Audio interviews with Chris Carter on his book Science and the Near Death Experience

Philosopher Chris Carter, the author of (in my opinion) the best book on near-death experience published so far, has been interviewed about his book entitled Science and the Near-Death Experience. Download the interviews here:

-Interview 1

-Interview 2

-Interview 3

In my opinion, most people (including some psi researchers) have wrong views regarding pseudo-skeptics' motivation for debunking and intentions. Some think that pseudo-skeptics are motivated by science and reason; others, that their motivation is personal fame or prestige; others, that their primary motivation is to defend the capitalist system and by this reason (as a side effect) they uncritically defend the status quo. All of these speculations about the professional pseudo-skeptic's motivations could have something of truth, but they miss the ESSENTIAL motivation of pseudo-skepticism.

Chris Carter uncovers this essential motivation with these wise and insighful words:

"Essentially, this debate is not about evidence. The debunkers and the deniers are defending an outmoded world view in which psychic phenomena and the separation of mind from body are simply not allowed to exist. It’s essential to realize that most of these deniers and these phony skeptics are militant Atheists and secular Humanists. For various reasons these people have an ideological agenda, which is anti-religious. One of the pillars of their opposition to religion and superstition is the doctrine of Materialism. That is, the doctrine that all events have a physical cause and that the brain therefore produces the mind. If they conceded the existence of psychic ability such as telepathy, if they conceded the existence of the near-death experience as a genuine separation of mind from body, then Materialism, this pillar of their opposition to religion, would crumble. This explains their dogmatic denial of all the evidence that proves Materialism false" (emphasis in blue added)

Note that essential to the pseudo-skeptical position is the commitment to atheistic materialism (or metaphysical naturalism) and hostility to religion. It's amazing to discover that, at the bottom, the controversy about psi/afterlife is actually something that has to do with God! (in this sense, we could call it a spiritual or even a "divine" battle).

To be honest, I arrived by my own means to Carter's same conclusion a long time ago. I was astonished to discover that some spiritualists, psi researchers or fans of parapsychology, and open minded scientists didn't realize that. Some of them, in fact, even bought and uncritically accepted the atheisitic propaganda against "religion" based mostly in slogans, historical misrepresentations, and simplistic false dilemmas (science vs. religion, reason vs. faith, etc.), ignoring that the evidence for psi and afterlife precisely validates the core and essential doctrines of most religions (namely, that we're spiritual beings, that the universe has a purpose, that the afterlife exists, that our actions have spiritual consequences, that possibly there is a God or a creative cosmic super-intelligence, that materialism is false, that love is a very powerful force, etc.).

I'm glad that someone like Carter is exposing the fallacies of pseudo-skeptics, making explicit the essence or core of the problem. In order to solve a problem, you need to have a correct understanding of it. So, in order to solve the "pseudo-skeptical problem" (i.e. the existence of a very influential minority of ideological dogmatists interested in blocking human knowledge when such knowledge is contrary to materialism and naturalism, and working hard everyday with agressive propagandistic means to discredit and misrepresent such investigations) you need to correctly understand what's pseudo-skepticism, which are its motivations, what ideological agenda are pseudo-skeptics pushing forward. Failing to understand that implies falling to the pseudo-skeptical trap and being fooled by them again.

I'm sorry if I sound too harsh or rude but WAKE, DON'T BE STUPID. It's your spiritual future what's at stake here. Don't allow that a bunch of atheistic ideologues with anti-religious obsessions/fixed ideas block your spiritual enlightment and evolution.

Some good readings suggestions

I'd strongly suggest the readers of my blog to take the time to read the following books:

A commentary about agency and other things

In an interesting post by the author of the blog Also Thinking Subversively, he defends two contentions about agency (in reply to my earlier post):

1-Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)

2-Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed.

I disagree with both accounts and I'll explain why.

First, let's to take 1 (Moral facts are facts about agency itself (though not solely about agency)).

I think this is incorrect. Moral facts are not "about" nothing, since "facts" are states of affairs (or change of them) in the real world.

The only way I can make sense of the author's use of the word "fact" is in the sense of a "true proposition" (which can be "about" something). But even in this case, it is not clear that "moral facts" are facts about agency.

Note that the author specifies that moral facts are "not solely about agency", but this is ambiguous. Is he saying that moral facts are about agency and, in some cases, agency + somehting else? Or is he saying that moral facts could be about something else which lacks agency? If the former, then agency is essential to the concept of moral facts (as the author understand it). If the latter, then agency is not essential to the concept of moral facts.

I think that if we understand the author as defending the former (agency is essential to moral facts), then his view is plausibly false: Earthquakes, Tsunamis, diseases, etc. are considered "natural evils", but they're not caused by any agency at all. Therefore, the proposition "Cancer in babies is bad" is not a fact about any agency at all, but about a very common unconcious biological process independent of any agency at all.

Replying that agency is implied after all because the receptor of such evil is an agent won't help, since babies are not agents (and evil even exists in that case).

So, it's highly disputable that "moral facts" are facts about agency (or at least, that agency is essential to moral facts. At most, agency is essential to moral responsability).

Regarding 2 (Facts about agency would be so even if no agents existed), I think the author is conflating a proposition with its referent (and this confusion is caused by the author's use of the word "fact").

For example, when we say that evolution is a "fact", we're not saying that facts about evolution would be so even if no evolution would happen. What we're saying is that evolution is TRUE.

If author's use of the word "fact" seems to refer to the meaning of the word or statement in question (regardless of whether the referent of such statement is instantiated or not). But this trivializes the discussion and change the topic.

We could say, using the word "fact" as the author does, that "facts about God" would be so even if no God actually exists. But in this case, what we're saying is that the meaning of words and propositions about God would be such and such, regardless of whether God exists or not. And this is correct but irrelevant, because what we want to know in a debate about God is if such God exists OBJECTIVELY or not. This is not a discussion about semantics, but about ontology.

This confusion between semantics and ontology is more evident in the author's following statement (in reply to my argument that agency doesn't exist by itself):

Facts about agency itself (apart from actual agents) are not facts about any sort of substance, but facts about the concept of agency... Facts about a concept are facts about what would be the case if the concept were instantiated. But such facts will be true even in the absence of their instantiation. (emphasis in blue added)

If it's true, then the author is arguing about semantics of agency, not about the ontology of agency (which is what we're talking about in the debate about naturalism and objective moral values).

To make this point clear, imagine the following dialogue:

Atheist: God doesn't exist.

Theist: Why do you think that?

Atheist: Because God is omnipotent and good and, however, he cannot eliminate the evil in the world. So, he's not omnipotent or not good, and in both cases he doesn't exist.

Theist: The statement is "God is good" is a objective fact about God

Atheist: No, it is not an objective fact because it doesn't refer to any actual objective reality (God)

Theist: It's an objective fact, because it's a fact about the concept of God (and this fact is independent of whether God exists or not)

Atheist: But then your response is about semantics, about the concept of God. And this is irrelevant to my point, because my original contention was that God doesn't exist. This is a metaphysical claim, a claim about the nature of reality. And if you're a theist, you have to believe that God exists objectively, not only that concepts about God are correct or wrong.

Theist: I think God exists objectively because our concepts about God are objective.

Atheist: But you're using "objective" in a misleading way. Your concept of "objective" conflate semantics with ontology, and the ontological problem of God's existence is trivialized by you when you refer to the objectivity of the concept of God (which is a semantical problem)

(This dialogue is fictional but this is useful to make the point: when talking about objective moral values in naturalism, we're talking about the ontological foundation of such values given the premises of naturalism. We're not talking about concepts of values, but about their objective reality in the world.)

A more evident proof of the author's serious confusion between semantics and ontology is this example of his:

"You can see this principle more clearly when you turn to imaginary beings: werewolves do not exist, but even so there are facts about werewolves."

