Atheist and naturalist philosopher of science and biology Alex Rosenberg has posed a powerful argument for the conclusion that, if naturalism is true, then beliefs don't exist. Therefore, true beliefs are non-existent too (so, it's impossible that natural selection could justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties on the grounds that true beliefs are likely to have survival value: if true beliefs don't exist, then natural selection couldn't select them, because natural selection cannot select for non-existent traits)Before we examine Rosenberg's argument, let's to briefly consider what's a good argument in general. A argument is good, if its premises are more plausibly true than its denial, and if the conclusion follows, logically, from the premises. (I'll ignore, for the moment, non-logically valid forms of inference)
Note that a good argument doesn't require 100% certainty in the truth of the premises: Only it is required that the premises are more plausibly true than their negations. (The reason is that in most cases it is impossible to be 100% sure of the truth of any factual statement)
Now, let's to quote Rosenberg's argument, and then I'll formalize it in a explicit form in order to see if its premises are (given naturalism) most plausibly true than false. Please, read carefully the following Rosenberg's argument:
If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs
Keep in mind that a truth seeker will follow the evidence/argument where it leads (regardless of whether he likes the conclusion or not). It's irrational to deny the conclusion of an argument, only because you don't like the conclusion. You have to examine the PREMISES of the argument in order to assess if they're more plausible to be true than false. If it's the case, and you're rational, you have to accept the conclusion even if it destroys your previous beliefs and causes emotional discomfort.
Now, I'll develop Rosenberg's argument in a more explicit form, so we can examine if its premises are more probably true than false, given metaphysical naturalism (that is, we're going to assume, for the sake of the argument, that naturalism is true, and from this background we'll examine Rosenberg's argument):
ROSENBERG'S ARGUMENT:
1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.
7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
8: Naturalism is true.
9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.
(Corollary: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either).
Let's to examine each point in depth:
1-If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states:
Think about it. If naturalism is true, which is more plausible positiob: that beliefs are brain states or that beliefs are NOT brain states? Obviously, that beliefs are brain states, since that naturalists don't accept beliefs as objects existing independently of any brain, or as properties of the legs or kidneys.
A possible naturalist reply here is that beliefs depend on brain states but are not brain states (they would be a kind of a epiphenomenon)
Let's to examine this possibility. If beliefs are epiphenomena, then they're causally non-efficacious, because they're non-physical (and naturalism, in virtue of the causal closure of the physical universe, explicitly excludes non-physical causation operating on the physical world). Therefore, a naturalist accepting this possibility cannot defend the reliability of our cognitive faculties appealing to natural selection, since natural selection only selects for traits which are useful for survival and reproduction (or at least, for traits which don't interfere with survival and reproduction)
And if beliefs are non-causally efficacious, then they cannot be efficacious to better the chances of survival and reproduction (nor to interfere with them). In fact, beliefs couldn't affect (positively or negatively) the process of survival and reproduction at all (nor any other physical process, for that matter). Therefore, natural selection cannot be rationally appealed to by naturalists in order to think that our cognitive faculties produce a preponderance of mostly true beliefs. The naturalist who accepts this option is believing in the reliability of his cognitive faculties in a uncritical way, dogmatically and BY FAITH.
Beliefs could affect our organism ONLY if they're brain states (and therefore, physical states, with causally efficacious properties on the physical body).
And this brings us to point 2 and 3.
2- Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
No serious naturalist would deny this proposition.
3-Therefore, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
This follows logically from 1 and 2. We have seen a naturalist only could deny this conclusion if he denies the first premise. But in this case, he's trapped in epiphenomenalism and he's easy prey of Plantinga's argument against naturalism.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
A belief can be true or false only if they refer to something or is "about" something. Examples:
My belief "Pseudoskeptics are charlatans, dogmatists, frauds and ideologues" refers to or is about pseudoskeptics.
My belief "Hard-core atheists and materialists are irrational" refers to hard-core atheists and materialists.
Your belief "Jime's blog is great" refers to my blog.
Your belief "My cell phone is black" refers to your cell phone.
In order to be true or false, beliefs need to be "about" something. It's the correspondence (or lack of it) of the belief with such "something" that such belief can be true or false.
For example, my belief that "Hard-core atheists and materialists are irrational" is true only if hard-core atheists and materialists are, actually, irrational (for evidence supporting this belief, see for example this post, or this one or this one). But if they're not irrational, then my belief would be false.
In any case, it's required that my beliefs refer to something as a previous condition to them being true or false. This property is known as INTENTIONALITY.
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
An essential aspect of naturalism is its mechanical conception of nature and its rejection of intrinsic teleology. Purposes, intentionality, intelligence, etc. are not intrinsic aspect of matter or the physical world.
