Scientists discover a second hidden CODE in the human DNA: More evidence for intelligent design?

According to this report in TIME Magazine:

"Scientists have marveled at the ingenuity of the DNA code since it was first deciphered in the early sixties, but now it appears that there is much more to it than previously known.

A research team at the University of Washington has discovered a second code hidden within the DNA, written on top of the other.

“Now we know that this basic assumption about reading the human genome missed half of the picture,” said team leader Dr. John Stamatoyannopoulos.

Whereas the first code describes how proteins are made, this second language instructs the cell on how genes are to be controlled. The discovery, published in Science on Friday, will enable improved diagnoses and treatments of disease"

So, we have now more evidence for an extremely complex informational process in the DNA, which includes:

1)A code for the making of proteins (this was already known)

2)A code for a second language which instructs the cell on how genes are controlled (the new scientific discovery).

But language and information always come, as far we know, from some kind of intelligence. And the development and complexity of such language is proportional to the level of intelligence in question (e.g. the human language is a lot more complex than the language used by dolphins) Otherwise, it wouldn't be a language at all. 

Language is teleological, namely, it is goal-directed to a certain goal and is intended to convey some information, which could be decoded by another intelligence which understands the codification. The whole process is information-based.

It is hard to see exactly where we could put such teleological and intelligent processes in a world which is, as philosophical naturalists think, wholly governed by brute, blind, random, mindless and mechanical (i.e. non-teleological and non-intelligent) forces and entities.

This new scientific evidence clinches the argument from design in biology.

I think skeptic David Hume (who's championed by atheists) was right when he wrote:

The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquierer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion... Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system . . .All the things of the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughtout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author" (The Natural History of Religion, pp. 21, 26, emphasis in blue added).

More recently, the defender of philosophical atheism for more than 4 decades and who then left such position in favour of theism, Antony Flew comments about his conversion:

There were two factors in particular that were decisive. One was my growing empathy with the insight of Einstein and other noted scientists that there had to be an Intelligence behind the integrated complexity of the physical Universe. The second was my own insight that the integrated complexity of life itself – which is far more complex than the physical Universe – can only be explained in terms of an Intelligent Source. I believe that the origin of life and reproduction simply cannot be explained from a biological standpoint despite numerous efforts to do so. With every passing year, the more that was discovered about the richness and inherent intelligence of life, the less it seemed likely that a chemical soup could magically generate the genetic code. The difference between life and non-life, it became apparent to me, was ontological and not chemical. The best confirmation of this radical gulf is Richard Dawkins' comical effort to argue in The God Delusion that the origin of life can be attributed to a "lucky chance." If that's the best argument you have, then the game is over. No, I did not hear a Voice. It was the evidence itself that led me to this conclusion

The new evidence for a second hidden code in the DNA, which is a discovery that Hume and Flew couldn't  know, reinforces, refines and updates their arguments.

It seems it is naturalistic atheism which is increasingly becoming pushed against the ropes by the scientific evidence.

Albert Einstein, Stephen Hawking and Robert Sungenis on the debate between geocentrism and heliocentrism: Reflections on the importance of philosophical pressupositions in science

Geocentrism is the model according to which the Earth is at the orbital center of all celestial bodies. We could summarize this view with this saying: The Earth is the center of the universe.

Since Galileo, it is widely held that the geocentric view has been empirically refuted by a heliocentric system, and no informed person would doubt that. 

However, among astrophycisists, there are some of whom argue that both the geocentric model and the heliocentric model are empirically equivalent, and therefore there is not scientific way to decide the question. The decision is, at the bottom, philosophical and extra-scientific.

Albert Einstein, for example, argued this:

The struggle, so violent in the early days of science, between the views of Ptolomy and Copernicus would then be quite meaningless. Either coordinate system could used with equal justification. The two sentences: "the sun is at rest and the Earth moves", or "the sun moves and the Earth is at rest", would simply mean to different conventions concerning two different coordinate systems. (The Evolution of Physics: From Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta, p.212. Emphasis added.)

According to Einstein, it is all dependent on the perspective that we choose (conventionally) to assume. For example, if you assume that the Earth is at rest and that all the other celestial bodies move, you can make calculations and predictions which can be empirically confirmed. But the same happens if you assume that it is the sun which is at rest and the Earth is moving...

So, both models are empirically equivalent (i.e. equivalent from the point of view of the empirical evidence).

More recently, Stephen Hawking, in his lastest book The Grand Design, has made exactly the same point than Einstein:

So which is real, the Ptolemaic or Copernican system? Although it is not uncommon for people to say that Copernicus proved Ptolemy wrong, that is not true (p.41. Emphasis added)

The underlying point of Einstein and Hawking is that, from a purely empirical point of view, both models (which are theoretically contradictory) are empirically equivalent, and hence there is no scientific justification at all to consider that one of them is the correct one. It is entirely dependent of the perspective that you assume that will determine which models explain the data, but (as Einstein notes) the perspective in question is a matter of convention.

Theirs is a kind of empirical relativism.

Now, I myself am a critic of geocentrism and a supporter of heliocentrism, but in all honesty I think that Einstein and Hawking have a point, if we limit out analysis to the empirical evidence alone. 

Now, obviously limiting oneself to scientific evidence alone (without any awareness of the underlaying philosophical assumptions) is simply naive. All of science has philosophical pressupositions which are assumed without question by scientists (the function of questioning such assumptions correspond to philosophers, not to scientists as such).

As philosopher Stephen Braude comments in his insighful critique of Ruper Sheldrake' work:

But no scientific theory is throughly empirical, and like many theories in science, Sheldrake looks more empirical than it is. Like all scientific theories, however, it rests on philosophical pressupositions. Every scientific theory starts from some assumptions or other about what nature is like and what observation is, as well as methodological assumptions about which investigate and explanatory procedures are appropiate to which domains. ("Radical Provincialism in Life Sciences" in The Journal of the American Society fo Physical Research, vol 77, January 1983).

Scientists as scientists seldom are trained to discover the working assumptions of their own discipline, let alone to critically examine and defend them from philosophical objections (again, this is the work of philosophy, not of science).

Braude adds that such philosophical naivité and ignorance is evident in the work of many parapsychologists. (He highlights this point in the case of survival research,  which makes a lot of implicit philosophical assumptions which are not almost never discussed, let alone defended. In my opinion, Braude's insight on survival research is one of the reasons which explain the thereotical lack of sophistication and development in much of the contemporary work on survival).

For example, at times Einstein seemed to believe that his special and general theory of relativity was purely empirical. Such radical and naive empiricism was instrumental in Einstein's rejection of absolute simultaneity. Most lay people and scientists think that Einstein "refuted" absolute simultaneity, but most philosophers of science who have studied the question are skeptical of such claim.