Note that the author conflates facts about werewolves themselves (which is ontological/factual and empirical question) with facts about the CONCEPT of werewolves (a semantical question). If facts about a factual entity X were purely conceptual, then they could be known a priori, independent of any empirical research. But empirical research is need precisely because facts about real entities of the world cannot be known a priori (even if we handle, a priori, concepts of such entities)

So, the author's fundamental mistake is the conflation of concepts with their referents, identifying facts about concepts with facts about the corresponding referents.

My main interest is not about semantics, but about ontology. My point is that, ontologically speaking, objective moral values don't exist if naturalism is true (and this ontological point is independent of the concepts of agency or any other concept. My argument is not about concepts, but about the objective reality of its referents and its ontological foundation in reality).

So, I repeat and confirm my previous statement: "Agency doesn't exist by itself, but only in particular individuals or persons. The author reifies "agency" as if it were a kind of ontologically existent substance with independent existence. But agency is not a substance, it's a property of agents (therefore, it cannot exist in the absence of agents themselves)" (Note the ontological, not semantical, point of my argument: My argument is that if agents doesn't exist, then agency either, because the latter is a property of the former. And no naturalist would accept properties existing by themselves, floating in the air, regardless of the physical/material substances that hold them)

In another topic, the author also disagrees with my statament: "A moral obligation implies a person who's the receptor of such obligation, but it also implies the existence of an author or authority who commands such laws or obligations on us. (For example, the laws of USA are commanded by the political authority of USA and are directed and imposed to USA citizens)"

The author's objection is this: "It's true enough that an obligation is always owed by someone to someone, though under some accounts, this can be the same person. What I'm not convinced of is that it needs to be specifically commanded"

Let me say something in reply:

1-The author agrees with me that an obligation is always owned by someone to someone. So, this point is out of discussion.

2-He comments that under some accounts, this can be the same person.

3-He's not convinced that an obligation needs to be specifically commanded. I agree with it, but it's irrelevant: the point is that an obligation only is such in the case it's commanded by an authority. If we know such authority or not is irrelevant: that's relevant is that the nature of an obligation depends on an authority capable of commanding it over us.

In moral semantics and logically, an obligation has the form of a command or prescription. It's an order.

For example: "You shall expose pseudoskeptics and other charlatans" is not an factual assertion about states of affairs in the real world, but a prescription for action. It's a command to behave in certain ways regarding pseudoskeptics.

Compare the above obligation with the following statament: "Pseudoskeptics are charlatans". The latter is a factual assertion, not a prescription. Such factual claim says something (true or false) about pseudoskeptics, but it doesn't prescribe anything to any person. It asserts something factual.

But obligations have the logical form of a command, not of a factual proposition. (A methodological consequence of this is that obligations are not true nor false; at most they can be binding or not binding in a moral sense, but not true or false because they don't describe any factual state of affairs in the external world)

The author doesn't seem to understand the crucial aspect of the question. He believes that obligations can exist in a descriptive form alone, or that facts by themselves are morally obligatory. He says:

For example, I have an obligation to each and every person not to steal from them (except under extenuating circumstances). Does that obligation really need to be commanded by an entity (i.e. god or a government) to which I owe an obligation to obey its commands?

Yes, otherwise it is not an obligation at all. At most, it would be a subjective feeling based on taste and preferences (e.g. certain feelings of empathy or love for other people, or the fear that if we steal them, they will do the same to us). But in this latter case, this is not an objective obligation, only a belief based on personal beliefs, indoctrination, taste and convention.

Think about it: Why does the author believe that he has an obligation to refrain of stealing? When pressed, he'll probably reply: "Because, except under some circunstances, stealing is bad"

Such reply assumes that stealing is (ontolologically) objectively bad (not bad only from a personal point of view). But how does such objective fact is constitutive of an obligation for me? Why should I refrain from stealing, even if I concede that it is bad? Why am I obligated to do the good instead of the evil, and not viceversa? WHY, exactly?

The author seems to believe that moral facts are, by themselves, morally binding and obligatory. But WHY? And HOW could such facts have a moral authority over me in order to make me a passive subject of objective moral obligation?

The author confuses his personal beliefs on morality (e.g. "Stealing is bad, don't do it") with an ontologically objective and existing order/realm of moral obligations. How does he know that his moral beliefs are true, or have any objective foundations? And if he knows such thing, are such objective foundations more compatible with naturalism than with supernaturalism? (This is the original point of discussion)

The author says "It would seem to me that this renders the concept of obligation circular: in order to explain why I have an obligation to you not to steal from you, I have to appeal to an obligation I owe to somebody else. But how do I then explain why I have that obligation? Why am I obligated to the authority to obey its commands? Surely not just because they commanded it"

The reason why you're obligated is because you're under the command and power of an authority above you. Otherwise, you're not objectively obligated to anything even if you subjectively feel such obligation.

Why am I obligated to respect civil contracts? Because if I break such contracts, the Goverment will punish me (e.g. making me pay much money, in court, due to breaking the civil law). The Goverment has the force or power to impose on me a certain way to act and behave. He's an authority over me and its commands are therefore obligatory for me (in a legal, not moral, sense).

Why are little children obligated to do whatever their parents says? Because they have authority over them. Parents can, using physical means if necessary, force on their little children their commands.

Now, try to imagine an obligation NOT based on any authority whatsoever. Just imagine me saying to the author "Author of the blog Also Thinking Subversively, You shall wash my car everyday!. And also I command you read my blog and agree with everything what I say!"

Obviously, the author will laugh and reply: "Why the hell am I obligated to do that? Who are you to command me that?" You're not an authority over me, so your commands are worthless"

Replying that in cases of moral obligations is different because we don't need to know the authority to tell us what to do because we know that certain actions are obligatory, is irrelevant. Because the argument is not that we need to know the authority in order to know the obligations; the argument is that an actual authority is need in order to ground the objective reality of such obligations (otherwise such obligations are purely subjective and illusory). And this is so, regardless of whether we know the identity of such authority or not.

If we have reasons to think that such authority doesn't exist, then no moral obligation is objectively valid, and our moral intuitions would be illusory or false. This is why naturalist Keith Augustine, consistently realizing the implications of naturalism (one of such implications is precisely the non-existence of any cosmic or transcendent authority), argues: "Admitting that moral laws are man-made is equivalent to acknowledging that ethical rules are arbitrary and therefore human beings are not obligated to follow them"

Keith is not saying that some people doesn't believe, sincerely and subjectively, that certains actions are morally right or wrong. Nor he's deying that some people (like the author) believe in moral obligations regardless of any authority. What's refuting is the ontological basis for the objectivity of such moral beliefs. Given naturalism, there is not plausible reason to think that moral obligations are objectively binding; and given that they're man-made, human beings are not (in any ontologically relevant moral sense) objectively obligated to follow them (even if by purely subjective factors, like indoctrination or prejudices, they feel actually obligated).

For this reason, philosopher of biology and naturalist Michael Ruse has said: "I appreciate that when somebody says 'Love they neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless, . . . such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory"

Again, Ruse is not denying that certain people subjectively believes in moral obligations like "Love they neighboor as thyself", or "Don't rape babies" or "Don't steal other people's objects". His point is ontological: Given naturalism, WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVE AND REAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SUCH BELIEFS?

Respectful, I'd suggest the author to critically examine the ontological implications of naturalism, and then comparing such implications with his own beliefs. If he concludes that naturalism is false, then some version of supernaturalism HAS to be true. Therefore, we cannot exclude in advance the existence of some cosmic, creative, intelligent or trascendent supernatural authority over us which grounds moral values and moral obligations, and commands them (perhaps not explicitly, but in the form of moral intuitions, as part of our spiritual nature) on us.

