This is part 6 of my fictional dialogues between a survivalist and a materialist.
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
Materialist: I'd like to discuss another good objection against dualism and, by implication, against the possibility of the afterlife.
Survivlist: Good.
Materialist: I'd like to call this objection "the causal closure of the physical world" objection against dualism.
According to this objection, if dualism is true, the soul would exert causal efficacy on the body. But it cannot be true, because the principle of causal closure of the physical world says that only physical causes exert causal influence on the physical world (Otherwise, a basic law of nature like the principle of energy conservation would be violated).
Therefore, if the soul is not physical, it's non-efficacious. And if it's efficacious, it's physical and thereby enterily explainable by materialism and physicalism, which would refute dualism.
As consequence, the soul as an nonphysical substance or entity doesn't and cannot exist and thereby has not causal influence at all. And by implication, it cannot survives physical death.
Survivalist: I understand your argument. But it's flawed on several grounds:
First, if the soul is causally non-efficacious, then it cannot be causally active on the body. And if it's true, then the soul (or consciousness, or mind) is not causally eficacious on adaptative behavior either; and if it's true, then consciousness (and rationality, which is part of it in the case of human beings) is invisible and irrelevant to natural selection (which favors adaptative behavior). Therefore, rational thinking (which only exist in conscious minds) wouldn't have any adaptative value at all.
As has written philosopher and neuroscientist Jeffrey Schwartz (in regards to "mental efforts" as a causally active entity not reducible to the brain): "Materialists may argue that although the experience of effort is caused by the brain's actitivity (as are all mental experience, in this view), it has no effect on the brain. If the brain changes, according to this argument, it is because the same brain events that generate the feeling of mental effort also act back on (other parts of) the brain; this intervining thing called "the feeling of mental effort", they might argue, is a mere side effect with no causal power of its own. But this sort of reasoning is inconsistent with evolutionary theory. The felt experience of willful effort would have no survival value if it didn't actually do something" (The Mind and the Brain, p. 318. Emphasis added)
A "mere side effect with no causal power of its own" wouldn't be seen or detected by natural selection, and therefore, it can't be argued that consciousness, the mind and its internal processes (like logical and rational thinking) were favored by natural selection due to their adaptative biological value.
And this refutes some of the objections against Alvin Plantinga's argument against naturalism. The conjuntion naturalism+evolution+materialism+nonefficacious of consciousness make your position essentially, positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational.
Second, the principle of the causal closure of the physical world begs the question against the existence of nonphysical things with causal influence. If dualism is true, then the causal closure principle is not true (or at least, not absolutely true in each case). So simply asserting that principle (which entails the falsehood of dualism) is not an logical argument against dualism.
Also, as has written philosopher Uwe Meixner: ""It is alleged again and again that the nonphysical causation of physical events is bound to violate received physics because it, allegedly, entails the violation of the law of the preservation of energy, or the violation of the law of the preservation ofmomentum. Repetition does not make false allegations any less false. First, in physics, the mentioned preservation laws are always asserted under the condition that the physical system with regard to which they are asserted is a socalled closed system: that no energy or momentum is coming into the system from entities that are outside of it, or is going out of the system to entities outside of it. Now, physics is silent on the question whether the entire physical world is a closed system. Moreover, it does not seem to be an analytic truth that the physical world is such a system. It follows that in order to have the nonphysical causation of physical events conflict with the preservation laws, it is necessary to go beyond physics and to assume the metaphysical hypothesis that the physical world is a closed system." (New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 18–19)
As a matter of fact, the principle of causal closure is a philosophical and metaphysical position. In fact, in wikipedia you can read the definition of the causal closure as "a metaphysical theory about the nature of causation in the physical realm with significant ramifications in the study of the mind."
But it's precisely a metaphysical position (i.e. dualism) what is at stake; so you can't assume as a premise of your argument against dualism a metaphysical position that entails the falsity of dualism, because you're guilty of begging the question (again!).
Materialist: I disagree. Leaving aside Plantinga's argument (which I consider already refuted by naturalists), I think the causal closure is justified by the evidence of all the sciences and it counts as an independent premise against dualism.
Survivalist: I disagree too. I don't think any naturalist has refuted Plantinga's argument with any nonquestiong begging objections. And some of the objectons to it are incompatible with the premises of consistent materialism (as explined above). So, they're merely sophistical ad hoc objections easily rebuttable and shown to be inconsistent with the premises that many naturalists and materialists defend in other contexts (this also give us some insights about the intellectual honesty of some of these individuals).
In any case, my argument doesn't rest on Plantinga's.
My point is that you beg the question, even when you assume that the evidence of all the sciences support your metaphysical principle of causal closure. In fact, some facts accepted by science don't support that principle:
-Cognitive Behavioural therapy assumes that changes in thoughts will be therapeutically beneficious and therefore causally efficacious. (This is why cognitive therapists try to change pattern of thinking, like beliefs, ideas, values, etc. to produce an effect and cause a change on the patient's condition)
-The placebo effect in medicine (which essentially and explicitly is defined in terms of the subjective belief of the patient, and how this subjective experience changes the body)
Also, parapsychology has evidence of the causal efficacy of consciousness on physical structures or objects.
So, if you were honest and would include ALL the evidence, you'll realize that your position is incorrect. You only include evidence that support your position, and dismiss or reinterpret (in terms favorable to your position) the evidence that refutes it. And you include only evidence favorable to your position because you believe, in advance, that dualism and survival cannot be true.
Materialist: I don't think so. And we're discussed in the previous dialogues why I think your argument are wrong.
Survivalist: Actually, I think I've proved that your arguments and objections are, at best, unconlusive and unconcinving and, at worst, clearly fallacious and false.
Materialist: Let's the readers to decide that.
Survivalist: I agree.
But let's to continue with our discussion in another moment.
Materialist: Fine.
Survivalist: Just think hard about all of these exchanges, otherwise we're wasting our time here.
TO BE CONTINUED...
Previous parts of this dialogue:
-Part 1
-Part 2
-Part 3
-Part 4
-Part 5
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