Philosophers of science have shown that Einstein's theory and metholdology is full of pressupositions, some of which are false or at best doubtious. See a philosophical discussion of some of the problems of Einstein's theory in William Lane Craig's book Time and Metaphysics of Relativity (Springer, 2001), and also the collection of essays by several philosophers of science edited by Craig and Quentin Smith in Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (Routledg, 2007)

A contemporary defender of geocentrism is Catholic thinker Robert Sungenis. In his controversial book "Galileo was wrong, the Church was right" he makes exactly the same point of Einstein and Hawking (and many other scientists), namely, that from an purely empirical point of view, both models are equivalent.

Watch this video by Sungenis explaning his arguments:

I side with defenders of heliocentrism, and consider that it is a better and more reasonable model than geocentrism.

But I fully admit that my preference of heliocentrism is primarily philosophical, that is, I consider that the pressupositions underlaying heliocentrism are more plausible than the ones underlaying geocentrism.

In all honesty and with some reluctance, I have to admit with Einstein, Hawking, Sungenis and others that that science, by itself, seems to be ambiguous regarding this problem and cannot settle the question.

The mataphysics of necessity: Ontology and conceptual distinctions

An interesting topic in metaphysics is the concept of necessity. Without any pretension of being exhaustive, in this post I'll comment on some of the main elements and kinds of necessity.

Kinds of necessity:

1-Logical, formal or conceptual necessity: This kind of necessity refers to truth-values of propositions, and have not (or doesn't need) to have any ontological commitments. They're truth in virtue of the concepts being used in the proposition.

For example, "bachelors are unmarried men" is necessarily true, in virtue of the concept of "bachelor". But note that this proposition doesn't say anything about the objective existence of bachelors. The proposition is true regardless of the existence of any bachelor.

For example: In classical theism, "God is omniscient" is necessarily true, in virtue of the concept of God. Again, this proposition tells us nothing about the objective existence of God. The proposition is true even if God doesn't exist.

For example: "2+2=4". This mathematical proposition is conceptually true (given Peano's axioms, the rules of inference of standard aritmethics and the concepts of "2", "+" and "4"), even if  numbers don't exist objectively.

Note that all of these propositions don't need to have any ontological commitments. Metaphysically, they are all subjective, in the sense of being mind-dependent (they depend for their existence on the concepts used by a mind. No mind --> no concepts --> no proposition --> no truth-values).

Since all the above necessarily true propositions don't imply the objective existence of the entities being mentioned in the proposition, then it follows that if such entities exist objectively, the question of "what explains these entities?" still makes sense.

For example, despite of "bachelors are unmarried men" being (conceptually) necessarily true, it doesn't explain why the hell bachelors exist at all. In fact, the existence of bachelors is (metaphysically, see below) contingent.

2-Metaphysical or ontological necessity: This kind of necessity refers to the existence of objects. Some object X is ontologically necessary if it couldn't not to exist. With some qualifications, they don't have anything to do with the concepts being used in propositions. They don't depend for their existence on the contents of the mind.

Philosophers specialized in metaphysics have realized that necessarily existing beings (e.g. God or numbers, if they exist) must have, in virtue of their necessity, at least the following two features:

-Eternity: they could not have a beginning nor end

-Indestructibility: They cannot be destroyed, otherwise they could have an end and hence could become non-existent. (This is why, Victor Stenger's "metaphysical pizza" reply against the ontological argument is clearly stupid, self-contradictory and embarassing, and only shows Stenger's intellectual limitation to understand propertly philosophical concepts).

Both properties are essential to necessity, not accidental. Lacking one of them implies that the being in question is not necessary, but contingent.

 

 Some implications:

Some important implications follow the above distinction:

1-Conceptually necessary truths don't have (or don't need to have) ontological commitments. This means that if a given conceptual truth is necessarily true, it doesn't mean that the entities posed by the propositions exist objectively.

For example, "triangles have three angles" is necessarily true, even if not triangle exists at all. And the existence of physical triangles in the world could be purely contingent and in need of further explanation (e.g a triangle on the sand requires of the existence of sand, which is a purely contingent phenomenon explained by natural sciences).

2-Some conceptually necessary truths could pose entities which exist in a metaphysically necessary way. 

For example "God is omniscient" is conceptually and necessarily true, but it doesn't tell us if God exists or not. But, if God exists, then it exists necessarily. So the proposition is both "conceptually necessary" and poses an entity which exists necessarily.

3-If an object is not eternal, it is not necessary.

In all the history of thought, atheism has hold that the universe is eternal and necessary and hence without a cause. 

The problem for atheism is that contemporaty cosmology tells us that the universe began to exist 13.798±0.037 billions of years ago. Therefore, the universe is not eternal. Therefore, the universe is contingent and it needs some kind of explanation of "why does it exist?" like any other contingent being.

This is why some contemporary atheists are prepared to say that the universe began to exist from "nothing", in order to avoid theism.

4-Metaphysical truths don't need to be conceptually necessary:

For example, "whatever begins to exist has a cause" seem to be metaphysically necessary, since its denial implies the coming into being "out of nothing", which seems to be impossible (except for atheists).

However, such proposition is not conceptually necessary, i.e. it doesn't derive its truth-value from the concepts being used in the proposition.

For example, "an actual infinite cannot exist in the concrete world" is not a conceptually necessary truth. But, given the absurd and physically impossible consequences that it has if it were instantiated in the real concrete world, it seems to be metaphysically impossible.

5-Only a necessary being could be the ontological ground for other metaphysically necessary beings.

In other words, necessary entities cannot be ultimately grounded (metaphysically) in contingent beings.

So, if moral values exist necessarily, they cannot be grounded in the physical universe (because it is contingent). This is why atheists tend to hold either the non-existence of such values (the most likely and consistent position given atheism), or to hold that such values exists contingently as an emergent property of matter (something which no natural science supports, since natural science have not discoveried any moral property in physical matter and all the laws of matter have nothing to do with morals nor other personal properties whatsoever).

But a necessarily existing personal being, like God, could ground the existence of necessary moral values (e.g. if God is the "Good", as classical theism holds, moral values must exists eternally and necessarily. God's nature implies them). But not all of morals need to be necessary. God could create them contingently too (e.g. specific moral laws for specific universes, in the same way that physical laws are created for specific universes or realms of existence). Both possibilities are open, provided that God exists and creates universes.

Since moral values are connected to persons, if morals are metaphysically necessary, then persons are metaphysically necessary too. This metaphysically necessity of persons (at least one person) is precisely what theism holds, and what atheism historically has denied and continue to deny (for contemporary metaphysical atheism, persons are not basic to reality, but later by products of a more fundamental non-personal reality, like quantum particles, fields, wave functions, etc. or in the case of some Eastern atheistic worldviews, "impersonal consciousness", "all-pervading energy", Deepak Chopra's "impersonal intelligence" and so forth).

Something similar could be said of mathematical objects (numbers, sets, etc.) but, in contrast with morals, numbers don't seem to be essentially connected with persons, except for the fact that numbers seem to be the contents of some mind.