Also, I'd suggest the author to discern carefully the actual terms of the debate: what's at stake are two things:

1-Are moral values and moral obligations objective? (that is, not purely subjective beliefs)

2-If the answer to 1 is YES, then another question is posed: such objective moral realm, provide evidence for or against naturalism? (that is, if naturalism were true, we would expect, plausibly, that such moral realm would exist and would be known by morally free, concious, rational agents in order to freely adapt their behaviour and actions to such normative moral realm? Does that make (plausible) sense in naturalism/ontological materialism?)

Alex Rosenberg: a powerful metaphysical naturalistic argument for the (ontologically speaking) non-existence of beliefs

Atheist and naturalist philosopher of science and biology Alex Rosenberg has posed a powerful argument for the conclusion that, if naturalism is true, then beliefs don't exist. Therefore, true beliefs are non-existent too (so, it's impossible that natural selection could justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties on the grounds that true beliefs are likely to have survival value: if true beliefs don't exist, then natural selection couldn't select them, because natural selection cannot select for non-existent traits)

Before we examine Rosenberg's argument, let's to briefly consider what's a good argument in general. A argument is good, if its premises are more plausibly true than its denial, and if the conclusion follows, logically, from the premises. (I'll ignore, for the moment, non-logically valid forms of inference)

Note that a good argument doesn't require 100% certainty in the truth of the premises: Only it is required that the premises are more plausibly true than their negations. (The reason is that in most cases it is impossible to be 100% sure of the truth of any factual statement)

Now, let's to quote Rosenberg's argument, and then I'll formalize it in a explicit form in order to see if its premises are (given naturalism) most plausibly true than false. Please, read carefully the following Rosenberg's argument:

If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs

Keep in mind that a truth seeker will follow the evidence/argument where it leads (regardless of whether he likes the conclusion or not). It's irrational to deny the conclusion of an argument, only because you don't like the conclusion. You have to examine the PREMISES of the argument in order to assess if they're more plausible to be true than false. If it's the case, and you're rational, you have to accept the conclusion even if it destroys your previous beliefs and causes emotional discomfort.

Now, I'll develop Rosenberg's argument in a more explicit form, so we can examine if its premises are more probably true than false, given metaphysical naturalism (that is, we're going to assume, for the sake of the argument, that naturalism is true, and from this background we'll examine Rosenberg's argument):

ROSENBERG'S ARGUMENT:

1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.

2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.

3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.

4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)

5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.

6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.

7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.

8: Naturalism is true.

9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.

(Corollary: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either).

Let's to examine each point in depth:

1-If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states:

Think about it. If naturalism is true, which is more plausible positiob: that beliefs are brain states or that beliefs are NOT brain states? Obviously, that beliefs are brain states, since that naturalists don't accept beliefs as objects existing independently of any brain, or as properties of the legs or kidneys.

A possible naturalist reply here is that beliefs depend on brain states but are not brain states (they would be a kind of a epiphenomenon)

Let's to examine this possibility. If beliefs are epiphenomena, then they're causally non-efficacious, because they're non-physical (and naturalism, in virtue of the causal closure of the physical universe, explicitly excludes non-physical causation operating on the physical world). Therefore, a naturalist accepting this possibility cannot defend the reliability of our cognitive faculties appealing to natural selection, since natural selection only selects for traits which are useful for survival and reproduction (or at least, for traits which don't interfere with survival and reproduction)

And if beliefs are non-causally efficacious, then they cannot be efficacious to better the chances of survival and reproduction (nor to interfere with them). In fact, beliefs couldn't affect (positively or negatively) the process of survival and reproduction at all (nor any other physical process, for that matter). Therefore, natural selection cannot be rationally appealed to by naturalists in order to think that our cognitive faculties produce a preponderance of mostly true beliefs. The naturalist who accepts this option is believing in the reliability of his cognitive faculties in a uncritical way, dogmatically and BY FAITH.

Beliefs could affect our organism ONLY if they're brain states (and therefore, physical states, with causally efficacious properties on the physical body).

And this brings us to point 2 and 3.

2- Brain states are physical configurations of matter.

No serious naturalist would deny this proposition.

3-Therefore, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.

This follows logically from 1 and 2. We have seen a naturalist only could deny this conclusion if he denies the first premise. But in this case, he's trapped in epiphenomenalism and he's easy prey of Plantinga's argument against naturalism.

4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)

A belief can be true or false only if they refer to something or is "about" something. Examples:

My belief "Pseudoskeptics are charlatans, dogmatists, frauds and ideologues" refers to or is about pseudoskeptics.

My belief "Hard-core atheists and materialists are irrational" refers to hard-core atheists and materialists.

Your belief "Jime's blog is great" refers to my blog.

Your belief "My cell phone is black" refers to your cell phone.

In order to be true or false, beliefs need to be "about" something. It's the correspondence (or lack of it) of the belief with such "something" that such belief can be true or false.

For example, my belief that "Hard-core atheists and materialists are irrational" is true only if hard-core atheists and materialists are, actually, irrational (for evidence supporting this belief, see for example this post, or this one or this one). But if they're not irrational, then my belief would be false.

In any case, it's required that my beliefs refer to something as a previous condition to them being true or false. This property is known as INTENTIONALITY.

5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.

An essential aspect of naturalism is its mechanical conception of nature and its rejection of intrinsic teleology. Purposes, intentionality, intelligence, etc. are not intrinsic aspect of matter or the physical world.

Physical properties are not teleological in the naturaslistic worldview. The physical properties of matter don't include any concept of "intentionality", "ends", "purposes", "agency" or anything like that.

Given naturalism's explicit or implicit commitment to physicalism (the view that everything is physical, or that only physical causes can be efficacious on the physical world), it's clear that point 5 is more plausibly true than its negation.

6: Therefore, beliefs cannot be "about" anything (i.e there is not intentionality)

Note that 6 follows logically of the previous steps of the argument. If you agree that the previous steps of the argument are, given naturalism, more plausibly true than false, then (provide you're rational) you're inescapably committed to the truth of 6.

You simply cannot reject point 6 because you don't like it. If you're a truth seeker, you have to examine the previous steps of the argument, and if you disagree with it, you have to provide evidence that such steps are more plausibly false than true.

This point is key, because some people try to avoid the conclusion of an argument simply "assuming" that the conclusion is false (which begs the question against the argument), or speculating about other possibilities (which, by itself, doesn't show that such possibilities are more plausibly true than the premises of the argument).

For example, the author of the blog "Also Thinking Subversively" (who's NOT a naturalist) tries to help the naturalist's case for the reliability of our cognitive faculties (given naturalism) appealing to a Davidsonian way out: "This is another case where I think the naturalist has, ignoring other possible considerations, a way out, but at great cost. Here's the way out: they could accept (as I do) Donald Davidson's argument that most of our beliefs have to be true. The argument quite simple: what any given belief is actually about is determined by the other beliefs about that thing. If I believe homeless people have weekly meetings on Mondays at a building without windows, wear funny white aprons, often donate money or labor to help the needy, and perform esoteric rituals, I've obviously confused "homeless people" with "Freemasons". If instead I think they are all from Alpha Centauri, are blue with black polka-dots, and meet frequently with Tony Blair to drink tea and play Call of Duty, I'm obviously using the term "homeless people" to refer to these fictional beings that exists only in my head. In both cases, what looked like a serious mass of errors about the subject actually showed that the subject wasn't what it seemed to be: the term "homeless people" wasn't being used the way most of us use it. The same is true of anything else: like an arrow, even if our beliefs miss the target entirely, we can still be sure they've at least hit something. Since I accept this argument, I can't agree with the suggestion that most of our beliefs could be false. We will have at minimum the percentage of correct beliefs needed to fix their reference." (emphasis in blue added)

Note that the author's argument simply assumes that beliefs do exist (so, begging the question against the conclusion of Rosenberg's argument which establish that, given naturalism, beliefs don't exist). To be fair, the author is not replying to Rosenberg's specific argument, but to my post on Plantinga's argument (so the author is not intentionally begging the question against Rosenberg)

But this is irrelevant. Objectively and taken in its own merits as part of the discussion about naturalism, the author's argument begs the question against the possibility (which is more plausible than other alternatives) that, given naturalism, beliefs don't exist in an ontologically relevant sense (and therefore, the author's Davidsonian way out about our beliefs being mostly true become irrelevant).

