Naturalist philosophers are very astute in hidding (or not specifying exactly) the empirical conditions under which metaphysical naturalism would be refuted. This trick allows them to dismiss any evidence which is presented against naturalism.
For example, naturalist philosopher J.J.C. Smart accepts that his own naturalism is empirically unfalsifiable (and hence unscientific): "Someone who has naturalistic preconceptions will always in fact find some naturalistic explanation more plausible than a supernatural one... Suppose that I woke up in the night and saw the stars arranged in shapes that spelt out the Apostle's Creed. I would know that astronomically it is impossible that stars should have changed their position. I don't know what I would think. Perhaps I would think that I was dreaming or that I had gone mad. What if everyone else seemed to me to be telling me that the same had happened? Then I might not only think that I had gone mad-- I would probably go mad" (J.J.C. Smart in his contribution to the book Atheism and Theism, pp.50-51. Emphasis in blue added)
Not even such a straighforward, empirically public and verificable miracle like the one mentioned by Smart would count as evidence against his naturalism. Such degree of faith in naturalism is, in my opinion, very common among naturalists, but not all of them have the intellectual honesty of Smart in conceding that their position is based on such a strong, fixed and unfalsifiable faith.
Another example is naturalist philosopher John Shook, who says that from the existence of nature plus the (supposed) lack of evidence for the supernatural, it follows that naturalism is true (clearly an obviously fallacious non-sequitur conclusion and faith-based position unworthy of a serious trained philosopher. Note that the people who applaud to Shook's logical fallacies are so irrational as him, they are incapable of rational thinking and unable to see the most obvious fallacies slaping their faces):
Not happy himself with a non-sequitur, Shook adds another fallacy at the end of the video: the fallacy of self-contradiction (when he says that beyond nature, perhaps there is "more nature", which is massively stupid and retarded, since in such case you have not gone beyond nature at all... all what you have done is just moved from a part of nature to another part of nature, not beyond nature simpliciter). And Shook asserts such self-contradiction with a craying baby face when he says "I don't need the supernatural" (which suggests a kind of emotional, childish connection with naturalism and the rejection of God). Jime Iron Law in dramatic functioning!.
An additional fallacy by Shook consists in saying "I don't need the supernatural", as whether you settle complex philosophical problems based on your personal "needs" (a similar mistake as the one committed by many American anti-Christians, who decide spiritual matters apparently based on what is subjectively appealing or not to them). If Shook needs or not the supernatural is irrelevant: What is relevant is what kind evidence would count against his naturalism, and he has made clear (like Smart) that NO evidence would be ever relevant. His position is unfalsifiable and strongly based on sheer FAITH.
Many atheistic naturalists are deludedby the idea that they're "scientific", champions of "reason" and "logic", but the way they hold their basic philosophical commitments is the most unscientific, unfalsifiable, irrational, fallacious and dogmatic position that one could imagine ever.
However, some naturalists are less dogmatic and unscientific. Naturalist philosopher Evan Fales seems to be one of them. In the Cambridge Companion to Atheism, professor Fales wrote: "A variety of paranormal effects, were they genuine, would provide evidence for supernatural beings, disembodied human minds, or nonnatural forces. They include alleged cases of reincarnation, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, and out-of-body experiences, especially those associated with near-death episodes (NDEs). Because such phenomena suggest the possibility of extra-bodily existence, of nonphysical channels of communication between minds, and of minds influencing distant physical objects directly, they have attracted the attention not only of laypeople but of philosophers." (p.130. Emphasis in blue added).
Some comments:
1)Fales accepts that genuine psychic phenomena, if they exist, would provide evidence for the supernatural. And the supernatural is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism. Therefore, whatever is evidence for the supernatural is evidence against naturalism.
Since Fales explicitly mentions putative psychic phenomena as evidence for the supernatural and the existence of nonnatural forces or beings, it follows that if such phenomena are genuine, naturalism is false.
At least, we find there a naturalistic philosopher who is willing to consider the naturalistic position not as a dogma, but as a scientific (and hence falsifiable) hypothesis.
2)Since Fales includes "clairvoyance" among the phenomena with the potential of refuting naturalism, I'd like to know what Fales think of the vedic astrologer Jeffrey Armstrong, who passed positively the skeptic Michael Shermer's test:
If such a result is not product of Shermer's scientific incompetence in designing the test, then such a result seems to count as evidence for the paranormal, specially of paranormal access to specific personal information (and hence to a kind of clairvoyance or at least of telepathy, which is also included in Fales' view when he refers to "nonphysical channels of communication between minds").
Therefore, such test seem to count as empirical evidence against naturalism.
3)Wholly apart of the Armstrong-kicking-Shermer-butt-case, it is well known that skeptic Richard Wiseman has admitted that the evidence for psi is so good that “by the standards of any other area of science" ESP has been proven.
In the case of remote viewing, Ray Hyman wrote in a technical paper: "The SAIC experiments are well-designed and the investigators have taken pains to eliminate the known weaknesses in previous parapsychological research. In addition, I cannot provide suitable candidates for what flaws, if any, might be present."
It seems that at least a prima facie case for the existence of some psi effects can be made based on the work of professional skeptics alone. And if Fales is right, them such evidence counts empirically against naturalism.
I'm sure that Fales will try, as hard as he can, to explain away this evidence in order to save naturalism. It is his prerrogative.
But people who accepts the above (and other) evidence for psi will have, on Fales' own principles, to consider that metaphysically naturalism has been empirically refuted, and this without including independent philosophical arguments for the falsehood of naturalism:
My blog is highly critical of contemporary atheism and its ideological-philosophical roots: scientific materialism and metaphysical naturalism. However, as an exception, I think atheist writer and leading philosopher of biology Alex Rosenberg deserves a defense in this blog.
As I've discussed in several posts, naturalist philosopher of biology Alexander Rosenberg has written what, in my opinion, is the most philosophically coherent and scientifically informed defense of metaphysical naturalism and atheism published so far. I strongly urge my readers, whatever their theological persuasion (atheists, agnostics, theists, spiritualists, etc.) to get a copy of Rosenberg's book and read it carefully. (Moreover, Rosenberg's book is NOT technical, and it is very easy to read and understand). You won't get a more consistent and easy-to-understand defense of naturalism.
