Christian philosopher Peter Williams, the author of the excellent book "A Sceptic's Guide to Atheism" (a powerful, sophisticated and erudite critique of contemporary atheism), has proposed a modified version of the standard formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.
Before I comment in Williams' version, I'd like to say that I agree to the idea that 1)The Universe had a cause; and 2)The cause is not explainable in a purely metaphysical naturalistic terms (but I'm not sure if that cause is the God of Christianity). In other words, I think the idea that the universe had a cause is more plausible than its denial.
But in this post, I'll try to do a critical examination Williams' modified argument, with the objective of making explicit its possible weaknesses. If Williams' version is defensible and stands to rigurous critical scrutiny, his argument would force any rational person to accept his conclusion. Let's to see if it stands to some criticism.
Williams' modified version of the Kalam argument is this:
1. Every physical event must have a cause
2. There was a first physical event of the universe
3. Therefore that first physical event of the universe must have had a cause (and that cause must have been nonphysical – it cannot have been physical because it cannot have come before the first physical event!)
One problem with Williams' first premise is that it has a normative character, not a descriptive one. The use of the verb "must" seems to imply an ought statement, an obligation, a command, a "must be the case", a prescription, not a description of reality. And it seems to impose on reality a certain mode of functioning on purely arbitrary grounds.
So, Williams' version of the Kalam argument avoids Craig's aparent or real fallacy of equivocation, but in its place, introduce a normative and prescriptive proposition which is improper for a metaphysical description of reality (and for an argument that pretends to say something factual about reality). So, I'd suggest to Williams to change "must" by "has": "every physical event has a cause", because this formulation is, in my opinion, more defensible on scientific and philosophical grounds.
One consequence of Williams' normative proposition is that, if my criticism is right, that premise couldn't be refuted by any empirical finding, because normative claims prescribe a "must be", but not describe an actual state of affairs on the real world.
For example, If I say "You must love your parents", such statement is not refuted by the fact that, actually, you don't love them. Even if you don't actually love them, you should, because "you must love them" is a prescription about how you must feel about your parents, not a description of your actual feelings. So, that normative proposition would be valid regardless of whether you love them or not.
Therefore, even if there are exist physical events without a cause, this fact would be irrelevant for Williams' first premise, because a believer in such premise would have to stick to the normative belief that such event "must have a cause" even if it is never actually found.
As consequence, Williams' first premise imposes on him (and in any person who wants to defend such version) an extreme burden of proof because he has to defend and justify the normative nature of his version of the Kalam argument (instead of Craig's descriptive metaphysical version of it) and its relevance for an actual state of affairs in the real world.
Also, a critic of the Kalam argument could consider Williams' version to be simply irrelevant: what's in stake is if the principle of causality has (actually) an universal validity on metaphysical and/or epistemological grounds; or whether, instead, it has factual exceptions which destroys the universality of that principle, making the beginning of the universe a possible candidate of a physical event without a cause. The critic of the Kalam doesn't have, in principle, to reply to normative or prescriptive propositions about what "must be the case" regarding the physical events.
Williams could reply that his premise is not arbitrary, and the normativity of the principle of causation is warranted, because the principle of causality is essential to science and rational thinking in general, i.e. to explain the phenomena and events in terms of causal mechanisms, physical laws and previous states of affairs. Without causality, we couldn't explain any physical event in terms of universal natural laws which would rule such events. Such events would be only "brute facts", irreductible phenomena beyond any rational and scientific understanding and explanation. They would be almost a "miracle".
This reply is correct and reasonable, but not so much as a normative-prescriptive rule (implied by Williams' version), but as a metaphysical principle of the real world necessary to any rational and scientific explanation of whatever physical phenomena is being studied.
If Williams argues that causality is not only metaphysical, but methodologically normative for science too, then the critic of the Kalam could reply that such rule is only a working and useful postulate valid to explain phenomena in the universe; but such rule is neutral (or even invalid) to explain the "first physical event", because by definition not previous physical event could exist as cause of the universe. Therefore, the normative rule in question cannot be extended, without argument, to the latter case of nonphysical causation.