Given Rosenberg's naturalistic argument against the existence of beliefs, the naturalist has to refute it, not simply to "assume" that it's false. And this is logically previous to the discussion about if our beliefs (assuming that they do exist) are mostly true or mostly false. (Note that if Rosenberg's argument is right, the existence of beliefs, true or false, counts AGAINST metaphysical naturalism. Even a false belief, provided it's ontologically existent, would undermine naturalism. So, if Rosenberg's argument is right, the author's Davidsonian way out would be an excellent argument against naturalism)

So when the author includes the qualification "ignoring other possible considerations", he's ignoring, in my opinion, precisely the most important considerations relevant for the discussion about the ontological status of beliefs in the naturalistic worldview (and its resources to justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties). This considerations, taken together, show that naturalism is plausibly false (precisely because we have good independent reasons to think 1) that beliefs do exist; and 2) that our cognitive faculties are reliable. And this precisely provides powerful evidence against naturalism)

7-Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.

It follows of the previous steps.

8-Naturalism is true.

It's accepted by every naturalist.

9-Therefore, there are not beliefs.

It's the conclusion of Rosenberg's argument and follows logically of all the previous steps of the argument.

This post is already too long, and I want to leave the readers the time to think seriously about it.

I only ask you for something (and sorry for being repetitive): when you examine Rosenberg's argument, ask yourself: Given the basic postulates of naturalism (physicalism, determinism, causal closure of the physical world, etc.), are Rosenberg's premises more plausibly true than their negations and other possible alternatives?

I submit that, if naturalism is true, then Rosenberg is right and there are not beliefs in the relevant sense.

So, if you agree with me that beliefs DO exist (in the ontologically relevant, intentionality-related sense), then you have another very poweful reason to think that naturalism is false.

Interview with Daniel Drasin, the author of Zen... and the Art of Debunkery

This is an interview with Daniel Drasin, the author of the excellent online article (recently updated) entitled "Zen... and the Art of Debunkery". Enjoy.

1-Dan, tell us something about your background.

I was born, raised and received my professional training in filmmaking and media production in the New York CIty area. Since 1973 I've been based primarily in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to my professional focus I'm broadly conversant with the arts, sciences and technology.

As a child I had many precognitive dreams. These experiences taught me that our normal perception of reality wasn't the whole picture, and that things went on "behind the scenes" to which our normal senses, and our scientific instruments, seem to be blind. This instilled in me a healthy skepticism toward the limited picture of reality we've been fed by our culture.

In the mid-1940s, Frank Edwards, one of that era's legendary New York radio broadcasters, often reported UFO sightings. This was a perfectly respectable subject at the time -- the ridicule-and-disinformation campaign wasn't launched until the infamous Robertson Panel initiated it in 1952. Fascinated by Edwards' UFO reports, I started reading everything I could find on the subject. I also became addicted to Long John Nebel's midnight radio show out of New York, which often featured purported UFO contactees and researchers of the paranormal.

In the mid-1960s I was invited by John Keel to accompany him on his research trips to Point Pleasant, West Virginia, where the mysterious Mothman was scaring the wits out of local residents, cops, and no-nonsense private pilots who had seen the enigmatic creature in full flight. This was my first exposure to "high strangeness," and it also taught me a lot about irrational and politicized skepticism. John wrote about some of my adventures in his book, *The Mothman Prophecies*, from which the Richard Gere movie was loosely adapted. It still freaks me out when I recall that I walked across the Silver Bridge less than a week before it collapsed into the Ohio River!

During the 1980s I became involved in the research into the apparent anomalies on Mars, initially working with Richard Hoagland and later with the Society for Planetary Seti Research. I'm still on the fence about some of these Mars features, but to me the most interesting part of that experience was my encounter with the bizarre irrationality and bullying tactics of the debunker community, many of whom fancied themselves scientists but were happy to behave perfectly unscientifically when it came to controversial subject matter.

Since about 2001 I've been producing some documentaries about scientific research into the afterlife. If you think the notion of ET brings out the bottom-feeding debunkers, just try getting into any inquiry that questions, on science's own terms, the materialist belief that the mind is the brain and that death is the end of awareness. That really drives them crazy!

2-You're the author of the excellent online article "Zen... and the Art of Debunkery". What motivated you to write it?

"Zen..." started out as a paper I delivered at a conference of the International Association for New Science in 1991. I wrote it pretty much off the top of my head, based on my run-ins with the debunking community over the years. My initial motive was simply to lay bare the strategies of the pathological skeptic, but I ended up having a lot of fun holding up the mirror to those who claim the scientific high ground without paying their dues, and who have made the lives of so many honest researchers so miserable for so long.

Of course, like any field of inquiry that's been marginalized, ufology, and anomalistics in general, have attracted their share of disgruntled eccentrics, carnival barkers and disinformers as well as bona-fide researchers. But I must say that the vast majority of people I've personally met in this field are simply trying to do their homework... often against formidable odds on a cruelly inclined playing field.

3-Have you received any feedback from "skeptics" and debunkers, regarding your article?

Some years ago I did receive an astonishingly unhinged rant from a fire-breathing debunker who claimed to be a scientist, but so far that's the only one. I certainly welcome reasoned feedback from anyone, but frankly I can't see most debunker types reading past the first paragraph of "Zen..." without rejecting the rest of the piece sight-unseen.

4-In your opinion, which are the main causes of the debunkers' almost obsessive hostility against unorthodox scientific theories?

The main cause, as far a I can see, is the overwhelming force of peer pressure, which can be especially nasty in the supposedly free-thinking provinces of science and academia. Step one degree out of line, and your reputation and funding can suddenly evaporate, your papers may be rejected for publication, and the church fathers will refuse to look through your telescope -- it's been going on for centuries. You may also be disinvited from professional conferences, as recently happened to the Nobel-laureate physicist Brian Josephson, whose unpardonable sin was following scientific studies of the "paranormal." (Ironically, "paranormal" is a social definition, not a scientific one. After all, how can one even determine the degree of normalcy of anything that can't be discussed openly?)

Another root cause of that hostility seems to be that some people need structure in their lives. Many of them join the armed services, religious cults, right-wing groups or whatever, because they can't bear to take responsibility for their own words and actions. The cult of turbo-skepticism is tailor-made for those of a scientific or intellectual bent who fall into this category.

Beyond that there are the usual political and commercial forces that seek to suppress inconvenient truths of all kinds by any means possible. The attitude of the SETI community toward the ufological community is a perfect example. I mean, what would happen to SETI's funding if the scientific community suddenly started examining the robust evidence and testimony underlying the UFO issue?

5-In your view, which is the field of research most negatively affected by the debunkers' attacks and propaganda?

That's a hard one because kneejerk negativists pervade just about every scientific and cultural field. In terms of immediate global consequences, I suppose the Big-Oil-fueled propaganda of the peak-oil deniers and climate-change debunkers is doing the most damage. Next in line would probably be the "free-energy" and cold-fusion "skeptics" who have cost us over two decades of delay and stagnation in the research and development of desperately needed new energy sources. Beyond that, of course, we have massive forces of denial pushing back against consciousness studies, post-materialist science, ufology, health and economic alternatives, and whatever threatens to render entrenched interests obsolete.

6- Your article addreses the common debunking tactics regarding evidence for extraterrestrial intelligence. Which is your current opinion about ufology?