Rosenberg's book has been widely misunderstood by some naturalists. His basic premise is that "scientism" (the worldview revealed by the best and most reliable findings of natural science) implies a series of naturalistic beliefs which, if taken seriously and consistently, provide us with clear scientific answers to philosophical topics like "Is there a purpose in the universe?" or "Do objective moral values exist?" or "Do Free Will exist?".
Naturalists who have misunderstood Rosenberg tend to be wishful thinkers who are unable to see, clearly, the implications of their own naturalism. They accept a bunch of naturalistic pressupositions (e.g. mind-body materialism, physical determinism, the causal closure of the physical world, non-teleology, blind natural selection, purely mechanistic explanations, etc.), but avoid their logical implications for topics like consciousness, free will, morality, purposes in the universe, human behaviour, etc. because they find them unpalatable (this is not surprising given Jime's Iron Law). But Rosenberg has guts: He explicilty accepts the full implications of the premises of naturalism and has the courage to live according to them.
Let's to mention a devastating example:
According to Rosenberg "No chunk of matter... can just by itself be about another chunk of matter... without a mind to interpret the first chunk of matter as being about the second chunk" (p.43. Emphasis in the original).
Note that such view is not an arbitrary opinion by Rosenberg. It is in fact what every serious scientific naturalist think, since naturalism interprets matter in a non-teleological way (i.e. as something not aimed to a particular end or purpose). In other words, matter (as discoveried by physical science) doesn't have any teleological or "purpose-oriented" properties. All properties of physical matter are mechanical, blind, non-teleological ones determined ENTIRELY by the corresponding physical laws. Period.
Now, if you are thoughful and deep enough like Rosenberg about the implications of such premise, you're in position to see why Rosenberg is right about his conclusions and their critics are demostrably wrong:
1-The mechanical view of matter implies that, in principle, it is impossible that any kind of purpose, end or design can exist in the material world. Physical matter simply doesn't work like that. Science shows that a chunk of matter can never (by physical reasons) be "about" any other chunk of matter. Both chunks of matter are connected exclusively by brute, blind mechanical-physical laws, with not "purpose" or "intention" about anything at all.
No scientific naturalist can sensibly to reject that view, because it is what natural science tells us about matter: there is not teleology nor purposes in matter.
But what does it imply? This view implies that, if our consciousness is reduced (or somehow caused) by the brain, then the common belief that our thoughts are "about" something is impossible and literally false. They're metaphors and illusions (perhaps useful fictions for certain purposes), not factual realities.
2-That view also rules out free will in a libertarian sense. The mind being totally dependent on the physical brain (a brain which functions entirely by mechanical, blind laws of physics, chemistry and neurophysiology) rules out (as a matter of necessity, not merely of accident) any autonomous "will" which can choose something for independent reasons or purposes. Such a thing doesn't exist. What any "will" chooses is, ultimately, determined by the brain (which in turns is determined by non-personalistic and deterministic physical laws). Hence, the "will" far from being "free" is actually determined as any other piece of material thing.
Any serious scientific naturalist cannot reject this, because it would imply that "the will" is a nonphysical entity which escapes the determination of physical laws, which is impossible and absurd if naturalism is true.
3-Point 2 discards actual moral responsability. This implication is unpalatable for many naturalists, but this is what their position actually implies (just think about it objectively).
Since what you do is what the physical laws determine that you will do, you are not free to do otherwise. (If you were free from such laws, then it would imply that your "will" is independent of the physical laws controlling the brain, which is impossible if naturalism is true).
4-Since physics fix all the facts about the universe, and physics shows that matter has not moral properties, it follows that the belief in objective moral values is literally false. At most we have a bunch of subjective beliefs about morality, but such beliefs are factually and objectively false (moreover, at the bottom, there is not such beliefs either, because in point 1 we saw that no piece of matter is "about" anything, hence not brain process connected with belief is actually about anything either).
Note that it is not a refutation to Rosenberg to reply that we are strongly convinced that moral values exist in the same way that 2+2=4 is true or that a married bachelor is a contradiction. Rosenberg would reply that your personal psychological convictions are irrelevant to science: Hard physics (which is not based on subjective convictions or self-evident beliefs, but in objective physical facts, some of which are counterintuitive) shows that physical matter has not room for moral properties at all. Not only such values have never been scientifically observed by the rigurous methods of natural science, but that the known and proven physical laws positively rules out such moral entities and properties in our physical universe. (Moreover, while mathematics, including formal truths like 2+2=4 are part of the theoretical structure of science, moral values are not part of theoretical science nor of matter nor of physical laws).
So far, we have seen that some of Rosenberg's conclusions DO follow logically and inescapably from his uncontroversial premise about physics. Natualists simply cannot accept the physicalist premise, and then fight hard trying to avoid the conclusions because they don't like it. If you're an intellectually serious and rational naturalist who accept that natural science actually reveals, or will reveal, everything that exists, you have to follow the above current evidence (contained in the physicalist premises) to wherever it leads. And the premise that matter is non-teleological, non-designed, non-mental, non-intentional and has not person-relative moral properties is firmly rooted in the current scientific understanding of the physical world.
Now, here is where my argument about "personalistic" vs "impersonalistic" worldviews becomes relevant.
Rosenberg's naturalism is what we would expect given a worldview based on impersonalistic premises. In the case of naturalism, such premises are matter and the physical laws controlling it. In principle, such things (matter and physical laws) don't include any "personalistic" entities nor properties like persons, intentionality, rationality, spiritual beings, consciousness, free will, objective moral values, etc. The latter entities simply don' fit well nor comfortably in an impersonalistic worldview (it applies too to many Eastern worldviews which, while claiming to be spiritualistic and non-materialistic, are based on impersonal principles too. Such impersonalistic principles simply cannot ground personalistic entities or properties, except as illusions, metaphors or lucky accidents... note the coincidence with naturalism!).
Now, in the case of personalistic worldviews (e.g. theism), the existence of persons (and their properties) are senior, basic, essential and intrinsic part of reality. The reality is, at a very fundamental level, PERSONAL (i.e. grounded ultimately in a Person = God). Therefore, such personalistic worldviews not only countenance such things like consciousness, the afterlife or moral values, but that IMPLY them.
