A brief comment about atheist Stephen Law's "the evil god challenge".

Atheist philosopher Stephen Law has written some technical and non-technical articles defending the so-called "evil god challenge", according to which the amount of good that we observe in the world is conclusive evidence that an "evil god" doesn't exist. The challenge (for theists) would be to explain why, in a similar fashion, the amount of evil that we see in the world is not conclusive evidence against the existence of a "good God".

Note that Law is not arguing for the existence of the evil god. He's simply saying that the reasons we have to reject the existence of the evil god are, mutatis mutandis, the same reasons we have to reject the existence of a good God. Therefore, the challenge to theists would be to explain why they accept the existence of a good God but reject the existence of an evil god.

In order to avoid misrepresentations of Dr.Law's argument, let's quote his own summary of the challenge: I simply take the evil god hypothesis (without arguing for it at all) and ask - is this god not pretty conclusively ruled out on the basis of the good we see? And if the answer is "yes", then I ask: "So why should we consider belief in a good god significantly more reasonable than this empirically ridiculous belief? That's the challenge I'm asking theists to meet.

Several problems affect Dr.Law's argument:

1-As Willian Lane Craig argued in his debate with Dr.Law, his challenge assumes that theists infer the "goodness" of God on the basis of an inductive survey of the good in the world. Therefore, the existence of the good would provide evidence for a good God. (Likewise, the existence of evil would provide evidence against the same good God).

But this is not the case. According to classical theism, God is by definition the most perfect being and this includes moral perfection. It implies that the notion of an "evil god" is incoherent, a contradictio in abjecto (similar to a "good Satan" or a "happy hell").

2-Dr.Law's argument assumes that the evil God hypothesis predicts a world without the amount of good we observe. Therefore, the evidence for the existence of the amount of good we observe is "conclusive evidence" against the existence of evil God hypothesis.

In the same inducitve way, the evidence for the evil that we observe is conclusive evidence against the hypothesis that God is good (because this hypothesis predicts, according to Dr.Law's implicit assumption, a world without the amount of evil that we actually observe. Therefore, the observation of such an evil is conclusive evidence against the hypothesis of a good God).

Note that Dr.Law's argument assumes that both hypotheses (the evil God and the good God) are empirically equivalent in regards to the existence of evils and goods in the world so whatever empirical reason you can pose against the evil God could be used to refute the good God too.

Again, it shows that Dr.Law's argument depends crucially on the assumption that the "goodness" of God is inferred by induction. Given that the world is morally ambiguous (it includes many evils and goods), induction cannot decide in favor of the evil God above the good God, or viceversa, and the evidence could be used both to refute the former as the latter.

3-As mentioned above, theists don't consider that the property of "goodness" is something that we infer by induction and observation of the world. Rather, God is good because metaphysically he is the most perfect being. (We could express this as a conditional: IF God exists, then he IS good. In the same way, if Satan exists, then he's BAD. If triangles exists, they have 3 angles and so forth.)

Talking of a "evil God" is so incoherent as talking of a "good Satan" or a "Christian atheist". Law arbitrarily misuses (or misunderstands) what theists conceived as "God".

Instead of talking of a "evil God", Law should talk of an "evil designer" (this is a logically coherent concept). And in this case, I agree that by observation of the world (and inductive inference from this) alone, it is not possible to discern if the designer of the world is an "evil designer" or if it is God (because the world is morally ambiguous).

4-At most, Dr.Law's challenge suggests the dificulty of using induction to discern an "evil designer" from God as the designer of the world. But his argument doesn't prove that God is in a metaphysical par with such an evil designer and therefore that the evidence for the evil is conclusive evidence against God in the same way that the existence of the good is conclusive evidence against an evil designer.

We could summarize Dr.Law's challenge in this way: "On inductive grounds, the morally ambiguous evidence that we observe in the world renders the hypothesis "An evil God exists" empirically on a par with the hypothesis "A good God exists", because the the good we observe refutes the former and the evil we observe refutes the latter".

The implication (and ultimate motivation of Dr.Law's argument) is that whatever argument we use to accept (or reject) the existence of a good God is, mutatis mutandis, a reason we could use to accept (or reject) the evidence for an evil God. He wants to create a stalemate regarding the hypothesis of God's existence, forcing theists to accept that the evidence for an evil God is so good (or so bad) as the hypothesis of a good God. Empirically they're on a par.

