Wednesday, December 30, 2009
The Lost Symbol interview with Dan Brown on freemasons, masonic philosophy, conspiracies, symbolism and noetic science
William Lane Craig vs. Daniel Dennett: Debate about the existence of God
Atheist philosopher Daniel Dennett and Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has debated about the existence of God.
You can hear the debate here
You can hear the debate here
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Maria Papagiannidou-St Pierre speaks on her experience as a former AIDS patient
Maria Papagiannidou St-Pierre speaks about her experience as an ex-AIDS patient, during her 'Adio AIDS!' Greek book launch party. Recorded live at the club Sychnotites in Athens, January 15, 2009.
Maria Papagiannidou St Pierre, author of Goodbye AIDS! Did it ever exist?, and former AIDS patient, speaks on Ehei Gousto TV interview
See this interview with Maria Papagiannidou-St Pierre, journalist, former AIDS patient who wrote the book "Goodbye AIDS! Did it ever exist?".
Recorded live, from the private Greek TV channel Alter, May 19 2009. The host, Kostas Hardavellas, is one of the most respected investigative journalists in Greece.
Her book:
Rebecca Culshaw, Ph.D. A mathematician questions HIV as the cause of AIDS
Rebecca Culshaw, Ph.D., a mathematics professor at the University of Texas in Tyler, won her Ph.D. by modeling the replication of HIV inside the human body — but her researches eventually led her to the conclusion that HIV, the so-called "AIDS virus," cannot possibly be the cause of the syndrome.
She's the author of the book "Science Sold Out: Does HIV cause AIDS?"
Links of interest:
-Dr.Culshaw's challenge to Julio Montaner
-Henry Bauer's blog on AIDS and HIV.
-Website of The Perth Group.
Thursday, December 24, 2009
David Hume, causality or causation, the mind-body problem, immortality and the afterlife
Some materialists and metaphysical naturalists have argued that the concomitant variation between consciousness and the brain (i.e. mental states correlate and change with brain states) proves, or strongly support the thesis that, the brain "causes or produces" the mind. Therefore, after death, the mind will dissapear.
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Mary Jo Rapini: Is God Pink? Dying to Heal. A psychotherapist relates her near-death experience
Psychotherapist Mary Jo Rapini suffered a life-threatening brain aneurysm and while awaiting surgery, had a near-death experience. See her story on Discovery Health cable channel on Monday, January 4, 2010. A riveting speaker, Mary Jo has authored Is God Pink? Dying to Heal:
Man Actually Returns From the Dead After 3 Days
This is a true story of a Russian doctor who was hit and killed by a car, but returns from the dead after 3 days in the morgue. The coroner prepares the body for autopsy when he wakes up. Be SURE to watch Part 2 (second video), that's when it gets interesting.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Richard Dawkins vs. William Lane Craig: Is Dawkins afraid of debating Craig?
One of the rules of scholarly discussion and truth seeking is engaging with your opponent's best formulation of the latter arguments. The reason is that if your position stands to the best objections of your opponents, you'll be reasonably sure that your position is good and strong.
One of the best defenders of Christian theism is William Lane Craig; and one of the best (or at least, better known) defender of contemporary "new" atheism is, for many people, Richard Dawkins.
So, you would expect that a debate between Dawkins and Craig would confront the best arguments of both of them, enabling the public to know which position is stronger.
In the above video (with funny additions by a Craig's fan), Dawkins was asked if he has considered debating Craig, and his reply was that he doesn't want debate creationists. However (and this is another evidence of Dawkins' logical inconsistency and intellectual dishonesty) Dawkins has debated "creationists" like John Lennox twice and has had exchanged arguments with other religious thinkers like Christian theologian Alister McGrath, as you can watch here:
So, is Dawkins' reply the REAL, rational and logically coherent reason to avoid debating Craig? Given the evidence, the answer is clearly NO.
In my opinion, Dawkins is smart enough to avoid debating Craig because he knows that Craig would destroy him easily. Craig is a seasoned debater, a prominent philosopher of religion and a professional theologian; and Dawkins' only expertise is in zoology and biological sciences.
Obviously, Dawkins is not so stupid to cross swords with a professional philosopher in the latter field of expertise, especially when Dawkins' argument for the improbability of God has been refuted by Craig and other philosophers, and it is not defended by any prominent and well-informed atheist philosopher of religion.
I'd like to see a debate between Richard Dawkins and William Lane Craig but I'm almost sure that it will never happen.
If it happens in some moment, Dawkins will be demolished. And he knows it. So he'll avoid this debate with everything he got.
Dawkins is intellectually dishonest, but certainly he is not stupid.
Link of interest:
-Christian philosopher Peter Williams' review of Dawkins' The God Delusion.
-Peter Williams on Dawkins' concepts of "Design" and "Designoid"
-Richard Dawkins' pseudoskepticism.
-Richard Dawkins' moral relativism.
-Thomas Nagel, the Cosmic Authority Problem and the atheist fear of God.
One of the best defenders of Christian theism is William Lane Craig; and one of the best (or at least, better known) defender of contemporary "new" atheism is, for many people, Richard Dawkins.
So, you would expect that a debate between Dawkins and Craig would confront the best arguments of both of them, enabling the public to know which position is stronger.
In the above video (with funny additions by a Craig's fan), Dawkins was asked if he has considered debating Craig, and his reply was that he doesn't want debate creationists. However (and this is another evidence of Dawkins' logical inconsistency and intellectual dishonesty) Dawkins has debated "creationists" like John Lennox twice and has had exchanged arguments with other religious thinkers like Christian theologian Alister McGrath, as you can watch here:
So, is Dawkins' reply the REAL, rational and logically coherent reason to avoid debating Craig? Given the evidence, the answer is clearly NO.
In my opinion, Dawkins is smart enough to avoid debating Craig because he knows that Craig would destroy him easily. Craig is a seasoned debater, a prominent philosopher of religion and a professional theologian; and Dawkins' only expertise is in zoology and biological sciences.
Obviously, Dawkins is not so stupid to cross swords with a professional philosopher in the latter field of expertise, especially when Dawkins' argument for the improbability of God has been refuted by Craig and other philosophers, and it is not defended by any prominent and well-informed atheist philosopher of religion.
I'd like to see a debate between Richard Dawkins and William Lane Craig but I'm almost sure that it will never happen.
If it happens in some moment, Dawkins will be demolished. And he knows it. So he'll avoid this debate with everything he got.
Dawkins is intellectually dishonest, but certainly he is not stupid.
Link of interest:
-Christian philosopher Peter Williams' review of Dawkins' The God Delusion.
-Peter Williams on Dawkins' concepts of "Design" and "Designoid"
-Richard Dawkins' pseudoskepticism.
-Richard Dawkins' moral relativism.
-Thomas Nagel, the Cosmic Authority Problem and the atheist fear of God.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
William Lane Craig on Richard Dawkins' argument for the improbability of God's existence based on the infinite regress of designers
William Lane Craig is a Christian philosopher and seasoned debater, who in the above brief video refutes (correctly in my opinion) Richard Dawkins' claim that the temptation to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself raises the larger question of who designed the designer (implying that if you have no explanation for the designer, you have not explained anything).
Craig's argument there doesn't assume the truth of Christianity, so atheists and agnostics could agree with him in his specific and compelling refutation of Dawkins' argument.
Personally, I think the flaws of Dawkins' argument are pretty obvious, and I doubt any rational person would take it seriously. Even a superficial analysis of Dawkins' argument reveals its extreme weakness.
Only raving and uncritical atheists would accept and repeat Dawkins' argument; but any thoughful person, be atheist, agnostic or theist, would recognize the extreme weakness of that objection.
Even though I'm not convinced of the Christian God's existence, sometimes I wonder why some prominent atheists use so silly and weak arguments against the idea of God. It makes me think their case against it is very weak, so they have to make purely rhetorical points aimed at a highly biased, credulous and uncritical atheist audience which will swallow whatever anti-theistic fallacy they hear, specially if it's defended by a prominent scientist and presented in (pseudo) scientific jargon.
It gives you an insight of the actual intellectual level, rationality and honesty of many atheists and specially of Dawkins' followers.
By the way, and this is only another evidence of Dawkins' intellectual dishonesty (and by implication, of the uncritical thinking, credulity and irrationality of his followers), in his second debate with John Lennox, Dawkins confessed to journalist Melanie Phillips that "rather than believing in God, he was more receptive to the theory that life on earth had indeed been created by a governing intelligence – but one which had resided on another planet."
In other words, Dawkins is accepting the possibility of intelligent design in the origin of life on Earth by aliens!.
But leaving aside that, if Dawkins and his followers were logically consistent and rational, they should apply the same or similar Dawkins' anti-God argument to his own alien-based intelligent design argument: attributing the appearance of design to an actual alien design about the origin of life on Earth itself raises the larger question of who designed the aliens! Therefore, Dawkins' theory of the possible extraterrestial (and intelligently created) origin of life on Earth explain nothing!.
It proves that Dawkins is a anti-God propagandist, not a serious and careful thinker. He wants atheism be true, regardless of whether his anti-God argument destroys his other beliefs too. His arguments are an a posteriori rationalization of his atheist beliefs, not a conclusion based on the evidence. It's pure ideologically and emotionally grounded atheistic wishful thinking.
He doesn't have problems with intelligent design as an explanation of the origin of life on Earth; his problem is with the supernatural (i.e God based) origin of that design. Therefore, his real motivation is materialistic atheism, not evidence-based science (in fact, the "theory" of intelligent aliens as the creators of life on Earth have no evidence at all. But Dawkins is "open" to it because it can explains the origin of life on Earth without appealing to God and, therefore, it serves and it's useful for his atheistic purposes!).
Links of interest:
-Christian philosopher Peter Williams' review of Dawkins' The God Delusion.
-Peter Williams on Dawkins' concepts of "Design" and "Designoid"
-Richard Dawkins' pseudoskepticism.