This is why you have an argument for God's existence based on all of these entities or properties, but not a comparable argument for naturalism based on them, because naturalism doesn't require the existence of such strange things or phenomena nor can ground them comfortably. (Failing to understand this insight underlies the typical and simplistic atheist objections to the moral argument, like the objection "Are you saying that only believers in God are good?" or "Moral laws don't require God in the same way that mathematical laws or scientific laws don't require him" or the most common so-called Euthyphro Dilemma "Is the good good because God wills it, or God wills it because it is good?". All of these objections misconstrue the metaphysical nature underlying the moral argument, and such misconstruction is rooted in the atheists' unability to understand the deep metaphysical relevant differences of theism, as a personalistic worldview capable of comfortably grounding person-relative properties, versus naturalism, as a impersonalistic one, incapable of making such foundation, at least not easily, predictably and comfortably).
Let's put this in a more formal way (but not one hard to understand):
Let's to call "T" is the hypothesis that theism is true. And "N" the hypothesis that naturalism is true.
If T is true, then persons (and their properties) are essential, because it is a personalistic worldview. This worldview implies:
-The existence of consciousness, since persons are conscious agents.
-The existence of intentionality, since persons are intentional agents (i.e. they act with ends or purposes in mind, for example "I'm going to read Jime's blog" is a purpose in the mind of people who intentionally want to read my blog).
-The existence of free will, since persons (having an inmaterial or spiritual souls) are not determined by physical causes. They're self-determined, at least for a large extent.
-The existence of moral values, since some kind of normativity, standard and moral order has to exist objectively and be followed if any positive spiritual progress (or regress) is to be made (not surprinsingly, from Jesus to many other spiritual teachers, a large part of their teachings concern moral content and information linked to spiritual evolution or even salvation. Obviously, this makes sense if reality is constituted in such a way that certain objective norms and the moral order entailed by them is an objective part of reality grounded in the person ultimately responsible of such reality, namely God in the case of theism).
Note that the hypothesis T implies all the above features (and many others no mentioned here):
T ------ > P (where "P" stand for "person-relative properties" and "----->" stands for "implies").
This is why any evidence for a"P" is evidence for T.
Consider N, the hypothesis that naturalism is true. This implies:
-The existence of matter
-The existence of physical laws controlling that matter
-The non-existence of teleology, design or purpose in the universe.
-The existence of evolution of matter by random chance and necessity of physical laws.
-The causal closure of the physical world according to which every physical event which is caused is caused by a physical cause (i.e. nonphysical causation is impossible).
Keep in mind that the above features are essential features of naturalism, not merely accidental ones. They have to exist IF naturalism is true. Whatever evidence for these features is evidence for naturalism.
N--------> Np (where "Np" stand for "natural and mechanical impersonalistic properties").
Note that P (personal properties) are not predicted not implied by naturalism. Perhaps naturalism is compatible with them, but they are not implied by naturalism in the same way that they are implied and necessitated by theism. This is why the existence of person-relative properties is clear evidence for theism, but not for naturalism (even if, for the argument's sake, we can concede that such properties are compatible with naturalism)
Consider this example: the existence of evolution is evidence for naturalism (because naturalism implies it), but not by theism. Theism, as such, can be compatible with evolution but it doesn't imply it in the same way in which naturalism does. So, if all what we have is the evidence for evolution (and no other feature of reality like consciousness for example), naturalism would be superior to theism, because evolution is necessary in naturalism but only accidental on theism (God could prescind of evolution and create everything without such mechanism).
Now you're in position to see why naturalists fight to dismiss or misrepresent ANY evidence of person-relative properties (consciousness, putative paranormal phenomena, the objectivity of normativity, intelligent design, and so forth). They intuitively realize that if you accept these person-relative phenomena, the evidence for theism will overcome the evidence for naturalism. Their purpose is trying to reduce everything to impersonalistic and mechanistic explanations (e.g. consciousness to blind brain processes; putative paranormal events to frauds and psychological delusions; intelligent design to Darwinian processes, etc.)
Also, you're in position to see why the existence of extraterrestial life (specially of intelligent aliens), if such evidence were available, supports theism over naturalism (because in theism, you would expect an universe with persons and spiritual beings, but in naturalism such thing is extremely unlikely). So, it is not surprising to see "skeptics" (i.e. naturalistic debunkers of the paranormal) to attack ufology as a "pseudoscience".
You need to understand the underlying metaphysical beliefs of naturalism in order to fully understand their behaviour and debunking actions.
Rosenberg's book is the best book explaining the actual, consistent metaphysical implications of naturalism.
In the interview that I published with Ulrich Mohrhoff, he suggested the reading of John Haught's book entitled "Is nature enough?". After having finished Haught's book, I must say that it is a very good book.
This book is philosophically sophisticated, scientifically very well informed and, still, very easy to read.
Readers interested in a rigorous, honest and serious critical examination of metaphysical naturalism, should get this book and study it carefully.
Crucial to the accurate understanding of contemporary pseudoskepticism is the insight and knowledge of the philosophical worldview that most "skeptics" take for granted and from which most of their criticisms against parapsychology, the afterlife and spirituality in general is ultimately based upon.
A five-minute text-to-animation short, in which a real scientist confronts a self-styled skeptic (more properly called, pseudo-skeptic, or also materialistic/naturalistic/atheistic dogmatist)
At one time, famous philosopher Bertrand Russell believed in the existence of objective moral values. After some criticisms and reflection, he realized that if metaphysical naturalism is true, then objective moral values cannot exist (other ideas followed Russell's realization of the implications of metaphysical naturalism. See for example this post.)
Having realized this, Russell wrote:
"...ethics arises from the pressures of the community on the individual. Man . . . does not always instinctively feel the desires which are useful to his herd. The herd, being anxious that the individual should act in its interests, has invented various devices for causing the individual’s interest to be in harmony with that of the herd. One of these . . . is morality" (Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p.124. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that, if Russell is right, morality is purely an expression of the pressures of the community on us. Therefore, if the pressures are different, then morality also is different, because morality as such doesn't refer to an objectively existent realm or reality of intrinsic values, but that is the product of (we can say) "peer pressure".
And I submit that, if naturalism were true, then Russell's view is basically correct.
In other posts, I've mentioned that hardcore metaphysical naturalists, metarialistic atheists and pseudo-skeptics are individuals of a typical and obvious herd-like mindset, where the herd in question is the the handful of comitted and organized atheists who are obsessed with the idea of convincing the rest the world (i.e. 97% of the world population) that atheism is true, that parapsychology is bunk and the afterlife doesn't exist. And this is done in the name of "science".
