Some materialists and metaphysical naturalists have argued that the concomitant variation between consciousness and the brain (i.e. mental states correlate and change with brain states) proves, or strongly support the thesis that, the brain "causes or produces" the mind. Therefore, after death, the mind will dissapear.
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
Their argument is that, when issue is one of probability, causality is precisely what concomitant variation or conjuntion implies (actually, concomitant variation doesn't imply causality, because two events could vary concomitantly without being causally connected. But let's to pass this obvious objection, and assume for the sake of argument Hume's concept of causation) .
One of Hume's relevant texts on survival of consciousness mentioned by naturalists is this: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death"
The basic assumption of the argument is that, given that we observe concomitant variation of mental states and brain states (specifically, when the brain changes, the mind changes), the brain causes the mind.
Let's to examine this argument:
1-The argument is arguebly incompatible with Hume's own radical empiricist philosophy, because the latter doesn't have any ontological commitments, and for this reason, causality is in Hume's philosophy only as relationship existing in THOUGHT, not in things themselves.
According to Hume: "A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other" (Treatise of the Human Nature, p. 170. Emphasis in blue added)
Note that Hume's conception of causality refers to the IDEAS that the human mind forms when it perceives sucession of events or objects; but the causality doesn't exist in the things or events in themselves.
Therefore, causality is not a necessary (metaphysical) connection between things, there is not such thing as an ontological and necessary causality. The latter point about necessity is made explicit by Hume when, refering to the essence of necessity, he said that it "is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects" (p. 160)
Please, read carefully the last Hume's assertion and think about it. This is key to understand this post.
2-If Hume is right, then the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in reality itself (i.e. between consciousness and the brain), but only in our mind (as ideas).
3-But if 2 is true, how the hell can Hume rationally assert that after death the mind (consciousness) will dissolve?
Consciousness would dissolve after death only IF consciousness is ACTUALLY produced by the brain, regardless of whether we believe such thing or any other. In other words, consciousness will dissapear after death only if ontological materialism is true.
In other words, only if consciousness is actually (ontologically) caused and produced by the brain, we can rationally assert that consciousness will, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, dissapear after death.
But if the causal connection between consciousness and the brain doesn't exist in the things themselves (in this case, in the relationships of consciousness with the brain), but only in our minds (as ideas), then we have no reason to assert that consciousness will dissapear after death, because the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.
4-Given 3, we know that consciousness will be extinguised after death only if ontological materialism is true.
But ontological materialism is a metaphysical position (i.e. a doctrine about the real and ontological connections of mind with the brain), and Hume's philosophy, being radically empiricist and phenomenalist (based on the perception of phenomena), can't draw metaphysical conclusions about the real (metaphysical) connections of the mind with the brain, because such causal connections ONLY EXIST IN THE MIND (not in things themselves).
This suffices to show that Hume's conclusion about the dissolution of consciousness after death ("The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death") is clearly inconsistent with his own philosophical empiricist-phenomenalist premises.
Ideas by themselves (and this is what causality is in Hume's philosophy) cannot make consciousness dissapear after death, without implying an actual, real, metaphysical connection and dependence of consciousness on the brain (=ontological materialism), which is contrary to Hume's own philosophy about necessity of causation (="is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects").
Something that exist in the mind (as ideas) alone and NOT IN THE OBJECTS is not a rational basis to conclude what will happen to the objects in question (i.e. consciousness) after death, no more that believing in a spiritual world is a sufficient basis to infer that a spiritual world actually exist. (Your ideas about the spiritual world doesn't cause nor imply nor enable us rationally conclude the existence or non-existence of such spiritual world, because your ideas exist only in your mind, while the spiritual world exist or not exist regardless of your ideas about it)
In conclusion, materialists and metaphysical naturalists who use Hume's conclusion on the afterlife fail to see the problems and inconsistencies mentioned above; they infer metaphysical conclusions from Hume's conception of causation which doesn't have any metaphysical commitment, because it doesn't exist in objects, but only in the mind.
Therefore, concomitant variation of mental states and brain states in Hume's philosophy give us no reason to conclude that the mind is caused (in the ontological relevant sense, i.e. produced = materialism) by the brain and that, as consequence, after death the mind will dissapear.
So talking about probability is a red herring, because what's at stake is the metaphysical intrepretation of the observed concomitant variation of the mind with the brain. And the concomitant variation as such, existing only in the mind (Hume's concept of causation) is irrelevant to settle the metaphysical question of the actual, objective, mind-independent nature of the mind-brain connection, specially when the observed concomitant variation is compatible with at least two contrary and competing metaphysical positions: the production hypothesis and the transmission hypothesis.
Do you understand why I think that many metaphysical naturalists and materialists are positively, demostrably and irrefutably irrational? Their logical inconsistencies have no limits; they can argue simultaneously for the truth of logically inconsistent theses and propositions, provided it supports naturalism. And they can't see any inconsistency at all in their position.
Their only (and most basic) motivation is to exclude the idea of God, even if they have to do that with fallacies and crude logical inconsistencies.
Metaphysical naturalism, when motived by such negative emotions like fear of, angry and hate to God (i.e. to the idea of God's existence) impairs and destroys the ability to think rationally. And this irrationality is confirmed by the fact they cannot see their own fallacies and inconsistences, what make any attempt to argue with them a waste of time.
And by the way... Merry Christmas to all of you, especially to my dear metaphysical naturalists' readers.
Links of interest:
-My post on Hume's argument against miracles.
-Chris Carter's paper on consciousness.
-Philosopher James Ross' must read paper "The Immaterial Aspects of Thought"
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