Sunday, June 24, 2012

More evidence for Jime's Iron Law: Richard Dawkins on the meaning of "nothing" and creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing)


As I've explained before, one of the most powerful evidences for the veracity of Jime's Iron Law is the absolute and astonishing intrinsic unability of hard-core atheists to understand what nothing (=not anything= absence of something) means. Something in the spiritual and intellectual nature of atheists simply prevent them to understand the concept of "not anything". 

As you can watch in the above video, the public laugh aloud about the stupid atheist re-definition of "nothing" as "something which is simple or basic".   However, Dawkins doesn't understand the (obvious) motive of laughs and ask "Why is that funny?" Look in Dawkins' face: Personally I think Dawkins is being HONEST in his question: He simply doesn't understand why people laugh on this, because for him it is very obvious that "nothing" is a very simple "something".

You can think that it is astonishing, and it does. But, from a scientific and spiritual perspective, it tells us A LOT about the veracity of Jime's Iron Law and the atheist's mindset.

People don't affected by Jime's Iron Law (=non-atheists, i.e. over the 97% of people on Earth) will agree with Edward Feser's illustration of the atheistic "nothing is something" fallacy: "Let me explain how this whole house is held up by nothing.  Consider the floor, which is what I really mean by ‘nothing.’  Now, the rest of the house is held up by the floor.  Thus, I’ve explained how the whole house is held up by nothing!”  Well, no you haven’t.  You’ve “explained” at most how partof the house is held up by another part, but you’ve left unexplained how the floor itself is held up, and thus (since the floor is itself part of the house) you haven’t really explained at all how the house as a whole is held up, either by “nothing” or by anything else.  Furthermore, you’ve made what is really just sheer muddleheadedness sound profound by using “nothing” in an eccentric way."

Don't expect that hard-core atheists will understand this. If Jime's Iron Law is true, they WON'T.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Edward Feser vs William Lane Craig on Divine Simplicity


The controversial theological doctrine of Divine Simplicity holds that God is essentially a simply entity, with no metaphysical parts. It implies that God's attributes are really identical (e.g God's goodness = omniscience = eternity = necessity = etc.)

Thomistic philosopher Edward Feser defends this view in his excellent introductory book Aquinas. He says:

"For Aquinas, God is simple in the sense of being in no way composed of parts... One famous implication of this doctrine is that though we distinguish in thought between God's eternity, power, goodness, intellect, will and so forth, in God himself there is no disctintion between any of the divine attirbutes. God's eternity is his power, which is his goodness, which is his intellect, which is his will and so on. Indeed, God himself just is his power, his goodmess, and so on, just as he just is his existence, and just is his essence" (p.126-127)

The obvious and most common objection to the implication mentioned by Feser is that God's attributes are different, not identical. For example, by "eternal" we mean that God has not beginning nor end. By omniscience, we mean that God knows every and only true propositions, etc.

But Feser has two replies to this objection. He comments:

"we can ackowledge that the expresions "the morning star" and the "evening star" differ in sense while consistently affirming that they refer to one and the same thing (the planet Venus), so too  can we acknowledge the obvious fact that "power", "goodness", "intellect" and so on differ in sense while insisting that when applied to God they refer to the one and the same thing" (p.129)

This first reply is based on the concepts of sense and reference, and how many concepts with different senses have the same referent.

William Lane Craig, a critic of Divine Simplicity, rejects the above reply and says "being the morning star and the evening star are distinct properties, both possesed by Venus; the same entity has these two distinct properties. In the same way, being omnipotent and being good are not two different senses for the same property (as are, say, being even and being divisible by two) but are clearly two distinct properties" (Creation Out of Nothing, p.178)

I agree with Craig. I see no compelling reason to think that omniscience (for example) is the same property than "eternity",  but with a different label. They seem to be clearly two different properties, not the same property. The example of the "morning star" and the "evening star", while referring to the same thing (Venus), also refer to different properties of that same thing.  In other words, they describe two different properties of the same thing. 

Likewise, omnipotence and eternity, while being attributes of the same God, refers to distinct properties of God (note that a property, like eternity, can be predicated of things other than God, like numbers and other  abtsract objects for example. Therefore, prima facie, it seems impossible that eternity, which can be predicated of non-divine objects, be identical to omnipotence which only can be predicated of God. This simple fact suffices to think that eternity and omnipotence are two different properties).

Feser also have a second reply to the objection based on Aquinas' doctrine of analogy: "While the terms we apply to created things do not apply to God in either equivocal or univocal sense, they do apply in analogical senses. So, while it of course would be absurd to say that power, goodness, intellect,  and so forth are identical to God if we were using these terms in exactly the same sense in which we apply them to ourselves, it is not absurd to say that there is in God something that is analogous to power, something analogous to goodness, something analogous to intellect, and so on, and that these "somethings"  all turn out to be one and the same thing." (p.128)

Again, I find Feser's reply unconvincing. First, Feser says that the terms that we apply to ourselves cannot apply to God in any equivocal or univocal sense. Fine. But what about terms that ONLY apply to God like omnipotence and omniscience? These terms clearly don't apply to "created things", let alone to finite and imperfect human beings. These terms apply exclusively to God.

