quickly

I hope to prove that my post's conclusions on naturalism weren't draw "too quickly", but I let you to decide.

Consider the following statement from his latest post on naturalism and value:

I submit that the above Keith's argument [sic] is irrefutable... IF naturalism were true (so, if you accept naturalism, you're rationally forced to agree with Keith's conclusion). And I think that naturalists who try to avoid the above conclusions are being intentionally dishonest, ignorant or plainly stupid.

I should preface this by saying that I'm not a metaphysical naturalist or materialist, and I do think that there is objective value and morality. And of course I agree that value subjectivism/nihilism (they're the same thing as far as I can see) is very tempting from a materialist point of view. But two questions need to be separated:

1. Is it the most coherent conclusion for naturalists?
2. Is it the necessary conclusion for naturalists?

I lean toward "yes" on the first and "no" on the second.

Please, note that the author answer "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second question. And note that the author also agree with moral objectivism, moreover he's not a materialist nor a naturalist.

Firstly, I don't see how the author's "two separate questions", could be relevant to qualify my conclusion or to show that it was gotten "too quickly". If subjectivism/nihlism is the most coherent position for naturalists, then (provided naturalists are rational and concerned with logical coherence) they should embrace subjectivism/nihilism, not objectivism. Why should a rational and logically consistent person avoid to accept the most coherent position in favor of the less coherent ones? Is rational to embrace the less coherent conclusion, when the most coherent is rationally available and known? Only if the naturalist wants to avoid the conclusion (and in this case he's intellectually dishonest), or if he can't see the implications of his position (in this case, he's ignorant of his position's premises or implications, or he's stupid), could he accept the less coherent position.

The author comments "Morality implies the possibility of moral choices; bullets don't choose to kill their targets and can't be held responsible for the murder. The person can because he or she made a choice. But metaphysical naturalism sits uneasily with the idea of a truly free will. It's not easy to see how free will can be fit to otherwise will-less laws of physics. And without free will, the difference between a bullet and the shooter is just degree of complexity"

Precisely, for these reasons, a consistent naturalist should deny free will and openly embrace determinism. Given the premises of naturalism, he cannot consistently talk of "free will" (unless the terms are re-defined to make them fit determinism). A consistent naturalist will agree with naturalist Tom Clark (who's the director of the Center For Naturalism): "In a deterministic universe, we understand that a criminal's career is not a matter of an unconditioned personal choice, but fully a function of a complex set of conditions, genetic and enviromental, that interact to produce the offender and his proclivities. Had we been in his shows in all respects, we too would have followed the same path, since there is no freely willing self that could have done otherwise as causality unfolds. There is no kernel of independent moral agency -- we are not, as philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices, including choices to rob, rape, or kill"

The author correctly notes: "There is, of course, the compatibilist view, but in my opinion that just redefines the terms that normally imply agency — like "choice" and "culpability" — to suit a deterministic worldview. They aren't the same concepts once compatibilism is done with them."

This is right and I fully agree with it. Now, if it's true, which are the logically consistent implications for a naturalist, given such premises? Is concluding that free will, in the relevant sense, is not possible if naturalism is true, a conclusion drawn "too quickly"? Obviously not. This is the conclusion implied (necessarily, or most plausibly) in the premises accepted by naturalists themselves.

The author notes: "Moral value is also a non-physical property, and metaphysical naturalism allows for only physical and logical/mathematical properties."

The author is absolutely right, and this is why moral objectivism cannot exist if naturalism (as defined by the author) is true. Logic demands such conclusion, as we can prove it with the following deductive argument (note that in a deductive argument, if you agree with the premises, you have to agree with the conclusion, on pain of irrationality):

1-If metaphysical naturalism is true, then it allows for only physical and logical/mathematical properties

2-Moral values are not physical (nor logical/mathematical properties)

3-Therefore, metaphysical naturalism doesn't allow for moral values

4-Moral values do exist objectively.

5-Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is false.

Given that the author accept 1 and 2, he's rationally committed to 3. And given the author accepts 4 (remember he wrote "I should preface this by saying that I'm not a metaphysical naturalist or materialist, and I do think that there is objective value and morality"), he's rationally committed to 5 (which is precisely my point!).