This is the "Dr.Law's challenge" for theists.

An again: the essential flaw of Dr.Law (mentioned by Craig in his debate and which Dr.Law couldn't refute) is that his entire challenge is based on the assumption that the moral properties of God are inferred on purely empirical-inductive survey of the evidence in the world and that given the evidence is morally ambiguous, both hypotheses (the evil God and the good God) are on a par.

Dr.Law strongly denies this. When I posed these arguments to him in Edward Feser's blog, Dr.Law replied: "Again no. I don't suppose the moral properties of god are inferred on empirical-inductive grounds. Obviously.

But I do assume that we can reasonably rule out SOME God hypotheses on empirical grounds. As indeed, does everyone, until that is, the penny drops... when suddenly they get hyper-skeptical like Craig did on the night.

Which is your prerogative too. But you'd better have a justification for that radical and highly counter-intutive degree of skepticism (that what we observe can gives us no clue AT ALL about the moral properties of god/s - good, bad or otherwise). Craig didn't. "

Note that he denies the contention that the moral properties of god are inferred by induction based on observation. But then he contradicts himself when he later concedes "But you'd better have a justification for that radical and highly counter-intutive degree of skepticism (that what we observe can gives us no clue AT ALL about the moral properties of god/s - good, bad or otherwise"

Then, are the moral properties of God based on observation (and hence, inferred by induction) or not? Which is Dr.Law's actual position?

In other words, he denies that the moral properties are inferred by induction of the observable world, but then suggest that our skepticism about the moral properties of God are unjustified because intuitively we recognize that the observation of the world (and the inductive inference based on it) DOES tell us something about the moral properties (good, bad or whatever) of God.

But our skepticism about the implications (to the moral properties of the designer) based on the moral evidence provided by the world is justified because the world is MORALLY AMBIGUOUS. The moral evidence is simply insufficient to settle the question about the moral properties of the designer (this is why theists in general don't appeal to this evidence to argue for God's moral properties. Rather, they defend different versions of the moral argumen showing that the existence of an objective, human mind-independent moral order, and hence of the evil as the antithesis and violation of that order, proves that God exists). You get a lot of good in this world, and a lot of evil too. How the hell, on pure inductive grounds, are you going to infer God's moral properties in a world with such a ambiguous evidence?

In other words, the evidence of the world actually tell us one thing, namely: that no rational conclusion about God's moral properties is possible based on such an ambiguous evidence. This is why theists don't infer God's "goodness" on purely inductive grounds, because on inductive grounds the only reasonable conclusion about the moral properties of God is skepticism. The skepticism about this point is a consequence of the ambiguity of the evidence, not an arbitrary assumption by the theist.

Let's consider an analogy:

Suppose that you're testing a parapsychological claim (let's say telepathy). And you get 100 technically correct and competently done studies, 50 of which gave positive evidence for telepathy and 50 of which gave negative evidence. Are justified in inferring that "telepahty exists" or "telepathy doesn't exist" based on such an evidence? Obviously not, the evidence is ambiguous, it includes positive and negative support alike, and from this evidence the only reasonable position is agnosticism/skepticism: we don't know, based on such studies, if telepathy exists or not.

Note that in this case your skepticism about the claim "telepathy exists" is not a purely arbitrary assumption, but a consquence of the existence of ambiguous and conflicting evidence supporting the claim.

Likewise, the the world is morally ambiguous (it includes good and evil), how the hell are you going to infer God's moral properties from this alone? Unless you assume that a good God must necessarily create a physical world in which the amount of good be superior than evil, then the ambiguous evidence would provide evidence against such a God.

But in theism, our lives are not limited to this one (the life on Earth is just a infinitesimal part of our overall existence, which extends beyond this life to the afterlife). Therefore, even if the amount of evil in this world were superior than the amount of good, it could be the case that in the afterlife the amount of good were infinitely superior to any finite evil that we experienced in this finite physical life.

This is why I agree with Craig that Law has the burden of proof regarding the claim that God cannot have any morally permisible reasons to enable the evil in this finite world. As far I know, no atheist philosopher has provided such reasons.

So, the skepticism regarding the designer's moral properties inferred by induction and observation alone is not arbitrary nor counter-intuitive, but that it is based on the fact that the finite world that we observe is morally ambiguous, so no inductive survey of the world can settle the questions about the moral properties of the designer.

