The purpose of this post is to show that many of the objections formulated by atheists against arguments for God's existence, are based on a wrong concept of God (or more exactly, a concept of God that the classical theist rejects).
The main objection used by atheists against the notion that objective moral values can be only plausibly grounded in God is the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma, posed by philosopher Plato against an ethics based on (the finite) gods of Greece (note that these finite gods have nothing to do with the infinite God of classical theism, which is defined as the greatest possible being, i.e. a being with superlative-maximal attributes like necessary existence, eternity, all-knowing, all-powerful,. the ground of reality and so forth).
The way to understand what "the greastest possible being" means is simple: If you can think coherently in a greater being than God, then THAT being would be God!. By "greatest" we're talking about qualitative aspects, not quantitative ones. For example, which is greastest, to be the creator of everything or just of a part of it? Obviously the former, because it entails a greatest and ilimited creative power.
Keep in mind this concept of the greatest possible being, because it is essential to the arguments of this post.
The atheistic objection against moral values dependent on God is often formulated in the form of a question: Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it’s good? If the former, then the good is arbitrary; if the latter, then the "good" is independent of God. And both options are supposed to be problematic for the theist (hence, the "dilemma").
I'm astonished by the constant use of this objection by atheists (as if it were a powerful objection, similar to the "What caused God?" objection), because it reveals their deep misunderstanding of the moral argument for God's existence and is telling of their superficiality and wrong concept of God. They have in their minds a strawman.
Note that the first horn of the dilemma (The good is good because God "wills" it) misconstrues the moral argument. This argument doesn't say that "the good" depends on God's "will", it simply says that it depends ultimately on God. In fact, most contemporary theists hold that "the good" is part of God himself, it is, the "good" is a essential property of God as the greatest possible being. It has nothing to do with God's "will" (hence, the charge of arbitrarity is based on a misunderstanding of the argument and the concept of God). Since God cannot change his nature, he cannot change "the good", and hence what is good or bad is not a matter of God's will even if it depends ontologically on God. Atheists, in their hostility to theism and intellectual superficiality, simply cannot get it.
Note that Plato was justified in formulating this argument against the finite gods of Greece, because these gods were voluntaristic finite gods (the Greeks didn't handled the notion of God as the greatest possible being, creator of all the reality. This is why after Plato, the neo-Platonic thinkers, influenced by classical theism, identified Plato's "Good" with God himself).
Note that the second horn of the dilemma (God wills something because it is good) doesn't imply that the good is independent of God: after all, God can will something because it conforms to God's nature (which is the source of the good). For example, God can will that you love other people or be rational, because it conforms with God's loving and rational nature.
But let that pass and let assume that this horn entails that the good is ontologically independent of God. In this case, the existence of the "good" itself (which is a person-relative property) becomes inexplicable. Person-relative properties are called like that precisely because they're connected or attached or dependent or referred to PERSONS. But the if the "good" itself exists objectively and independently of the most essential, necessary and fundamental person in the universe (God) and hence also independent of finite, contingent, non-necessary, less essential and fundamental persons (us), then it is hard to see exactly how such a property is essentially "person-relative". In fact, it would still exists in the absence of any person whatsoever.
On the other hand, it is not clear why God himself has to be submitted to an external standard that He has not created. It would entail that God is ontologically inferior to the "good" itself (in the sense that God created everything, except the good itself and more importantly God has to be submitted to the that standard of goodness in order to be himself qualify as "good", which is absurd).
Note that in this case, God's goodness is not the source of value, and hence not the creator of value. God's creative powers are limited in a matter so essential as the moral properties of existence, which seem clearly absurd for the greatest possible being which is supposed to be the GROUND OF REALITY.
It is not hard to see why atheists don't understand the above argument: they have a crude concept of God as a finite, contingent, created being (not of God as the greatest possible being) and this is why they keep repeating the Euthyphro Dilemma objection against the moral argument (or the more ridiculous "What caused God?" as an objection against the comsological argument).
Spiritually and intellecually, they are impaired to have a proper understanding of God (which, in passing, provide more evidence for Jime's Iron Law).
Atheists' concept of a finite God is evident in their caricatures and silly questions about God:
- "What caused God?" (which implies that God is a caused or created being or object)
-Dawkins' question "Who designed the designer?" (which implies that God is a designed object similar to my shoes or computer or cell phone)
-Silly comparisons of God with Pink Elephants or Spaguetti Monsters (which obviously are finite entities, unwhorty of being called the greatest possible being).
-Michael Shermer's inept definition of God as a being "relatively superior" than us (what would make any alien civilization more advanced than us to become a DEITY... which if discoveried by SETI or any other scientific means, would destroy Shermer's atheism since in Shermer's definition such aliens would be God and atheism is incompatible with the existence of any god = Shermer's advanced alien beings!).