-Richard Dawkins' moral relativism.
-Thomas Nagel, the Cosmic Authority Problem and the atheist fear of God.Craig's argument there doesn't assume the truth of Christianity, so atheists and agnostics could agree with him in his specific and compelling refutation of Dawkins' argument.
Personally, I think the flaws of Dawkins' argument are pretty obvious, and I doubt any rational person would take it seriously. Even a superficial analysis of Dawkins' argument reveals its extreme weakness.
Only raving and uncritical atheists would accept and repeat Dawkins' argument; but any thoughful person, be atheist, agnostic or theist, would recognize the extreme weakness of that objection.
Even though I'm not convinced of the Christian God's existence, sometimes I wonder why some prominent atheists use so silly and weak arguments against the idea of God. It makes me think their case against it is very weak, so they have to make purely rhetorical points aimed at a highly biased, credulous and uncritical atheist audience which will swallow whatever anti-theistic fallacy they hear, specially if it's defended by a prominent scientist and presented in (pseudo) scientific jargon.
It gives you an insight of the actual intellectual level, rationality and honesty of many atheists and specially of Dawkins' followers.
By the way, and this is only another evidence of Dawkins' intellectual dishonesty (and by implication, of the uncritical thinking, credulity and irrationality of his followers), in his second debate with John Lennox, Dawkins confessed to journalist Melanie Phillips that "rather than believing in God, he was more receptive to the theory that life on earth had indeed been created by a governing intelligence – but one which had resided on another planet."
In other words, Dawkins is accepting the possibility of intelligent design in the origin of life on Earth by aliens!.
But leaving aside that, if Dawkins and his followers were logically consistent and rational, they should apply the same or similar Dawkins' anti-God argument to his own alien-based intelligent design argument: attributing the appearance of design to an actual alien design about the origin of life on Earth itself raises the larger question of who designed the aliens! Therefore, Dawkins' theory of the possible extraterrestial (and intelligently created) origin of life on Earth explain nothing!.
It proves that Dawkins is a anti-God propagandist, not a serious and careful thinker. He wants atheism be true, regardless of whether his anti-God argument destroys his other beliefs too. His arguments are an a posteriori rationalization of his atheist beliefs, not a conclusion based on the evidence. It's pure ideologically and emotionally grounded atheistic wishful thinking.
He doesn't have problems with intelligent design as an explanation of the origin of life on Earth; his problem is with the supernatural (i.e God based) origin of that design. Therefore, his real motivation is materialistic atheism, not evidence-based science (in fact, the "theory" of intelligent aliens as the creators of life on Earth have no evidence at all. But Dawkins is "open" to it because it can explains the origin of life on Earth without appealing to God and, therefore, it serves and it's useful for his atheistic purposes!).
Links of interest:
-Christian philosopher Peter Williams' review of Dawkins' The God Delusion.
-Peter Williams on Dawkins' concepts of "Design" and "Designoid"
-Richard Dawkins' pseudoskepticism.
-Richard Dawkins' moral relativism.
-My post on Richard Carrier and his "Blue Monkeys Flying Out my Butt" argument against the existence of God.
Monday, December 21, 2009
Neuroscientist and skeptic Michael Persinger has found evidence suggestive of telepathy based upon quantum entanglement
In this interview for Skeptiko, neuroscientist Michael Persinger has said:
"What we have found, for example, is that if you place two different brains, two different people at a distance, you put a circular magnetic field around both. There’s a magnetic field going around like a coil, around both brains even at a distance. You make sure both coils are connected to the same computer which means they’re generating the same configuration of two different spaces.
If you flash a light in one person’s eye, even though they’re in a chamber that’s closed up, the person in the other room that’s receiving just the magnetic field now, they’re not aware of the light flashing or not, they will show similar changes in frequency in the room. And we think that’s tremendous because that maybe the first macro demonstration of a quantum connection or so-called quantum entanglement. "
Links of interest:
-Skeptic Richard Wiseman concedes that remote viewing is proven.
-Paper "Investigating paranormal phenomena: Functional brain imaging of telepathy"
-Paper "Investigating paranormal phenomena: Functional brain imaging of telepathy"
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Richard Carrier and the Blue Monkeys Flying Out of My Butt argument for God's nonexistence
In his book "Sense and Goodness Without God", historian, atheist, skeptic and metaphysical naturalist Richard Carrier wrote an argument for God's nonexistence which is truthly amazing for its extreme childishness, irrelevance and philosophical unsophistication :
"Since there is no observable divine hand in nature as a causal process, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand. After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else" (Sense and Goodness Without God, p. 273. Emphasis n blue added).
I'd doubt that a trained philosopher, or at least any careful thinker, would be convinced or impressed by an argument like that, let alone to attempt to defend it or justify it with any clever rhetoric or fallacy. Even a hard-core atheist, provided he's careful enough, would be ashamed of an argument like that.
Some of the obvious objections for that argument:
1-If God exists, he's immaterial and supernatural. Therefore, He's not part of nature and, as consequence, by definition, a "divine hand" won't be found IN nature as a causal process.
2-But even if that divine hand would exist in nature as a causal process, it wouldn't be observable, because it is not material (and therefore, it cannot possibly impress or affect our senses).
3-Therefore, given point 1 and 2, the conclusion "it's reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand" is a silly non-sequitur. It would be logical only if God were a natural observable process (and therefore, not a supernatural entity). But this is not the God that Christians and other theists have in mind. As consequence, Carrier's argument is based on a straw man and it's irrelevant.
4-God, as understood by most theists, is not a process, but an entity (more specifically, a Being). Conflating an entity with a process reveals unability to draw accurate conceptual metaphysical distinctions and it's evidence of Carrier's lack of philosophical training.
5-The implication of Carrier's argument is that we're justified to accept the existence only of observable things or processes (therefore, if something is non-observable, it's reasonable to conclude that it doesn't exist).
But it's false. Abstract objects, like propositions, concepts, numbers, and values argueably exist (even some metaphysical naturalists, even though inconsistent in my opinion, defend the objective existence of these abstract objects) but they're not observable (because they're conceptual, not physical).
Consciousness also exists, even though it is not observable (you can only observe its neural correlates). And observation, specially the scientific one, pressupose the existence of the (nonobservable) consciousness which is able to interpret and understand the things and processes being observed.
Moreover, science accepts the existence of (non-observable) theoretical entities which account for observable phenomena. But it's precisely what theists try to do when postulating God's existence: they're postulating a non-observable entity (God) in order to explain observable phenomena and experiences (e.g. the origin, order and fine tuning of the universe, the existence of natural laws, the reliability of our cognitive faculties, our moral experience, the existence of paranormal phenomena, near-death experiences and so forth).
6-Unable to defend his argument, he tries to persuade the reader with a false analogy (which in itself is fallacious too): "After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else"
This is a false analogy, because blue monkeys, provide they exist, would be material (only material things could have "colors", like the blue color.), but God is inmaterial. And being material or inmaterial is crucial to the argument, because both kinds of beings have wholly different properties, including (and this is key) the property of being observable or unobservable by human beings. Therefore, his analogy is false and irrelavant for his argument on God.
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we examine the "blue monkeys" argument in its merits (regardless of its relevance for the God question), it's clear the argument is clearly fallacious and, at best, is weak in extreme.
Read again: "that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures"
We can interpret that argument in two senses: one charitable and one uncharitable.
Charitably, the expression "no such creatures" would refer to blue monkeys with the property of "flying out my (Carrier) butt". Given that Carrier's butt is one of the many butts on existence, and given that the properties of blue monkeiys are not determined by Carrier's butt alone, we have to think that "such creatures" actually refers to blue monkeys with the property of flying out of people's butts (including but not limited to Carrier's butt)
But note that the reason for the conclusion about the non-existence of "such creatures" is that there are not such creatures flying out of Carrier's butt. Carrier calls this a "sufficient" reason to conclude the non-existence of such creatures.
And this is a clear non-sequitur. At most, his argument tell us that no "such creatures" are present in Carrier's butt, but it says nothing about such creatures existing on and flying out of other people butts. (Of course, most of you won't believe in the existence of such creatures; but not because they don't fly out of Carrier's butt, but because we have absolutely no reason to think that they exist. Things failing to fly out of Carrier's butt is not a general criterion of non-existence)
If such creatures exist, and they have the property of flying out of people's butts, the absence of such criatures in Carrier's specific butt wouldn't give us any reason to conclude they don't exist.
A less charitable interpretation would be that, with the expression "such creatures", Carrier is refering to blue monkeys in general. In this case, his argument would be a straighfoward falsehood, because many things exist which don't flying out of Carrier's butt (think in stars, shoes, books, CDs, countries, black holes, planes or your father).
Therefore, something "flying out of Carrier's butt" would be a sufficient reason to conclude the existence of that something; but the inverse, i.e. the absence of something flying out of Carrier's butt, by itself, give us absolutely no reason to conclude the nonexistence of something in general.
Even though this second interpretation is less charitable than the first one (and therefore, we should to prefer the first one), this second interpretation could be justified when we realize that Carrier adds in his argument the phrase "and so it is with anything else"
This seems to imply that his argument is not limited to blue monkeys with the property of flying of his butt, but with anything else (e.g. blue monkeys with other properties, chairs, books, universities, propositions, etc.).
It's clear that such argument is not only philosophically unsophisticated (in fact, I don't consider it a philosophical argument at all), but manifiestly ridiculous, childish and silly. To be fair with Carrier, he doesn't present that argument as the foundation or main argument of his book, nor his case for metaphysical naturalism rests on that ridiculous argument; but the fact he dared to write something like that in a book that pretends be a serious academic contribution to philosophy is revealing of Carrier's way of thinking (in fact Carrier believes in the possibility of afterlife and immortality inside a computer and other weird ideas like that; which by the way is consistent with mind-body dualism and inconsistent with the strong dependence of consciousness on the brain and the impossibility of immortality defended by some of Carrier's friends, like Keith Augustine, who rejects the immortality precisely on the grounds of the dependence of consciousness on the brain as shown by science).