So, when the author says that I drew my conclusion "too quickly", I think he was who drew his conclusions (about my conclusion) too quickly, since it can be proved, deductively, that he also accepts the same premises that imply my conclusion.

The author wisely notes: "If you think of chairs and dogs as ultimately nothing but arrangements of elementary particles, what place is there for moral principles that apply to humans but not to any of our parts, or for moral values that apply to actions but not to mere motions?

So to be a moral realist, it would seem (I could be wrong, but don't see how) that one cannot be a reductionist"

Precisely one of Rosenberg's insights is that, in a world which consists purely of fixed physical facts, there is no place for meaning, purposes, values (or even "beliefs" in the semantic-propositional sense). Most naturalists agree with Rosenberg's premises, but they avoid the conclusion because they realize it leads to irrationalism, nihilism and subjetivism, and they don't like these implications.

Like the author, I cannot see how a naturalist could avoid reductionism, provided he accepts the basic premises of naturalism and follow them consistently through their conclusions.

The author poses some interesting thoughts about the possibility of moral facts in naturalism:

In other words, why should the Universe have moral principles unless there were destined to be moral agents? Look at it this way: moral facts are facts about two things. The fact that "murder is unjust" is fact about the act of murder and a fact about moral agents; namely, that every moral agent has an obligation not to commit murder. The two facts have to go together; they are, if you will, the same fact. "Murder is unjust but no one has an obligation not to commit it," is a contradiction in terms.

I disagree with the author's conclusion in this point. I think a brief summary of two basic concepts in meta-ethics will help us to clarify this question:

1-A "moral proposition" is a proposition which is true or false if, and only if, it corresponds (or not) to a external, objective moral state of affairs. Note that moral propositions, in order to be true, depends on the existence of an objectively existent moral realm (and is this moral realm which demands an ontological foundation).

2-A "moral obligation, duty or law" is a ought (normative) statement, which commands certain kinds of actions as moral or inmoral (note that normative statements are not true or false, because they don't describe any actual state of affairs; only commands a certain action given certain values). A moral obligation implies a person who's the receptor of such obligation, but it also implies the existence of an author or authority who commands such laws or obligations on us. (For example, the laws of USA are commanded by the political authority of USA and are directed and imposed to USA citizens)

When the author says "Murder is unjust but no one has an obligation not to commit it," is a contradiction in terms", I think he's conflating moral facts with moral obligations. There is not contradiction in terms between accepting a moral fact, and rejecting its morally binding obligatory force us (because facts by themselves have not moral authority. How could a fact to "obligate" me, in a moral sense, to do something? Facts tell us about states of reality, not about how ought we to act in a morally binding sense. Obligations come from persons, not from facts)

Imagine this dialogue:

You: Murder is unjust, so you're obligated not to murder any person.

Professional murderer: I know that "Murder is unjust", and so what? I'm not obligated to avoid murdering other people. After all, who or what imposes such obligation on me?

You: Your obligation is part of your recognition that "murder is unjust". It's a contradiction in terms to to think otherwise.

Professional murderer: Tell me, where is the contradiction?

You: It's obvious, can't you see it?

Professional murderer: No, I can't. In fact, I consider myself an unjust person. I like to cause pain and destruction in other people's lives. I enjoy it.

You: But you're contradicting yourself, you've admitted that murder is unjust!

Professional murderer: Where is the contradiction? If murder is unjust, the contradiction would be to assert that murder is not unjust. I've never asserted the latter. Moreover, I'm unjust!. Far from contradicting myself, my unjust actions are fully consistent with my unjust nature and desires.

You: If you accept that murder is unjust, you're obligated to avoid murdering other people

Professional murderer: No, I don't. I'm obligated to follow my desires and pleasures. And my pleasure and desire right now is to destroy other people's lives, and murdering them is a good mean to do that. Who or what obligate me to do otherwise? Why should I to sacrifice my own pleasures and desires?

