Let's to examine another of atheist Richard Carrier's objections to Alex Rosenberg's essay on the actual and consistent implications of the naturalistic worldview.
Carrier's objection 6 is this:
(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..
Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:
1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".
But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.
Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)
Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)
It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.
2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."
But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.
But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).
For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.
The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.
Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.
More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).
The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).
Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).
This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".
3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."
What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).
As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)
This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)
Carrier's objection 6 is this:
(Objection 6) Alex does this again when concluding that because folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect (which is a fact), therefore our brain “doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations” (which is a non sequitur). Once you define those terms with the correct cognitive science, the conclusion becomes false. I say a great deal more about this in my Critique of Victor Reppert’s Argument from Reason, particularly in respect to the Churchlands and Eliminativism (I recommend skipping directly to the latter). But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist. Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly..
Let's to examine Carrier's objection in detail:
1-Carrier crudely misrepresents Rosenberg's point when he asserts that Rosenberg's conclusion is that our brain "doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations" based on the premise that " folk notions of belief and sensation and desires are incorrect".
But it is not what Rosenberg's is arguing. His argument is NOT that given that folks notions of beliefs are incorrect, therefore our brain doesn't operate on beliefs.
Let's to quote Rosenberg to correct Carrier's straw man: "Whatever the brain does, it doesn’t operate on beliefs and wants, thoughts and hopes, fears and expectations, insofar as these are supposed to be states that “contain” sentences, and are “about” things, facts, events that are outside of the mind. That the brain no more has original intentionality than anything else does is the hardest illusion to give up, and we probably won’t be able completely to do so till neuroscience really understands the brain." (emphasis in blue added)
Note that Rosemberg's actual conclusion is that our brain cannot operate on beliefs in virtue of the latter propositional and intentional content (because such propositional and intentional content actually doesn't exist IF naturalism is true; therefore, it cannot be efficacious on the brain)
It's comical how Carrier omitted all the line of reasoning that followed the word "insofar" in the above Rosenberg's quote. But that omission was rhetorically necessary and useful to misrepresent Rosenberg's argument and say that his conclusion is a non-sequitur.
2-Carrier follows with this point: "But the bottom line is, Alex is like someone who discovers the moon is actually made of iron instead of rock, and then runs around insisting that therefore the moon doesn’t exist."
But note that if the moon is defined and understood as the Earth's natural satellite composed of rock, then discovering that such satellite is not made of rock but of iron refutes the existence of the moon according to the previous definition. Such "natural satellite composed of rock" would not exist at all.
But in any case, Carrier is using a false analogy, because essential to the epistemic notion of beliefs is that they're true or false in virtue of their intentionality and propositional content (not in virtue of being a brain phenomenon or physical fact). Therefore, if intentionally doesn't exist, and beliefs don't refer to anything outside of the mind, then it's impossible that the brain operates on beliefs (that is, in virtue of beliefs having an intentional content).
For example, let's take the belief "As a rule, pseudo-skeptics are materialistic ideologues who don't want to and won't accept positive evidence for psi or afterlife". This belief is true or false in virtue of their content and meaning, and the correspondence and match of that meaning with a reality outside our mind.
The belief refers to something beyond itself, that is, to an actual state of affairs in the actual world. It's "about" something.
Once you understand the meaning of that proposition, and know that in general pseudo-skeptics are materialistic atheists, and that they belong to debunking organizations (or secular humanists organizations), and in addition you have evidence that the origin of organized pseudo-skepticism was inspired by ideological-marxist motivations, then you know that the actual state of affairs match or correspond to the belief in question. Therefore the belief is demostrably true and you're rationally forced to accept it if you know the evidence.
More facts of the external world will serve you as evidence that will give more support to your belief (let's to say, atheist Richard Dawkins' dishonest addressing of Rupert Sheldrake's research on telepathy; or professional skeptic Richard Wiseman's rejection of remote viewing in spite of the latter being admittedly proven by the accepted rigurous standards of science).
The true of such belief will enable to you to make testable predictions; for example, the prediction that if more positive evidence in favor of psi (or afterlife, like the AWARE study in NDEs) is attained or accumulated, the new evidence and research ALSO will be misrepresented, undermined, rationalized and distortioned by pseudo-skeptics to avoid falsification of their materialistic ideology (this prediction is testable: if new positive evidence is found, and pseudo-skeptics accept it, then the prediction is false, and the original belief would be refuted or seriously undermined).
Precisely, this property of beliefs as being "about" something, and therefore true or false in virtue of the correspondence with such "something", it's essential to the epistemic evaluation of beliefs as beliefs (and not as psychological or neurophysiolocal phenomena alone).
This is why Carrier had to intentionally to disregard Rosenberg's line of reasoning following the word "insofar".
3-Carrier ends his objection with a summarized version of his straw man: "Just because beliefs and desires are in actual physical fact different things than some folk conceptions imagine them, doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they don’t exist. They obviously do. We just have to understand them correctly.."
What Carrier doesn't understand is that Rosenberg's argument doesn't rest on simply asserting that beliefs are different than folk conceptions imagine; his point is that beliefs, as implied by naturalism (which doesn't accept intentionality as an ontological reality), don't have any actual existence, and if it's the case, then a essential epistemological element and property of beliefs (their "aboutness") is eliminated, and therefore beliefs wouldn't exist anymore as beliefs (maybe they would exist as an electro-chemical phenomenon in the brain, or as a physical fact; but not as a belief in the epismetological sense).
As Rosenberg argues explicitly in reply to his critics: "It is of course obvious that introspection strongly suggests that the brain does store information propositionally, and that therefore it has beliefs and desire with “aboutness” or intentionality. A thoroughgoing naturalism must deny this, I allege. If beliefs are anything they are brain states—physical configurations of matter. But one configuration of matter cannot, in virtue just of its structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires (because it cant pass the referential opacity test). So, there are no beliefs." (emphasis in blue added)
This simple and easy-to-understand point seems to be beyond Carrier's ability for understanding (or perhaps, beyond his ability to resist cognitive dissonance when evidence or logically consistent philosophical arguments cast doubts on the logical coherence and rationality of his worldview)
TO BE CONTINUED...
Part 1 of this series here.
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