In his book "Sense and Goodness Without God", historian, atheist, skeptic and metaphysical naturalist Richard Carrier wrote an argument for God's nonexistence which is truthly amazing for its extreme childishness, irrelevance and philosophical unsophistication :
"Since there is no observable divine hand in nature as a causal process, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand. After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else" (Sense and Goodness Without God, p. 273. Emphasis n blue added).
I'd doubt that a trained philosopher, or at least any careful thinker, would be convinced or impressed by an argument like that, let alone to attempt to defend it or justify it with any clever rhetoric or fallacy. Even a hard-core atheist, provided he's careful enough, would be ashamed of an argument like that.
Some of the obvious objections for that argument:
1-If God exists, he's immaterial and supernatural. Therefore, He's not part of nature and, as consequence, by definition, a "divine hand" won't be found IN nature as a causal process.
2-But even if that divine hand would exist in nature as a causal process, it wouldn't be observable, because it is not material (and therefore, it cannot possibly impress or affect our senses).
3-Therefore, given point 1 and 2, the conclusion "it's reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand" is a silly non-sequitur. It would be logical only if God were a natural observable process (and therefore, not a supernatural entity). But this is not the God that Christians and other theists have in mind. As consequence, Carrier's argument is based on a straw man and it's irrelevant.
4-God, as understood by most theists, is not a process, but an entity (more specifically, a Being). Conflating an entity with a process reveals unability to draw accurate conceptual metaphysical distinctions and it's evidence of Carrier's lack of philosophical training.
5-The implication of Carrier's argument is that we're justified to accept the existence only of observable things or processes (therefore, if something is non-observable, it's reasonable to conclude that it doesn't exist).
But it's false. Abstract objects, like propositions, concepts, numbers, and values argueably exist (even some metaphysical naturalists, even though inconsistent in my opinion, defend the objective existence of these abstract objects) but they're not observable (because they're conceptual, not physical).
Consciousness also exists, even though it is not observable (you can only observe its neural correlates). And observation, specially the scientific one, pressupose the existence of the (nonobservable) consciousness which is able to interpret and understand the things and processes being observed.
Moreover, science accepts the existence of (non-observable) theoretical entities which account for observable phenomena. But it's precisely what theists try to do when postulating God's existence: they're postulating a non-observable entity (God) in order to explain observable phenomena and experiences (e.g. the origin, order and fine tuning of the universe, the existence of natural laws, the reliability of our cognitive faculties, our moral experience, the existence of paranormal phenomena, near-death experiences and so forth).
6-Unable to defend his argument, he tries to persuade the reader with a false analogy (which in itself is fallacious too): "After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else"
This is a false analogy, because blue monkeys, provide they exist, would be material (only material things could have "colors", like the blue color.), but God is inmaterial. And being material or inmaterial is crucial to the argument, because both kinds of beings have wholly different properties, including (and this is key) the property of being observable or unobservable by human beings. Therefore, his analogy is false and irrelavant for his argument on God.
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we examine the "blue monkeys" argument in its merits (regardless of its relevance for the God question), it's clear the argument is clearly fallacious and, at best, is weak in extreme.
Read again: "that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures"
We can interpret that argument in two senses: one charitable and one uncharitable.
Charitably, the expression "no such creatures" would refer to blue monkeys with the property of "flying out my (Carrier) butt". Given that Carrier's butt is one of the many butts on existence, and given that the properties of blue monkeiys are not determined by Carrier's butt alone, we have to think that "such creatures" actually refers to blue monkeys with the property of flying out of people's butts (including but not limited to Carrier's butt)
But note that the reason for the conclusion about the non-existence of "such creatures" is that there are not such creatures flying out of Carrier's butt. Carrier calls this a "sufficient" reason to conclude the non-existence of such creatures.
And this is a clear non-sequitur. At most, his argument tell us that no "such creatures" are present in Carrier's butt, but it says nothing about such creatures existing on and flying out of other people butts. (Of course, most of you won't believe in the existence of such creatures; but not because they don't fly out of Carrier's butt, but because we have absolutely no reason to think that they exist. Things failing to fly out of Carrier's butt is not a general criterion of non-existence)
If such creatures exist, and they have the property of flying out of people's butts, the absence of such criatures in Carrier's specific butt wouldn't give us any reason to conclude they don't exist.