Like in a herd of wolves, they tend to follow and be absolutely submitted to the will and power of a leader which tells them what to do and think. In the case of pseudo-skeptics, naturalists and materialists, the leader in question is science (more exactly, orthodox scientific authorities or the scientific establisment). As consequence of this herd mentality, they are intellectually unable to have an independent opinion or belief inconsistent with the consensus of the scientific authorities. They're essentially incapable of free thinking and independent thought (they're the secular equivalent of the religious dogmatist). They need the approval of mainstream scientific authorities, in order to have a personal opinion about whatever topic. Whatever evidence is incompatible with such consensus, the pseudo-skeptic will reject and dismiss it on purely a prori grounds (in the few cases of a posterior research, this is performed not to seek the truth, but as a debunking exercise of the anomalous information in question, because the aim is to protect the consensus of the scientific orthodoxy which is essential to the pseudo-skeptical belief system)
Marcello Truzzi, original member of the leading pseudo-skeptical organization CSICOP and hence an "insider", realized this:
The second common approach is what critics usually call the debunkers' approach. This is the main attitude of the orthodox scientific community towards anomaly claims. It is characterized by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP). "Whatever is claimed is nothing but ... something else." Seemingly anomalous phenomena are denied first and sometimes investigated only second. Like the Fortean the debunker is not concerned with the full explanation. Whereas the Fortean types don't want explanations, the debunkers don't need them as they believe they have already them.
The above is an empirical observation, which whoever is familiar with professional pseudo-skepticism will know that it is demostrably true. But it's a purely psychological and sociological fact. The knowledge of it is useful in order to know the sociology of professional pseudo-skepticism and the very particular psychology of its followers, ideologues and propagandists (so-called metaphysical naturalists, secular humanists, "brights", philosophical materialists, apologists of atheism, etc.)
In principle, the above has nothing to do with Russell's philosophical realization about morality. The latter is a purely philosophical insight, derived of a study of the consistent logical implications of the naturalistic worldview. This implication is independent of the psychology of pseudo-skeptics and materialists.
In a purely physical world (if it's all what exists as naturalism and materialism imply), there is not space for objectively existing normative properties like values (properties which, in contrast with physical properties, are not accesible to empirical observation nor are explainable in terms of materialism, precisely because they're not physical. This is why materialists have a tremedous pressure to define such values in terms of natural or physical properties, mainly psychological ones, like pleasure, desires, happiness, etc.).
On the other hand, even if an objective realm of moral value were consistent with naturalism, it is extremely unlikely that given a purely evolutionary process (which is largely random), we're equiped to grasp such moral realm, specially when such realm is, in naturalism, causally non-efficacious (since it is not physical) and hence incapable of having direct influence or effect on the organism and enviroment in order to be detected in the process of natural selection (note that this implies that our cognitive faculties couldn't be selected in the evolutionary process for their reliability to grasp or detect such non-physical moral realm, since such realm couldn't have any effect in our behaviour). Moreover, given naturalism and conceding for the argument's sake that our cognitive faculties developed by natural selection enable us to grasp such moral realm, how are we going to explain, ontologically, that a purely physical brain can grasp (or be in touch or interaction with) such non-physical realm of normative properties?
This is why a naturalists, if consistent, have to reject the objectivity of moral value, and accept moral subjetivism (in its relativistic implications). Moral values would be a projection of human ideas, which are essentially the product of evolution, herd pressure and cultural indoctrination.
But if you have good reasons to think that objective moral values do exist, and that certain actions or behaviours (like torturing a baby for pleasure alone, or raping animals for fun) are intrinsically bad and wrong (and not just a matter of herd pressure, personal taste or shared cultural fashion), then you have a powerful reason to reject metaphysical naturalism, and the moral poverty implied by it.
You'll have a purely ethical reason against metaphysical naturalism.
Think about it.
Link of interest:
-Bertrand Russell's realizations on other consequences of metaphysical naturalism.
Daniel Drosnin has updated his much read article on pseudo-skepticism entitled "Zen and the Art of Debunking", which is a funny and clever way to explain the common tricks used by pseudo-skeptics and materialistic ideologues to dismiss, reject, misinterpret and undervalue the evidence and data which refutes the metaphysical naturalistic worldview and the scientific orthodoxy (due to their faulty cognitive functioning, intellectual cowardice, spiritual impairment, herd-like mindset and typical dogmatism, naturalistic-materialistic ideologues and pseudo-skeptics manifest an obvious intellectual submission and an extreme credulity to the authority of the scientific orthodoxy, a trait which prevents them to think for themselves, and put them permanently and predictably at the feet of the scientific authorities. As consequence, these ideologues also will attack, ridiculize and try to suppress ideas which are not, as such, contrary to the metaphysical naturalistic ideology, provided they're widely rejected or still unaccepted by the mainstream science. Read this article by Marcello Truzzi, for a brief explanation of this ideological mindset)
In a previous post, I argued how an atheist philosopher (Michael Martin) intentionally misrepresented the cosmological argument for God's existence, in a debate with a Christian apologist.
These kind of atheistic misdirections and fallacies are very common, and this is exactly what we'd expect if atheism is false. Given that metaphysical naturalism (the foundation of contemporary atheism) is not based on true premises, it cannot refute the best counterarguments except through a consistent misrepresentation of them (and of other contrary evidence). It's mostly grounded on myths and fallacies, which are perpetuated in order to avoid that the believers in naturalism learn and correctly interpret the actual refutations of naturalism. (All the ideologies have that kind of self-protective mechanism in order to survive among their hard-core followers)
In my previous post, I argued that atheist/naturalist ideologues consistently present the statement "Everything has a cause" as the basic premise of the traditional cosmological argument for God's existence. Having misrepresented the actual argument, they commonly proceed to refute such argument arguing "If everyting has a cause, then God has a cause too. Therefore, it's impossible that God be the first uncaused cause, so the cosmological argument is self-refuting"
Obviously, an atheist ideologue arguing like that simply cannot understand the fact that no one of the best philosophical theists defending the cosmological argument has ever defended it on the grounds of the "everything has a cause" premise. Despite of this fact, atheist ideologues continue to use such fallacy. This is evidence that the cognitive faculties of these people don't function properly or that they're intentionally dishonest (or both things)
To use another factual example of how an atheist philosopher commits such fallacy, please read this article by atheist and naturalist philosopher Theodore Schick Jr., published in the leading website of the internet materialistic and naturalistic believers, Infidels.org.