And this bring us to another problem, this time with Williams' conclusion. Physical events are caused by other previous physical events. Broadly speaking, an event is a change of state of a physical thing (object/entity); and a state is the totality of the properties of a thing (object or entity) in a specific time.
This diagram shows the above idea:
Entity (object/thing) -------------> State (totality of the properties of that object in time X) ---------- > Event (changes in the state of object X; i.e change of the properties of such entity).
(This diagram implies that events always requires and occur in time. Therefore an a-temporal event seem to be hard to understand)
In that diagram, the concept of event is logically posterior to the concept of state, and the latter is dependent of the concept of entity (object). Physical causality functions for physical events, and this makes plausible Williams' first premise (if fomulated in a descriptive way, i.e. "Every physical event HAS a cause").
But the critic of the Kalam argument could concede Williams' premise with one important qualification: Every physical event known has a PHYSICAL cause. Therefore, the unknown origin of this universe had to be physical (a parallel universe or dimension, for example?), or doesn't have any physical cause at all (because not previous physical event existed before the universe, so no physical event could be the cause of it) or be itself self-caused (whatever it means).
But in any case, God couldn't be the cause, because God is not physical and, most importantly, God is not an event! (Therefore, the qualification introduced by the critic would destroy Williams' argument)
Finally, in my opinion, Williams' first premise (in his descriptive version mentioned above) is still open to the objection that quantum mechanics has demostrated, or made plausible, the idea that some physical events are "spontaneous" and argueably uncaused. Given that Williams' premise is limited to "physical events" (not to "whatever begins to exist", which is Craig's broad version) he'll find himself in the incomfortable position to explain how putative uncaused quantum physical events have an actual quantum physical cause.
In Summary:
1-Williams' premise could be attacked due to its arguably normative structure, instead of a descriptive one. It says nothing factual about causation, only imposes on physical events the command of having a previous cause (regardless of whether such cause actually exist or not).
2-If Williams' premise is interpreted in a descriptive way, it could be only (or mainly) defended in regards to physical causation of physical events. And the critic could argue that there is not certified or noncontroversial instances of a physical event caused by a nonphysical event, property or thing (of course, dualists like Williams and me, to whom the mind is nonphysical and causally efficacious on the body, that objection doesn't pose a problem; but to use such idea as part of the Kalam argument, Williams would have to make a case for the nonmateriality of the mind and then include such conclusion in his defence of his first premise. Likewise, I think the best studied parapsychological phenomena strongly supports the idea of nonphysical causation; but to use these evidences as part of his case, Williams would have to defend them first)
3-Therefore (it could be argued) Williams' premise, even if accepted by a critic for the sake of the argument, is irrelevant for the conclusion that a nonphysical cause (like God) caused the beginning universe, because God is inmaterial and (what's relevant for this point) is not a physical event (God, if He exists, belong to a wholly different metaphysical category: He would be a substance, the ultimate one; not an event).
My opinion is that these objections are not fatal to Williams' argument, but they're reasonably defensible. I think that Williams could defend his modified (normative) version of the Kalam argument through the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causality (see references below). In that case, the principle of causality (including specially formal and final causes) would be a metaphysical necessity, and in this case the expression "every physical event must have a cause" would makes complete sense.
Recommended reading:
-For a contemporary, sophisticated and powerful defense of the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causation and metaphysics in general, see Edward Feser's lastest book "Aquinas"; and especially David Oderberg's brilliant and original book "Real Essentialism".
-For an explanation of Aristotle's cosmological argument and ideas on causes, see this article by Christian philosopher David Wood.
-Peter Williams' blog on philosophy, ID and Christianity.
-For nonreligious philosophical defense dualism and the nonmateriality of the mind, see David Lund's book "The Conscious Self" and especially his lastest one "Persons, Souls and Death: A Philosophical Investigation of an Afterlife".