So, if numbers exist objectively, the following conclusion of mathematician Elliot Benjamin, PhD, seems to be reasonable:

Well if it were the case that numbers and mathematics did exist in some kind of objective/ontological sense, then perhaps this would give us some evidence for some kind of intelligent being who designed the universe--I suppose you can call it God. For the astounding logic involved in higher mathematics is staggering virtually beyond comprehension, with a phenomenal level of mental acrobatics involved in the highest mathematical realms.

This would lead us into a complex mathematical argument for God's existence (there are several of them), which is not the purpose of this post (see, however, this post).

In future posts we'll continue discussing the problems of necessity.

Graham Oppy on the actual infinite and the Kalam argument, conditionals and the instantation in reality of abstract objects.

Secular philosopher Graham Oppy, whose views on the kalam argument I discussed in a previous post, is author of an interesting book on the infinite, as this concept plays a role in mathematics and cosmological arguments for God's existence.

In the kalam cosmological argument, it is argued that an actual infinite (i.e. a collection or set composed by a infinite numbers of parts) cannot be instantiated in the concrete world (e.g. in the physical world). If this argument is sound (and I think it is) it implies that the universe is not past eternal, because a past eternal universe would be composed by an infinite number of past events, and such infinite cannot exist.

This implies the absolute beginning of the universe (note that this argument, developed in medieval times, is wholly independent of the current scientific-cosmological evidence for the universe's beginning). So both scientific and philosophical considerations support the universe's absolute beginning.

In the kalam argument, it is shown that the existence of an actual infinite in the concrete world would produce absurd and physically impossible situations. A leading defender of the argument, William Lane Craig, comments:

Take, for example, Hilbert's Hotel, a product of the mind of the great German mathematician David Hilbert. Let us first imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full. There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4, and so on, out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant, and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there are now no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest's name to the register and gave him his keys—how can there not be one more person in the hotel than before?...  suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one fewer person in the hotel? Not according to the mathematicians! Suppose the guests in rooms # 1, 3, 5 ... check out. In this case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians, there are no fewer people in the hotel! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any fewer people in the hotel.

Craig's argument is basically a reductio ad absurdum of the existence of the actual infinite in the concrete world.

In the universe of purely conceptual discourse of mathematicians, the actual infinite is a perfectly a logical concept, you're just playing with a bunch of concepts and trying to reason logically about such concepts. But when you try to make it instantiated in the concrete, physical reality, outside of the conceptual realm of mathematics, the actual infinite produces clearly impossible and absurd situations as the ones mentioned above by Craig.

Now, Oppy (who is a sophisticated secular philosopher) understands perfectly the argument and its absurd implications.

To my astonishment, Oppy's reply to it is... to accept such absurd consequences!

Oppy says that we have to "outsmart" the proponent of the argument, that is, "to embrace the conclusion of one's opponent's reductio ad absurdum argument".

But surely this is wrong. If you accept the conclusion of your opponent's reductio ad absurdum argument, then you're accepting that you position was soundly refuted, since it is the main function of any successful reductio ad absurdum, specially in mathematics. (In fact, it is hard to think in a more sound and convincing form of refutation than an reductio ad absurdum argument).

No mathematician would say "Well, you have provided a sound reductio ad absurdum of my argument, and I fully accept and embrace it. Therefore, my argument is right!"

Only an atheist philosopher would dare to suggest something like that, just on behalf of having the upper hand in a debate and trying to appear to be right (to himself) in the face of contrary evidence and sound logical refutation.

By "embracing" the conclusion of the opponent's reductio, Oppy means to accept that if an actually infinite numbers of things exist in the concrete, extra-conceptual world, the absurd situations mentioned by Craig would happen and we should expect and accept them.

Such reply is shocking coming from a philosopher of Oppy's intellectual stature. 

Obviously, if an actual infinite exists, then such absurd situations should be expected. This is simply to repeat the conditional "If an actual infinite number of things exist in the real world, then absurd consequences result"

But the conditional is not in dispute (in fact, such conditional is precisely what the proponent of the kalam is arguing for!). What is in dispute is the antecedent of such conditional, namely, the existence of an actual infinite in the real world.

Simply embracing the conclusion of the argument does nothing to show that the antecedent is possible and hence that such absurd situations can be factually instantiated in the real world.

That a philosopher of Oppy's level of sophistication and erudition have defended such mathematically, metaphysically and logically implausible objection to the kalam argument, reinforces our confidence in the soundness of the kalam as a good argument for the universe's absolute beginning, and hence for God's existence.

Contemporary atheists not just are disposed to accept that "the universe came from nothing", but alternatively also that the universe is composed of an infinite number of past events which, if true, would imply the existence of an actual infinite with its absurd and impossible (and never observed!) consequences in the real world.

It is hard to think about a position which requires more faith than this, and which is more contrary to logic and evidence.

Atheists are prepared to accept ANY position, if it provides them with a apparent escape or way out for not accepting God's existence.

In addition to psychological factors, I suspect that spiritual factors play a role and some religious traditions (from several perspectives) have alerted about it.

For example, in the New Testament, in Matthew 13: 10-13, when asked for his continuous use of parables to convey his teachings, Jesus explained:

And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why speakest thou unto them in parables?

¹¹ He answered and said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given.

¹² For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.

¹³ Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.

Did Jesus perhaps know in advance that certain kind of persons (the ones who are fully committed to reject any evidence for God) won't hear, and hence to such persons no correct or straightforward or unambiguous explanation and information about God should be given?

Who knows...

Stephen Braude on the nature of physical laws, Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanations and the location problem for naturalism

Philosopher Stephen Braude explains the proper function and domain of physical laws:

"The laws of physics (including conservation laws) strictly speaking apply only to impersonal or mechanical forces, i.e. to physical systems and interactions abstracted from the realm of intention". 

The realm of "intention" is the realm of mind, which (at least in its rational expression) is a property of persons. 

But according to metaphysical naturalism, "persons" are not basic to reality, but just late and derivative byproducts of the evolution of impersonal or mechanical physical forces. The basic elements of reality are purely impersonal or mechanical.

Granted this basic premise of naturalism, then the existence of personal properties becomes a problem.

Prominent naturalist philosopher John Searle understands the problem:

how do intentional phenomena and consciousness fit into a world made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force?

Obviously if our world is "entirely" made up of impersonal forces and entities, exactly where we can ground the existence of intentional phenomena, consciousness and other personal properties (like moral values, moral responsability, etc.)?

Note that is not simply the personal opinion of Searle, but a real and serious problem implied by the basic premises of naturalism itself. That many naturalists don't realize this (or don't want to see it, because they are not open to other worldviews) is their problem...

Consider another fully consistent naturalist, Alex Rosenberg:

Since physics has excluded the existence of anything concrete but nonspatial, and since physics fixes all the facts, we have to give up this last illusion consciousness foists on us... There is no room in a world where all the facts are fixed by physical facts for a set of free floating independently existing norms or values (or facts about them) that humans are uniquely equipped to discern and act upon

Consider naturalist Richard Dawkins:

Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing a damaged component, either in hardware or software... Presumably because mental constructs like blame and responsibility, indeed evil and good, are built into our brains by millennia of Darwinian evolution

Try to put yourself in the shoes of naturalists. It is obvious that if you begin with a purely and entirely physical world (which is purely mechanical and impersonal) you will be forced to end up with purely physical, mechanical and impersonal reconstruction of reality, which don't allow for any personal feature.