In that article, Schick Jr. comments that "The traditional first-cause argument rests on the assumption that everything has a cause. Since nothing can cause itself, and since the string of causes can't be infinitely long, there must be a first cause, namely, god. This argument received its classic formulation at the bands of the great Roman Catholic philosopher, Thomas Aquinas "(Emphasis in blue added)
But this is simply, radically, factually and demostrably false. As has commented philosopher Edward Feser: "In fact, not oneof the best-known defenders of the Cosmological Argument in the history of philosophy ever gave this stupid “everythinghasa cause” argument—not Plato, not Aristotle, not al-Ghazali, not Maimonides, not Thomas Aquinas, not John Duns Scotus, not G.W. Leibniz, not Samuel Clarke, not Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, not Mortimer Adler, not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne. And not anyone else either, as far as I know. Perhaps... you think that when trying to refute some of history’s greatest minds, a good strategy would be to attack an argument none of them ever defended" (emphasis in blue added)
Even some atheists, unaware of their solid and consistent ignorance, arrogantly ask: "If everything has cause, what caused God?" This ridiculous atheist question (intented to be a fast and smart refutation of the cosmological argument) has been called "sophomoric" (or typical of colleges' sophomores) by Christian philosopher William Lane Craig (a contemporary and sophisticated philosophical defender of the cosmological argument):
So you can ask: if not one of the best philosophical defenders of the cosmological argument has argued from the "Everything has a cause" premise, why the hell atheist ideologues keep repeating such straighforward lie? Is it intellectual honest? Is it rational?
The answer, according to my experience and opinion, is twofold: 1)As a rule, the cognitive faculties of hard-core materialists and naturalists don't function properly, that is, their mind is essentially irrational, illogical, incapable of thinking straight as a consequence (possibly) of spiritual and psychological factors. And 2)As a rule, they're intellectually dishonest (note that 2 could be a consequence of 1, since an irrational person tend to be impaired to recognize objective values like honesty).
Let's to examine Schick Jr.'s reply to Thomas Aquinas' cosmological argument. Schick Jr. quotes directly, from an Aquinas' work, this formulation of the cosmological argument:
In the world of sensible things, we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known ... in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go to infinity, because . . . the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause.... Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause . . . therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name god.
Please, read carefully and objectively (two or three times, or more if you need it) the above Aquinas' quotation. Now, I ask to my dear readers the following straightforward question: In the above Aquinas' text in blue, where the hell is Aquinas saying that "evertyhing has a cause"?
The most inept, irrational, ignorant, stupid person would easily see that in no place of that quotation the premise "evertyhing has a cause" (or that "everything is caused by something other than itself") is mentioned, defended or implied at all.
In fact, Aquinas explicitly limits his premise to the "world of sensible things" (and therefore, of contingent things), which doesn't include God since God is not a "sensible thing" (i.e. we cannot "see" God, He's not an object of our sensory experience, therefore is not part of the "world of sensible things"). So, he's not arguing from "everything", but specifically and only from the known order of efficient causes existent in the world of sensible things.
As has commented philosopher Edward Feser in his lastest book on Aquinas (an excellent introduction to Aquinas' philosophy): "Let us note first (and yet again) that Aquinas does not say, here or elsewhere, that "everything has a cause"; rather, he begins the argument by saying that there are efficient causes and that nothing can cause itself. The implication is that if something is caused, then it is something outside the thing being caused that is doing the causing... Aquinas is committed in particular to the principle of causality, according to which that which comes into being, or more generally, that which is contingent, must have a cause. Needless to say, this is not the same thing as to claim that everything without exception has a cause" (Aquinas, pp 81-82. Emphasis in the original)
However, a "professional philosopher" like Schick Jr. ineptly "constructs" the above Aquinas' argument in this way:
Saint Thomas's argument is this:
1. Everything is caused by something other than itself 2. Therefore the universe was caused by something other than itself. 3. The string of causes cannot be infinitely long. 4. If the string of causes cannot be infinitely long, there must be a first cause. 5. Therefore, there must be a first cause, namely god.
As seen, premise 1 of Schick Jr.'s straw man only exist in Schick Jr.'s (and other atheist believers) imagination. It's pure fiction.
Having constructed such straw man, Schick Jr. proceeds to easily demolish it: "The most telling criticism of this argument is that it is self-refuting. If everything has a cause other than itself, then god must have a cause other than himself. But if god has a cause other than himself, he cannot be the first cause. So if the first premise is true, the conclusion must be false"
Bravo!. What amazing display of philosophical sophistication, intellectual power, historical knowledge of classical philosophy and interpretative charity. A typical atheist masterpiece.
In future posts, I'll present more evidence of atheist philosophers attacking the (imaginary) "everyhting has a cause" premise of the cosmological argument.
You'll learn that contemporary atheism, grounded on metaphysical naturalism, is a faith-based ideology constructed on misrepresentations, contantly repeated lies and logical fallacies like the ones mentioned here. And you'll understand such fallacies are almost a constitutive part of the naturalistic worldview because such worldview is (when examined philosophically and critically in depth) extraordinarly weak, and cannot be defended rationally.
And don't waste your time trying to explain this to these atheist individuals. Intellectually, most of them simply cannot understand the difference between the (imaginary) "Everything has a cause", and the actual premise of the traditional versions of the cosmological argument (e.g. Whatever begins to exist has a cause or Whatever is moved is moved by another).
The hard-core atheistic materialist's impaired cognitive faculties and irrationality prevent him to reach to this level of conceptual, logical and semantical distinction.