In classical theism, these questions and caricatures of God make no sense, because God is not in the same category of created, finite, contingent, objects. Atheists simply cannot understand this due to spiritual and intellectual factors.
In classical and philosophical theism, God is the greatest possible being in the sense that he's ontologically above all created reality (including moral reality, if it exists) and whatever exists (moral reality, consciousness, spiritual dimensions, universes, spirits, etc.) is dependent ontologically on God. If something exists which doesn't depend on God, then God wouldn't be the greatest possible being and his creative power would be limted (hence, he would be a finite god).
A fine (and embarrassing) example of this typical misconception about God as a finite being is seen in Victor Stenger's parody of the ontological argument, appealing to a "ontological pizza", which he used in his debate with William Lane Craig. Since Stenger is clearly affected by Jime's Iron Law, he cannot see that he's showing publicly his stupidity, irrationality and misunderstanding of the ontologically argument in that parody:
The main objection used by atheists against the notion that objective moral values can be only plausibly grounded in God is the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma, posed by philosopher Plato against an ethics based on (the finite) gods of Greece (note that these finite gods have nothing to do with the infinite God of classical theism, which is defined as the greatest possible being, i.e. a being with superlative-maximal attributes like necessary existence, eternity, all-knowing, all-powerful,. the ground of reality and so forth).
The way to understand what "the greastest possible being" means is simple: If you can think coherently in a greater being than God, then THAT being would be God!. By "greatest" we're talking about qualitative aspects, not quantitative ones. For example, which is greastest, to be the creator of everything or just of a part of it? Obviously the former, because it entails a greatest and ilimited creative power.
Keep in mind this concept of the greatest possible being, because it is essential to the arguments of this post.
The atheistic objection against moral values dependent on God is often formulated in the form of a question: Is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it’s good? If the former, then the good is arbitrary; if the latter, then the "good" is independent of God. And both options are supposed to be problematic for the theist (hence, the "dilemma").
I'm astonished by the constant use of this objection by atheists (as if it were a powerful objection, similar to the "What caused God?" objection), because it reveals their deep misunderstanding of the moral argument for God's existence and is telling of their superficiality and wrong concept of God. They have in their minds a strawman.
Note that the first horn of the dilemma (The good is good because God "wills" it) misconstrues the moral argument. This argument doesn't say that "the good" depends on God's "will", it simply says that it depends ultimately on God. In fact, most contemporary theists hold that "the good" is part of God himself, it is, the "good" is a essential property of God as the greatest possible being. It has nothing to do with God's "will" (hence, the charge of arbitrarity is based on a misunderstanding of the argument and the concept of God). Since God cannot change his nature, he cannot change "the good", and hence what is good or bad is not a matter of God's will even if it depends ontologically on God. Atheists, in their hostility to theism and intellectual superficiality, simply cannot get it.
Note that Plato was justified in formulating this argument against the finite gods of Greece, because these gods were voluntaristic finite gods (the Greeks didn't handled the notion of God as the greatest possible being, creator of all the reality. This is why after Plato, the neo-Platonic thinkers, influenced by classical theism, identified Plato's "Good" with God himself).
Note that the second horn of the dilemma (God wills something because it is good) doesn't imply that the good is independent of God: after all, God can will something because it conforms to God's nature (which is the source of the good). For example, God can will that you love other people or be rational, because it conforms with God's loving and rational nature.
But let that pass and let assume that this horn entails that the good is ontologically independent of God. In this case, the existence of the "good" itself (which is a person-relative property) becomes inexplicable. Person-relative properties are called like that precisely because they're connected or attached or dependent or referred to PERSONS. But the if the "good" itself exists objectively and independently of the most essential, necessary and fundamental person in the universe (God) and hence also independent of finite, contingent, non-necessary, less essential and fundamental persons (us), then it is hard to see exactly how such a property is essentially "person-relative". In fact, it would still exists in the absence of any person whatsoever.
On the other hand, it is not clear why God himself has to be submitted to an external standard that He has not created. It would entail that God is ontologically inferior to the "good" itself (in the sense that God created everything, except the good itself and more importantly God has to be submitted to the that standard of goodness in order to be himself qualify as "good", which is absurd).
Note that in this case, God's goodness is not the source of value, and hence not the creator of value. God's creative powers are limited in a matter so essential as the moral properties of existence, which seem clearly absurd for the greatest possible being which is supposed to be the GROUND OF REALITY.
It is not hard to see why atheists don't understand the above argument: they have a crude concept of God as a finite, contingent, created being (not of God as the greatest possible being) and this is why they keep repeating the Euthyphro Dilemma objection against the moral argument (or the more ridiculous "What caused God?" as an objection against the comsological argument).