No philosopher would have posed an argument like that in a book on serious philosophy. And no serious naturalist would accept it or would try to defend it.
The fact that some atheists are impressed with Carrier's book is more evidence for my hypothesis that many hard-core atheists are deeply irrational and that their cognitive faculties are seriously and permanently destroyed (= Jime's Iron Law)
"Since there is no observable divine hand in nature as a causal process, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand. After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else" (Sense and Goodness Without God, p. 273. Emphasis n blue added).
I'd doubt that a trained philosopher, or at least any careful thinker, would be convinced or impressed by an argument like that, let alone to attempt to defend it or justify it with any clever rhetoric or fallacy. Even a hard-core atheist, provided he's careful enough, would be ashamed of an argument like that.
Some of the obvious objections for that argument:
1-If God exists, he's immaterial and supernatural. Therefore, He's not part of nature and, as consequence, by definition, a "divine hand" won't be found IN nature as a causal process.
2-But even if that divine hand would exist in nature as a causal process, it wouldn't be observable, because it is not material (and therefore, it cannot possibly impress or affect our senses).
3-Therefore, given point 1 and 2, the conclusion "it's reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand" is a silly non-sequitur. It would be logical only if God were a natural observable process (and therefore, not a supernatural entity). But this is not the God that Christians and other theists have in mind. As consequence, Carrier's argument is based on a straw man and it's irrelevant.
4-God, as understood by most theists, is not a process, but an entity (more specifically, a Being). Conflating an entity with a process reveals unability to draw accurate conceptual metaphysical distinctions and it's evidence of Carrier's lack of philosophical training.
5-The implication of Carrier's argument is that we're justified to accept the existence only of observable things or processes (therefore, if something is non-observable, it's reasonable to conclude that it doesn't exist).
But it's false. Abstract objects, like propositions, concepts, numbers, and values argueably exist (even some metaphysical naturalists, even though inconsistent in my opinion, defend the objective existence of these abstract objects) but they're not observable (because they're conceptual, not physical).
Consciousness also exists, even though it is not observable (you can only observe its neural correlates). And observation, specially the scientific one, pressupose the existence of the (nonobservable) consciousness which is able to interpret and understand the things and processes being observed.
Moreover, science accepts the existence of (non-observable) theoretical entities which account for observable phenomena. But it's precisely what theists try to do when postulating God's existence: they're postulating a non-observable entity (God) in order to explain observable phenomena and experiences (e.g. the origin, order and fine tuning of the universe, the existence of natural laws, the reliability of our cognitive faculties, our moral experience, the existence of paranormal phenomena, near-death experiences and so forth).
6-Unable to defend his argument, he tries to persuade the reader with a false analogy (which in itself is fallacious too): "After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else"
This is a false analogy, because blue monkeys, provide they exist, would be material (only material things could have "colors", like the blue color.), but God is inmaterial. And being material or inmaterial is crucial to the argument, because both kinds of beings have wholly different properties, including (and this is key) the property of being observable or unobservable by human beings. Therefore, his analogy is false and irrelavant for his argument on God.
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we examine the "blue monkeys" argument in its merits (regardless of its relevance for the God question), it's clear the argument is clearly fallacious and, at best, is weak in extreme.
Read again: "that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures"
We can interpret that argument in two senses: one charitable and one uncharitable.
Charitably, the expression "no such creatures" would refer to blue monkeys with the property of "flying out my (Carrier) butt". Given that Carrier's butt is one of the many butts on existence, and given that the properties of blue monkeiys are not determined by Carrier's butt alone, we have to think that "such creatures" actually refers to blue monkeys with the property of flying out of people's butts (including but not limited to Carrier's butt)
But note that the reason for the conclusion about the non-existence of "such creatures" is that there are not such creatures flying out of Carrier's butt. Carrier calls this a "sufficient" reason to conclude the non-existence of such creatures.
And this is a clear non-sequitur. At most, his argument tell us that no "such creatures" are present in Carrier's butt, but it says nothing about such creatures existing on and flying out of other people butts. (Of course, most of you won't believe in the existence of such creatures; but not because they don't fly out of Carrier's butt, but because we have absolutely no reason to think that they exist. Things failing to fly out of Carrier's butt is not a general criterion of non-existence)
If such creatures exist, and they have the property of flying out of people's butts, the absence of such criatures in Carrier's specific butt wouldn't give us any reason to conclude they don't exist.
A less charitable interpretation would be that, with the expression "such creatures", Carrier is refering to blue monkeys in general. In this case, his argument would be a straighfoward falsehood, because many things exist which don't flying out of Carrier's butt (think in stars, shoes, books, CDs, countries, black holes, planes or your father).
Therefore, something "flying out of Carrier's butt" would be a sufficient reason to conclude the existence of that something; but the inverse, i.e. the absence of something flying out of Carrier's butt, by itself, give us absolutely no reason to conclude the nonexistence of something in general.
Even though this second interpretation is less charitable than the first one (and therefore, we should to prefer the first one), this second interpretation could be justified when we realize that Carrier adds in his argument the phrase "and so it is with anything else"
This seems to imply that his argument is not limited to blue monkeys with the property of flying of his butt, but with anything else (e.g. blue monkeys with other properties, chairs, books, universities, propositions, etc.).
It's clear that such argument is not only philosophically unsophisticated (in fact, I don't consider it a philosophical argument at all), but manifiestly ridiculous, childish and silly. To be fair with Carrier, he doesn't present that argument as the foundation or main argument of his book, nor his case for metaphysical naturalism rests on that ridiculous argument; but the fact he dared to write something like that in a book that pretends be a serious academic contribution to philosophy is revealing of Carrier's way of thinking (in fact Carrier believes in the possibility of afterlife and immortality inside a computer and other weird ideas like that; which by the way is consistent with mind-body dualism and inconsistent with the strong dependence of consciousness on the brain and the impossibility of immortality defended by some of Carrier's friends, like Keith Augustine, who rejects the immortality precisely on the grounds of the dependence of consciousness on the brain as shown by science).
No philosopher would have posed an argument like that in a book on serious philosophy. And no serious naturalist would accept it or would try to defend it.
The fact that some atheists are impressed with Carrier's book is more evidence for my hypothesis that many hard-core atheists are deeply irrational and that their cognitive faculties are seriously and permanently destroyed (= Jime's Iron Law)
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Victor Zammit: Why Richard Dawkins is Wrong about the Afterlife
Thursday, December 17, 2009
A commentary on philosopher Peter Williams' modified version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
Christian philosopher Peter Williams, the author of the excellent book "A Sceptic's Guide to Atheism" (a powerful, sophisticated and erudite critique of contemporary atheism), has proposed a modified version of the standard formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
Before I comment in Williams' version, I'd like to say that I agree to the idea that 1)The Universe had a cause; and 2)The cause is not explainable in a purely metaphysical naturalistic terms (but I'm not sure if that cause is the God of Christianity). In other words, I think the idea that the universe had a cause is more plausible than its denial.
But in this post, I'll try to do a critical examination Williams' modified argument, with the objective of making explicit its possible weaknesses. If Williams' version is defensible and stands to rigurous critical scrutiny, his argument would force any rational person to accept his conclusion. Let's to see if it stands to some criticism.
Williams' modified version of the Kalam argument is this:
1. Every physical event must have a cause
2. There was a first physical event of the universe
3. Therefore that first physical event of the universe must have had a cause (and that cause must have been nonphysical – it cannot have been physical because it cannot have come before the first physical event!)
One problem with Williams' first premise is that it has a normative character, not a descriptive one. The use of the verb "must" seems to imply an ought statement, an obligation, a command, a "must be the case", a prescription, not a description of reality. And it seems to impose on reality a certain mode of functioning on purely arbitrary grounds.
So, Williams' version of the Kalam argument avoids Craig's aparent or real fallacy of equivocation, but in its place, introduce a normative and prescriptive proposition which is improper for a metaphysical description of reality (and for an argument that pretends to say something factual about reality). So, I'd suggest to Williams to change "must" by "has": "every physical event has a cause", because this formulation is, in my opinion, more defensible on scientific and philosophical grounds.
One consequence of Williams' normative proposition is that, if my criticism is right, that premise couldn't be refuted by any empirical finding, because normative claims prescribe a "must be", but not describe an actual state of affairs on the real world.
For example, If I say "You must love your parents", such statement is not refuted by the fact that, actually, you don't love them. Even if you don't actually love them, you should, because "you must love them" is a prescription about how you must feel about your parents, not a description of your actual feelings. So, that normative proposition would be valid regardless of whether you love them or not.
Therefore, even if there are exist physical events without a cause, this fact would be irrelevant for Williams' first premise, because a believer in such premise would have to stick to the normative belief that such event "must have a cause" even if it is never actually found.
As consequence, Williams' first premise imposes on him (and in any person who wants to defend such version) an extreme burden of proof because he has to defend and justify the normative nature of his version of the Kalam argument (instead of Craig's descriptive metaphysical version of it) and its relevance for an actual state of affairs in the real world.
Also, a critic of the Kalam argument could consider Williams' version to be simply irrelevant: what's in stake is if the principle of causality has (actually) an universal validity on metaphysical and/or epistemological grounds; or whether, instead, it has factual exceptions which destroys the universality of that principle, making the beginning of the universe a possible candidate of a physical event without a cause. The critic of the Kalam doesn't have, in principle, to reply to normative or prescriptive propositions about what "must be the case" regarding the physical events.