Jime: This is only an imaginary dialogue, but I think we can see the author's view that moral facts implies moral obligations is clearly inadequate (both logically and in terms of its efficacy for rational persuasion).

So the question is, would "murder is unjust" be true even if moral agents had never graced the Universe? Keith Augustine's implied answer is "no," and he despairs for how such a truth could have come about once moral agents hit the scene (assuming they have at all). I agree; there's no reasonable explanation for how moral facts can come into being if they didn't already exist.

I think the question is a deeper one: Which is the ontological foundation of moral facts? This is the issue. Paul Kurtz, "the father of secular humanism", got it right when he wrote: "The central question about moral and ethical principles concerns this ontological foundation. If they are neither derived from God nor anchored in some transcendent ground, are they purely ephemeral? (Forbidden Fruit, p.65)

The question is not if moral facts are previous or posterior to moral agents, but which are the metaphysical foundations of such moral facts (provided they exist), and if naturalism can account or not for the existence of such moral facts. Keith's point is that, if naturalism is true, then plausibly moral values and laws are subjective, not objective, because the existence of objective moral laws and values would imply an universe with properties which are, ontologically, at variance with the basic ontological premises of naturalism. This is what I've called Keith's "irrefutable" argument.

So, I think the author has not grasped (or only grasped superficially) Keith's deep insight regarding the ontology of moral values and laws. This explains the author's following comment:

But it seems to me that it's still possible for the naturalist to answer "yes." They can do this by holding that moral facts are not merely facts about agents, but facts about agency itself. And this is, in fact, the more natural point of view. "Murder is unjust" would be true even if there were no murder, because is not just a fact about each and every murder, but something intrinsic to the very concept of murder. There are no just murders — killing someone justly, such as in self-defense, is not murder.

But if moral facts are facts about agency itself, then accepting that objective moral facts exist implies accepting the existence of an objective moral agency (which is what precisely naturalism rejects, since for naturalism, moral agency only exists subjetively, i.e. in human subjects). Moreover, "muder is unjust" could be true even in the absence of murderers, but not in the absence of an objective realm of justice and value according to which we can contrast and classify certain actions as just and unjust.

In my opinion, what the author has failed to grasp is that moral facts implies moral realism (the existence of an objective realm of moral value), and what's in question is the ontological foundation of such moral realm. Is such moral realm what we would expect to exist if naturalism (with its determinism, physicalism, materialism, reductionism) were true? Obviously not, and this is why the existence of objective moral values gives us an argument against naturalism.

Likewise, it seems natural to say that "murder is unjust" would be true even if there were no one around to commit murder. It's a fact about moral agency that there is an obligation not to commit murder; anything lacking such an obligation — a rock, a bullet, many if not all animals — also lacks agency. And as a fact about agency rather than just particular agents, it can be true even if there are no agents.

I also disagree with that. What's a "fact about agency" in the absence of agents? Agency doesn't exist by itself, but only in particular individuals or persons. The author reifies "agency" as if it were a kind of ontologically existent substance with independent existence. But agency is not a substance, it's a property of agents (therefore, it cannot exist in the absence of agents themselves)

In summary, to avoid nihilism/subjectivism, a metaphysical naturalist cannot be a determinist or reductionist, he or she has to hold that moral properties are logical properties, and he or she has to hold that moral facts are facts about agency itself, rather than just particular agents.

I think the discussion so far has shown that a naturalist cannot consistently (i.e. consistent with the basic premises of his worldview) avoid subjectivism and nihilism. In particular:

-He cannot avoid being a determinist given his ontological physicalism and materialism, fully committed to the physical laws governing matter (and hence, human body and brain too).

-He cannot hold that moral properties are logical/mathematical properties, since logic is formal (it refers to propositions and rules of inferences, not to external objects themselves and their properties, which is a matter of ontology and metaphysics). Objective moral properties refers to an objectively existent realm, which demands a ontological foundation in reality (not a purely logical explanation or mathematical formulation)

-He cannot hold that moral facts are facts about agency itself (in the absence of any agent), since that agency is not an independently existent substance, but a property of concrete agents. Therefore, "agency itself" doesn't exist in the absence of particular agents (moreover, given the naturalist commitment to physicalism, what meaning has "agency itself" in the absence of any physical agent as such? Given naturalism, "agency itself" is not physical, therefore it doesn't exist).