Well, "ufology" has always been poorly defined as a discipline, and is a mixed bag in terms of integrity, scientific rigor and so forth. It has also been heavily contaminated by those who, for whatever reasons, seek to muddy the waters by concocting hoaxes and other distractions. Once you force any field of inquiry underground, these kinds of dynamics are pretty much inevitable. In fact, those who suppress the truth rely on them and sometimes jump-start them behind the scenes. Those two old geezers, "Doug and Dave," who claimed to have hoaxed hundreds of crop circles, are a perfect example. You can find some provocative information about these and other crop-circle disinfo tactics at http://www.consciousape.com/news/mi5-crop-circle-makers/

Probably the greatest breath of fresh air to come along in many years is Leslie Kean's new book, *UFOs: Generals, Pilots and Government Officials Go on the Record*. With this book, Kean has set a new benchmark for journalism and scientific clarity in this field. So far, all the debunkers can do about it is to crawl out from under their rocks, take Leslie's words out of context, manufacture distractions and straw-man arguments, and toss a few outright lies into the mix. James Fox's documentary films, *Out of the Blue*, and its sequel *I Know What I Saw*, are also very well worth a look. In the related field of crop-circle research, Nancy Talbott's website, http://bltresearch.com, and Suzanne Taylor's documentary "What on Earth?" are quite good.

6A- Do you think we have reasonably good evidence for the possible extraterrestrial origin of some ufos?

Yes, but I think the evidence suggests that the bigger picture may be more interesting than that. My guess is that it also involves several aspects of reality for which our current physics and psychology haven't yet developed appropriate language or conceptual frameworks.

7-One common objection to the hypothesis that alien beings are visiting us is that, given the extremely large distances between stars, it's monumentally improbable that such beings could arrive here. What do you think of this objection?

It's pretty shortsighted, and also way out of line with the speculations of modern physics. As recently as 1900, the idea of flying from Los Angeles to London overnight would have seemed just as monumentally improbable and would surely have been shot down by any number of debunkers, foaming at the mouth about such nonsense and providing plenty of reasons why it would forever remain impossible.

Fortunately, what's possible isn't dictated by our theories. What matters is the evidence, and how honestly and carefully we study and interpret it.

8-Another objection is that, even if we accept the non-conventional nature of ufos, it doesn't imply that such objects are from an extraterrestrial origin. Some speculate that they could be human beings coming from the future, or even "angels" of other dimensions. Do you think it is a good objection against the alien hypothesis?

The "UFO phenomenon" actually appears to be a range of different phenomena that we've lumped together into one big, fuzzy category. The political, scientific and social taboos against research in this area have kept our discernment stuck pretty much at the kindergarten level for at least a half a century.

9-What do you think of the phenomenon of "contactees" (i.e. people who claim to be in communication with ET)? Is there good evidence for these cases?

I don't think a broad-brush answer is possible -- one has to study these cases individually and carefully. Some seem to be transparent frauds and hoaxes. Some may be wholly or partly true. Unfortunately, many people's minds tend to snap completely open or shut too easily, so the possibility of a partial truth is almost never considered. We need to remember that sometimes witnesses and experiencers have to massage the facts a bit for their own protection. Others may embellish it for reasons of ego or opportunism.

10-Do you think the abduction phenomenon is real?

There seems to be quite a lot of evidence for it, and no evidence against it that I know of. There may be abstract arguments against it, but reality doesn't give a hoot about our abstract arguments.

11-Do you think the ufo phenomenon has any connection with the history of humankind and religion?

As with the abduction phenomenon, there seems to be compelling evidence for it. I'm not aware of any evidence against it.

12-Are there some books you would like to recommend about ufology or any other topic?

For ufology I'd start with Leslie Kean's book, then go back a few years to Timothy Good's "Above Top Secret" and his subsequent books.

For a peek beyond the boundaries of the materialist paradigm I'd start with Charles T. Tart's "The End of Materialism," Michael Newton's "Journey of Souls," and The Solomons' "The Scole Experiment."

13-Something else you would like to add to end the interview?

I'd just like to thank you for publishing your blog and for shining so much light on these abuses and distortions of skepticism and critical thinking.

Links of interest:

-Daniel Drasin's website.

-Daniel Drasin's article "Zen... and the Art of Debunkery"

-Daniel Drasin's video "I'm a skeptic"

Budd Hopkins 3-7-2004 UFO Abduction Lecture

Budd Hopkins is one of the top researchers of the phenomenon known as "alien abduction". In this lecture, Hopkins discusses his latest research work in the field of UFO / alien abductions.

The evidence seems to suggest that abductees are psychologically normal people (i.e. they're not mentally ill) and they believe that they had a real experience. However, by itself, it doesn't show that they have been actually abducted by aliens. It's still an open question, even though researchers like Hopkins, John Mack and David Jacobs have concluded that the evidence strongly supports the alien hypothesis of the abduction experience.

You'll draw your own conclusions.

Read an interview with Hopkins here.

Michael Ruse and the moral poverty of materialistic atheism, secular humanism and metaphysical naturalism

Philosopher of science and biology Michael Ruse explains us what is morality from the point of view of metaphysical naturalism, given the Darwinian evolutionary theory: "The position of the modern evolutionist is that humans have an awareness of morality because such awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation no less than hands and feet and teeth. Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. (The Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics, in the Darwinian Paradigm, pp. 262-269. Emphasis in blue added.)

Like Richard Dawkins, Bertrand Russell, Keith Augustine and Alex Rosenberg (and many other naturalists), Ruse fully understands the implications for morality of metaphysical naturalism. They understand that, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then objective moral values plausibly don't exist. Therefore, like it or not, moral subjetivism and its relativistic implications have to be right (if naturalism were true).

Note Ruse's brilliant insight "considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory". Ethics is illusory in this sense, because (given metaphysical naturalism) there is not reason to think that an objective realm of moral value actually exist in a world which is purely physical and material. In fact, given our current scientific knowledge of physics, matter doesn't have any moral or normative properties at all. Physical laws specify only physical and chemical properties, not normative or value-laden properties. So, we have a reason against the view that matter has normative properties.

Therefore, our moral claims don't refer to anything objective. We think they do but reflection on the premises of naturalism teaches us otherwise and this is why we're rationally compelled to conclude that ethics is illusory.

So, as has argued naturalist philosopher of science and biology Alex Rosenberg: "There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon."

Moreover, given that the evolutionary theory can explain why we have moral beliefs (regardless of the existence or non-existence of any objective moral realm), then we don't need to appeal to any ontologically objective morality in order to explain our morality. Therefore, if metaphysical naturalism is true, morality is (very plausibly) a purely subjective phenomenon, a projection of the human mind.

Understanding this point is essential to fully understand the metaphysical naturalist worldview and its devastating implications for ethics. In words of Rosenberg: "The process of natural selection is not in general good at filtering for true beliefs, only for ones hitherto convenient for our lines of descent. Think of folk physics, folk biology, and most of all folk psychology. Since natural selection has no foresight, we have no idea whether the moral core we now endorse will hold up, be selected for, over the long-term future of our species, if any. This nihilistic blow is cushioned by the realization that Darwinian processes operating on our forbearers in the main selected for niceness! The core morality of cooperation, reciprocity and even altruism that was selected for in the environment of hunter-gatherers and early agrarians, continues to dominate our lives and social institutions. We may hope the environment of modern humans has not become different enough eventually to select against niceness. But we can’t invest our moral core with more meaning than this: it was a convenience, not for us as individuals, but for our genes. There is no meaning to be found in that conclusion"

Many naturalists have serious problems accepting such conclusions and implications. They accept certain key premises (e.g. that "everything is physical", that "evolution is an unguided and contingent process", that "determinism is true", etc.) but don't want to accept the full implications and conclusiones derived of a fully consistent application of such premises. This is evidence of intellectual dishonesty, superficiality or, in general, flawed cognitive faculties.

Rational people try to put together their beliefs and examine their implications. Ideologues, charlatans, or simply superficial people, tend to defend proposition X and proposition B, but reject a conclusion Z (when this conclusion is not liked), without realizing that X+B implies (necessarily or plausibly) Z.