      Physical facts  ------------------> more physical facts.

No moral values, no moral responsability, no free will, no consciousness, no rationality, no mind, no intentionality, no conceptual framework, no spiritual realm, etc. seem to fit confortably with such worldview.

This is the decisive metaphysical adventage of theism. This worldview begins with and it is grounded upon a spiritual PERSON (God) and end up with personal, spiritual properties (spirits, afterlife, intentional phenomena, consciousness,  etc.) which fit nicely and are to expected to exists if such worldview were correct.

This is why we have arguments for God's existence based on all the above personal features of reality. (The argument from consciousness, the argument from morality, the argument from intentionality and so forth. All of these arguments have in common to argue for God's existence based on the evidence of personal properties in a physical world).

And this is why the objections against such arguments are superficial, based on an improper understanding of the deeper metaphysical problems of any impersonalistic worldview (e.g. the Euthyphro's Dilemma used by atheists to object the moral argument is, in my opinion, one of the worst and more superficial arguments in the history of philosophy. I've commented about this argument here).

Note, by the way, that the problem of naturalists also exist for any other worldview which is impersonalistic (like some Easter philosophies which talks about "impersonal consciousness", whatever they mean). Like naturalism, these philosophies tend to be skeptical or dimissive of personal properties as actual, trascendent realities (e.g. when they say that we live in a "world of duality, in which evel and good are illusions which exist only in appearence in this world". Note that it is what Richard Dawkins more or less says too!).

Clearly, there is an intellectual pressure for proponents of impersonalistic worldviews to explain away these personal properties and somehow undermine them because they realize that such personal features don't fit nicely or comfortably into an impersonalistic worldview (naturalistic or not).

Again, in theism, a person (God) produces, at his image, other persons (human beings, aliens beings if they exists, spiritual beings, etc.), which share, limitedly but essentially, some of His basic personal properties. In theism, persons comes from the Person, minds from the Mind, intrinsic moral worth from the Perfect Goodness itself (=God).

Infinite Person (God)--------------------> finite persons
Infinite Consciousness (God)--------> finite consciousness
Perfect Good itself (God) ----------> intrinsic moral worth
Perfect Freedom (God)----------> limited but actual free will

Not one of the above properties exist nor can be found in the physical world itself, and naturalists are philosophically committed (whether they realize it or not) to deny, or cast serious doubts on the objective existence of these personalistic properties.

These properties is precisely what we would expect to find if theism were true, but not if naturalism were true (this counterfactual insight underlies the whole argument...).

Richard Swinburne on two kinds of explanation

According to philosopher of science Richard Swinburne, there are two kinds of explanations used in science and common sense: personal explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of the intentions of a person) and scientific explanations (e.g. explanations in terms of mechanical or impersonal forces).

For example, evolution is explained in terms of a mechanical process, namely, natural selection operating on random mutations. This is a kind of scientific explanation. No "person" is involved in the explanation.

But there are also personal explanations (e.g. used in social science and daily life). For example, if you ask me why I wrote this post, I'll reply with a personal explanation: I wrote it because I wanted to share metaphysical insights by Braude and Swinburne about the nature of reality and how they affect our assessment of the evidence for theism vs the alternatives.

My intention is the ultimate explanation of the coming into being of this post.

Note that the above personal explanation only makes sense if you understand my intention (or if you suspect that I have other, hidden intentions).

But if you remove any intentional process whatsoever as an explanation of this post, then the coming into being of this post becomes wholly inexplicable. A sheer mistery.

Swinburne's insight and the Big Bang Cosmology

If we agree with Swinburne that there are only two kinds of explanations (I'd like to call them, personalistic explanations and impersonalistic explanations, which are mutually exhaustive), then you're in position to understand why atheists are prepared to say that the universe "came from nothing".

In the case of the absolute beginning of the unverse, the scientific (impersonalistic) explanation is not possible, because there cannot be in principle any physical explanation of the coming into being of the whole physical universe itself. 

Since the impersonalistic explanation is not possible in this case, the only possible explanation is the personalistic one: The universe came into being by the intention and power of a person (or bunch of persons), which naturalism cannot accept at all. So, they prefer to say that the universe came "from nothing".

So, naturalists only have two choices: Either deny the evidence for the absolute beginning of the physical world, or either to claim that it comes from "nothing". Both alternatives have been (as expected) defended by some atheists.

Since the absolute beginning of the physical unverse implies that the only possible explanation is that the universe came from a person (God) or a bunch of person (e.g. a kind of polytheism = multiple god-like spiritual entities = multiple very powerful spiritual persons), the whole question is if theism or polytheism is true. By Occkam's razor the former is simpler than the latter, hence theism seems to be the best explanation.

The atheist reply "the universe came from nothing" is not just absurd and obscurantistic but in addition question-begging too, since it assumes (don't prove) that persons are not basic to reality and hence that theism cannot be a possible explanation at all. 

This shows that atheism is, for many people, a commitment of the will which has nothing to with the evidence, science or rationality.

The essay of Francis Bacon on ATHEISM: a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion

 

As I've discussed here, famous skeptic, hero of many atheists and empiricist philosopher David Hume was a theist (of a moderate type).

According to Hume:

The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquierer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion... Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system . . .All the things of the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughtout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author" (The Natural History of Religion, p. 21, 26).

Hume is posing such argument, fisrt against atheism ("no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion"), and then against polytheism ("Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being"). 

Basically, Hume is saying that both atheism and polytheism are irrational in the light of the works of nature and keep in mind that Hume wrote this in a time in which it was unknown that the universe is fine-tuned for life and, above all, began to exist in a Big Bang. (What would have Hume thought of contemporary atheists like Quentin Smith who, faced with the absolute beginning of the universe, have concluded that the "most reasonable" view is to think that we came from nothing, for nothing and by nothing?)

Another hard-core empiricist philosopher and very influential modern thinker, Francis Bacon, also was a theist. One of the major contentions of Bacon (as you can read below in his full essay on atheism) is that atheism is focused in secondary causes alone, but it is incapable of explaining the whole causal chain, which is simply taken for granted as a brute fact. 

This is why Bacon famously said "a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion", because only a superficial assesment of the empirical evidence (=secondary causes) will tend to make you prone to think that only such causes exist. But depth philosophy will push you into the inquiry for the explanation of the whole causal chain and intelligent organization of the whole universe, until you get some kind of first cause or necessary (and hence eternal) being which is the ultimate being and ground of reality. (This is why so many atheists are obsessed with empirical evidence alone, but don't question the more fundamental question of existence itself, which atheists tend to take for granted as a brute and unexplainable fact. This fact becomes more devastating for the plausibility of atheism when it was discoveried that the universe as a whole has a beginning and hence it is contingent, not a necessary self-existing eternal being...).