-For a defense of the immateriality of thought and consciousness, see James Ross's paper "The immaterial aspects of thought" (Some dualist philosophers consider this paper one of the most important and overlooked contributions to philosophy of mind in the 20th century)
-As example of physical causation by intention and other subjective aspects of the mind, see noetic scientist Dean Radin's books "The Conscious Universe" and "Entangled Minds"; and this lecture:
Before I comment in Williams' version, I'd like to say that I agree to the idea that 1)The Universe had a cause; and 2)The cause is not explainable in a purely metaphysical naturalistic terms (but I'm not sure if that cause is the God of Christianity). In other words, I think the idea that the universe had a cause is more plausible than its denial.
But in this post, I'll try to do a critical examination Williams' modified argument, with the objective of making explicit its possible weaknesses. If Williams' version is defensible and stands to rigurous critical scrutiny, his argument would force any rational person to accept his conclusion. Let's to see if it stands to some criticism.
Williams' modified version of the Kalam argument is this:
1. Every physical event must have a cause
2. There was a first physical event of the universe
3. Therefore that first physical event of the universe must have had a cause (and that cause must have been nonphysical – it cannot have been physical because it cannot have come before the first physical event!)
One problem with Williams' first premise is that it has a normative character, not a descriptive one. The use of the verb "must" seems to imply an ought statement, an obligation, a command, a "must be the case", a prescription, not a description of reality. And it seems to impose on reality a certain mode of functioning on purely arbitrary grounds.
So, Williams' version of the Kalam argument avoids Craig's aparent or real fallacy of equivocation, but in its place, introduce a normative and prescriptive proposition which is improper for a metaphysical description of reality (and for an argument that pretends to say something factual about reality). So, I'd suggest to Williams to change "must" by "has": "every physical event has a cause", because this formulation is, in my opinion, more defensible on scientific and philosophical grounds.
One consequence of Williams' normative proposition is that, if my criticism is right, that premise couldn't be refuted by any empirical finding, because normative claims prescribe a "must be", but not describe an actual state of affairs on the real world.
For example, If I say "You must love your parents", such statement is not refuted by the fact that, actually, you don't love them. Even if you don't actually love them, you should, because "you must love them" is a prescription about how you must feel about your parents, not a description of your actual feelings. So, that normative proposition would be valid regardless of whether you love them or not.
Therefore, even if there are exist physical events without a cause, this fact would be irrelevant for Williams' first premise, because a believer in such premise would have to stick to the normative belief that such event "must have a cause" even if it is never actually found.
As consequence, Williams' first premise imposes on him (and in any person who wants to defend such version) an extreme burden of proof because he has to defend and justify the normative nature of his version of the Kalam argument (instead of Craig's descriptive metaphysical version of it) and its relevance for an actual state of affairs in the real world.
Also, a critic of the Kalam argument could consider Williams' version to be simply irrelevant: what's in stake is if the principle of causality has (actually) an universal validity on metaphysical and/or epistemological grounds; or whether, instead, it has factual exceptions which destroys the universality of that principle, making the beginning of the universe a possible candidate of a physical event without a cause. The critic of the Kalam doesn't have, in principle, to reply to normative or prescriptive propositions about what "must be the case" regarding the physical events.
Williams could reply that his premise is not arbitrary, and the normativity of the principle of causation is warranted, because the principle of causality is essential to science and rational thinking in general, i.e. to explain the phenomena and events in terms of causal mechanisms, physical laws and previous states of affairs. Without causality, we couldn't explain any physical event in terms of universal natural laws which would rule such events. Such events would be only "brute facts", irreductible phenomena beyond any rational and scientific understanding and explanation. They would be almost a "miracle".
This reply is correct and reasonable, but not so much as a normative-prescriptive rule (implied by Williams' version), but as a metaphysical principle of the real world necessary to any rational and scientific explanation of whatever physical phenomena is being studied.
If Williams argues that causality is not only metaphysical, but methodologically normative for science too, then the critic of the Kalam could reply that such rule is only a working and useful postulate valid to explain phenomena in the universe; but such rule is neutral (or even invalid) to explain the "first physical event", because by definition not previous physical event could exist as cause of the universe. Therefore, the normative rule in question cannot be extended, without argument, to the latter case of nonphysical causation.
And this bring us to another problem, this time with Williams' conclusion. Physical events are caused by other previous physical events. Broadly speaking, an event is a change of state of a physical thing (object/entity); and a state is the totality of the properties of a thing (object or entity) in a specific time.