Williams could reply that his premise is not arbitrary, and the normativity of the principle of causation is warranted, because the principle of causality is essential to science and rational thinking in general, i.e. to explain the phenomena and events in terms of causal mechanisms, physical laws and previous states of affairs. Without causality, we couldn't explain any physical event in terms of universal natural laws which would rule such events. Such events would be only "brute facts", irreductible phenomena beyond any rational and scientific understanding and explanation. They would be almost a "miracle".
This reply is correct and reasonable, but not so much as a normative-prescriptive rule (implied by Williams' version), but as a metaphysical principle of the real world necessary to any rational and scientific explanation of whatever physical phenomena is being studied.
If Williams argues that causality is not only metaphysical, but methodologically normative for science too, then the critic of the Kalam could reply that such rule is only a working and useful postulate valid to explain phenomena in the universe; but such rule is neutral (or even invalid) to explain the "first physical event", because by definition not previous physical event could exist as cause of the universe. Therefore, the normative rule in question cannot be extended, without argument, to the latter case of nonphysical causation.
And this bring us to another problem, this time with Williams' conclusion. Physical events are caused by other previous physical events. Broadly speaking, an event is a change of state of a physical thing (object/entity); and a state is the totality of the properties of a thing (object or entity) in a specific time.
This diagram shows the above idea:
Entity (object/thing) -------------> State (totality of the properties of that object in time X) ---------- > Event (changes in the state of object X; i.e change of the properties of such entity).
(This diagram implies that events always requires and occur in time. Therefore an a-temporal event seem to be hard to understand)
In that diagram, the concept of event is logically posterior to the concept of state, and the latter is dependent of the concept of entity (object). Physical causality functions for physical events, and this makes plausible Williams' first premise (if fomulated in a descriptive way, i.e. "Every physical event HAS a cause").
But the critic of the Kalam argument could concede Williams' premise with one important qualification: Every physical event known has a PHYSICAL cause. Therefore, the unknown origin of this universe had to be physical (a parallel universe or dimension, for example?), or doesn't have any physical cause at all (because not previous physical event existed before the universe, so no physical event could be the cause of it) or be itself self-caused (whatever it means).
But in any case, God couldn't be the cause, because God is not physical and, most importantly, God is not an event! (Therefore, the qualification introduced by the critic would destroy Williams' argument)
Finally, in my opinion, Williams' first premise (in his descriptive version mentioned above) is still open to the objection that quantum mechanics has demostrated, or made plausible, the idea that some physical events are "spontaneous" and argueably uncaused. Given that Williams' premise is limited to "physical events" (not to "whatever begins to exist", which is Craig's broad version) he'll find himself in the incomfortable position to explain how putative uncaused quantum physical events have an actual quantum physical cause.
In Summary:
1-Williams' premise could be attacked due to its arguably normative structure, instead of a descriptive one. It says nothing factual about causation, only imposes on physical events the command of having a previous cause (regardless of whether such cause actually exist or not).
2-If Williams' premise is interpreted in a descriptive way, it could be only (or mainly) defended in regards to physical causation of physical events. And the critic could argue that there is not certified or noncontroversial instances of a physical event caused by a nonphysical event, property or thing (of course, dualists like Williams and me, to whom the mind is nonphysical and causally efficacious on the body, that objection doesn't pose a problem; but to use such idea as part of the Kalam argument, Williams would have to make a case for the nonmateriality of the mind and then include such conclusion in his defence of his first premise. Likewise, I think the best studied parapsychological phenomena strongly supports the idea of nonphysical causation; but to use these evidences as part of his case, Williams would have to defend them first)
3-Therefore (it could be argued) Williams' premise, even if accepted by a critic for the sake of the argument, is irrelevant for the conclusion that a nonphysical cause (like God) caused the beginning universe, because God is inmaterial and (what's relevant for this point) is not a physical event (God, if He exists, belong to a wholly different metaphysical category: He would be a substance, the ultimate one; not an event).
My opinion is that these objections are not fatal to Williams' argument, but they're reasonably defensible. I think that Williams could defend his modified (normative) version of the Kalam argument through the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causality (see references below). In that case, the principle of causality (including specially formal and final causes) would be a metaphysical necessity, and in this case the expression "every physical event must have a cause" would makes complete sense.
Recommended reading:
-For a contemporary, sophisticated and powerful defense of the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causation and metaphysics in general, see Edward Feser's lastest book "Aquinas"; and especially David Oderberg's brilliant and original book "Real Essentialism".
-For an explanation of Aristotle's cosmological argument and ideas on causes, see this article by Christian philosopher David Wood.
-Peter Williams' blog on philosophy, ID and Christianity.
-For nonreligious philosophical defense dualism and the nonmateriality of the mind, see David Lund's book "The Conscious Self" and especially his lastest one "Persons, Souls and Death: A Philosophical Investigation of an Afterlife".
-For a defense of the immateriality of thought and consciousness, see James Ross's paper "The immaterial aspects of thought" (Some dualist philosophers consider this paper one of the most important and overlooked contributions to philosophy of mind in the 20th century)
-As example of physical causation by intention and other subjective aspects of the mind, see noetic scientist Dean Radin's books "The Conscious Universe" and "Entangled Minds"; and this lecture:
Before I comment in Williams' version, I'd like to say that I agree to the idea that 1)The Universe had a cause; and 2)The cause is not explainable in a purely metaphysical naturalistic terms (but I'm not sure if that cause is the God of Christianity). In other words, I think the idea that the universe had a cause is more plausible than its denial.
But in this post, I'll try to do a critical examination Williams' modified argument, with the objective of making explicit its possible weaknesses. If Williams' version is defensible and stands to rigurous critical scrutiny, his argument would force any rational person to accept his conclusion. Let's to see if it stands to some criticism.
Williams' modified version of the Kalam argument is this:
1. Every physical event must have a cause
2. There was a first physical event of the universe
3. Therefore that first physical event of the universe must have had a cause (and that cause must have been nonphysical – it cannot have been physical because it cannot have come before the first physical event!)
One problem with Williams' first premise is that it has a normative character, not a descriptive one. The use of the verb "must" seems to imply an ought statement, an obligation, a command, a "must be the case", a prescription, not a description of reality. And it seems to impose on reality a certain mode of functioning on purely arbitrary grounds.
So, Williams' version of the Kalam argument avoids Craig's aparent or real fallacy of equivocation, but in its place, introduce a normative and prescriptive proposition which is improper for a metaphysical description of reality (and for an argument that pretends to say something factual about reality). So, I'd suggest to Williams to change "must" by "has": "every physical event has a cause", because this formulation is, in my opinion, more defensible on scientific and philosophical grounds.
One consequence of Williams' normative proposition is that, if my criticism is right, that premise couldn't be refuted by any empirical finding, because normative claims prescribe a "must be", but not describe an actual state of affairs on the real world.
For example, If I say "You must love your parents", such statement is not refuted by the fact that, actually, you don't love them. Even if you don't actually love them, you should, because "you must love them" is a prescription about how you must feel about your parents, not a description of your actual feelings. So, that normative proposition would be valid regardless of whether you love them or not.
Therefore, even if there are exist physical events without a cause, this fact would be irrelevant for Williams' first premise, because a believer in such premise would have to stick to the normative belief that such event "must have a cause" even if it is never actually found.
As consequence, Williams' first premise imposes on him (and in any person who wants to defend such version) an extreme burden of proof because he has to defend and justify the normative nature of his version of the Kalam argument (instead of Craig's descriptive metaphysical version of it) and its relevance for an actual state of affairs in the real world.
Also, a critic of the Kalam argument could consider Williams' version to be simply irrelevant: what's in stake is if the principle of causality has (actually) an universal validity on metaphysical and/or epistemological grounds; or whether, instead, it has factual exceptions which destroys the universality of that principle, making the beginning of the universe a possible candidate of a physical event without a cause. The critic of the Kalam doesn't have, in principle, to reply to normative or prescriptive propositions about what "must be the case" regarding the physical events.
Williams could reply that his premise is not arbitrary, and the normativity of the principle of causation is warranted, because the principle of causality is essential to science and rational thinking in general, i.e. to explain the phenomena and events in terms of causal mechanisms, physical laws and previous states of affairs. Without causality, we couldn't explain any physical event in terms of universal natural laws which would rule such events. Such events would be only "brute facts", irreductible phenomena beyond any rational and scientific understanding and explanation. They would be almost a "miracle".
This reply is correct and reasonable, but not so much as a normative-prescriptive rule (implied by Williams' version), but as a metaphysical principle of the real world necessary to any rational and scientific explanation of whatever physical phenomena is being studied.
If Williams argues that causality is not only metaphysical, but methodologically normative for science too, then the critic of the Kalam could reply that such rule is only a working and useful postulate valid to explain phenomena in the universe; but such rule is neutral (or even invalid) to explain the "first physical event", because by definition not previous physical event could exist as cause of the universe. Therefore, the normative rule in question cannot be extended, without argument, to the latter case of nonphysical causation.
And this bring us to another problem, this time with Williams' conclusion. Physical events are caused by other previous physical events. Broadly speaking, an event is a change of state of a physical thing (object/entity); and a state is the totality of the properties of a thing (object or entity) in a specific time.
This diagram shows the above idea:
Entity (object/thing) -------------> State (totality of the properties of that object in time X) ---------- > Event (changes in the state of object X; i.e change of the properties of such entity).
(This diagram implies that events always requires and occur in time. Therefore an a-temporal event seem to be hard to understand)
In that diagram, the concept of event is logically posterior to the concept of state, and the latter is dependent of the concept of entity (object). Physical causality functions for physical events, and this makes plausible Williams' first premise (if fomulated in a descriptive way, i.e. "Every physical event HAS a cause").
But the critic of the Kalam argument could concede Williams' premise with one important qualification: Every physical event known has a PHYSICAL cause. Therefore, the unknown origin of this universe had to be physical (a parallel universe or dimension, for example?), or doesn't have any physical cause at all (because not previous physical event existed before the universe, so no physical event could be the cause of it) or be itself self-caused (whatever it means).