Bacon's insights also include reference to the psychological need of many atheists to receive the consent of others, which suggest a kind of internal insecurity about atheism (this could explain why some of them tend to be so militant, agressive, intolerant in the defense of their worldview, even creating an "organized skepticism" to debunk topics like parapsychology. Their proposal is not motivated by a constructive project, like a promise of spiritual salvation for others or  commitment to the solution of social problems like poverty, misogyny, rape, violence, child abuse, low self-esteem, existential problems, etc., but an extremely agressive and almost obsessive fight stance against religion, spirituality, parapsychology, etc.).

Another insight of Bacon is that many atheists actually impugn a particular religion (historically, mainly Christianity), and having rejected a particular religion, they become atheists (which is a fallacious inference, since the falsehood of a particular religion does not imply God's nonexistence). Suppose for the argument's sake that Christianity is false: How exactly this proves God's non-existence? At most, it proves that the Christian conception of God is not true, not that God doesn't exist.

Another of Bacon's insight is how the existence or non-existence of God affects man's nature and instrinsic value. (For readers familiar with philosophy, I suggest that this argument must be better understood as a counterfactual claim: IF God doesn't exist, then man is... or If God exists, then man is... Amazingly, some philosophers don't understand the counterfactual nature of this argument, see for example my brief discussion on counteractuals and how a professional atheist philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong consistently misunderstood William Lane Craig's counterfactual formulation of the moral argument in their debate).

Let's read Bacon's essay by ourselves and try to think hard about his multiple insights in this short essay (I've stressed in blue some of these insights):

ON ATHEISM

Francis Bacon

I HAD rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind. And therefore, God never wrought miracle, to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion. For while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity. Nay, even that school which is most accused of atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus. For it is a thousand times more credible, that four mutable elements, and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions, or seeds unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty, without a divine marshal. The Scripture saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart; so as he rather saith it, by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it. 

For none deny, there is a God, but those, for whom it maketh that there were no God. It appeareth in nothing more, that atheism is rather in the lip, than in the heart of man, than by this; that atheists will ever be talking of that their opinion, as if they fainted in it, within themselves, and would be glad to be strengthened, by the consent of others. Nay more, you shall have atheists strive to get disciples, as it fareth with other sects. And, which is most of all, you shall have of them, that will suffer for atheism, and not recant; whereas if they did truly think, that there were no such thing as God, why should they trouble themselves? Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit’s sake, when he affirmed there were blessed natures, but such as enjoyed themselves, without having respect to the government of the world. Wherein they say he did temporize; though in secret, he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced; for his words are noble and divine: Non deos vulgi negare profanum; sed vulgi opiniones diis applicare profanum. Plato could have said no more. And although he had the confidence, to deny the administration, he had not the power, to deny the nature. The Indians of the West, have names for their particular gods, though they have no name for God: as if the heathens should have had the names Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, etc., but not the word Deus; which shows that even those barbarous people have the notion, though they have not the latitude and extent of it. So that against atheists, the very savages take part, with the very subtlest philosophers. 

The contemplative atheist is rare: a Diagoras, a Bion, a Lucian perhaps, and some others; and yet they seem to be more than they are; for that all that impugn a received religion, or superstition, are by the adverse part branded with the name of atheists. But the great atheists, indeed are hypocrites; which are ever handling holy things, but without feeling; so as they must needs be cauterized in the end. The causes of atheism are: divisions in religion, if they be many; for any one main division, addeth zeal to both sides; but many divisions introduce atheism. Another is, scandal of priests; when it is come to that which St. Bernard saith, non est jam dicere, ut populus sic sacerdos; quia nec sic populus ut sacerdos. A third is, custom of profane scoffing in holy matters; which doth, by little and little, deface the reverence of religion. And lastly, learned times, specially with peace and prosperity; for troubles and adversities do more bow men’s minds to religion. 

They that deny a God, destroy man’s nobility; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts, by his body; and, if he be not of kin to God, by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity, and the raising of human nature; for take an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on, when he finds himself maintained by a man; who to him is instead of a God, or melior natura; which courage is manifestly such, as that creature, without that confidence of a better nature than his own, could never attain. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself, upon divine protection and favor, gathered a force and faith, which human nature in itself could not obtain. Therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself, above human frailty. As it is in particular persons, so it is in nations. Never was there such a state for magnanimity as Rome. Of this state hear what Cicero saith: Quam volumus licet, patres conscripti, nos amemus, tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Poenos, nec artibus Graecos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terrae domestico nativoque sensu Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed pietate, ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus.

Quentin Smith on one argument for God's existence based upon the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Atheist philosopher Quentin Smith comments:

According to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the wave function needs to be collapsed by something outside the system being measured. The wave function of the universe, accordingly, needs to be collapsed by something outside the universe. Now most versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation regard the observer (often explicitly identified with consciousness) as what collapses the wave function. In this respect, the cosmological application of the Copenhagen Interpretation may reasonably be thought to posit God (or a disembodied person who has superhuman attributes) outside the universe. Indeed, it seems to be the best scientific argument for God which is present in the twentieth century science. (Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Cosmology, p. 325. Emphasis in blue added).

Smith's argument (or rather, a modified version of it) could be summarized (and suplemented) like this:

1) If the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is true, the wave function of any physical system needs to be collapsed by an external conscious (intentional) observer.

2)The Copenhagen interpretation of QM is (probably) true

3)Therefore, the wave function of any physical system needs to be collapsed by an external conscious (intentional) observer

4)The physical universe as a whole is a physical system.

5)Therefore, the wave function of the universe needs to be collapsed by an external conscious (intentional) observer.

(You can substitute the Copenhagen interpretation by any other which implies the need of the wave function being reduced by a concious observer, and the argument runs alike).

The inmediate implication is that the universe has a trascendent cause. This suffices to destroy metaphysical naturalism (which conceives everything that exists as co-extensive with the physical world and explicitly denies any kind of non-physical causation).

Since we are considering the wave function of the entire physical universe (not just apart of it), and the observer in question is outside the physical universe, it follows that the observer in question is NON-PHYSICAL. Hence, it doesn't have the attributes of temporality or spaciality (which are part of the physical universe). Therefore, the observer in question is TIMELESS (outside of time = permanent = eternal) and SPACELESS. 

The observer in question is CONSCIOUS, but the mere existence of consciousness by itself seems to be incapable of causing the reduction of the wave function (because, if consciousness is eternal and were sufficient to bring about the reduction of the wave function, then universe would be eternal too since its wave function had been collaped an infinite time ago co-eternal with consciousness, which it is not the case as proved by the evidence for the absolute beginning of the universe at the Big Bang). As Henry Stapp and other physicists (and philosophers of science like J.P.Moreland or William Lane Craig) suggest, in addition to mere consciousness, it is needed an INTENTION (freely exercised) to bring about the reduction of the wave function.

Therefore, the observer in question is conscious, free and intentional, which are essential and distintive features of persons. Hence, the observer in question is plausibly personal.