Physical properties are not teleological in the naturaslistic worldview. The physical properties of matter don't include any concept of "intentionality", "ends", "purposes", "agency" or anything like that.
Given naturalism's explicit or implicit commitment to physicalism (the view that everything is physical, or that only physical causes can be efficacious on the physical world), it's clear that point 5 is more plausibly true than its negation.
6: Therefore, beliefs cannot be "about" anything (i.e there is not intentionality)
Note that 6 follows logically of the previous steps of the argument. If you agree that the previous steps of the argument are, given naturalism, more plausibly true than false, then (provide you're rational) you're inescapably committed to the truth of 6.
You simply cannot reject point 6 because you don't like it. If you're a truth seeker, you have to examine the previous steps of the argument, and if you disagree with it, you have to provide evidence that such steps are more plausibly false than true.
This point is key, because some people try to avoid the conclusion of an argument simply "assuming" that the conclusion is false (which begs the question against the argument), or speculating about other possibilities (which, by itself, doesn't show that such possibilities are more plausibly true than the premises of the argument).
For example, the author of the blog "Also Thinking Subversively" (who's NOT a naturalist) tries to help the naturalist's case for the reliability of our cognitive faculties (given naturalism) appealing to a Davidsonian way out: "This is another case where I think the naturalist has, ignoring other possible considerations, a way out, but at great cost. Here's the way out: they could accept (as I do) Donald Davidson's argument that most of our beliefs have to be true. The argument quite simple: what any given belief is actually about is determined by the other beliefs about that thing. If I believe homeless people have weekly meetings on Mondays at a building without windows, wear funny white aprons, often donate money or labor to help the needy, and perform esoteric rituals, I've obviously confused "homeless people" with "Freemasons". If instead I think they are all from Alpha Centauri, are blue with black polka-dots, and meet frequently with Tony Blair to drink tea and play Call of Duty, I'm obviously using the term "homeless people" to refer to these fictional beings that exists only in my head. In both cases, what looked like a serious mass of errors about the subject actually showed that the subject wasn't what it seemed to be: the term "homeless people" wasn't being used the way most of us use it. The same is true of anything else: like an arrow, even if our beliefs miss the target entirely, we can still be sure they've at least hit something. Since I accept this argument, I can't agree with the suggestion that most of our beliefs could be false. We will have at minimum the percentage of correct beliefs needed to fix their reference." (emphasis in blue added)
Note that the author's argument simply assumes that beliefs do exist (so, begging the question against the conclusion of Rosenberg's argument which establish that, given naturalism, beliefs don't exist). To be fair, the author is not replying to Rosenberg's specific argument, but to my post on Plantinga's argument (so the author is not intentionally begging the question against Rosenberg)
But this is irrelevant. Objectively and taken in its own merits as part of the discussion about naturalism, the author's argument begs the question against the possibility (which is more plausible than other alternatives) that, given naturalism, beliefs don't exist in an ontologically relevant sense (and therefore, the author's Davidsonian way out about our beliefs being mostly true become irrelevant).
Given Rosenberg's naturalistic argument against the existence of beliefs, the naturalist has to refute it, not simply to "assume" that it's false. And this is logically previous to the discussion about if our beliefs (assuming that they do exist) are mostly true or mostly false. (Note that if Rosenberg's argument is right, the existence of beliefs, true or false, counts AGAINST metaphysical naturalism. Even a false belief, provided it's ontologically existent, would undermine naturalism. So, if Rosenberg's argument is right, the author's Davidsonian way out would be an excellent argument against naturalism)
So when the author includes the qualification "ignoring other possible considerations", he's ignoring, in my opinion, precisely the most important considerations relevant for the discussion about the ontological status of beliefs in the naturalistic worldview (and its resources to justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties). This considerations, taken together, show that naturalism is plausibly false (precisely because we have good independent reasons to think 1) that beliefs do exist; and 2) that our cognitive faculties are reliable. And this precisely provides powerful evidence against naturalism)
7-Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
It follows of the previous steps.
8-Naturalism is true.
It's accepted by every naturalist.
9-Therefore, there are not beliefs.
It's the conclusion of Rosenberg's argument and follows logically of all the previous steps of the argument.
This post is already too long, and I want to leave the readers the time to think seriously about it.
I only ask you for something (and sorry for being repetitive): when you examine Rosenberg's argument, ask yourself: Given the basic postulates of naturalism (physicalism, determinism, causal closure of the physical world, etc.), are Rosenberg's premises more plausibly true than their negations and other possible alternatives?
I submit that, if naturalism is true, then Rosenberg is right and there are not beliefs in the relevant sense.
So, if you agree with me that beliefs DO exist (in the ontologically relevant, intentionality-related sense), then you have another very poweful reason to think that naturalism is false.
0 comments:
Post a Comment