This diagram shows the above idea:
Entity (object/thing) -------------> State (totality of the properties of that object in time X) ---------- > Event (changes in the state of object X; i.e change of the properties of such entity).
(This diagram implies that events always requires and occur in time. Therefore an a-temporal event seem to be hard to understand)
In that diagram, the concept of event is logically posterior to the concept of state, and the latter is dependent of the concept of entity (object). Physical causality functions for physical events, and this makes plausible Williams' first premise (if fomulated in a descriptive way, i.e. "Every physical event HAS a cause").
But the critic of the Kalam argument could concede Williams' premise with one important qualification: Every physical event known has a PHYSICAL cause. Therefore, the unknown origin of this universe had to be physical (a parallel universe or dimension, for example?), or doesn't have any physical cause at all (because not previous physical event existed before the universe, so no physical event could be the cause of it) or be itself self-caused (whatever it means).
But in any case, God couldn't be the cause, because God is not physical and, most importantly, God is not an event! (Therefore, the qualification introduced by the critic would destroy Williams' argument)
Finally, in my opinion, Williams' first premise (in his descriptive version mentioned above) is still open to the objection that quantum mechanics has demostrated, or made plausible, the idea that some physical events are "spontaneous" and argueably uncaused. Given that Williams' premise is limited to "physical events" (not to "whatever begins to exist", which is Craig's broad version) he'll find himself in the incomfortable position to explain how putative uncaused quantum physical events have an actual quantum physical cause.
In Summary:
1-Williams' premise could be attacked due to its arguably normative structure, instead of a descriptive one. It says nothing factual about causation, only imposes on physical events the command of having a previous cause (regardless of whether such cause actually exist or not).
2-If Williams' premise is interpreted in a descriptive way, it could be only (or mainly) defended in regards to physical causation of physical events. And the critic could argue that there is not certified or noncontroversial instances of a physical event caused by a nonphysical event, property or thing (of course, dualists like Williams and me, to whom the mind is nonphysical and causally efficacious on the body, that objection doesn't pose a problem; but to use such idea as part of the Kalam argument, Williams would have to make a case for the nonmateriality of the mind and then include such conclusion in his defence of his first premise. Likewise, I think the best studied parapsychological phenomena strongly supports the idea of nonphysical causation; but to use these evidences as part of his case, Williams would have to defend them first)
3-Therefore (it could be argued) Williams' premise, even if accepted by a critic for the sake of the argument, is irrelevant for the conclusion that a nonphysical cause (like God) caused the beginning universe, because God is inmaterial and (what's relevant for this point) is not a physical event (God, if He exists, belong to a wholly different metaphysical category: He would be a substance, the ultimate one; not an event).
My opinion is that these objections are not fatal to Williams' argument, but they're reasonably defensible. I think that Williams could defend his modified (normative) version of the Kalam argument through the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causality (see references below). In that case, the principle of causality (including specially formal and final causes) would be a metaphysical necessity, and in this case the expression "every physical event must have a cause" would makes complete sense.
Recommended reading:
-For a contemporary, sophisticated and powerful defense of the Aristotelian Thomistic conception of causation and metaphysics in general, see Edward Feser's lastest book "Aquinas"; and especially David Oderberg's brilliant and original book "Real Essentialism".
-For an explanation of Aristotle's cosmological argument and ideas on causes, see this article by Christian philosopher David Wood.
-Peter Williams' blog on philosophy, ID and Christianity.
-For nonreligious philosophical defense dualism and the nonmateriality of the mind, see David Lund's book "The Conscious Self" and especially his lastest one "Persons, Souls and Death: A Philosophical Investigation of an Afterlife".
-For a defense of the immateriality of thought and consciousness, see James Ross's paper "The immaterial aspects of thought" (Some dualist philosophers consider this paper one of the most important and overlooked contributions to philosophy of mind in the 20th century)
-As example of physical causation by intention and other subjective aspects of the mind, see noetic scientist Dean Radin's books "The Conscious Universe" and "Entangled Minds"; and this lecture:
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