Spiritually and intellecually, they are impaired to have a proper understanding of God (which, in passing, provide more evidence for Jime's Iron Law).
Atheists' concept of a finite God is evident in their caricatures and silly questions about God:
- "What caused God?" (which implies that God is a caused or created being or object)
-Dawkins' question "Who designed the designer?" (which implies that God is a designed object similar to my shoes or computer or cell phone)
-Silly comparisons of God with Pink Elephants or Spaguetti Monsters (which obviously are finite entities, unwhorty of being called the greatest possible being).
-Michael Shermer's inept definition of God as a being "relatively superior" than us (what would make any alien civilization more advanced than us to become a DEITY... which if discoveried by SETI or any other scientific means, would destroy Shermer's atheism since in Shermer's definition such aliens would be God and atheism is incompatible with the existence of any god = Shermer's advanced alien beings!).
In classical theism, these questions and caricatures of God make no sense, because God is not in the same category of created, finite, contingent, objects. Atheists simply cannot understand this due to spiritual and intellectual factors.
In classical and philosophical theism, God is the greatest possible being in the sense that he's ontologically above all created reality (including moral reality, if it exists) and whatever exists (moral reality, consciousness, spiritual dimensions, universes, spirits, etc.) is dependent ontologically on God. If something exists which doesn't depend on God, then God wouldn't be the greatest possible being and his creative power would be limted (hence, he would be a finite god).
A fine (and embarrassing) example of this typical misconception about God as a finite being is seen in Victor Stenger's parody of the ontological argument, appealing to a "ontological pizza", which he used in his debate with William Lane Craig. Since Stenger is clearly affected by Jime's Iron Law, he cannot see that he's showing publicly his stupidity, irrationality and misunderstanding of the ontologically argument in that parody:
Stenger's silly parody is actually rooted in his intellectual incapacity for understading what a "greatest possible being" means.
In summary, atheists cannot understand the moral argument because they have a wrong concept of God as a finite, created, designed, contingent, ontologically secondary, purely voluntaristic being. This explains their silly comparisons with Pink Elephants, their "what created God" questions, their "If God arbitrarly commands..." (as if God, who is supposed to be the ultimate rational being, would simply command something "arbitrarily" without connection with other aspects of reality, or with God's ultimate purposes) and so forth.
The Euthyphro Dilemma is an egregious expression of this misconcept of God (which, again, in Plato was justified because he used such dilemma against the Greek gods who were finite and contingent, not against the ultimate God of classical theism. I'm sure that if Plato had been familiar with the concept of God as the greatest possible being, he would have identify his notion of "The Good" with such being as its ontological foundation, as done by neo-Platonic thinkers).
If you understand the concept of God as the greatest possible being, then you have to ask yourself: What God is greatest, a God who is essentially by his own nature the source of all moral value, the ontological ground of all reality, including moral and spiritual realities, the sustainer of everything what exists and the creator of all, or a God who cannot create a moral reality, who is not the source of value, who is not the source of objective purposes or meanings in the universe, and who is subjected and submitted to a mysteriously uncreated external standard of value (not created by God nor by anyone else) that God has to respect in order to qualify himself as "good"?
These are deeper questions that theists have to reflect hard, because it determines which kind of supreme being they have in mind.
In summary, atheists cannot understand the moral argument because they have a wrong concept of God as a finite, created, designed, contingent, ontologically secondary, purely voluntaristic being. This explains their silly comparisons with Pink Elephants, their "what created God" questions, their "If God arbitrarly commands..." (as if God, who is supposed to be the ultimate rational being, would simply command something "arbitrarily" without connection with other aspects of reality, or with God's ultimate purposes) and so forth.
The Euthyphro Dilemma is an egregious expression of this misconcept of God (which, again, in Plato was justified because he used such dilemma against the Greek gods who were finite and contingent, not against the ultimate God of classical theism. I'm sure that if Plato had been familiar with the concept of God as the greatest possible being, he would have identify his notion of "The Good" with such being as its ontological foundation, as done by neo-Platonic thinkers).
If you understand the concept of God as the greatest possible being, then you have to ask yourself: What God is greatest, a God who is essentially by his own nature the source of all moral value, the ontological ground of all reality, including moral and spiritual realities, the sustainer of everything what exists and the creator of all, or a God who cannot create a moral reality, who is not the source of value, who is not the source of objective purposes or meanings in the universe, and who is subjected and submitted to a mysteriously uncreated external standard of value (not created by God nor by anyone else) that God has to respect in order to qualify himself as "good"?
These are deeper questions that theists have to reflect hard, because it determines which kind of supreme being they have in mind.
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