As Smith realizes, all of these attributes of the observer of the universe are precisely the attributes commonly conceived of God, namely, a non-physical, timeless, spaceless, eternal, free, personal (conscious and intentional) being  who consciously and intentionally brings about the universe a finite time ago. Whatever more can one say about God, these attributes are certainly essential to God.

At first glance, this argument seems compatible with a plurality of observers as being the causes of the universe (e.g. a bunch of spiritual observers agreed to create the universe, a view defended for example by Ron Hubbard). But by Occam's Razor, postulating one single cause is simpler than postulating an arbitrary number of causes and since a single cause suffices to produce the effect, in this case wave function reduction, a plurality of causes seem to be ad hoc and hence less plausible  (leaving aside the fact that a plurality of causes seem to be supporting a kind of polytheism, that is, the worldview which is rooted in bunch of mini-gods, which in certain New Age circles, which are extremely ego-centred, arrogant, prone to wild fantasies about "your mind creates everything" and not critically aware of human limitations, such mini-gods are identified with... ourselves).

Smith's insight implies that, if one accepts the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, then ones is (or should be) strongly pushed in the direction of theism (at least, as a more plausible candidate than naturalism, since the latter cannot account for nor accept the external, non-physical personal cause of the universe. And other candidates like pantheism or polytheism seem to be even more inadequate and objectionable than theism or naturalism).

Note that this argument applies to any interpretation of QM which postulates an external observer (or consciousness) as the only cause of the reduction of the wave function.

It seems to me that all the versions of pantheism (which identifies God with physical nature, namely a God inherent in nature) are refuted by this argument too.

Also, all the worldviews which are impersonalistic (like some commonly found on Eastern philosophies) cannot accout for such personal cause either, since such personal cause is basic, not derivative (and causally senior regarding the universe).

This argument seems to me impeccable, with the exception that it is not clear that the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is true. I personally have doubts about such interpretation. As I've mentioned before, there are around of 10 different interpretations of QM, some of which seem to imply that "observation" is sufficient, but not necessary, for the collapse of the wave function.

For this reason, I don't think it is a compelling argument for God's existence (except if one accepts the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, or any other version which postulates consciousness as necessary condition for the reduction of the wave function, as the best interpretation).

Just for the record: Quentin Smith is an atheist, and hence he doesn't accept this nor any other argument for God's existence. Moreover, it is hard to see what argument would convince him, since in the same book he says: "The fact of the matter is that the most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing and for nothing... We should instead acknowledge our foundation in nothingness and feel awe at the marvellous fact that we have a chance to participate briefly in this incredible sunburst that interrupts without reason the reign of non-being ." (Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Comsology. P.135. emphasis in blue added)".

If nothingness is a better explanation than God, then it is hard to see what evidence for God he would accept, since any possible evidence could be explained as caused by "nothingness" too. (See discussion of this latter view of Smith here).

Summary of my criticisms to Ken Wilber's metaphysics: Tension with the possibility of survival of consciousness, the afterlife, abstract objects, the Big Bang Cosmology and the existence of God

In two previous posts, this and this (which I suggest you to read carefully), I argued that the metaphysics of Ken Wilber is in tension with  number of things agreed by most people (including some of Wilber's readers), namely:

1)With the possibility of survival of consciousness (specially in an unembodied form, like suggested by the best cases of NDEs) and the afterlife.

2)With the existence of abstract objets (like numbers or propositions), provided they're not just subjective and useful concepts in our minds.

3)With the theory of the Big Bang, which implies the absolute origin of matter, energy and space-time (i.e. the absolute origin and coming into being of nature itself).

4)With the existence of God.

Just for the record: My main and underlying argument in both posts is NOT that Wilber's metaphysics is false (although I think it is), but that they're in tension with the existence, or possible existence, of at least the 4 categories of beings, events or phenomena mentioned above.

Why is that important? Because Wilber's ideas are shared by a lot of "New Age" fans and students (specially those with certain intellectual interests) and such people also tend to share all or some of the above 4 beliefs, at least implicitly.

Therefore, if I'm right in my critique of Wilber, people who holds one of the above 4 beliefs have to either abandon them, or reject Wilber's metaphysics.

In my opinion, Wilber's metaphysics can be useful to understand the evolution of material systems, but not to understand the origin of matter/nature itself, let alone spiritual problems. His view is highly similar to emergent materialism, with the difference that Wilber uses a spiritualistic terminology (e.g. "consciousness") and a kind of Hegelian mindset.

Ultimately, Wilber's system seems to imply the same kind of impersonalistic worldview (=a worldview based ultimately and fundamentally on non-personal forces, processes or entities) than materialism or scientific naturalism, which is at variance with the objective existence (as part of the fabric of reality) of basic and intrinsic person-relative/person-dependent features like rationality, intentionality, free will, moral responsability, etc. 

In impersonalistic worldviews, "persons" (if they exist at all) are later by-products of more fundamental, non-personal forces, entities, events or processes (e.g. subatomic particles, fields of forces, the law of entropy or gravity, natural selection, "universal consciousness" or "cosmic energy", and so forth). In some New Age doctrines, person-relative properties are "reified" (=assumed to be individual things and not properties of things), like "love" (without lover), or "intelligence" (without a person who exercises it) and other abstract "energies" which being impersonal behave as persons... so, these people can say "the universe is intelligent", or "the universe is love" or "the universe cares of you",  without realizing that they are positing person-dependent features to non-personal realities.

Impersonalistic worldviews, at the bottom, tend to ultimately nullify, limit and undermine the distinctive features of persons on behalf of (supposedly) most important, fundamental and senior impersonal forces and processes (think about the "dissolution of the self" so common in the Eastern and New Age literature... a dissolution which, if true, will ultimately destroy any sense of rationality, free will, personal agency, moral responsability, etc. since the existence of a individual free and rational "self" is a necessary condition of these person-relative features. Not surprinsingly, many of these impersonalistic worldviews say that things like "good and evil are mere illusions based upon dualistic thinking" or "there is not justice nor injustice in the creation but only love..." which obviously is the negation of the objective existence of a rational, moral and just realm in which we are ultimately accountable for our free decisions and deeds, specially if our conscious, spiritual and moral life extends beyond this physical existence).

A given worldview is either personal or non-personal, that is, rooted ultimately in a person or persons, or in non-personal forces. This is why the most plausible cadidates are theism (personal worldview) or scientific naturalism (impersonal worldview based on natural science).

Postulating a spiritual dimesion fit well with theism, since God is a spiritual being. But a spiritual dimension of souls and finite conscious beings don't fit well in a worldview which is impersonalistic, like naturalism. (This is why naturalists are critical and debunkers of spiritual matters).

Monistic metaphysics (like Wilber's) don't escape from this. Either, such unitary principle is a person or not. If it is a person, then everything that exists is a expression of such person (and some version of theism seems implied) and person-dependent features find a secure place in that worldview. If not, and the root of reality is a non-personal principle or entitiy ("undifferentiate consciousness", "cosmic energy", "loving universe", the quantum vacuum, "abstract intelligence", numbers, etc.), then "persons" seem to be secondary by-products, contingent, more or less accidental, non-fundamental realities, and person-dependent features have not a fundamental place in it, only a secondary and temporal one.