In his debate with Christian apologist Phil Fernandes, atheist apologist and philosopher Michael Martin replied to the Fernandes' Kalam cosmological argument for God's existence like this:
According to Dr. Fernandes the Kalam cosmological argument demonstrates the existence of God. This is the argument that (1) the universe began in time, that (2) this beginning was caused, and that (3) this cause was God. I am willing to grant (1) although I believe that this premise is much more controversial than Dr. Fernandes supposes.[5] The other two premises I do not grant. First of all, the universe could arise spontaneously, that is, "out of nothing." Several well known cosmologists have embraced this view and it is not to be dismissed as impossible.[6] In particular, Dr. Fernandes misunderstands modern science very badly in supposing that embracing such a view would "destroy the pillars of modern science." It is simply not the case that modern science assumes that everything has a cause. Second, the cause of the universe need not be God. It could be a malevolent being or an impersonal force or a plurality of gods or a finite God. Of course, Dr. Fernandes uses other considerations to support his theistic interpretation of the cause of the Big Bang. But these considerations are not well argued for. For example, he maintains that intelligence cannot come from non-intelligence; hence human intelligence cannot come from a mindless universe. However, no good reason is given for this claim and, in any case, a nonmindless universe is compatible with other hypotheses beside theism, for example, polytheism. Third, it is unclear how God could have caused the Big Bang since time is supposed to have been created in the Big Bang. God cannot have caused the universe in any sense one can understand since a cause is normally temporally prior to its effect. In particular, causation in terms of intentions and desires are temporally prior to their effects. God's desires and intentions therefore cannot be the cause of the Big Bang. (emphasis in blue added)
Let's to examine Martin's contentions in more detail:
1-First, he misrepresents and misconstructs the kalam cosmological argument, when he formulates it like this: "This is the argument that (1) the universe began in time, that (2) this beginning was caused, and that (3) this cause was God"
This is simply false. The kalam cosmological argument is actually constructed like this:
1)Whatever begins to exist have (or must have) a cause
2)The universe began to exist
3)Therefore, the universe had a cause
You can see a video explaining the actual formulation of this argument here:
In fact, Fernandes in his opening statement (to which Martin replied), explicitly formulate it in that way: "This argument is called the kalaam cosmological argument for God's existence. Saint Bonaventure utilized this argument.[1] William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland are two modern proponents of it.[2] This argument is as follows: 1) whatever began to exist must have a cause, 2) the universe began to exist, 3) therefore, the universe had a cause."(Emphasis in blue added)
So, note that Martin's misrepresentation of the kalam argument is intentional. It's known as a straw man fallacy and it's unworthy of serious philosophers (Personally, when I read "thinkers" defending intentionally fallacies like that, I loss any intellectual respect for them). Serious philosophers try to examine opposing arguments in their best formulation (i.e. in their strongest version) in order to assess the actual force (or weakness) of the argument. (Instead, propagandists and ideologues tend to use the straw man fallacies, because their purpose is not to find the truth and follow the argument where it leads, but to defend their cherished beliefs and ideology from falsification)
2-On the other hand, Martin's intentional misconstruction of the kalam argument is not an argument of all (all of the propositions used in Martin's straw man have not the form of a logically valid argument). Compare Martin's straw man with the actual formulation of the kalam argument (which is a formally valid argument).
When you see a person arguing like that, you have a powerful reason to doubt that person's intellectual competence. Given that Martin is a trained philosopher, it's unlikely that he cannot understand the arguments he's criticizing. So we can only conclude that his misinterpretation of the kalam argument is intentional (which suggest some kind of intellectual dishonesty).
3-Note Martin's intentional omission of the crucial metaphysical premise of the kalam argument: the premise that "Whatever begins to exist has a cause". That premise is crucial, because it's what warrant the belief that the universe, if it began to exist, must have a cause. (So, the belief that the universe was caused is not arbitrary; rather, it's a consequence of a highly plausible metaphysical principle commonly assumed in science and confirmed by our everyday experience)
Now, astute readers will be in position to see why Martin intentionally misconstructed the argument. He accepts the universe has a beginning, but he denies it was caused (something that he couldn't deny if he accepts the premise "Whatever begins to exist has a cause". Do you see why he didn't mention that premise at all in his straw man? It's an astute debating tactic, but it's a unacceptable for honest truth seekers and sincere lovers of wisdom)
4-Martin argues: "First of all, the universe could arise spontaneously, that is, "out of nothing." Several well known cosmologists have embraced this view and it is not to be dismissed as impossible"
How the hell the universe "could" arise out of "nothing"? Martin doesn't explain how such thing could occur. He simply asserts it, without any sound argument to support that view. (it's called the fallacy of proof by mere assertion) Coming from nothing would imply the existence of an effect without a cause, and this seems to be absurd and unintelligible (except for atheist ideologues eager to avoid a conclusion favourable to theism), since an effect is an essential element of a causal relation (i.e. a causal relation is causal precisely because there are causes and effects).
But Martin could reply that his point is precisely that there is not causal relation at all in the beginning of the universe. However, in that case, the burden of proof is in Martin to prove that claim. Simply asserting it is not an argument for it. Only uncritical thinkers will swallow such claim without any evidence or argument.
Moreover, we have powerful reasons to think such thing (coming from nothing) is metaphysically impossible. "Nothing" is not an entity or process, so it cannot create anything at all since "it" doesn't even exist. Nothing is nothing, it doesn't exist. It's not a being, a substance, an entity, a process, a state, a property... it's simply NOTHING (=absolute non-existence at all). Therefore, coming from nothing seems to be make no rational sense at all (but atheists prefer to believe in this nonsense before accepting that naturalism could be false).
Note that nautralists and materialists are "skeptics" of claims about psychokinesis and other phenomena suggesting the causal efficacy of the mind or consciousness, but are highly credulous when they heard that the universe was caused by or come from "nothing". (I ask objective readers: what is more likely, that a mind or consciousness could be causally efficacious, like in psychokinesis or the placebo effect; or that "nothing" could bring into existence something like the whole universe? Why the hell materialistic atheists are extremely skeptical of the former and believers in and highly sympathetic to the latter? I think the reason is obvious: Atheist irrationalists and ideologues are "skeptical" of the former, despite of the evidence for it, because it refutes their worldview; and they're believers of the latter, because it allows them to block the conclusion of the kalam cosmological argument and keep metaphysical naturalism alive. This is more evidence of the extreme weakness of atheistic metaphysical naturalism and, specially, of the fact that the cognitive faculties of these atheists don't function properly, and also of the fact that these individuals are not interested in the truth, but in the defense of their naturalistic-atheistic ideology)
Martin argues that: "Several well known cosmologists have embraced this view and it is not to be dismissed as impossible"
So what? The fact that several comsologists have embraced that view is not a logical argument for the conclusion that it's possible that something can come out of nothing. (Just imagine that I argue that several cosmologists or physicists are theists and have defended that the universe was caused by God. Does it, by itself, show that theism is possible?)