But in any case, God couldn't be the cause, because God is not physical and, most importantly, God is not an event! (Therefore, the qualification introduced by the critic would destroy Williams' argument)
Finally, in my opinion, Williams' first premise (in his descriptive version mentioned above) is still open to the objection that quantum mechanics has demostrated, or made plausible, the idea that some physical events are "spontaneous" and argueably uncaused. Given that Williams' premise is limited to "physical events" (not to "whatever begins to exist", which is Craig's broad version) he'll find himself in the incomfortable position to explain how putative uncaused quantum physical events have an actual quantum physical cause.
In Summary:
1-Williams' premise could be attacked due to its arguably normative structure, instead of a descriptive one. It says nothing factual about causation, only imposes on physical events the command of having a previous cause (regardless of whether such cause actually exist or not).
2-If Williams' premise is interpreted in a descriptive way, it could be only (or mainly) defended in regards to physical causation of physical events. And the critic could argue that there is not certified or noncontroversial instances of a physical event caused by a nonphysical event, property or thing (of course, dualists like Williams and me, to whom the mind is nonphysical and causally efficacious on the body, that objection doesn't pose a problem; but to use such idea as part of the Kalam argument, Williams would have to make a case for the nonmateriality of the mind and then include such conclusion in his defence of his first premise. Likewise, I think the best studied parapsychological phenomena strongly supports the idea of nonphysical causation; but to use these evidences as part of his case, Williams would have to defend them first)
3-Therefore (it could be argued) Williams' premise, even if accepted by a critic for the sake of the argument, is irrelevant for the conclusion that a nonphysical cause (like God) caused the beginning universe, because God is inmaterial and (what's relevant for this point) is not a physical event (God, if He exists, belong to a wholly different metaphysical category: He would be a substance, the ultimate one; not an event).
My opinion is that these objections are not fatal to Williams' argument, but they're reasonably defensible. I think that Williams could defend his modified (normative) version of the Kalam argument through the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causality (see references below). In that case, the principle of causality (including specially formal and final causes) would be a metaphysical necessity, and in this case the expression "every physical event must have a cause" would makes complete sense.
Recommended reading:
-For a contemporary, sophisticated and powerful defense of the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causation and metaphysics in general, see Edward Feser's lastest book "Aquinas"; and especially David Oderberg's brilliant and original book "Real Essentialism".
-For an explanation of Aristotle's cosmological argument and ideas on causes, see this article by Christian philosopher David Wood.
-Peter Williams' blog on philosophy, ID and Christianity.
-For nonreligious philosophical defense dualism and the nonmateriality of the mind, see David Lund's book "The Conscious Self" and especially his lastest one "Persons, Souls and Death: A Philosophical Investigation of an Afterlife".
-For a defense of the immateriality of thought and consciousness, see James Ross's paper "The immaterial aspects of thought" (Some dualist philosophers consider this paper one of the most important and overlooked contributions to philosophy of mind in the 20th century)
-As example of physical causation by intention and other subjective aspects of the mind, see noetic scientist Dean Radin's books "The Conscious Universe" and "Entangled Minds"; and this lecture:
David James interview with Vinstonas Wu on SCEPCOP and materialistic pseudo-skepticism
Hear this interview with Vinstonas Wu by David James about SCEPCOP - The Scientific Committee to Evaluate Pseudo-Skeptical Criticism of the Paranormal.
Links of interest:
-Website of SCEPCOP.
-Vinstonas Wu's article on pseudoskepticism.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Robert Scott Bell talks to Brent Leung about the Luc Montagnier interview for The House of Numbers
Robert Scott Bell talks to Brent Leung about the interview he done with discover of HIV, Dr.Luc Montagnier, where Montagnier says its not all about drugs and vaccines, and that you can get rid of HIV naturally.
Remember that in 2008, Dr.Montagnier won the Nobel Prize by his "discovery" of HIV (actually, the idea that HIV has been discoveried is disputed by some scientists, see links below).
Dr.Montagnier currently defends the idea that the body can get rid of HIV naturally, as you can see in this brief video:
Remember that in 2008, Dr.Montagnier won the Nobel Prize by his "discovery" of HIV (actually, the idea that HIV has been discoveried is disputed by some scientists, see links below).
Dr.Montagnier currently defends the idea that the body can get rid of HIV naturally, as you can see in this brief video:
You can imagine the important implications of Montagnier's views and the debate about the HIV/AIDS theory. If HIV doesn't exist or hasn't been proved to exist, then the current conventional AIDS treatment lack of any factual and scientific basis, and this could be very negative for the AIDS patients (who receive drugs like AZT and other chemotherapy which are very dangerous and have potentially devastating biological effects. See this critical analyzis on AZT). But even if HIV exists, and if Montagnier is right, the conventional treatment of AIDS would be incorrect and misguided (and this would explain why after almost 30 years, there is not a cure of AIDS through conventional therapeutical means).
So, this is an important topic for any sensible and rational human being who needs and wants to know the truth about AIDS.
Links of interest:
-Website of The House of Numbers documentary
-Website of Henry Bauer on the HIV/AIDS theory.
-Website of the The Perth Group (the best source of scientific criticisms of the mainstream theory of HIV/AIDS)
-Website of The House of Numbers documentary
-Website of Henry Bauer on the HIV/AIDS theory.
-Website of the The Perth Group (the best source of scientific criticisms of the mainstream theory of HIV/AIDS)
Thursday, December 10, 2009
A fictional dialogue between a survivalist/dualist and a materialist/skeptic (Part 6)
This is part 6 of my fictional dialogues between a survivalist and a materialist.
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Monday, December 7, 2009
What Darwin Got Wrong by atheist philosopher Jerry Fodor and cognitive scientist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini
Atheist philosopher Jerry Fodor and cognitive scientist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini have written the book What Darwin Got Wrong, where they develop a criticism of Darwinian theory of evolution. The book will be available in February, 2010.
Professor of Cell Biology Stuart Newman has praised this book with these words: "Evolution needs a persuasive theory if the struggle for public acceptance is to be won. Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini’s bold treatise, What Darwin Got Wrong, convincingly shows that natural selection is not that theory. Drawing on scientific literature spanning the molecular, behavioral, and cognitive scales, with sophisticated excursions into evolutionary-developmental biology and the physics of complex systems, the authors perform a philosophical dismantling of the standard model of evolutionary change that is likely irreversible. Their unambiguous grounding in the factuality of evolution renders this work a service to science and a setback for its opponents"
As you know, one of the strategies of darwinists and atheists is to conflate the fact of evolution with the Darwinian theory of evolution. This strategy give them rhetorical adventages, because if you challenge or criticize the Darwinian model of evolution, you'll be stigmatized as a "creationist" (who denies the fact of evolution). (A similar strategy is employed by apologists of mainstream medicine when they stigmatize the critics of the HIV/AIDS theory as "AIDS denialists"). These kind of fallacies are easy to spot, but they're effective as a method of emotional self-validation between and support for believers (in this case, believers in Darwinism), and as a way to avoid cognitive dissonance in the face of contrary or uncomfortable evidence.
Given that many atheists have weird obsessions with God, and they see Him everywere, their intellect is impaired to make conceptual distinctions when discussing about evolution and Darwinism with critics of the latter. Constantly and predictably, they interpret any criticisms of Darwinism as a defense of "creationism" and, therefore, as religion-driven (and therefore, unscientific) criticisms. An example of this irrationality and bigotry is Richard Dawkins's reply to the criticisms against Darwinism by Richard Milton.
In addition to having psychological/emotional causes, these irrational and emotional responses by some bigoted atheists, secularists and naturalists are also caused by what naturalistic philosopher Thomas Nagel has called "The Cosmic Authority Problem" (See my post about Atheism and the Fear of God).
So, the impairment of rational faculties to do a rational and objective examination of the anti-Darwinian arguments has a emotional and an ideological component (in each case, you have to examine what component has more weight for individual materialistic atheists; but many of them, possibly most of them, have both of these components or factors causing their irrationality and emotional responses)
My prediction: Fodor's book will be rejected and criticized by naturalists and secularists on the grounds that it contributes to the "creationist" or "intelligent design" cause. Therefore, it has to be false and unscientific.
Finally, keep in mind that, technically, the falsehood of Darwinism doesn't implies the falsehood of atheism or metaphysical naturalism. In other words, even if Darwinism is false, metaphysical naturalism could be true, because the truth of the latter doesn't depend of the truth of the former. (As a matter of fact, in Europe, there are some nonreligious scientists working in scientific alternatives to Darwinism; as an example, see this paper by a Neo-Lamarckian scientist/biologist)
The reason why naturalists are so obsessed with defending Darwinism is because they're afraid (remember the irrational factors mentioned above) that if Darwinism is wrong, then creationism or intelligent design (which is different of "creationism") is true. This either/or mentality is another example of irrationality.
This is also the reason why the recent sympathetic review by atheist Thomas Nagel of ID theorist Stephen Meyer's lastest book has been replied with hostility and emotionality by some of the most extreme naturalists out there (as an example, read this atheist philosopher blog's entry). This is the predictable, consistent, emotional response of extreme naturalists when confronted with uncomfortable information which challenge their philosophical beliefs.
So, don't be suprised if Fodor's book is met with the same resistance, bias and emotional rejection by the "rational" naturalists.
Links of Interest:
-My post on Thomas Nagel and the Fear of God.
-Naturalist philosopher Alex Rosemberg's paper "The Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality"
-Naturalist David Macarthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"
-Materialist philosopher William Lycan's paper on dualism.