Therefore, that God is good is not a matter of induction, but it is essential to the concept of God as the most perfect being. Hence, if such a being exists, then he IS good.

Hear the recent Craig vs Law debate here:

Why is there something rather than nothing? Intellectual genius Richard Dawkins responds the fundamental question of philosophy!

To be fair, you have to realize that Richard Dawkins is not a philosopher, he's a zoologist. So, Dawkins' response is completely out of his intellectual training and expertise.

What is astonishing to me is that Dawkins has not been able to recognize the fallacy of his answer (It suggests either intellectual dishonesty or simply stupidity on his part, or both). He seems to believe that has gotten a knock-down argument against the existence of God (or God as an explanatory hypothesis).

Oxford Atheist philosopher Daniel Came (being academically trained in philosophy) comments on Dawkins' main argument (which he repeats in the above video in a modified version in order to response the fundamental question of philosophy):

Dawkins maintains that we're not justified in inferring a designer as the best explanation of the appearance of design in the universe because then a new problem surfaces: who designed the designer? This argument is as old as the hills and as any reasonably competent first-year undergraduate could point out is patently invalid. For an explanation to be successful we do not need an explanation of the explanation. One might as well say that evolution by natural selection explains nothing because it does nothing to explain why there were living organisms on earth in the first place; or that the big bang fails to explain the cosmic background radiation because the big bang is itself inexplicable.

As Came's realizes, if Dawkins' argument were correct, then:

-Natural selection explains nothing because it doesn't explain why there were living organisms on earth in the first place.

-The big bang theory explains nothing because the big bang itself doesn't have any explanation.

I'd add the following couple of examples:

1-In 1983/84, when HIV was discoveried and the HIV theory of AIDS was formulated, the origin of HIV was unknown and hence unexplained. Therefore, the HIV theory of AIDS explains nothing! Or to use Dawkins' phraseology and stupid way of thinking: "Even if HIV were postulated to exist, it doesn't explains absolutely anything because you left without an explanation of HIV itself." (Is it a good scientific or philosophical objection to the HIV theory of AIDS? Do you need an explanation of HIV itself in order to conclude, if the evidence is good, that HIV is the "probable cause of AIDS" as Robert Gallo declared in 1984? Obviously not. Only atheists like Dawkins and his "fans" would accept such an intellectually ridiculous and spurious objection, what tell us something about the psychology of atheists and their intellectual powers).

2-After his debate with John Lennox, Dawkins was interviewed and asked about the origin of life on Earth. Dawkins reportedly said that "he was more receptive to the theory that life on earth had indeed been created by a governing intelligence – but one which had resided on another planet."

Now, using Dawkins' own assumptions in his argument against God, we could say "Dawkins, your alien creationist hypothesis doesn't explain absolutely anything because the aliens in question remain themselves unexplained"

Reflecting hard and in a charitable way about Dawkins' argument, I've concluded that Dawkins is stupid in the literal sense of the word (stupid = very dull in mind). He's simply incapable of sophisticated intellectual thinking and even of recognizing obvious fallacies. He's stupid. (And by extension, I assume until proved wrong that most of Dawkins' "fans" are stupid too, because it is irrational and stupid to be an intellectual fan of an intellectually stupid person).

I've found a similar stupidity in other atheists (remember the "What caused God" objection posed by some of them against the cosmological argument), and this "atheistic stupidity pattern" strongly suggest something about the psychology of hard-core atheists. This why currently I'm convinced that hard-core atheists have a kind of intellectual and cognitive impairment, which makes them incapable of thinking rationally.

Their intelligence only reach to the most superficial level on difficult topics.

I'll comment more on the psychology of atheists in future posts.

Richard Dawkins supports infanticide of innocent babies with incurable diseases

Euan Squires and the quantum mechanics arguments for God's existence

The late agnostic physicist Euan Equires wrote in his book "The Mystery of the Quantum World" two plausible scientific arguments for God's existence based on quantum mechanics (or more exactly, two technical ways in which God could play a role in quantum mechanics. A more formal argument in this line, and reply to potential objections, would require a more detailed philosophical-conceptual analysis, which I'll develop in future posts).

