In other posts, I've discussed the so-called "location problem" faced by scientific naturalists. As mentioned, first-rate naturalists have recognized the problem and, since they find theism wholly impalatable, they try hard to find a solution for the problem inside the naturalist framework.Commenting on this, world-renown naturalist philosopher John Searle (one of the most important and influential analytic philosophers in the world) has written:
There is exactly one overriding question in contemporary philosophy...How do we fit in it?... How can we square this self-conception of ourselfves as mindful, meaning creating, free, rational, etc. agents with an universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles?(Freedom and Neurobiology, pp. 4-5)
The key word in Searle's argument is "entirely". According to scientific naturalism (metaphysical naturalism), the natural world is ENTIRELY physical. And by "physical" we have to understand what physical science (the most basic of all the sciences) tells about matter: Physical matter is mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, mechanical, non-moral, non-ethical, non-conscious, etc.
But if it is what physical things are, and we're physical things, then we're necessarily mindless, meaningless, etc. But our self-perception is different: We are conscious (at least, it seems to be the case), rational, free, moral, etc. Therefore, scientific naturalism is and HAVE TO BE, false.
In order to remain consistent, naturalists have to deny the objective existence of these things (e.g. arguing that we "seem" to be free, but ultimately we're not; or moral values "seem to exist", but actually they don't, they're illusions of our minds projected into the objective world).
This is why scientific naturalists (and atheists who believe in this worldview, if are consistent) have to deny the objective existence of consciousness, free will, objective moral values, objective purposes or meaning and so forth.
Many people don't understand that, because their analysis is too superficial. They simply assume that given that they have strong moral beliefs, or a strong sense of their own rationality, then somehow these things have to be compatible with naturalism. They don't understand that the basic impersonalistic postulates and premises of naturalism implies the non-existence of these person-relative properties.
This is why many atheists don't understand, for example, the moral argument for God's existence. They misrepresent the argument as saying that God arbitrarily commands this or that, or that a moral statement like "Torturing little children is bad" is true, regardless of whether God exists or not.
They don't understand that in their naturalistic worldview, which is essentially impersonalistic, "bad" is a moral, and hence a person-relative property which cannot exist objectively in a world " that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles", and "little children" are conceived in non-personalistic ways as special configurations of matter (biological matter which essentially is not different than other physical things). So, arguing that torturing little children is "bad" or "wrong" (in any actual, ontological sense of the word) is clearly in variance with impersonalistic worldviews, and certainly the existence or non-existence of God is relevant to this problem, because if God exists, then the fabric of reality is ultimately personalistic and the person-relative properties like moral ones makes sense. If God doesn't exist, then is not clear that the fabric of reality is personalistic (even if contingent and accidental "persons", evolved randomly from brute matter, like you or me happens to exist) and in this case moral and other person-relative properties become inexplicable and the suspicion of naturalists regarding the existence of consciuousness, minds, free of the will, etc. become more plausible and justified.
For example, in her debate with William Lane Craig, prominent atheist moral philosopher Louise Anthony said "The universe has no purpose, but I do… I have lots of purposes…. It makes a lot of difference to a lot of people and to me what I do. That gives my life significance… The only thing that would make it [sacrificing her own life] insignificant would be if my children’s lives were insignificant. And, boy you better not say that!"
In reply to her, Craig responded, “But Louise, on atheism, their lives are insignificant.” Anthony interjected, “Not to me!”
Many people predictably misinterprets this exchange, because they're too superficial. They misunderstand Craig's reply as saying that "Atheists cannot consider their children's lives significant". This is NOT Craig's point. (In fact, I'm sure that mosts atheists, even the irrationalistic ones affected by Jime's Iron Law, consider their children's lives as significant, and probably Craig would agree with this).
Craig's point is NOT about the moral beliefs of atheists, but about the ontological foundation (in the fabric of reality) of those beliefs. If as Searle says, the world is entirely and essentially meaningless, then the belief that something is meaningful (e.g. the lives of Anthony's children) is FALSE. The fact that theists and atheists stick to this false belief won't change this objective fact, if naturalism is true.
This is why Craig's reply to Anthony has to be understood properly as saying: "In atheism (more specifically, in the most plausible and scientific form of atheism known as naturalism), given its essentially impersonalistic conception of everyhting what exists, the concept of "significant" or "meaningful" make no sense in any objective sense".
If Anthony were consistent, she would agree with Craig's point, because her worldview has exactly these implications.
In fact, note Anthony's inept objection. She concedes that there is not objective purpose or meaning in the universe (which is Craig's entire point!): "The universe has no purpose", but then she asserts her subjective purposes as if they're relevant to Craig's point: " but I do… I have lots of purposes"
Note the reference to personal subjects "I", "me", etc.
Note carefully that her reply doesn't refute the point made by Craig, since he is not arguing that atheists don't have subjective purposes. What he's arguing (in full consistence with the features of naturalism recognized by contemporary naturalists like Searle and Anthony) is that if naturalism is true there is not OBJECTIVE purposes or meanings. And this is perfectly compatible with Louise's subjective purposes regarding her children, with Marcus Borg's subjective purposes of destroying the exclusivistic view of Jesus on behalf of religious pluralism, with Kobe Bryant's subjective purposes of being the NBA MVP this year, with Jime Sayaka's subjective purposes of making clear my arguments for my readers, with the atheistic readers' subjective purposes of reading uncharitably and disagreeing with whatever I write here, or with William Lane Craig's subjective purposes of defending traditional Christianity.
The existence of a bunch of subjective purposes in people's minds don't imply the existence of objective purposes in the fabric of reality.
I'm astonished by the replies of first-rate atheistic moral philosophers when faced with a sophisticated defense of the moral argument for God's existence. They simply don't understand the argument, or they affect to misunderstand it (I'm sure some of them understand it, because in their books they themselves sometimes highlights the problems of objective moral values in a physicalist world... they simply affect to misunderstand the argument in order to make naturalism to appear stronger when debating with theists in front of audiences ignorant of their own academic work).
Their weak replies, which are incompatible with their own actual philosophical views, is evidence for the soundness of contemporary versions of the moral argument, as properly understood in its broad metaphysical context.
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