Wilber's view uses a person-dependent language (e.g. "The Spirit"), but in examination such principle seems to be a non-personal energy or entity. Such Spirit far from being "free", is subject to a bunch of metaphysical laws which imply a continuous progression of developmental process through the material world and eventually evolving to personal minds.

For the reasons explained in my two posts on Wilber, I find his metaphysics at variance with phenomena which fit better with theism.

More on Ken Wilber's metaphysics: Problems related to the philosophy of mathematics, the concept of God, the Big Bang and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

In a previous post, I've commented on some problems that I think Wilber's metaphysics pose to the notion of survival of consciousness.

But I think Wilber's metaphysics is also at variance with the existence of entities which, if they exist, don't fit well with Wilber's metaphysics. A couple of examples:

1-Mathematical entities (numbers, sets, etc.): If they exist objectively (either in the strong Platonistic sense, or as divine ideas in God), then it is hard to see how Wilber's metaphysics could account for it.

If such objects like numbers exist, presumibly they are perfect, changeless, immaterial entities... how could such entities be explained in terms of holons and evolutionary development? Just think about it: Imagine that the number 0 exist objectively. Now, how exactly such object is a holon which has evolved progressively in a development process? What are the lower and higher holonic structures of such object?

If such object exists, it seems an immutable, perfect, changeless object, not sensitive to change (and hence, not sensitive to evolution or regression). 

It is not clear exactly where such objects, if exist, would fit in Wilber's metaphysics. In this point, Wilber's only consistent position would be a kind of strong anti-realism in the philosophy of mathemathics.

2-God: In the classical theistic tradition, God is a personal being, who is spiritual, immaterial, ommipotent, perfect and so forth.

But in Wilber's metaphysics, such classical concept of God is hard to find. If God is perfect, He already possess all of His essential properties at maximal degree. As consequence, He cannot evolve (i.e. change in a better, progressive way), because He is already perfect. 

Note that if we accept that God is evolving, we are accepting that God is NOT perfect in a given time, because in such time He lacks an essential property that He will have in a later time. This concept would be the concept of an imperfect, but always evolving God, which is at variance with classical theism.

Also, since He's subject to evolutionary process, such God is a contingent entity, not a necessary one. He's more like a physical object, an highly advanced extraterrestial being, than a necessary, fully perfect being which is the ground of reality.

So, Wilber's metaphysics seem to imply atheism regarding the classical concept of God as a personal, perfect immaterial being.

The Big Bang and the concept of God implied in the Kalam Cosmological Argument in tension with Wilber's metaphysics: 

As I've argued in several posts, the evidence for the absolute beginning of the universe poses a massive problem for naturalists, because such beginning cries for an explanation which, given the nature of the case, cannot be a natural explanation (because precisely is the beginning of nature itself which is the issue at stake).

Some leading atheists have fully understood this, and in order to avoid theism, they have used as their last card the view that the universe began to exist from "absolutely nothing at all", and that "there is not reason at all" for the universe's absolute coming to existence. "Nothinhness" becomes the ultimate God-stopper and the last refuge of atheism.

It is obvious why some atheists take such implausible, obscurantistic and irrational view. The absolute beginning of the universe implies that its cause is:

-Immaterial: because the whole of matter is created in the Big Bang.

-Spaceless: because space is created in the Big Bang.

-Timeless: because physical time itself is created in the Big Bang.

-Changless (at least without the universe):  since change implies time, and the cause in question is timeless.

-Extremely powerful: because the cause is creating the universe without any material cause (=creatio ex nihilo), which plausibly only an omnipotent being could do.

-Personal:  Since the only two plausible candidates for a cause possessing all the above attributes are abstract objects (like numbers), or immaterial spirits. Since abstract objects are not causally efficacious (e.g. the number 3 by itself doesn't cause anything... even thought your belief about the number 3 does), the only alternative seems to be immaterial spirits.

So, we're left (as plausible causes of the universe) with the existence of a powerful single immaterial spirit (God), or with a plurality of immaterial spirits who are extremely powerful and even omnipotent (polytheism or a pluralitiy of mini-gods). By Ockham's razor, postulating one single cause = one single God (which suffices to produce the effect) is simpler than postulating an arbitrary number of immaterial causes, it follows that it is more reasonable to postulate one single God as the creator of the universe, than postulating an arbitrary number of mini-gods or God-like spirits.

But such view of God, being timeless and changeless, doesn't fit well with Wilber's evolutionary metaphysics. 

Moreover, Wilber's basic concept that all holons have the property of being simultaneously "part/whole", cannot apply to God. If a perfect God is a holon, exactly what is the "whole" in regards to which such God is a "lower" or "smaller" part?

As I said, the problem with Wilber's metaphysics is that it is monistic, not dualistic. And form a monistic perspective, it is very hard to explain the whole diversity of everything that exists, because some entities (like God, mathematical objects, etc. seem to be ontologically different and non-reducible to a single principle common with material systems). Matter and Consciousness seems to be radically different kinds of entities, not two expressions or manifestations of a single entity.

In classical theism, God is the creator of everything which exists outside himself, including the material world. But the latter, even though God's creation, is NOT God himself (nor has any of God's essential properties). So, a kind of metaphysical dualism is implied.

But in Wilber's system, one single entitiy expresses itself (not "creating" something in addition to itself) through a bunch of wholly different manifestations, from sub-atomic particles to personal minds.

I don't think Wilber's monism is absurd nor obviously false. It could be true. But I find the metaphysical dualism of classical theism, specially in the lights of the Big Bang and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, to be more plausible.

Ken Wilber's metaphysical theory of holons, the afterlife and survival of consciousness and his book Sex, Ecology and Spirituality

Ken Wilber is regarded by many, in New Age (and alternative spiritualities) circles, as the world's greatest living philosopher. And by his critics, as the world's greatest fake philosopher. My current opinion is that Wilber is a brilliant, intelligent, honest and extremely erudite man, with many interesting philosophical insights, even though I strongly disagree with most of his ideas (many of which are not original... many of them come from philosophers like Hegel, Plotinius and others, which doesn't undermine Wilber's own original contributions).

In this post, I'd like to comment briefly on Wilber's metaphysical theory of "holon" and its connection with survival of consciousness. My contention is that such theory (at least as explained in his major scholarly work Sex, Ecology and Spirituality or SES) is at variance with the possibility of survival of consciousness. I don't mean that such notions are straightforwardly incompatible, only that they're in tension, waiting for more elaboration and articulation from Wilber's metaphysics.

In SES, one of Wilber's essential metaphysical concepts is that the Kosmos is hierarchically structured, that is, things are arranged hierarchically, with their specific position in the hierarchy determined by their particular level of developmental advance. So, for example, atoms aggregate into molecules, molecules into cells, cells into biological organisms (please keep in mind this example, because it will be necessary for the discussion below). Each new stage in the evolutionary process “transcends and includes” what came before it and exhibits new emergent properties. So, for example cells include atoms, but "trascend" them in the sense that they have new emergent properties (e.g. metabolism).