For example, a naturalist could try to block Ruse/Rosenberg conclusion, arguing that their argument shows, at most, that our moral beliefs are sensible to the evolutionary process. But that it, by itself, doesn't imply that an objective moral realm cannot exist.

But this reply is extremely weak and ignore the ontological point made by Ruse/Rosenberg.

Rosenberg has given an argument to think that, given a world fixed by purely physical facts (and physics doesn't predict for matter any moral or normative property), there is not room for an independent realm of objective moral value. So, the burden of proof is for the naturalist who believes that such objective realm of value exists.

Moreover, even if such realm exists in a naturalistic worldview, the naturalist even would have to explain how our purely physical brain can grasp and discern such purely conceptual and non-physical realm of moral value and cosmic normativity.

The naturalistic worldview is essentially inmoral, in the sense that its basic and essential premises (physicalism; determinism; unguided, contingent and largely accidental evolutionary process; materialism about persons, etc.) imply the destruction of any objective morality, ethics, normativity and value.

Some smart naturalists trained in sophistry, try to appeal to emotions, red herrings and other fallacies in order to avoid this conclusion. For example, they can say that they love their children or that murder is wrong. Period.

These red herrings are evidence of the faulty cognitive faculties of the naturalists arguing like that. What's at stake is not if loving our children is good, or of "murder is wrong", but whether objective moral values are objective and metaphysical naturalism provides an ontological foundation for such objectivity. This is the issue.

In words of Rosenberg: "The problem for naturalism is to explain why a process of blind variation and natural selection landed us with what naturalists think just happens to be the right core morality of mankind. There are two ways to do this, neither of which are satisfactory. There is one way to explain the correlation away, which is perfectly satisfactory. The trouble is it produces nihilism about ethics.

The two unsatisfactory ways: Either, natural selection is so smart (to use a Fodor-like trope) that it was able to filter for the right morality among all the other wrong moralities, the way it was able to filter for the best hereditary system (using DNA) among all the other less reliable ones. Or, by filtering for the one core morality we share most widely around the world, natural selection made that morality the right one. The first alternative is unsatisfactory because the process of natural selection is notoriously unable to deliver true beliefs, only ones that enhance the survival of our genes (and memes, if there are any) in the local environment. The second alternative is unsatisfactory, since a set of norms’ wining the genetic or memetic fitness-race is no reason for it to be certified to be true, right, or correct.

The way to deal with the correlation of putative correctness of our moral core and its winning the Darwinian struggle for survival, is simply to deny it is correct, right, or true. Since we don’t think any of core morality’s incompatible alternatives is true, right or correct, we naturalists are committed to nihilism. Ways to escape nihilism: deny that there is a universal moral core, reject the view that our moral core has far reaching consequences for survival and reproduction, give up naturalism about morality. These alternatives are so implausible, I’d rather be a nihilist—a nice one, since nature has selected for it."

It's very important to think about it, because if these arguments are solid, then we know that naturalism is a deeply inmoral worldview. But, if we have independent reasons to think that moral values are objective, that actions like torturing little babies or raping atheists are objectively and intrinsically wrong and bad, then we have a powerful reason to think that naturalism is plausibly false (on purely moral grounds).

If we add the evidence for consciousness, psi phenomenon and the afterlife, then we can be reasonably sure that naturalism is certainly false.

Reverend and Presbyterian minister Barry Downing on UFOs and religion

Rev. Barry Downing, author of The Bible and Flying Saucers, discusses UFOs and religion in this clip from an interview conducted in 2001 In Irvine, California, where he was speaking at the 2001 MUFON Symposium.

The fourth kind: A movie based on actual case studies about alien abductions. Plus a History Channel documentary on alien abbuctions

TRAILER:

I tend to avoid commenting about movies in my blog, but the content of many movies are relevant for the psi and afterlife topics (and the related philosophical problems) discussed in this blog.

Regarding the movie "The Fourth Kind", it is not properly about psi or the afterlife, but about the topic of ufology (to which I've became recently interested).

I enjoyed this movie, even though alien movies in general are not of my special interest. As far I know, this is the first movie dealing entirely with alien abductions (contrasting with other alien movies, which refers to more generic themes like alien invasion of Earth, or good aliens helping human beings).

The term "fourth kind" refers to an actual classification in ufology, refered to alien abductions specifically (the "third kind", for example, refers to the direct, physical observation of aliens beings by human beings)

The movie is apparently based on actual case studies and investigations about alien abductions (we can think in actual researchers like John Mack, Budd Hopkins or David Jacobs).

I suggest you to watch the movie, and then compare it with real-life documentaries about putative cases of alien abductions, like the following (aired on the History Channel):

UFOs in the Bilble documentary

Most serious UFO researchers agree that the ufo phenomenon (whatever is its origin) has existed for millenia. Each culture has offered different interpretations of basically the same phenomena.

In sacred texts, ancient documents, etc. we can read descriptions of phenomena which, in the light of our current understanding, they seem to be clearly phenomena that we would consider as belonging to "ufos".

Personally, I have not doubt that ancient cultures experienced the same phenomena that we currently "UFOs", but what's at stake is the origin of such phenomena. Are they caused extraterrestrial beings? Or by beings of other dimensions? Or by human beings coming from the future? Or are they psychic projections of human beings? Or is the explanation of UFOs a combination of all of these hypotheses? We don't know for sure.

Another important question is: Do UFOs, assuming (for the argument's sake) that they're from extraterrestrial origin, undermine the belief in GOD (or broadly in a spiritualistic worldview), and support materialism and metaphysical naturalism?

Personally, I think the answer is NO. Given metaphysical naturalism and materialism, the origin of life is an extraordinarily rare and improbable phenomenon, almost a cosmic accident. But even if life were consistent with materialism, the problem of the origin of consciousness and rationality (and how natural selection could select conscious beings, given that consciousness is non-efficacious in materialism) remains. So, it seems extremely unlikely that, given naturalism and materialism, intelligent life and rational, conscious beings would exist in the universe.

Therefore, it seems to me, the existence of extraterrestrial life is more likely given a spiritualistic worldview. Life, rationality, normative properties and consciousness aren't property of physical objects, but of spiritual beings.

So, I think that, given a non-naturalistic worldview, we could expect the existence of intelligent life and consciousness in many other parts of this large universe, if the physical conditions for them are adequate (after all, if spiritual beings exist in a physical universe, they need a correct, adequate physical instrument in order to operate here).

However, the existence of (extraterrestrial) UFOs in the Bible could undermine some religious interpretations of its texts and hence affect some of the basic religious doctrines. And I guess this is not a small or irrelevant point, specially for biblical scholars.

Watch carefully the documentary and draw your conclusions.

Thinking Subversively: Constructive criticisms of my blog

I've just received a kind e-mail by "shiningwhiffle", the author of the new blog Also Thinking Subversively, a blog created to respond or comment, from a critical-constructive point of view, to some of my blog's posts. I think this is a great idea, because even though I defend my opinions with great conviction and in a straightforward, direct way, and I don't consider my opinions to be "the ultimate truth". I've been wrong in a number of topics in the past, so it is not impossible that I'm wrong in some topics right now or in the future.

So perhaps shiningwhiffle's new blog will bring a little bit of balance to the way I discuss the topics in my blog. (For the purposes of this post, I'll call shiningwhiffle simply as "the author", because it's easier to write)

I'd like to reply to the author's opening post on my lastest post on naturalism. The author's text is in blue, mine in normal black color.

I agree with Jime of Subversive Thinking much more than I disagree, but sometimes I feel he draws conclusions too quickly

I hope to prove that my post's conclusions on naturalism weren't draw "too quickly", but I let you to decide.

Consider the following statement from his latest post on naturalism and value:

I submit that the above Keith's argument [sic] is irrefutable... IF naturalism were true (so, if you accept naturalism, you're rationally forced to agree with Keith's conclusion). And I think that naturalists who try to avoid the above conclusions are being intentionally dishonest, ignorant or plainly stupid.