Professor of Cell Biology Stuart Newman has praised this book with these words: "Evolution needs a persuasive theory if the struggle for public acceptance is to be won. Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini’s bold treatise, What Darwin Got Wrong, convincingly shows that natural selection is not that theory. Drawing on scientific literature spanning the molecular, behavioral, and cognitive scales, with sophisticated excursions into evolutionary-developmental biology and the physics of complex systems, the authors perform a philosophical dismantling of the standard model of evolutionary change that is likely irreversible. Their unambiguous grounding in the factuality of evolution renders this work a service to science and a setback for its opponents"
As you know, one of the strategies of darwinists and atheists is to conflate the fact of evolution with the Darwinian theory of evolution. This strategy give them rhetorical adventages, because if you challenge or criticize the Darwinian model of evolution, you'll be stigmatized as a "creationist" (who denies the fact of evolution). (A similar strategy is employed by apologists of mainstream medicine when they stigmatize the critics of the HIV/AIDS theory as "AIDS denialists"). These kind of fallacies are easy to spot, but they're effective as a method of emotional self-validation between and support for believers (in this case, believers in Darwinism), and as a way to avoid cognitive dissonance in the face of contrary or uncomfortable evidence.
Given that many atheists have weird obsessions with God, and they see Him everywere, their intellect is impaired to make conceptual distinctions when discussing about evolution and Darwinism with critics of the latter. Constantly and predictably, they interpret any criticisms of Darwinism as a defense of "creationism" and, therefore, as religion-driven (and therefore, unscientific) criticisms. An example of this irrationality and bigotry is Richard Dawkins's reply to the criticisms against Darwinism by Richard Milton.
In addition to having psychological/emotional causes, these irrational and emotional responses by some bigoted atheists, secularists and naturalists are also caused by what naturalistic philosopher Thomas Nagel has called "The Cosmic Authority Problem" (See my post about Atheism and the Fear of God).
So, the impairment of rational faculties to do a rational and objective examination of the anti-Darwinian arguments has a emotional and an ideological component (in each case, you have to examine what component has more weight for individual materialistic atheists; but many of them, possibly most of them, have both of these components or factors causing their irrationality and emotional responses)
My prediction: Fodor's book will be rejected and criticized by naturalists and secularists on the grounds that it contributes to the "creationist" or "intelligent design" cause. Therefore, it has to be false and unscientific.
Finally, keep in mind that, technically, the falsehood of Darwinism doesn't implies the falsehood of atheism or metaphysical naturalism. In other words, even if Darwinism is false, metaphysical naturalism could be true, because the truth of the latter doesn't depend of the truth of the former. (As a matter of fact, in Europe, there are some nonreligious scientists working in scientific alternatives to Darwinism; as an example, see this paper by a Neo-Lamarckian scientist/biologist)
The reason why naturalists are so obsessed with defending Darwinism is because they're afraid (remember the irrational factors mentioned above) that if Darwinism is wrong, then creationism or intelligent design (which is different of "creationism") is true. This either/or mentality is another example of irrationality.
This is also the reason why the recent sympathetic review by atheist Thomas Nagel of ID theorist Stephen Meyer's lastest book has been replied with hostility and emotionality by some of the most extreme naturalists out there (as an example, read this atheist philosopher blog's entry). This is the predictable, consistent, emotional response of extreme naturalists when confronted with uncomfortable information which challenge their philosophical beliefs.
So, don't be suprised if Fodor's book is met with the same resistance, bias and emotional rejection by the "rational" naturalists.
Links of Interest:
-My post on Thomas Nagel and the Fear of God.
-Naturalist philosopher Alex Rosemberg's paper "The Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality"
-Naturalist David Macarthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"
-Materialist philosopher William Lycan's paper on dualism.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
The House of Numbers: AIDS truth and industry exposed. And The Perth Group's scientific refutation of Jeanne Bergman's defense of the AIDS theory
SYNOPSIS:
In 'House of Numbers,' an AIDS film like no other, the HIV/AIDS story is being rewritten. This is the first film to present the uncensored POVs of virtually all the major players; in their own settings, in their own words. It rocks the foundation upon which all conventional wisdom regarding HIV/AIDS is based. 'House of Numbers' could well be the opening volley in a battle to bring sanity and clarity to an epidemic gone awry.
INTERVIEWEES IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE:
Mark Conlan, Dr. John P. Moore, Dr. Donald P. Francis, Dr. Hans R. Gelderblom, Eleni Papadopulos, MSc; Dr. Robert Gallo, Street Interview England, Street Interview Australia, Dr. Kary Mullis, Dr. James Chin, Dr. Peter H. Duesberg, Dr. Reinhard Kurth, Dr. Niel T. Constantine (voice over in testing), Dr. Harold Jaffe, Celia Farber, Neville Hodgkinson, and Dr. Luc Montagnier.
A piece of the dialogue with co-discover of HIV, Dr. Luc Montagnier:
Montagnier: We can be exposed to HIV many times without being chronically infected… our immune system will get rid of the virus within a few weeks if you have a good immune system.
Brent Leung: If you have a good immune system then your body can naturally get rid of HIV?
Montagnier: Yes.
Brent Leung: If you take a poor African who’s been infected and you build up her immune system is it also possible for them to also naturally get rid of it?
Montagnier: I would think so… It’s important knowledge, which is completely neglected. People always think of drugs and vaccine.
Brent Leung: There’s no money in nutrition, right?
Montagnier: There’s no profit, yes
--------
-Visit The House of the Numbers website.
-Henry Bauer's blog entry on this movie.
-Stephen Barrett (self-proclaimed Quackbuster) exposed in court. (More on Barrett's apologetical activities for mainstream medicine here.)
In 'House of Numbers,' an AIDS film like no other, the HIV/AIDS story is being rewritten. This is the first film to present the uncensored POVs of virtually all the major players; in their own settings, in their own words. It rocks the foundation upon which all conventional wisdom regarding HIV/AIDS is based. 'House of Numbers' could well be the opening volley in a battle to bring sanity and clarity to an epidemic gone awry.
INTERVIEWEES IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE:
Mark Conlan, Dr. John P. Moore, Dr. Donald P. Francis, Dr. Hans R. Gelderblom, Eleni Papadopulos, MSc; Dr. Robert Gallo, Street Interview England, Street Interview Australia, Dr. Kary Mullis, Dr. James Chin, Dr. Peter H. Duesberg, Dr. Reinhard Kurth, Dr. Niel T. Constantine (voice over in testing), Dr. Harold Jaffe, Celia Farber, Neville Hodgkinson, and Dr. Luc Montagnier.
A piece of the dialogue with co-discover of HIV, Dr. Luc Montagnier:
Montagnier: We can be exposed to HIV many times without being chronically infected… our immune system will get rid of the virus within a few weeks if you have a good immune system.
Brent Leung: If you have a good immune system then your body can naturally get rid of HIV?
Montagnier: Yes.
Brent Leung: If you take a poor African who’s been infected and you build up her immune system is it also possible for them to also naturally get rid of it?
Montagnier: I would think so… It’s important knowledge, which is completely neglected. People always think of drugs and vaccine.
Brent Leung: There’s no money in nutrition, right?
Montagnier: There’s no profit, yes
--------
-Visit The House of the Numbers website.
-Jeanne Bergman wrote a critical comment about this movie here and here (note Bergman's constant use of the label "AIDS denialists"). A scientific refutation of Bergman's claims is available here and here (this papers are written by The Perth Group)
-Henry Bauer's blog entry on this movie.
-Stephen Barrett (self-proclaimed Quackbuster) exposed in court. (More on Barrett's apologetical activities for mainstream medicine here.)
Introduction to AIDS Dissent and alternative views on the origin of AIDS
As the readers of my blog know, I've presented a lot of videos and information about critical views on the mainstream AIDS theory. The idea is that you know that scientific criticisms about the official AIDS theory exist; so you can draw your own informed conclusions or opinions.
The highly economic-influenced mainstream medical-science, and its uncritical followers (e.g. pseudo-skeptics), have been clever enough to stigmatize as "AIDS denialists" those who disagree or question with the official AIDS theory.
Actually, most critics of the mainstream AIDS theory don't deny the existence of AIDS (therefore, the don't "deny" AIDS), but the THEORY according to which HIV causes AIDS. They don't dispute the existence of a clinical picture known as AIDS, but dispute the role of HIV in the cause of this disease. (So, the debate posed by scientific dissents is about the causes of AIDS, not about the factual existence of AIDS itself)
Therefore, conflating the fact of AIDS with the "theory about the origin of AIDS" is proper of ignorant or intellectually impaired individuals; or of individuals who INTENTIONALLY make that conflation to misrepresent and stigmatize (while avoiding scientific debate) those who, with scientific arguments, casts doubts on the official AIDS theory.
This point is important, because the "AIDS denialists" label is a clever rhetorical trick to discredit those scientists who dare to make unconfortable and critical questions on the theory of AIDS.
The idea is not that you believe whatever you read, but that you think for yourselves.
The following videos are a good introduction to the scientists critical of AIDS theory and their claims:
The highly economic-influenced mainstream medical-science, and its uncritical followers (e.g. pseudo-skeptics), have been clever enough to stigmatize as "AIDS denialists" those who disagree or question with the official AIDS theory.
Actually, most critics of the mainstream AIDS theory don't deny the existence of AIDS (therefore, the don't "deny" AIDS), but the THEORY according to which HIV causes AIDS. They don't dispute the existence of a clinical picture known as AIDS, but dispute the role of HIV in the cause of this disease. (So, the debate posed by scientific dissents is about the causes of AIDS, not about the factual existence of AIDS itself)
Therefore, conflating the fact of AIDS with the "theory about the origin of AIDS" is proper of ignorant or intellectually impaired individuals; or of individuals who INTENTIONALLY make that conflation to misrepresent and stigmatize (while avoiding scientific debate) those who, with scientific arguments, casts doubts on the official AIDS theory.
This point is important, because the "AIDS denialists" label is a clever rhetorical trick to discredit those scientists who dare to make unconfortable and critical questions on the theory of AIDS.
The idea is not that you believe whatever you read, but that you think for yourselves.