Weak arguments like that provide strong evidence of the extreme weakness of metaphysical naturalism (which rest mostly on faith and wishful thinking and fallacious arguments like that one)
But let's concede, only for the argument's sake and despite of Martin's weak arguments, that it's "possible" to something come from nothing.
Does it mean that such thing is "probable", likely or plausible in the specific case of the universe's beginning to exist? Does it mean we're epistemically justified in believing such thing? Even if it were logically possible that something could come from nothing, we need a reason to think that it is more likely than the (well-confirmed) premise that whatever begins to exist has a cause.
The mere possibility of an idea is not an argument for the probability or plausibility of it. So, Martin needs an argument to convince us that something can come from nothing is not only "possible" (or at least conceivable) but more plausible than whatever begins to exist has cause (the latter is a principle confirmed by our experience, and assumed by science. After all, is not science in the business of explaining facts and phenomena appealing to the causal mechanisms that produce them? So, if the beginning of the universe is a fact, it is not a scientific explanation to say that it comes from nothing, without any rational explanation at all).
Just imagine a professional scientist who, confronted with a new phenomenon X (e.g. a new disease, or an explosion or whatever) would say: "Such phenomenon could come from nothing. Science doesn't require that whatever begins to exist has a cause, so there is not reason to think that the beginning to exist of such phenomenon was caused. It could simply exist, without any cause at all. Period" (Do you think that reply is proper of a scientist? Do you think that belief would help to improve science and promote scientific investigation? Does such belief would promote new and original scientific discoveries about the universe? Do you think it is a proper scientific stance?)
By the way, that "whatever begins to exist has a cause" is plausible given our personal and collective experience and the practique of science; so who argues that such principle is false, is making an extraordinary claim given that background. But if it's the case, why the hell atheists don't appeal to the "skeptical principle" that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence in that case? Exactly, which is the extraordinary evidence for the extraordinary claim that something can come out nothing? Where is the extraordinary evidence for that outlandish claim? Naturalist and materialist ideologues in their pseudo-skeptical humour appeal to that principle when they need to refute or cast doubts on paranormal claims (because such claims refutes naturalism and materialism); but when the claim is entailed or implied by naturalism (e.g. that the universe's beginning wasn't caused by anything), these ideologues "forget" the "extraordinary claims..." rule and uncritically accepts the unsupported claim that the universe came from nothing. (the same applies when these ideologues are highly sympathetic or even accept, without any evidence, the existence of multiverses, i.e. that there are many universes in addition to this one). This is product of wishful thinking, cognitive malfunctioning and irrationality typical of hard-core metaphysical naturalists and materialists.
Take for example the case of multiverses. In this article, infidels writer, atheist and naturalist Richard Carrier believes that such multiverses cannot be proved to exist or not exist, and hence we'd be agnostic about it: "Certainly, we cannot know they do. But we cannot know they do not and thus... agnosticism is the only justified outcome of this line of reasoning"
However, given that the multiverse hypothesis can explain the origin of this universe (and hence, make the hypothesis of God unnecessary, according to atheists), atheists are eager to believe in the evidentially unsupported (and accordintg to Carrier, in principle unprovable) multiverse hypothesis. In fact, in his book, Carrier is highly sympathetic about such evidentially unsupported hypothesis and even dare to make wild (and unprovable) speculations about its nature and features:
"Currently the most credible explanations of the nature and origin of the universe belong to “multiverse theory,” the idea that our universe is just one of many... We don’t yet know if the multiverse has existed for an infinite length of time, or if it had a beginning. . . . it may be that if we keep going back in time we will keep finding universe after universe, and it may well be it is universes all the way down. . . . Our universe is simply in the middle of a fixed, endless structure. For the same reason a multiverse that had a beginning would not have come “from” anywhere—there would exist nothing “before” the first ever moment of time, and that first moment of time, like every moment of time, would simply be an eternal fixed reality. It needs no cause. It is its own cause" (Sense and Goodness witout God, pp. 75-84)
If according to Carrier, the existence of multiple universes cannot in principle be known to exist, on what evidential grounds does Carrier say that the "multiverse theory" is credible? Why does he speculate about the properties of such entities (other universes) if such entities cannot be known to exist or not exist (so making his speculations untestable too)? Where's Carrier's agnosticism (the "only justified outcome of this line of reasoning")? Why does he consider such admittedly unprovable hypothesis to be "credible", while he's highly skeptical of psi claims which, according to skeptics like Wiseman, meet the usual evidential standards for any normal scientific claim (and hence, are scientifically better supported than the multiverse hypothesis, which is untestable, unsupported and in principle UNSUPPORTABLE)?
Do you see why I'm convinced that these individuals are not rational? They change their standards in a ad hoc way in order to keep their beliefs consistent and inmune from empirical or rational refutation. They're deluding themselves (and this is why I submit that these individuals' cognitive faculties don't function properly. Their minds don't function properly in order to figure out and discover the truth. They're irrational) They're not truth seekers, but ideologues, defenders of an atheistic, materialistic ideology. They have an extraordinary faith in and emotional commitment to naturalistic atheism, and they want to believe that atheism is true.
5-Martin's next move is to use another crude, dishonest and obvious straw man: "It is simply not the case that modern science assumes that everything has a cause" (emphasis in blue added)
Who's the hell is arguing that "everything has a cause"? No sophisticated philosophical theist I know of has ever defended such ridiculous statement. And Fernandes is not arguing such thing either.
Again, Martin intentionally misrepresent Fernandes' argument and assumes that is based on the view that "everyhting has a cause". But it is NOT Fernandes' premise. The actual premise is whatever BEGINS TO EXIST has a cause (the "BEGINS" word is key, since that such premise doesn't imply that everything, without exception, has a cause; it only asserts that things that begin to exist, that is, contingent or non-necessary things, needs a cause for their existence)
Atheists intentionally and dishonestly misconstruct the argument in order to make it more easily refutable (After all, atheists like to say, "if everything, without exception, has a cause, then God also needs a cause"... so the theist argument seems to be self-defeating) When you read such thing, you'll know for sure that these atheistic individuals are not worthy of intellectual respect.