I should preface this by saying that I'm not a metaphysical naturalist or materialist, and I do think that there is objective value and morality. And of course I agree that value subjectivism/nihilism (they're the same thing as far as I can see) is very tempting from a materialist point of view. But two questions need to be separated:

1. Is it the most coherent conclusion for naturalists?
2. Is it the necessary conclusion for naturalists?

I lean toward "yes" on the first and "no" on the second.

Please, note that the author answer "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second question. And note that the author also agree with moral objectivism, moreover he's not a materialist nor a naturalist.

Firstly, I don't see how the author's "two separate questions", could be relevant to qualify my conclusion or to show that it was gotten "too quickly". If subjectivism/nihlism is the most coherent position for naturalists, then (provided naturalists are rational and concerned with logical coherence) they should embrace subjectivism/nihilism, not objectivism. Why should a rational and logically consistent person avoid to accept the most coherent position in favor of the less coherent ones? Is rational to embrace the less coherent conclusion, when the most coherent is rationally available and known? Only if the naturalist wants to avoid the conclusion (and in this case he's intellectually dishonest), or if he can't see the implications of his position (in this case, he's ignorant of his position's premises or implications, or he's stupid), could he accept the less coherent position.

The author comments "Morality implies the possibility of moral choices; bullets don't choose to kill their targets and can't be held responsible for the murder. The person can because he or she made a choice. But metaphysical naturalism sits uneasily with the idea of a truly free will. It's not easy to see how free will can be fit to otherwise will-less laws of physics. And without free will, the difference between a bullet and the shooter is just degree of complexity"

Precisely, for these reasons, a consistent naturalist should deny free will and openly embrace determinism. Given the premises of naturalism, he cannot consistently talk of "free will" (unless the terms are re-defined to make them fit determinism). A consistent naturalist will agree with naturalist Tom Clark (who's the director of the Center For Naturalism): "In a deterministic universe, we understand that a criminal's career is not a matter of an unconditioned personal choice, but fully a function of a complex set of conditions, genetic and enviromental, that interact to produce the offender and his proclivities. Had we been in his shows in all respects, we too would have followed the same path, since there is no freely willing self that could have done otherwise as causality unfolds. There is no kernel of independent moral agency -- we are not, as philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, "moral levitators" that rise above circunstances in our choices, including choices to rob, rape, or kill"

The author correctly notes: "There is, of course, the compatibilist view, but in my opinion that just redefines the terms that normally imply agency — like "choice" and "culpability" — to suit a deterministic worldview. They aren't the same concepts once compatibilism is done with them."

This is right and I fully agree with it. Now, if it's true, which are the logically consistent implications for a naturalist, given such premises? Is concluding that free will, in the relevant sense, is not possible if naturalism is true, a conclusion drawn "too quickly"? Obviously not. This is the conclusion implied (necessarily, or most plausibly) in the premises accepted by naturalists themselves.

The author notes: "Moral value is also a non-physical property, and metaphysical naturalism allows for only physical and logical/mathematical properties."

The author is absolutely right, and this is why moral objectivism cannot exist if naturalism (as defined by the author) is true. Logic demands such conclusion, as we can prove it with the following deductive argument (note that in a deductive argument, if you agree with the premises, you have to agree with the conclusion, on pain of irrationality):

1-If metaphysical naturalism is true, then it allows for only physical and logical/mathematical properties

2-Moral values are not physical (nor logical/mathematical properties)

3-Therefore, metaphysical naturalism doesn't allow for moral values

4-Moral values do exist objectively.

5-Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is false.

Given that the author accept 1 and 2, he's rationally committed to 3. And given the author accepts 4 (remember he wrote "I should preface this by saying that I'm not a metaphysical naturalist or materialist, and I do think that there is objective value and morality"), he's rationally committed to 5 (which is precisely my point!).

So, when the author says that I drew my conclusion "too quickly", I think he was who drew his conclusions (about my conclusion) too quickly, since it can be proved, deductively, that he also accepts the same premises that imply my conclusion.

The author wisely notes: "If you think of chairs and dogs as ultimately nothing but arrangements of elementary particles, what place is there for moral principles that apply to humans but not to any of our parts, or for moral values that apply to actions but not to mere motions?

So to be a moral realist, it would seem (I could be wrong, but don't see how) that one cannot be a reductionist"

Precisely one of Rosenberg's insights is that, in a world which consists purely of fixed physical facts, there is no place for meaning, purposes, values (or even "beliefs" in the semantic-propositional sense). Most naturalists agree with Rosenberg's premises, but they avoid the conclusion because they realize it leads to irrationalism, nihilism and subjetivism, and they don't like these implications.

Like the author, I cannot see how a naturalist could avoid reductionism, provided he accepts the basic premises of naturalism and follow them consistently through their conclusions.

The author poses some interesting thoughts about the possibility of moral facts in naturalism:

In other words, why should the Universe have moral principles unless there were destined to be moral agents? Look at it this way: moral facts are facts about two things. The fact that "murder is unjust" is fact about the act of murder and a fact about moral agents; namely, that every moral agent has an obligation not to commit murder. The two facts have to go together; they are, if you will, the same fact. "Murder is unjust but no one has an obligation not to commit it," is a contradiction in terms.

I disagree with the author's conclusion in this point. I think a brief summary of two basic concepts in meta-ethics will help us to clarify this question:

1-A "moral proposition" is a proposition which is true or false if, and only if, it corresponds (or not) to a external, objective moral state of affairs. Note that moral propositions, in order to be true, depends on the existence of an objectively existent moral realm (and is this moral realm which demands an ontological foundation).

2-A "moral obligation, duty or law" is a ought (normative) statement, which commands certain kinds of actions as moral or inmoral (note that normative statements are not true or false, because they don't describe any actual state of affairs; only commands a certain action given certain values). A moral obligation implies a person who's the receptor of such obligation, but it also implies the existence of an author or authority who commands such laws or obligations on us. (For example, the laws of USA are commanded by the political authority of USA and are directed and imposed to USA citizens)

When the author says "Murder is unjust but no one has an obligation not to commit it," is a contradiction in terms", I think he's conflating moral facts with moral obligations. There is not contradiction in terms between accepting a moral fact, and rejecting its morally binding obligatory force us (because facts by themselves have not moral authority. How could a fact to "obligate" me, in a moral sense, to do something? Facts tell us about states of reality, not about how ought we to act in a morally binding sense. Obligations come from persons, not from facts)

Imagine this dialogue:

You: Murder is unjust, so you're obligated not to murder any person.

Professional murderer: I know that "Murder is unjust", and so what? I'm not obligated to avoid murdering other people. After all, who or what imposes such obligation on me?

You: Your obligation is part of your recognition that "murder is unjust". It's a contradiction in terms to to think otherwise.

Professional murderer: Tell me, where is the contradiction?

You: It's obvious, can't you see it?

Professional murderer: No, I can't. In fact, I consider myself an unjust person. I like to cause pain and destruction in other people's lives. I enjoy it.

You: But you're contradicting yourself, you've admitted that murder is unjust!

Professional murderer: Where is the contradiction? If murder is unjust, the contradiction would be to assert that murder is not unjust. I've never asserted the latter. Moreover, I'm unjust!. Far from contradicting myself, my unjust actions are fully consistent with my unjust nature and desires.

You: If you accept that murder is unjust, you're obligated to avoid murdering other people

Professional murderer: No, I don't. I'm obligated to follow my desires and pleasures. And my pleasure and desire right now is to destroy other people's lives, and murdering them is a good mean to do that. Who or what obligate me to do otherwise? Why should I to sacrifice my own pleasures and desires?

Jime: This is only an imaginary dialogue, but I think we can see the author's view that moral facts implies moral obligations is clearly inadequate (both logically and in terms of its efficacy for rational persuasion).