A less charitable interpretation would be that, with the expression "such creatures", Carrier is refering to blue monkeys in general. In this case, his argument would be a straighfoward falsehood, because many things exist which don't flying out of Carrier's butt (think in stars, shoes, books, CDs, countries, black holes, planes or your father).
Therefore, something "flying out of Carrier's butt" would be a sufficient reason to conclude the existence of that something; but the inverse, i.e. the absence of something flying out of Carrier's butt, by itself, give us absolutely no reason to conclude the nonexistence of something in general.
Even though this second interpretation is less charitable than the first one (and therefore, we should to prefer the first one), this second interpretation could be justified when we realize that Carrier adds in his argument the phrase "and so it is with anything else"
This seems to imply that his argument is not limited to blue monkeys with the property of flying of his butt, but with anything else (e.g. blue monkeys with other properties, chairs, books, universities, propositions, etc.).
It's clear that such argument is not only philosophically unsophisticated (in fact, I don't consider it a philosophical argument at all), but manifiestly ridiculous, childish and silly. To be fair with Carrier, he doesn't present that argument as the foundation or main argument of his book, nor his case for metaphysical naturalism rests on that ridiculous argument; but the fact he dared to write something like that in a book that pretends be a serious academic contribution to philosophy is revealing of Carrier's way of thinking (in fact Carrier believes in the possibility of afterlife and immortality inside a computer and other weird ideas like that; which by the way is consistent with mind-body dualism and inconsistent with the strong dependence of consciousness on the brain and the impossibility of immortality defended by some of Carrier's friends, like Keith Augustine, who rejects the immortality precisely on the grounds of the dependence of consciousness on the brain as shown by science).
No philosopher would have posed an argument like that in a book on serious philosophy. And no serious naturalist would accept it or would try to defend it.
The fact that some atheists are impressed with Carrier's book is more evidence for my hypothesis that many hard-core atheists are deeply irrational and that their cognitive faculties are seriously and permanently destroyed (= Jime's Iron Law)
"Since there is no observable divine hand in nature as a causal process, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand. After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else" (Sense and Goodness Without God, p. 273. Emphasis n blue added).
I'd doubt that a trained philosopher, or at least any careful thinker, would be convinced or impressed by an argument like that, let alone to attempt to defend it or justify it with any clever rhetoric or fallacy. Even a hard-core atheist, provided he's careful enough, would be ashamed of an argument like that.
Some of the obvious objections for that argument:
1-If God exists, he's immaterial and supernatural. Therefore, He's not part of nature and, as consequence, by definition, a "divine hand" won't be found IN nature as a causal process.
2-But even if that divine hand would exist in nature as a causal process, it wouldn't be observable, because it is not material (and therefore, it cannot possibly impress or affect our senses).
3-Therefore, given point 1 and 2, the conclusion "it's reasonable to conclude that there is no divine hand" is a silly non-sequitur. It would be logical only if God were a natural observable process (and therefore, not a supernatural entity). But this is not the God that Christians and other theists have in mind. As consequence, Carrier's argument is based on a straw man and it's irrelevant.
4-God, as understood by most theists, is not a process, but an entity (more specifically, a Being). Conflating an entity with a process reveals unability to draw accurate conceptual metaphysical distinctions and it's evidence of Carrier's lack of philosophical training.
5-The implication of Carrier's argument is that we're justified to accept the existence only of observable things or processes (therefore, if something is non-observable, it's reasonable to conclude that it doesn't exist).
But it's false. Abstract objects, like propositions, concepts, numbers, and values argueably exist (even some metaphysical naturalists, even though inconsistent in my opinion, defend the objective existence of these abstract objects) but they're not observable (because they're conceptual, not physical).
Consciousness also exists, even though it is not observable (you can only observe its neural correlates). And observation, specially the scientific one, pressupose the existence of the (nonobservable) consciousness which is able to interpret and understand the things and processes being observed.