Squires' first scientific argument is this:

Quantum theory offers at least two possible roles for a ‘God’, where we use this term for a being that is non-physical, nonhuman, in some sense superhuman, and is conscious. The first role is to make the ‘choices’ that are required whenever a measurement is made that selects from a quantum system one of the possible outcomes. Such a God would remove the indeterminacy from the world by taking upon himself those decisions that are not forced by the rules of physics. Although expressed in nontraditional terms, this is reasonably in accordance with the accepted role of a God. He would be very active in all aspects of the world, and would be totally omnipotent within the prescribed limits. Prediction of his behaviour from the laws of physics would be impossible (note that we are not permitting any hidden variables in this chapter), although from both the theological and the scientific viewpoint we would want to believe that there were reasons for at least some of the choices; otherwise we would be back with random behaviour and the God would not have played any part. It is interesting to note that this role might even permit ‘miracles’, if we were to regard these as events so highly unlikely that they would be effectively impossible without very specific, and unusual, ‘divine’ choice. For example, according to quantum theory, there must be a small, but non-zero, probability that if I run into a wall, then I will pass right through it. This is a special case of the potential barrier experiment and the wavefunction on the left-hand side, corresponding to transmission, is never quite zero. Then, however small the probability for transmission might be, a God would be able to select it as the outcome, if he so chose. (pp.66-67)

According to this first argument:

1)God could intervene making the choices required each time a measurement is done in order to select an specific outcome (note that, as Squires realize, this would refute the indeterminism which is thought to be esssential to QM, at least in the standard orthodox interpretation. I think the refutation of indeterminism in this level is reasonable because, if God exists, his creation couldn't be dependent on wholly random phenomena in the quantum level).

2)God's essential attribute of omnipotence would be preserved (so, making full justice to the classical concept of God). Other attributes like non-physicality, consciousness, superhuman, etc. are preserved too. (Note that no one of God's attributes implied in this argument conflicts with the classical attributes that theology posits as belonging to God).

Rather, these attributes strongly suggest that we're not dealing with an human-like form of consciousness, but with consciousness with superlative attributes which have been typically reserved to God as the ultimate perfect being.

3)Even miracles would be possible, again vindicating the classical concept of God who intervenes, by his own decisions, in events in this world.

I think this argument could be developed in detail and in a logically rigurous way.

Squires' second argument (which is largely independent of the first one) is this:

The second possible role for a God to play in quantum theory is more relevant to our principal topic. God might be the conscious observer who is responsible for the reduction of wavefunctions. Whether, in addtion, he also decides the outcome of his observations, as in the above paragraph, or whether this is left to chance is not important here. What is important is the fact that God must be selective-he must not reduce all wavefunctions automatically, otherwise we meet the same problem that we met when discussing modifications to the Schrodinger equation in $3.7: the reduction that is required depends on the observation that we are going to make. If, for example, a reduction to figure 16 is made, then there will be no possibility of interference, whereas a human observer might decide to do the interference experiment. It is therefore necessary that the God who reduces wavefunctions, and so allows things to happen in the early universe, in particular things that might be required in order for other conscious observers to exist, should know about these other observers and should know what they intend to measure. God must in some way be linked to human consciousness. (pp.67-68. Emphasis in blue added)

This argument is, in my view, stronger than the first one. But Squires doesn't formulate it in its strongest version. In my opinon, the possible theistic implications of Squires' second argument are more obvious when we asked for the reduction of wavefunctions of the universe as a whole (and hence, previous to the existence of human or extraterrestial (conscious) beings).

We could argue like this:

1-Concious observation is needed to the reduction of the wavefunctions in the origin of the universe.

2-Human (and alien, if they exist) concious observers are posterior to the origin of the Universe (i.e. the concrete physical world existed before the emergence of human or alien consciousness)

3-Therefore, human (and alien) conscious observers are not the cause of the reduction of the wavefunctions in the origin of the universe (the latter is previous to the emergence of human and alien beings).

This implies that a nonhuman, non-physical consciousness is the cause of the reduction of the wavefunction of the whole universe.

It points out to a being which is:

1-Non-physical (since it is the cause of the physical world). Note that if this being were physical (embodied), then we are confronted again with the problem of which conscious observation produced the reduction of the wavefunctions necessary to the existence of his physical body.

2-Timeless (since it is the cause of the universe, and hence of physical time). Being "timeless", it is argueably eternal, since eternity has been classically understood as either 1)Existing in each point of time; or 2)Existing independently of time (i.e. as trascendent regarding to the physical time).