So the question is, would "murder is unjust" be true even if moral agents had never graced the Universe? Keith Augustine's implied answer is "no," and he despairs for how such a truth could have come about once moral agents hit the scene (assuming they have at all). I agree; there's no reasonable explanation for how moral facts can come into being if they didn't already exist.

I think the question is a deeper one: Which is the ontological foundation of moral facts? This is the issue. Paul Kurtz, "the father of secular humanism", got it right when he wrote: "The central question about moral and ethical principles concerns this ontological foundation. If they are neither derived from God nor anchored in some transcendent ground, are they purely ephemeral? (Forbidden Fruit, p.65)

The question is not if moral facts are previous or posterior to moral agents, but which are the metaphysical foundations of such moral facts (provided they exist), and if naturalism can account or not for the existence of such moral facts. Keith's point is that, if naturalism is true, then plausibly moral values and laws are subjective, not objective, because the existence of objective moral laws and values would imply an universe with properties which are, ontologically, at variance with the basic ontological premises of naturalism. This is what I've called Keith's "irrefutable" argument.

So, I think the author has not grasped (or only grasped superficially) Keith's deep insight regarding the ontology of moral values and laws. This explains the author's following comment:

But it seems to me that it's still possible for the naturalist to answer "yes." They can do this by holding that moral facts are not merely facts about agents, but facts about agency itself. And this is, in fact, the more natural point of view. "Murder is unjust" would be true even if there were no murder, because is not just a fact about each and every murder, but something intrinsic to the very concept of murder. There are no just murders — killing someone justly, such as in self-defense, is not murder.

But if moral facts are facts about agency itself, then accepting that objective moral facts exist implies accepting the existence of an objective moral agency (which is what precisely naturalism rejects, since for naturalism, moral agency only exists subjetively, i.e. in human subjects). Moreover, "muder is unjust" could be true even in the absence of murderers, but not in the absence of an objective realm of justice and value according to which we can contrast and classify certain actions as just and unjust.

In my opinion, what the author has failed to grasp is that moral facts implies moral realism (the existence of an objective realm of moral value), and what's in question is the ontological foundation of such moral realm. Is such moral realm what we would expect to exist if naturalism (with its determinism, physicalism, materialism, reductionism) were true? Obviously not, and this is why the existence of objective moral values gives us an argument against naturalism.

Likewise, it seems natural to say that "murder is unjust" would be true even if there were no one around to commit murder. It's a fact about moral agency that there is an obligation not to commit murder; anything lacking such an obligation — a rock, a bullet, many if not all animals — also lacks agency. And as a fact about agency rather than just particular agents, it can be true even if there are no agents.

I also disagree with that. What's a "fact about agency" in the absence of agents? Agency doesn't exist by itself, but only in particular individuals or persons. The author reifies "agency" as if it were a kind of ontologically existent substance with independent existence. But agency is not a substance, it's a property of agents (therefore, it cannot exist in the absence of agents themselves)

In summary, to avoid nihilism/subjectivism, a metaphysical naturalist cannot be a determinist or reductionist, he or she has to hold that moral properties are logical properties, and he or she has to hold that moral facts are facts about agency itself, rather than just particular agents.

I think the discussion so far has shown that a naturalist cannot consistently (i.e. consistent with the basic premises of his worldview) avoid subjectivism and nihilism. In particular:

-He cannot avoid being a determinist given his ontological physicalism and materialism, fully committed to the physical laws governing matter (and hence, human body and brain too).

-He cannot hold that moral properties are logical/mathematical properties, since logic is formal (it refers to propositions and rules of inferences, not to external objects themselves and their properties, which is a matter of ontology and metaphysics). Objective moral properties refers to an objectively existent realm, which demands a ontological foundation in reality (not a purely logical explanation or mathematical formulation)

-He cannot hold that moral facts are facts about agency itself (in the absence of any agent), since that agency is not an independently existent substance, but a property of concrete agents. Therefore, "agency itself" doesn't exist in the absence of particular agents (moreover, given the naturalist commitment to physicalism, what meaning has "agency itself" in the absence of any physical agent as such? Given naturalism, "agency itself" is not physical, therefore it doesn't exist).

Just imagine a naturalist who accepts free will, indeterminism, non-physical objects, realms and dimensions (and therefore, a dualist ontology which includes physical and non-physical objects), paranormal phenomena, "self-existing agency" (independent of any particular agent whatsoever), objective moral values, commands and laws (independent of any sentient beings at all). What do you think of a naturalist like that? Simple: He's NOT a naturalist!

That's a pretty tall order when you consider most naturalists' commitment to pseudoskepticism, so it's easy to see why so many opt for nihilism/subjectivism

Personally, I think pseudoskeptics are false skeptics precisely because they're committed to naturalism (which excludes the paranormal, the afterlife, etc.) Therefore, they don't have any other option than attack, refute, discredit and misrepresent the evidence in favor of psi and the afterlife.

Jime and others have made the argument that since naturalism implies (strongly if not necessarily) moral nihilisim/subjectivism, the existence of moral facts counts against it.

I repeat my (I hope, after this discussion, not too quick) conclusion: Moral subjetivism, or moral nihilism, are the only reasonable alternatives for consistent metaphysical naturalists. I can't see any other reasonable options for them, for the reasons discussed above.

The author concludes his interesting opening post with this comment:

If there are no moral facts, then no one can be obligated to be a skeptic about them. Religious fanatics can't be truthfully said to be doing anything wrong, they're just inconvenient for the rest of us. And perhaps the biggest point that most pseudoskeptics (but not great thinkers like Nietzsche!) miss is that unless there is an obligation to pursue the truth, science and reason are reduced to hobbies to pursued and believed if you want to, and accusations of irrationality boil down to nothing more than expressions of disgust. But a dog can express displeasure and even attack those who displease it; that doesn't obligate us to please it.

So, if the pseudoskeptics are right, believers aren't doing anything wrong by disagreeing, and changing their mind wouldn't make it any better unless they also changed their values (but why should they?). While that's not strictly a contradiction for the skeptic, I take it as a reason to dismiss their position.

I'd add that if there are not moral facts, moral objectivism is false, and not objective ethical grounds exist to reject (on moral grounds) anything. Everything becomes an expression of mere taste, preference, prejudices, habits or socio-biological conditioning. In words of naturalist Paul Kurtz: "The moral principles that govern our behaviour are rooted in habit and custom, feeling and fashion."(same book, p.65)

Or in words of Keith Augustine: "Ethics, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The argument I am proposing is that there is no objective fact that genocide is morally wrong anymore than there is an objective fact that rock and roll is better than country music. Both statements, no matter how well agreed-upon by most people, merely express the opinion of the people who state them"

Or in words of naturalist Massimo Pligliucci: "There is no such a thing as objective morality. We got that straightened out. Morality in human cultures has evolved and is still evolving, and what is moral for you might not be moral for the guy next door and certainly is not moral for the guy across the ocean, the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, and so on." (See Pigliucci's arguments in his debate with Christian philosopher William Lane Craig)

Given that metaphysical naturalism implies (necessarily or plausibly) moral subjectivism (or nihilism, according to Rosenberg), naturalists are not in position to make objective moral statements about anything, including moral stataments about the virtues of science, rationality and free thinking. The naturalist worldview, ultimately, undercuts the objectivity of such stataments.

Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is (necessarily or plausibly) ultimately self-defeating, irrational and inmoral, and not worthy of being accepted by any rational and moral person. (This doesn't imply that every naturalist is inmoral or irrational; what's inmoral and irrational is their worldview and the beliefs entailed by it)

This is where years of honest reflection lead me.

But perhaps I'm completely wrong, and naturalism is an amazingly beautiful, rational and consistent worldview with powerful intellectual resources to ground the existence of objective moral values, laws and duties in particular, and meaning, and purposes in general.

You're the judge.

Links of interest:

-Check shiningwhiffle's new blog for alternative considerations, ideas, reflections and opinions about some of my posts.