Moreover, science accepts the existence of (non-observable) theoretical entities which account for observable phenomena. But it's precisely what theists try to do when postulating God's existence: they're postulating a non-observable entity (God) in order to explain observable phenomena and experiences (e.g. the origin, order and fine tuning of the universe, the existence of natural laws, the reliability of our cognitive faculties, our moral experience, the existence of paranormal phenomena, near-death experiences and so forth).
6-Unable to defend his argument, he tries to persuade the reader with a false analogy (which in itself is fallacious too): "After all, that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures, and so it is with anything else"
This is a false analogy, because blue monkeys, provide they exist, would be material (only material things could have "colors", like the blue color.), but God is inmaterial. And being material or inmaterial is crucial to the argument, because both kinds of beings have wholly different properties, including (and this is key) the property of being observable or unobservable by human beings. Therefore, his analogy is false and irrelavant for his argument on God.
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we examine the "blue monkeys" argument in its merits (regardless of its relevance for the God question), it's clear the argument is clearly fallacious and, at best, is weak in extreme.
Read again: "that there are no blue monkeys flying out my butt is sufficient reason to believe that there are no such creatures"
We can interpret that argument in two senses: one charitable and one uncharitable.
Charitably, the expression "no such creatures" would refer to blue monkeys with the property of "flying out my (Carrier) butt". Given that Carrier's butt is one of the many butts on existence, and given that the properties of blue monkeiys are not determined by Carrier's butt alone, we have to think that "such creatures" actually refers to blue monkeys with the property of flying out of people's butts (including but not limited to Carrier's butt)
But note that the reason for the conclusion about the non-existence of "such creatures" is that there are not such creatures flying out of Carrier's butt. Carrier calls this a "sufficient" reason to conclude the non-existence of such creatures.
And this is a clear non-sequitur. At most, his argument tell us that no "such creatures" are present in Carrier's butt, but it says nothing about such creatures existing on and flying out of other people butts. (Of course, most of you won't believe in the existence of such creatures; but not because they don't fly out of Carrier's butt, but because we have absolutely no reason to think that they exist. Things failing to fly out of Carrier's butt is not a general criterion of non-existence)
If such creatures exist, and they have the property of flying out of people's butts, the absence of such criatures in Carrier's specific butt wouldn't give us any reason to conclude they don't exist.
A less charitable interpretation would be that, with the expression "such creatures", Carrier is refering to blue monkeys in general. In this case, his argument would be a straighfoward falsehood, because many things exist which don't flying out of Carrier's butt (think in stars, shoes, books, CDs, countries, black holes, planes or your father).
Therefore, something "flying out of Carrier's butt" would be a sufficient reason to conclude the existence of that something; but the inverse, i.e. the absence of something flying out of Carrier's butt, by itself, give us absolutely no reason to conclude the nonexistence of something in general.
Even though this second interpretation is less charitable than the first one (and therefore, we should to prefer the first one), this second interpretation could be justified when we realize that Carrier adds in his argument the phrase "and so it is with anything else"
This seems to imply that his argument is not limited to blue monkeys with the property of flying of his butt, but with anything else (e.g. blue monkeys with other properties, chairs, books, universities, propositions, etc.).
It's clear that such argument is not only philosophically unsophisticated (in fact, I don't consider it a philosophical argument at all), but manifiestly ridiculous, childish and silly. To be fair with Carrier, he doesn't present that argument as the foundation or main argument of his book, nor his case for metaphysical naturalism rests on that ridiculous argument; but the fact he dared to write something like that in a book that pretends be a serious academic contribution to philosophy is revealing of Carrier's way of thinking (in fact Carrier believes in the possibility of afterlife and immortality inside a computer and other weird ideas like that; which by the way is consistent with mind-body dualism and inconsistent with the strong dependence of consciousness on the brain and the impossibility of immortality defended by some of Carrier's friends, like Keith Augustine, who rejects the immortality precisely on the grounds of the dependence of consciousness on the brain as shown by science).
No philosopher would have posed an argument like that in a book on serious philosophy. And no serious naturalist would accept it or would try to defend it.
The fact that some atheists are impressed with Carrier's book is more evidence for my hypothesis that many hard-core atheists are deeply irrational and that their cognitive faculties are seriously and permanently destroyed (= Jime's Iron Law)
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