3-Spaceless (since it is the cause of the universe, and hence of the physical space)

4-Conscious (otherwise, not reduction of the wavefunction would be possible).

5-Intentional (since such consciousness cannot reduce all the wavefunctions simultaneously, but only some of them selectively which implies concrete intentions. If conciousness without intention were sufficient to collapse the wave function, then the selectivity mentioned by Squieres would be inexplicable. This point seems to refute some of the versions of "universal consciousness" who see it as purely impersonal consciousness, "all are one" and other argueably unintelligible slogans common in some mystical, Hegelian, Wilberian, and new age circles).

6-Personal (given point 5), since essential to a person is the property of having ends, desires, purposes and intentions (all of the which implies selectivity regarding specific ends or purposes). It is not a purely undifferentiated or impersonal consciousness (whatever it means), but a personal consciousness. We are dealing with a non-physical being which is a person with concrete purposes and intentions.

All the above properties seem to be much like the personal God as understood in classical theism. Again, crucial to the argument is the implication that it is not mere "consciousness" in any undifferentiated, impersonal, collectivistic or mystical sense, but argueably a "personal consciousness". And this cannot be human consciousness, since the concrete universe that we're trying to explain preceded the emergence of humans and other conscious beings (e.g. intelligent physical aliens, if they exist).

It could be replied that perhaps multiple spirits or souls existed before the origin of the universe; and they were responsible for the creation of the universe (this is the view of L.Ron Hubbard and some others) but who argue for this polytheistic view has the burden of proof that it is the case, and moreover Occkam's Razor suggests that positing ONE personal being (instead of an arbitrary number of particular beings) as the responsible for the origin of the physical world is more parsimonious than positing many gods or god-like entities.

So, it seems we have two plausible and very good scientific arguments for God's existence based on quantum mechanics, being the second one far better than the first one.

Atheist philosopher (a sophisticated defender of atheism) Quentin Smith comments:

According to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the wave function needs to be collapsed by something outside the system being measured. The wave function of the universe, accordingly, needs to be collapsed by something outside the universe. Now most versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation regard the observer (often explicitly identified with consciousness) as what collapses the wave function. In this respect, the cosmological application of the Copenhagen Interpretation may reasonably be thought to posit God (or a disembodied person who has superhuman attributes) outside the universe. Indeed, it seems to be the best scientific argument for God which is present in the twentieth century science. (Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Cosmology, p. 325. Emphasis in blue added)

So, if the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM (which sees consciousness as that which collapses the wave function) is true, then we have a purely scientific argument for the existence of God.

In order to deny this conclusion, atheists would have to challenge the Copenhagen Interpretation (an interpretation which they endorse when criticizing the causal principle "whatever begins to exist has a cause", because they falsely think that indeterminism posed by that interpretation implies non-causality regarding the origin of contingent substances. But this endorsement open the door to a new and independent argument for God's existence, so atheists seem to be caught in a kind of dilemma in this point).

Truth-seekers will follow the evidence whenever it leads; hard-core atheists and naturalistic ideologues will follow the evidence except when it refutes atheism (in this case, they become highly skeptical of current scientific theories... as an example, see atheist philosopher Peter Millican's skeptical arguments on contemporary scientific cosmology in his recent debate with William Lane Craig).

In future posts I hope to develop even more these arguments and consider what kind of objections (and replies to the objections) could be posed against them.

Nori Muster's review of the book Modern Religions: An Experimental Analysis and Exposé by Elliot Benjamin

Elliot Benjamin, Ph.D., describes his experiences in a variety of new age spiritual organizations, most of which are psychology-based groups. He describes each group and offers his ratings based on three academic scales in use since the 1970s: the Anthony Typology, the Wilber Integral Model, and the Bonewits Cult Danger Scale. He then places the groups on a spectrum that ranges from favorable and benign to high cult danger. The first hundred pages of the book familiarize the reader with the scales and Dr. Benjamin’s method of rating.

Developing a reliable rating method is useful, since it emphasizes the differences between groups, and would prevent journalists and casual researchers from lumping all new age spiritual organizations in the same category of danger. Along with the more notorious groups such as Scientology and Avatar, Dr. Benjamin rates about a dozen groups that he considers benign. This may help researchers who study group dynamics to recognize what makes a group dangerous. It may also inform religious leaders who want to fall on the favorable-benign side of the spectrum.