And in this case, again, each term seems to refer to distinct properties, not to just one. Omniscience is the property of knowing all and only true propositions. And omnipotence is the power of bringing about everything which is logically possible. Clearly, we're talking of two different properties here, and the distinction between them have nothing to do with how we apply these terms to created things (e.g. human beings) since these specific terms DO NOT apply to them at all (only apply to God).

On the other hand, that there is something "analogous" to power, intellect, eternity, etc. which turn out to be one and the same thing only can be accepted if we have an account and definition of exactly what that "something" is. As far I know, no clear definition of that "analogous something" (which is identical to all the divine attributes) has been provided. How could be "eternity" defined analogously in a way that make it identical to omnipotence or to aseity?

In conclusion, and being largely an "outsider" in theological questions, I side provisionally with Craig in his rejection of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity.

In any case, I fully recommend Feser's books (including Aquinas), and a careful reading and study of his blog

You'll learn a lot of good, erudite and sophisticated philosophy in Feser's works.

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Leah Libresco: Atheist blogger schocked the secular community with her announcement that she's converting to Christianity

According to this website, "Libresco details her personal struggles with understanding the root of moral law... For Libresco, this ideal has come full-circle, as she inevitably arrived at an understanding that aligns with a Christ-centered world-view".

Libresco comments "I believed that the Moral Law wasn’t just a Platonic truth, abstract and distant.  It turns out I actually believed it was some kind of Person, as well as Truth.  And there was one religion that seemed like the most promising way to reach back to that living Truth.  I asked my friend what he suggest we do now, and we prayed the night office of the Liturgy of the Hours together (I’ve kept up with that since).  Then I suggested hugs and playing Mumford and Sons really, really loudly."

As I've explained in other posts, it is hard to make sense of the ontology of objective moral values in a  worldview which is non-personalistic. Naturalism and many Eastern wordviews are essentially, fundamentally and radically, non-personalistic (i.e. the fabric of reality is fundamentally non-personal). But moral values are essentially personal (i.e. related intrinisically with PERSONS endowed with free will, consciousness, rationality and so forth). Hence, in a personalistic worldview (i.e. a worldview rooted in am ultimate person who is the creator of all reality, like God), moral values are expected to exist and be a intrinsic, essential, ultimate and objective part of such created reality.

This powerful philosophical insight underlies the so-often misunderstood and intentionally misrepresented moral argument for God's existence.(This argument doesn't says or entails that moral values are arbitrarily imposed and enforced by God's commands... the argument only says that moral values, if objective (i.e. instrinsically constitutive of reality), fit better in a theistic wordlview because it is a radically personalistic worldview which makes sense of person-relative properties like moral values, and related person-relative phenomena like moral responsability, consciousness, free will, rationality, purpose, decision-making, etc. The common idea that the moral argument postulates an arbtrary decision or imposition by God is a straw man created by atheists who are impaired to understand correctly arguments for theism = another consequence of Jime's Iron Law).

Once you grasp clearly the radical difference between personalistic and non-personalistic worldviews, and the essentially personalistic nature of moral values and their presupossitions of efficacy (consciousness, free will, rationality, purposeness, etc.), you'll realize (even in an intuitive level) the cogency of the moral arguments for God's existence.  Do objective, essential and intrinsic personal properties fit better in a personalistic wordlview than in a intrinsically impersonalistic one? I think the answer is pretty obvious.

Even in spiritual-oriented circles (e.g. New Age cirlces) informed by Easter philosophies, objective moral values cannot be grounded in any person and turn out to be illusory. Some of these philosophies say, for example, that we live in a world of "duality" (e.g. good and evil, you and me), of illusion, of shadows, "egos" etc. which are not fundamental to reality and that the TRUTH is beyond all duality (including all good and evil) whatsoever, etc. 

Obviously, such morally neutral wordlview cannot ground objective moral values in anything, because such values are illusory products of the dualistic way in which we perceive the world. Objective moral values don't exist in a substantial, intrinsic sense and "persons" are also by-product of these illusions. The "truth" (so argues the followers of these views) is beyond all of this.

This is a spiritual, non-materialistic version of the impersonalistic worldview of naturalism (they are different in their principles, but they have THE SAME impersonalistic consequences and hence don't make room for essential, intrinsic, ultimate person-relative properties or entities).

It is not surprising that Libresco, after deep reflection on morality, renunced her atheistic position. Many other people, including atheistic philosophers who have defended for decades a secular morality, have realized the ontological insufficience of atheism (in all its versions, specially in its contemporary naturalistic version) for grounding moral values, and the superiorioty of its leading competitor (personalistic theism) in this regard. (See for example the confession of atheist moral philosopher Joel Marks). If they keep being atheists, they consistently become moral relativists or nihilists; or if they stick to objective moral values, they consistently become theists.