In this article, philosopher Edward Feser, commenting on the common and intentional atheist's straw man ("everything has a cause"), has written: "In fact, not oneof the best-known defenders of the Cosmological Argument in the history of philosophy ever gave this stupid “everythinghasa cause” argument—not Plato, not Aristotle, not al-Ghazali, not Maimonides, not Thomas Aquinas, not John Duns Scotus, not G.W. Leibniz, not Samuel Clarke, not Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, not Mortimer Adler, not William Lane Craig, not Richard Swinburne. And not anyone else either, as far as I know. Perhaps... you think that when trying to refute some of history’s greatest minds, a good strategy would be to attack an argument none of them ever defended."
And attacking an argument that no serious philosophical defender of the cosmological argument has ever defended (and certainly, no the argument that Fernandes is defending in his opening statement) is exactly what Martin is doing in his reply to Fernandes, in order to fool his readers and preach for the atheist chorus (a chorus of atheist believers and ideologues which lack the intellectual competence, honesty, objectivity and logical training to spot Martin's straw man fallacies).
It's a shame, since that serious philosophers are characterized by attacking the argument in its best version and as defended by its best proponents (instead of attacking silly straw men). Martin's misconstruction of the kalam argument, and his systematic use of straw men, is an insult to philosophy of religion and the readers' intelligence (in fact, in Martin's books, he repeats the same fallacy again and again when addresing the cosmological argument)
I'm used to that kind of atheistic intellectual dishonesty (or incompetence, or both), but I confess to get strongly annoyed each time I read such fallacies when they are used by supposedly competent atheist philosophers. I consider such thing an insult to philosophy in general and an offense to the intelligence of the readers, even of the honest atheist readers who are genuinely interested in finding the truth about God's existence or non-existence.
For more examples on that kind of intellectual dishonesty and incompetence by atheist philosophers and propagandists, and the "everything has a cause" atheistic straw man, please read this article in Edward Feser's blog.
At the same time, attacking a straw man suggests that the attacker cannot refute the argument in his best formulation (maybe, because the argument is good or plausible if formulated correctly or in its strongest form?)
6-Martin argues that "God cannot have caused the universe in any sense one can understand since a cause is normally temporally prior to its effect"
But it doesn't imply that simultaneous causation doesn't exist. In fact, there are many cases where causes and effects are clearly simultaneous (e.g. the potter making a pot, where the potter's positioning his hand in such and such way and the pot's taking on such and such a shape are simultaneous. You can think in your own examples of simultaneous causation)
Routinely, professional philosophers (most of them atheists) interested in causation, discuss cases of actual simultaneous causation (i.e. where causes and effects are simultaneous) and even cases of (more speculatively) "backward causation". As has argued atheist philosopher of science James Ladyman: "Another characteristic of causal relations is that causes usually precede effects in time. Whether this is always so is not immediately obvious, because sometimes it seems that causes and effects can be simultaneous, as when we say that the heavy oak beam is the cause of the roof staying up. Furthermore, some philosophers hold that ‘backwards causation’ where a cause brings about an effect in the past is possible." (Understanding philosophy of science, p. 36)
Even atheist philosopher Quentin Smith, in his defense of the beginning of the universe without needing God as explanation, appeals to simultaneous causation in order to support his case. In his debate with William Lane Craig, atheist Smith argued: "Scientists have been saying for a long time that the universe began about 15 billion years ago with an explosion they call the Big Bang. Bill believes the Big Bang was caused by God and I believe it both caused itself to exist and caused the later states of the universe to exist. At the Big Bang there is a line of simultaneous causes and effects. This is implied both by a Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics and by the EPR correlations - for those of you in the audience who are science majors - which imply - you don't need to understand either of the sciences to understand my talk - and these theories imply that there are instantaneous causal relations between simultaneous events" (emphasis in blue added)
So, that causes usually precede their effects is true; but that causes MUST (always) precede their effects is false, and this point is widely known by philosophers specialized in causation and even explicitly defended by some atheist philosophers of religion (like Quentin Smith) to argue for their atheist case.
Therefore, supposing that God caused the universe, it is not logically nor metaphysically impossible for Him (who's "omnipotent") to bring the universe into existence simultaneously with the creation of the time.
CONCLUSION:
In my opinion, metaphysical naturalism is false (most posts of my blog present evidence for this conclusion). This explains why atheists like Martin employ fallacies when tryting to refute arguments against naturalism (e.g. argument for God's existence). You cannot defend a falsehood in a coherent way. The naturalist needs to distortion and misrepresent consistently the opponent's argument, in order to avoid the refutation of naturalism.
The above also explains why atheists contradict each other in essential points when arguing for their atheism. While Martin tries to block the cosmological argument saying that causes are prior to their effects, Quentin Smith argues his atheist case appealing to simultaneous causation.
The reason for that that they want to reach a atheism-favourable conclusion, and they try to rationalize (i.e. seek reasons to support a previously assumed to be true conclusion) their atheism, in order to find premisses that support their previously assumed atheistic conclusion. (Actual truth-seekers use the reverse procedure: they reach the conclusions AFTER having examined the best reasons for and against a given matter or claim).
As has conceded atheist Thomas Nagel: "I am talking about something much deeper—namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and wellinformed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that."
Obviously, if you don't want that a certain claim be true, and you're strongly committed to reject such claim, you're going to use every kind of fallacy in the book in order to avoid the conclusion that you dislike.
This is called WISHFUL THINKING, which is a kind of intellectual delusion and is rampant among metaphysical naturalists (and other people too), and it's the actual explanation of Martin's fallacies, specially his silly straw man and often repeated misrepresentation of the key premise of cosmological argument ("everthing has a cause").
Recommended reading:
-A summary and defense of some of the most sophisticated contemporary arguments for God's existence can be read in this paper by Christian theist and philosopher William Lane Craig (Even though Craig is a believer in the existence of the Christian God, astute readers will realize that some of his arguments support a broad conception of God in general as a supreme spiritual and causally creative cosmic intelligence of great power. Such arguments, like the cosmological argument, don't commit the readers to believe in any religious text or doctrine. It's what make these arguments very interesting from a purely philosophical point of view)
-For a summary of the cosmological arguments for God's existence, see this paper by David Oderberg.
-For an explanation of the "principle of causality" as actually defended by classical theists, see Edward Feser's book Aquinas.
-For a debate between an atheist and a theist on the kalam cosmological argument, see the book Theism, Atheism and The Big Bang Cosmology (by William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith)