Beginning from the Big Bang, things have evolved progressively into more complicated arrangements which create new emergent properties as the developmental process progressively unfolds.

In this point, we confront a problem, namely, the problem of the existence of "emergent properties".  Some philosophers and scientists have argued that emergent properties don't exist, except in the phenomenological-macrophysical level (that is, our sense perception interprets certain things as having emergent properties like solidity or roughness and other macroscopic properties, when in fact they don't have them).

Physicist Marco Biagini comments:

Also the concept of a macroscopic rigid and compact object is only an optical illusion, and not a physical entity. The image of the object we see is in fact only an approximate representation of the real physical object. No object exist in nature as we see it; solid objects appear to us as if they were uniformly filled with motionless matter, while they are only sets of rapidly moving particles; matter is concentrated in a very small fraction of the space occupied by the solid object, mostly in the atomic nuclea, and it has no uniform distribution as it appears to us. The laws of physics establish that the possible properties of every particle or molecule are the same, that is the property of exchange energy with other particles or photons, and the property of movement; these are the properties of every quantum particle, and no aggregate of quantum particles can have new properties. Therefore, no real macroscopic properties exist. The macroscopic properties quoted by materialists, are not objective properties of the physical reality, but they are only abstractions or concepts used to describe our sensorial experiences; in other words, they are ideas conceived to describe or classify, according to arbitrary criteria, a given succession of microscopic processes, and these ideas exist only in a conscious and intelligent mind. Therefore, the macroscopic property, being only an abstraction, presupposes the existence of consciousness. It is obvious that consciousness cannot be considered a macroscopic property of the physical reality, because the macroscopic property itself presupposes the existence of consciousness. We have then a logical contradiction. No entities which existence presupposes the existence of consciousness can be considered as the cause of the existence of consciousness

I'm not sure whether Biagini is correct about the non-existence of macrophysical properties, but his arguments deserve careful examination. In any case, my point is that if emergent properties are not objective (but a function of our phenomenological constitution), then one of the basic pillars of Wilber's metaphysics collapses.  Wilber's position needs further defense in terms of contemporary physics and the relevant discussions in metaphysics.

But let that pass. Let's assume, for the argument's sake of this post, that emergent properties exist objectively.

Another key concept in Wilber's metaphysics is that the things so arranged in the Kosmos are simultaneously a part and a whole; a part in regards to some larger whole, and a whole in regards to its smaller parts. For example, cells are a part in regards to biological organisms; but are a "whole" in regards to their smaller parts (e.g. molecules). Wilber calls this "part/whole" property of every thing in the Kosmos HOLON (following the term coined by Arthur Koestler).

Consistent with this holonic metaphysics, Wilber argues that the mind (the individual mind like yours or mine) is a property of the brain; the brain is constituted by cells; cells by molecules; and molecules by atoms; atoms by sub-atomic particles, etc. As consequence, the mind is a higher and more developed state of the evolution of material holons like cells or atoms.

Here is where I think we can see a problem in Wilber's metaphysics for the possibility of an (unembodied) afterlife.

Note that Wilber's view so far is very similar to emergent materialism. The mind is a emergent property of the brain, not an (ontologically) independent entity. At first glance, given this premise, the mind couldn't survive the destruction of the biological brain. Therefore, survival of consciousness cannot exist.

If the mind is a holon (like everything else), then by definition it "includes and trascends" aspects of lower holons (like cells, molecules, etc.). But in such case, it's evident that the mind cannot exist after the destruction of the biological brain, because it would imply that the holonic structure underlying and supporting the mind doesn't exist anymore. If it is claimed that the mind can exist in absence of the lower holonic structure, then it becomes a kind of independent and self-subsistent holon (which is self-contradictory given the Wilberian concept of holon), or that it is not a holon anymore (which contradicts Wilber's evolutionary holonic metaphysics).

In the examples mentioned by Wilber, the lower structures of a given holon exist simultaneously to the holon. A cell, for instance, includes molecules and trascends them, but molecules exist simultaneously to cells and hence a cell cannot exist without molecules. Likewise, if the human mind include a material structure (like brain cells, etc.) and trascends it (with emergent properties like rationality or free will), then it implies that the human mind cannot exist in the absence of the brain.

Hence, the more reasonable and consistent conclusion of Wilber's metaphysics would seem to be that, once you have destroyed the lower structure (e.g. the cells), the higher structure (e.g. the brain) is destroyed. On parity of reasoning, the destruction of the brain would imply the extinction of the mind, as emergent materialists consistently realize.

The problem with Wilber's holonic metaphysics is that it is monistic, not dualistic. He postulates one single reality as ontologically fundamental, which expresses itself through progressive evolutionary process in a holonic-fashion. It doesn't make room (at least not comfortably) to basic metaphysical entities like a personal God, or to ontologically distinct entities like mathematical objects (if they exist objectively) or immaterial souls. (Note, by the way, that in the case of mathematical objects, if they exist, presumibly they are perfect, unchangless entities... how could such entities be explained in terms of holons and evolutionary development? Also, in the case of God, if He's a perfect being, it seems impossible that He's a Holon constituted by lower holons which progressively creates new entities in an evolutionary process. A perfect being cannot "evolve", since He's already perfect, He possess all his essential properties to a maximal degree).

Wilber's holon theory is useful to understand material systems (their constitution and evolution), but (in my opinion) not to understand spiritual matters, which are ontologically different and seem to obey wholly different metaphysical principles.

In conclusion:

Wilber's metaphysics of holons don't seem to provide a good theoretical framework to understand survival of consciousness in any of its standard forms (specially in unembodied forms).

If, for example, reincarnation exists, it is hard to see how Wilber's theory could consistently explain it.  How exactly a fully developed mind (that "includes and trascends" atoms and molecules of a particular biological brain) could be attached to a wholly new and independent body and brain when reincarnation happens? In this case, the mind would be previous to the new brain that supports it, which destroys the whole concept of holon in the terms argued by Wilber. (This becomes more evident in cases of "regressive reincarnations", namely, when a human being is reincarnated into lower animals, as some believers in reincarnation suggest).

Ironically, a kind of bodily immortality like the resurrection would seem, at first glance, to be compatible with Wilber's metaphysics, since in the Christian view, the "resurrection" entails the existence of a previous physical body. So, a transformed body (the resurrection body) could be considered as an holon which "trascend and include" the previous physical body (i.e., it includes the same body, and trascends it in the sense of providing it with new emergent properties, for example making it spiritually fit for immortality or immune to disease or decay).

In any case, I think Wilber's metaphysics (widely read and sympathetically accepted by many New Age believers, and fans of the paranormal) is not in home (at least not comfortably) with the idea of survival of consciousness, specially of consciousness existing in an unembodied state (e.g. as suggested by some cases of NDEs).