See also the view about morality and moral problems by leading atheist intellectuals here.

I think the moral argument, when properly understood in its implications and worldview pressupositions, is one of the most convincing arguments for theism.

The main reason why some atheists don't concede this point is that they're so hostil to theism, that they don't want to make any major concession (specially any moral concession) to it. Another reason is that they strongly misunderstand the argument; and another reason is that they conflate the argument with the claim that atheists are inmoral (which is NOT the argument... the argument is not about the moral beliefs of atheists or theists, but about competing WORLDVIEWS and how objective moral values fit in them).

Friday, June 8, 2012

Does Romans 1 contain a precursor of Jime's Iron Law?

A Christian reader wrote to me commenting that Jime's Iron Law is, in a sense, already contained in the New Testament. 

Specifically, according to my reader, in Romans 1, Paul argues like this:

18 The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of people, who suppress the truth by their wickedness, 19 since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. 20 For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.
21 For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened

Now, at face falue, I don't think the above passages are identical to what Jime's Iron Law describes. Let me explain a couple of differences:

1-Jime's Iron Law says that hard-core atheists are stupid, irrational, positively illogical and wishful thinkers. This law applies to hard-core atheists SPECIFICALLY, not to "unbelievers" (=skeptics of Christianity) in general. So my law is specific of hard-core atheists.

2-Jime's Iron Law doesn't link the atheist's irrationality and imbecility to "wickedness" and "foolish hearts". A reason for this is that, in this moment, Jime's Iron Law is purely descriptive (this law is a factual description of the intellectual faculties of hard-core atheists), but it is still undeveloped regarding the mechanisms underlying the operation of such a law.

However, I strongly suspect that the mechanisms have connection with spiritual and psychological matters, but it is pure speculation and not part of my law yet.

Now, keep in mind that in Paul's view, the unbelievers "suppress the truth by their wickedness". In other words, the atheist suppress the truth BECAUSE his wickedness (the latter being the hidden motivation of the suppression of the truth). 

Even though such a consideration doesn't belong to Jime's Iron Law, certainly Paul's view seems to apply in a straigforward way to many hard-core atheists (I don't know about other kind of "unbelievers"). Just take a cursory look in the blogs of atheists like PZ Myers, or the Forum of Richard Dawkins, or of "skeptics" forum. Clearly, you can watch there bad people, intentionally dishonest sophists and charlatans, people of very low and questionable integrity and ethics. They certainly seem to be "wicked" people in a certain sense. They're bad persons.

Evidence:

In order to see this point more carefully, let's to mention some cases of hard-core atheists to whom Paul's view seems to apply. When you check this evidence, ask yourself: Do these people belong to the "good, honest people with good will", or rather to the "wicked" people with darkened hearts? (Try to think hard about it, not letting your Christian or anti-Christian ideas to colour your assesment of the evidence).

1)Recently, James Randi has been the center of a polemic, in which his ethical principles have been fully exposed. (See here for more information). Does he fit Paul's view?

2)Consider Richard Dawkins views on infanticide:


 3)Consider this "insider" confession by a former skeptic: "But such is the character of skepticism that good intentions quickly get swamped by bad ones. Look past the crocodile tears on any online debunking forum, and you'll quickly find that the majority of visitors are not drawn there by concern for the victims of irrationality, but by contempt. They're there to laugh at idiots. I'm not going to plead innocence here: I've often joined in with the laughter, at least vicariously; laughing at idiots can be fun. But in the context of skeptic sites, the laughter takes on a bullying and unhealthy tone. It's never pleasant to watch a group of university graduates ganging up to sneer at people denied their advantages in life, especially when for some of them it's a full-time hobby... It's an increasingly acknowledged fact that the skeptic community is rife with sexism -- especially in the wake of the "elevator guy" controversy, about which more later. Women are a small minority in the skeptic world, and the few who get involved get shit thrown at them constantly by their skeptic peers. Every day, they suffer the whole gamut of attitudes from sneering to leering."

Does the above description of skeptics fit better with the notion of wicked, bad, mean people of dark hearts, or rather with the notion of good people of clear hearts and good will?

4)Consider the evidence that I've provided regarding Prometheus Books (the leading American publishing house of books on skepticism and atheism) and its explicit and implicit promotion of sexual perversions.

I have no doubts that Paul's view applies to many hard-core atheists and secularists. They certainly seem to be people of darkened hearts, questionable morality, unreliable ethical principles, self-centered egocentrism (which obviously doesn't promote good will towards others) and, in many cases, straighforward wickedness.

I think Paul's view is clearly different of Jime's Iron Law, but I have to recognize that thinking hard about Paul's point and comparing it with hard-core atheists have provided me with new insights.

I don't agree with Paul that his view applies to "unbelievers" in general, but I suspect that it applies to a large portion of hard-core, hard-nosed atheists, secularists and "skeptics" in particular.

Perhaps Jime's Iron Law will be expanded to include something like Paul's view, provided the evidence for the atheist's irrationality be clearly linked to moral deficiences or impairments.
 
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