The following videos are a good introduction to the scientists critical of AIDS theory and their claims:
More information:
-Henry Bauer's excellent and well-documented blog critical of the mainstream AIDS theory.
-Website "Science Guardian"
-Website "Science Guardian"
Leading AIDS Dissident: David Crowe Speaks Out
David Crowe is the President of Alberta Reappraising AIDS Society, whose mission is "to promote critical discussion of the HIV=AIDS=Death dogma. It does this by making basic science available to a wider audience and by disseminating the writings of other critics of the theory to a wide audience. The society is always interested in hearing from people who would like to help through volunteering their time, offering their writing or research skills or who wish to donate money to support and expand the work of the society"
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Naturalist and atheist philosophers against naturalism: The Emperor's new clothes and an upcoming new era for humankind.
Before I write about the main topic of this post, let me do a brief introduction:
Whoever is familiar with contemporary philosophy knows that metaphysical naturalism, ontological materialism and atheism are taken from granted for most philosophers (and academics in general); and most of the philosophical work is thereby done inside the naturalistic framework.
No thinking is allowed outside of the metaphysical naturalist and materialistic mindset. This creates the illusion that naturalism is true, or probably true, because after all "how could it be that most philosophers and academics are wrong"? and such illusion is a validation for naturalists who, confronted with contrary evidence (like skeptic Richard Wiseman's concession that remote viewing is "proven" by conventional scientific standards) and facts incompatible with or "strange" in the naturalist worldview (like consciousness, rationality, abstract objects, etc.) can always appeal to the "opinion of majority" (of academics) as a last argument.
The pressure of the majority and the herd-mentality exists too in intellectuals. In fact, when you debate with someone with this kind of herd-mentality, the "argument based on mainstream opinion" is almost always mentioned: If most scientists or philosophers think that X is true, then X is probably true... (when this argument is presented without proper qualification, or relevance for the specific case, you'll know for sure that you're dealing with an intellectual coward, a person unable to think by himself)
But truth-seekers are not interested in what the majority think, but in the TRUTH.
Of course, if the majority of specialists in a field agree that X is true, and you have no valid arguments for the falsehood of X, then the "authority argument" is reasonable and the presumption that the majority of scientists are probably right is valid. But if you have arguments and evidence against X, then rational discourse demands that your arguments be addressed with arguments and evidence, not with the claim that most scientists disagree with you.
This kind of dishonest use of authority is commonly employed for rhetorical purposes in debates about parapsychology. Given that most scientists don't accept the evidence for psi phenomena, then psi phenomena probably don't exist (or more exactly, that the evidence for psi is not good enough to convince most scientists of its existence; what implicitly implies that the phenomenon is not actually existent).
This kind of silly argument omits:
1-Most professional scientists have not studied the evidence for psi; therefore, they're not expert in this field, and thereby their opinion is not relevant or authoritative. Therefore, appealing to the authority of most (ignorant about psi) scientists is only a clever and fallacious misdirection, not a valid argument from authority.
2-Most of the actual specialists in psi research (parapsychologists, noetic scientists, etc.) agree that psi exists as an fact, even if they disagree regarding many theoretical and methodological aspects. So, the actual "authorities" of this field agree that psi exists, even if most scientists (who are not authorities in this field) disagree with such conclusion Therefore, the valid argument from authority favors the existence of psi.
3-Philosophically, most scientists and philosophers assume a metaphysical naturalist and materialist framework. And, contrary to the clever misdirection of pseudoskeptics, this is a highly relevant point, because psi phenomena are incompatible with the materialism and naturalism assumed by most scientists (and this is why materialists create "organized skeptical movements" to debunk psi research; and this is the reason why people who belongs to secular humanism and metaphysical naturalist organizations write articles against psi, afterlife, NDEs, etc. as parte of the "defense" of the naturalist worldview)
So, the mataphysical background of scientists hostile to psi research is relevant for this discussion, because such background entails the non-existence of the phenomena being discussed (creating, a priori, a psychological and philosophical bias against the topic at stake, bias which is independent of the existence or non-existence of the phenomena in question.).
This point is cleaverly hidden by metaphysical naturalists and seasoned professional pseudoskeptics.
But this is not the topic of this post, so excuse my long introduction.
My main point is that some metaphysical naturalists have recognized that naturalism has serious problems, some of them arguebly fatal. Briefly, some of these problems are:
1-The existence of abstract objects, like propositions, mathemathical truths and objective moral values. All of these things are non-physical. They're conceptual.
A core problem is explaining, in a naturalistically consistent fashion, how these NON-PHYSICAL objects could exert causal efficacy on our minds, and how a purely physical brain could interact and grasp such things.
2-The existence of subjective experience (consciousness) in a world composed (according to naturalism) of purely physical particles, entities or processes (all of them explainable in terms of physical laws); where consciousness seems to have no room in that framework (and where no physical law predicts or entails the existence of consciousness, making it a "strange", "weird", "unexpected" or "extraordinary" phenomenon).
3-The rise and origin of rationality on purely unguided and blind evolutionary process based on natural selection (where the latter favors only adaptative behaviour, not true beliefs; and where true beliefs, being conceptual and part of subjective experience and consciousness is argueably nonphysical and thereby non-efficacious according to the naturalist principle of causal of closure of the physical world. If it's the case, then true beliefs aren't and cannot be causally efficacious and thereby are invisibible and irrelevant to natural selection which only favor useful and thereby causally efficacious pro-survival behaviour)
Note that many naturalists like to think that neuroscience shows that our minds are illusions . But if it's true, then our mind (including our rationality) cannot be causally efficacious on the real world and, therefore, can't be efficacious or useful for our survival. As consequence, it destroys the objection that rationality was useful and thereby favored by natural selection.
How could an illusion be causally efficacious for survival? How could natural selection detect and favor such illusion?
If naturalism is true, natural selection only could select the neurophysiological structure and function that causes the illusion of our mind, but the mind as such is illusory, and therefore non-existent (and by implication, non-efficacious). Therefore, it cannot be useful and causally active on the real world and for this reason it cannot favor survival - which is a phenomenon existing in the real world of biological organisms).
(And just by the way: given that neurophysiological processes are physical-chemical processes, they will be selected by natural selection only if they favor adaptative pro-survival behaviour, not true beliefs (because beliefs are conceptual, but neurophysiological processes are material); therefore, natural selection selected neurophysiological processes by their adaptative pro-survival value, not by their epistemic properties since natural selection doesn't discern between epistemic or non-epistemic properties).
In short: arguing that rationality favors survival implies conceding that consciousness (and reason) is causally efficacious (for survival), and therefore, real. And this is inconsistent with consistent materialism and the deterministic interpretations of neuroscience and the idea that consciousness and their contents are "illusory".
Many of these arguments have been developed by non-materialistic philosophers (like Christian philosophers), but recently, a group of naturalist philosophers have made explicit the problems of naturalism in the book "Naturalism in Question":
Another example is atheist and naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg who has written an article entitled The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality, where he honestly concedes that naturalism entails denying the existence of objective moral values, of beliefs, of the self, of linguistic meaning, of purpose. As consequence, metaphysical naturalism, when consistently assumed and followed, leads to a radical and extreme eliminativism. (And I'd add, if it's true, then naturalism is intellectually self-defeating and morally dangerous, because if beliefs don't exist, then the belief that "naturalism is true" doesn't exist either and thereby cannot be true, and the belief in naturalism would be irrational)
Also, atheistic and naturalistic philosophers have been sympathetic to the intelligent design theory (a theory long fought against by naturalists). For example, first-rate atheistic philosopher Thomas Nagel wrote a sympathetic commentary on ID theorist Steven Meyer's lastest book "The Signature on the Cell": "Stephen C. Meyer’s Signature in the Cell: DNA and the evidence for Intelligent Design (HarperCollins) is a detailed account of the problem of how life came into existence from lifeless matter – something that had to happen before the process of biological evolution could begin. The controversy over Intelligent Design has so far focused mainly on whether the evolution of life since its beginnings can be explained entirely by natural selection and other non-purposive causes. Meyer takes up the prior question of how the immensely complex and exquisitely functional chemical structure of DNA, which cannot be explained by natural selection because it makes natural selection possible, could have originated without an intentional cause. He examines the history and present state of research on non-purposive chemical explanations of the origin of life, and argues that the available evidence offers no prospect of a credible naturalistic alternative to the hypothesis of an intentional cause. Meyer is a Christian, but atheists, and theists who believe God never intervenes in the natural world, will be instructed by his careful presentation of this fiendishly difficult problem."
Atheist philosopher of science Bradley Monton has defended the idea that ID is a scientific theory in his book "Seeking God in Science: Atheist defends Intelligent Design"
Note that all of these criticisms against naturalism and ontological materialism are not based on psi or survival evidence. They stand in themselves as separate and independent arguments against naturalism (but if you add psi or survival evidence to the equation, the naturalist worldview would be totally destroyed and crushed. This is why desperate but smart naturalists have to suppress, misrepresent and debunk that kind of research with all they got)
When confronted with all of these criticisms, many naturalists tend to get defensive and desperate; then cognitive dissonance sets in and elaborate and ad hoc attempts to rationalize their intellectually self-defeating, irrational and inconsistent worldview gives us even more arguments against them.
My prediction: metaphysical naturalism will be a minoritary position in academy in the future. And it won't occur due to the criticisms of Christian philosophers or other supernaturalists, but by the criticism of conscious, rational, reflective and honest naturalists themselves.
When it occurs (and perhaps we have to wait 50 or more years to see that), we'll live in a new enlightening era, where the materialism-based oscurantism (which denies consciousness, objective values, ultimate purposes and everything that is essentially important to human beings) will be widely recognized as an intellectual fraud, and the spiritual aspects of human beings will be studied with an open mind, and without ideological prejudices sold as "science".
The full potential of human beings, their spiritual nature and its meaning or place in this universe will be a matter subject to rigorous scientific exploration by mainstream academy.