Just imagine a naturalist who accepts free will, indeterminism, non-physical objects, realms and dimensions (and therefore, a dualist ontology which includes physical and non-physical objects), paranormal phenomena, "self-existing agency" (independent of any particular agent whatsoever), objective moral values, commands and laws (independent of any sentient beings at all). What do you think of a naturalist like that? Simple: He's NOT a naturalist!

That's a pretty tall order when you consider most naturalists' commitment to pseudoskepticism, so it's easy to see why so many opt for nihilism/subjectivism

Personally, I think pseudoskeptics are false skeptics precisely because they're committed to naturalism (which excludes the paranormal, the afterlife, etc.) Therefore, they don't have any other option than attack, refute, discredit and misrepresent the evidence in favor of psi and the afterlife.

Jime and others have made the argument that since naturalism implies (strongly if not necessarily) moral nihilisim/subjectivism, the existence of moral facts counts against it.

I repeat my (I hope, after this discussion, not too quick) conclusion: Moral subjetivism, or moral nihilism, are the only reasonable alternatives for consistent metaphysical naturalists. I can't see any other reasonable options for them, for the reasons discussed above.

The author concludes his interesting opening post with this comment:

If there are no moral facts, then no one can be obligated to be a skeptic about them. Religious fanatics can't be truthfully said to be doing anything wrong, they're just inconvenient for the rest of us. And perhaps the biggest point that most pseudoskeptics (but not great thinkers like Nietzsche!) miss is that unless there is an obligation to pursue the truth, science and reason are reduced to hobbies to pursued and believed if you want to, and accusations of irrationality boil down to nothing more than expressions of disgust. But a dog can express displeasure and even attack those who displease it; that doesn't obligate us to please it.

So, if the pseudoskeptics are right, believers aren't doing anything wrong by disagreeing, and changing their mind wouldn't make it any better unless they also changed their values (but why should they?). While that's not strictly a contradiction for the skeptic, I take it as a reason to dismiss their position.

I'd add that if there are not moral facts, moral objectivism is false, and not objective ethical grounds exist to reject (on moral grounds) anything. Everything becomes an expression of mere taste, preference, prejudices, habits or socio-biological conditioning. In words of naturalist Paul Kurtz: "The moral principles that govern our behaviour are rooted in habit and custom, feeling and fashion."(same book, p.65)

Or in words of Keith Augustine: "Ethics, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The argument I am proposing is that there is no objective fact that genocide is morally wrong anymore than there is an objective fact that rock and roll is better than country music. Both statements, no matter how well agreed-upon by most people, merely express the opinion of the people who state them"

Or in words of naturalist Massimo Pligliucci: "There is no such a thing as objective morality. We got that straightened out. Morality in human cultures has evolved and is still evolving, and what is moral for you might not be moral for the guy next door and certainly is not moral for the guy across the ocean, the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, and so on." (See Pigliucci's arguments in his debate with Christian philosopher William Lane Craig)

Given that metaphysical naturalism implies (necessarily or plausibly) moral subjectivism (or nihilism, according to Rosenberg), naturalists are not in position to make objective moral statements about anything, including moral stataments about the virtues of science, rationality and free thinking. The naturalist worldview, ultimately, undercuts the objectivity of such stataments.

Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is (necessarily or plausibly) ultimately self-defeating, irrational and inmoral, and not worthy of being accepted by any rational and moral person. (This doesn't imply that every naturalist is inmoral or irrational; what's inmoral and irrational is their worldview and the beliefs entailed by it)

This is where years of honest reflection lead me.

But perhaps I'm completely wrong, and naturalism is an amazingly beautiful, rational and consistent worldview with powerful intellectual resources to ground the existence of objective moral values, laws and duties in particular, and meaning, and purposes in general.

You're the judge.

Links of interest:

-Check shiningwhiffle's new blog for alternative considerations, ideas, reflections and opinions about some of my posts.