Edward Feser lectures at the Faith and Reason Institute at Gonzaga University in Spokane, WA

In a previous lecture, Feser has argued (in line with Thomistic philosophy) that natural theology (e.g. arguments for God's existence) must be grounded on philosophy of nature, not on the findings of natural science:

A major problem that I see in Feser's view about philosophy of nature is that the premises of such philosophy will be rejected by contemporary naturalists and other skeptics for God's existence, since these people only believe in natural science. 

Obviously, Feser will reply that such rejections by atheists are irrational and question-begging (and I'll agree with it), and that they should accept such premises.  But the point is that they DON'T, so I think it is useful, for the argument's sake, to take the own premises of naturalists and argue from them.

So, I think the proper use of natural science (without undermining alternative ways for natural theology like Feser's proposal) is not only strategically useful, but also more convincing for people who are skeptics of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics, and are more sympathetic to contemporary mechanisic, naturalistic approach.

As consequence, an argument like William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument is based on premises that, taken in isolation, are widely accepted by atheists and naturalists; but when put together, such premises imply that the universe has a cause, and hence such conclusion tends to force the atheist to deny one of the premises (revealing, by the way, that such  atheists are not truth-seekers who follow the evidence wherever it leads, but ideologues who accept the premises only on the condition that it doesn't lead to conclusion favourable to theism. In other words, it is the prior commitment to the conclusion that atheism is true which tells the atheist what premise he should accept).

This is why Craig's argument, which according to Daniel Dennett is based on "very plausible premises",  has forced atheists to deny the causal principle,  or to suggest (contrary to the principle, essential to naturalism, known as the causal closure of the physical world) that immaterial abstract objects like numbers or sets could be the cause of the universe... a view that no atheist would defend outside debates about God's existence. 

So, the kalam argument is so effective in forcing atheists to hold positions contrary to their own views and exposing their irrationality, then they need to deny theism.

It is crucial to realize that atheists are going to deny ANY evidence or argument for God's existence. No matter what it is. They are prepared even to believe that something can begin from nothing, or that 2+2=5, or that "nothing at all exists", in order to deny theism.

Not understanding that is failing to understand exactly the psychology of atheists.