It's only a matter of time.
And when that occurs, many naturalists will realize that, after all, the Naturalistic Emperor was naked...
Links of interest:
-Naturalist David Macarthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"
-Naturalist philosopher Alex Rosemberg's paper "The Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality"
-My post on Thomas Nagel and the Fear of God.
-Materialist philosopher William Lycan's paper on dualism.
-Christian Philosopher Peter Williams' paper "Atheists against Darwinism"
-Alvin Plantinga's paper "Against Materialism"
-My post on Secular Humanism.
-My post on skeptic and naturalist Richard Wiseman's concession that remote viewing is proven
-Mathematician Russell W. Howell's paper Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problems for Naturalism?
The pressure of the majority and the herd-mentality exists too in intellectuals. In fact, when you debate with someone with this kind of herd-mentality, the "argument based on mainstream opinion" is almost always mentioned: If most scientists or philosophers think that X is true, then X is probably true... (when this argument is presented without proper qualification, or relevance for the specific case, you'll know for sure that you're dealing with an intellectual coward, a person unable to think by himself)
But truth-seekers are not interested in what the majority think, but in the TRUTH.
Of course, if the majority of specialists in a field agree that X is true, and you have no valid arguments for the falsehood of X, then the "authority argument" is reasonable and the presumption that the majority of scientists are probably right is valid. But if you have arguments and evidence against X, then rational discourse demands that your arguments be addressed with arguments and evidence, not with the claim that most scientists disagree with you.
This kind of dishonest use of authority is commonly employed for rhetorical purposes in debates about parapsychology. Given that most scientists don't accept the evidence for psi phenomena, then psi phenomena probably don't exist (or more exactly, that the evidence for psi is not good enough to convince most scientists of its existence; what implicitly implies that the phenomenon is not actually existent).
This kind of silly argument omits:
1-Most professional scientists have not studied the evidence for psi; therefore, they're not expert in this field, and thereby their opinion is not relevant or authoritative. Therefore, appealing to the authority of most (ignorant about psi) scientists is only a clever and fallacious misdirection, not a valid argument from authority.
2-Most of the actual specialists in psi research (parapsychologists, noetic scientists, etc.) agree that psi exists as an fact, even if they disagree regarding many theoretical and methodological aspects. So, the actual "authorities" of this field agree that psi exists, even if most scientists (who are not authorities in this field) disagree with such conclusion Therefore, the valid argument from authority favors the existence of psi.
3-Philosophically, most scientists and philosophers assume a metaphysical naturalist and materialist framework. And, contrary to the clever misdirection of pseudoskeptics, this is a highly relevant point, because psi phenomena are incompatible with the materialism and naturalism assumed by most scientists (and this is why materialists create "organized skeptical movements" to debunk psi research; and this is the reason why people who belongs to secular humanism and metaphysical naturalist organizations write articles against psi, afterlife, NDEs, etc. as parte of the "defense" of the naturalist worldview)
So, the mataphysical background of scientists hostile to psi research is relevant for this discussion, because such background entails the non-existence of the phenomena being discussed (creating, a priori, a psychological and philosophical bias against the topic at stake, bias which is independent of the existence or non-existence of the phenomena in question.).
This point is cleaverly hidden by metaphysical naturalists and seasoned professional pseudoskeptics.
But this is not the topic of this post, so excuse my long introduction.
My main point is that some metaphysical naturalists have recognized that naturalism has serious problems, some of them arguebly fatal. Briefly, some of these problems are:
1-The existence of abstract objects, like propositions, mathemathical truths and objective moral values. All of these things are non-physical. They're conceptual.
A core problem is explaining, in a naturalistically consistent fashion, how these NON-PHYSICAL objects could exert causal efficacy on our minds, and how a purely physical brain could interact and grasp such things.
2-The existence of subjective experience (consciousness) in a world composed (according to naturalism) of purely physical particles, entities or processes (all of them explainable in terms of physical laws); where consciousness seems to have no room in that framework (and where no physical law predicts or entails the existence of consciousness, making it a "strange", "weird", "unexpected" or "extraordinary" phenomenon).
3-The rise and origin of rationality on purely unguided and blind evolutionary process based on natural selection (where the latter favors only adaptative behaviour, not true beliefs; and where true beliefs, being conceptual and part of subjective experience and consciousness is argueably nonphysical and thereby non-efficacious according to the naturalist principle of causal of closure of the physical world. If it's the case, then true beliefs aren't and cannot be causally efficacious and thereby are invisibible and irrelevant to natural selection which only favor useful and thereby causally efficacious pro-survival behaviour)
Note that many naturalists like to think that neuroscience shows that our minds are illusions . But if it's true, then our mind (including our rationality) cannot be causally efficacious on the real world and, therefore, can't be efficacious or useful for our survival. As consequence, it destroys the objection that rationality was useful and thereby favored by natural selection.
How could an illusion be causally efficacious for survival? How could natural selection detect and favor such illusion?
If naturalism is true, natural selection only could select the neurophysiological structure and function that causes the illusion of our mind, but the mind as such is illusory, and therefore non-existent (and by implication, non-efficacious). Therefore, it cannot be useful and causally active on the real world and for this reason it cannot favor survival - which is a phenomenon existing in the real world of biological organisms).
(And just by the way: given that neurophysiological processes are physical-chemical processes, they will be selected by natural selection only if they favor adaptative pro-survival behaviour, not true beliefs (because beliefs are conceptual, but neurophysiological processes are material); therefore, natural selection selected neurophysiological processes by their adaptative pro-survival value, not by their epistemic properties since natural selection doesn't discern between epistemic or non-epistemic properties).
In short: arguing that rationality favors survival implies conceding that consciousness (and reason) is causally efficacious (for survival), and therefore, real. And this is inconsistent with consistent materialism and the deterministic interpretations of neuroscience and the idea that consciousness and their contents are "illusory".
Many of these arguments have been developed by non-materialistic philosophers (like Christian philosophers), but recently, a group of naturalist philosophers have made explicit the problems of naturalism in the book "Naturalism in Question":
Another example is atheist and naturalist philosopher Alex Rosenberg who has written an article entitled The Disenchanted Naturalist’s Guide to Reality, where he honestly concedes that naturalism entails denying the existence of objective moral values, of beliefs, of the self, of linguistic meaning, of purpose. As consequence, metaphysical naturalism, when consistently assumed and followed, leads to a radical and extreme eliminativism. (And I'd add, if it's true, then naturalism is intellectually self-defeating and morally dangerous, because if beliefs don't exist, then the belief that "naturalism is true" doesn't exist either and thereby cannot be true, and the belief in naturalism would be irrational)
Also, atheistic and naturalistic philosophers have been sympathetic to the intelligent design theory (a theory long fought against by naturalists). For example, first-rate atheistic philosopher Thomas Nagel wrote a sympathetic commentary on ID theorist Steven Meyer's lastest book "The Signature on the Cell": "Stephen C. Meyer’s Signature in the Cell: DNA and the evidence for Intelligent Design (HarperCollins) is a detailed account of the problem of how life came into existence from lifeless matter – something that had to happen before the process of biological evolution could begin. The controversy over Intelligent Design has so far focused mainly on whether the evolution of life since its beginnings can be explained entirely by natural selection and other non-purposive causes. Meyer takes up the prior question of how the immensely complex and exquisitely functional chemical structure of DNA, which cannot be explained by natural selection because it makes natural selection possible, could have originated without an intentional cause. He examines the history and present state of research on non-purposive chemical explanations of the origin of life, and argues that the available evidence offers no prospect of a credible naturalistic alternative to the hypothesis of an intentional cause. Meyer is a Christian, but atheists, and theists who believe God never intervenes in the natural world, will be instructed by his careful presentation of this fiendishly difficult problem."
Atheist philosopher of science Bradley Monton has defended the idea that ID is a scientific theory in his book "Seeking God in Science: Atheist defends Intelligent Design"
Note that all of these criticisms against naturalism and ontological materialism are not based on psi or survival evidence. They stand in themselves as separate and independent arguments against naturalism (but if you add psi or survival evidence to the equation, the naturalist worldview would be totally destroyed and crushed. This is why desperate but smart naturalists have to suppress, misrepresent and debunk that kind of research with all they got)
When confronted with all of these criticisms, many naturalists tend to get defensive and desperate; then cognitive dissonance sets in and elaborate and ad hoc attempts to rationalize their intellectually self-defeating, irrational and inconsistent worldview gives us even more arguments against them.
My prediction: metaphysical naturalism will be a minoritary position in academy in the future. And it won't occur due to the criticisms of Christian philosophers or other supernaturalists, but by the criticism of conscious, rational, reflective and honest naturalists themselves.
When it occurs (and perhaps we have to wait 50 or more years to see that), we'll live in a new enlightening era, where the materialism-based oscurantism (which denies consciousness, objective values, ultimate purposes and everything that is essentially important to human beings) will be widely recognized as an intellectual fraud, and the spiritual aspects of human beings will be studied with an open mind, and without ideological prejudices sold as "science".
The full potential of human beings, their spiritual nature and its meaning or place in this universe will be a matter subject to rigorous scientific exploration by mainstream academy.
It's only a matter of time.
And when that occurs, many naturalists will realize that, after all, the Naturalistic Emperor was naked...
Links of interest:
-Naturalist David Macarthur's paper "Naturalism and Skepticism"
-Naturalist philosopher Alex Rosemberg's paper "The Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality"
-My post on Thomas Nagel and the Fear of God.
-Materialist philosopher William Lycan's paper on dualism.
-Christian Philosopher Peter Williams' paper "Atheists against Darwinism"
-Alvin Plantinga's paper "Against Materialism"
-My post on Secular Humanism.
-My post on skeptic and naturalist Richard Wiseman's concession that remote viewing is proven
-Mathematician Russell W. Howell's paper Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problems for Naturalism?
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