Researchers will find plentiful information on lesser known groups. Since many of the groups described in the book are small, or not considered dangerous, until now they may have been ignored in the cultic studies literature. Hopefully, the information on benign groups will put some people’s minds at ease. As the director of Steamboats.com, a website dedicated to historic preservation, I once received a letter from a concerned mother questioning her son’s employment as a deckhand on the Delta Queen Steamboat. I assured her that it was most likely a positive experience for her son that would look good on his resumé.

Dr. Benjamin’s descriptions may bring similar peace of mind to friends and relatives of people who dabble in the benign groups he covers.

A Closer Look at the Rating Scales

The Anthony Typology, developed by Dick Anthony, analyzes a group on the scope of its beliefs, whether it is charismatic, and whether it is antagonistic toward the outside world. The Wilber Integral Model, developed by Ken Wilber, rates a group according to how controlling it is, and whether its philosophy has a rational or traditional basis. The Bonewits scale, developed by Isaac Bonewits, assigns a number between one (low danger) and ten (high danger) on fifteen traits, such as the leader’s(s’) claim of wisdom, the amount of wisdom attributed (blind followers), and rigidity of dogma. Bonewits rates on how much a group is interested in money and political power; as well as the common hallmarks of a dangerous cult: sexual abuse, censorship, endorsement of violence, paranoia, lack of sense of humor about itself, internal control of members, and surrender of will. The ratings are added up and divided by fifteen to come up with an average cult danger rating.

Dr. Benjamin describes each group, then rates each on the three scales, and follows with his rationalization for why he rated each group as he did. He admits that his ratings are purely subjective, based on his experiences. Individual researchers will certainly disagree with some of Dr. Benjamin’s ratings, and certainly the groups themselves will disagree if they have a bad rating.

One of the weaknesses of rating organizations is that it is difficult to see what is going on behind the scenes. A researcher would have to stumble into the inner circle of any group to find out what is really going on. Therefore, there is a danger of falsely giving a group a benign rating. Even a homeowners association or bridge club may have the potential to inflict extreme emotional, financial, or other abuses, which a casual observer may not notice. Also, it must be kept in mind that groups can change. They may reform themselves or turn sinister, based on who is in the group, and whether the system is ripe for abuse, or ready for healing. In addition, once a group has been stained by sexual or other violent forms of abuse, it may have a difficult time getting its reputation back. Therefore high ratings on the Sexual Manipulation and Endorsement of Violence scales need to be more heavily weighted to get an accurate picture of a group’s overall danger rating.

Another note is that it would be a mistake to apply the Bonewits scale to political groups, as Dr. Benjamin has in essays outside of this volume. All political groups would score high on several of the scales, such as Wisdom Claimed, Wisdom Credited, and Dogma; and certainly they would score high on the Wealth and Political Power scales. Since these five scales would be elevated, it would be unfair to compare the average of a political group’s rating to the average of a new age spiritual organization. To obtain a more accurate rating of political organizations, a researcher would need to remove those five items, and add five items to rate the group’s integrity. Does the group lie for political gain? This would say more about whether a political group is dangerous than if they want wealth. Needing money is built into the game of politics these days.

A Closer Look at the Author

In chapters two and three, Dr. Benjamin presents a collection of essays he wrote at the time he was going through his group encounters. The essays are presented in two sections, first the late 1990s and early 2000s; then the 1970s.

Dr. Benjamin took about fifteen years off in between to earn his Ph.D. in mathematics and establish himself as a college professor with a specialization in pure mathematics. He describes his academic pursuits as part of his spiritual search, since he spent years working on pure mathematics for several hours each morning as a meditation.

Dr. Benjamin’s essays in chapters two and three read like journal entries, written in the moment. Many of these entries begin when he is enamored with a new group he is exploring, then in a subsequent entry, he denounces the group and explains what he dislikes about it. He seems to have a cast iron stomach for unusual group experiences. Many ex-cult members and researchers may experience the gack factor (feeing repulsed) by some of Dr. Benjamin’s realizations as a naïve follower.

As an ex-member of an Eastern guru group, I have avoided all new age religious organizations except a very few. The Philosophical Research Society, founded by Manly Hall in 1934, was a short walk from where I lived in Los Angeles in the early 2000s. I attended many lectures, workshops, and even a tai chi class there with no adverse reactions. However, once in the late 1990s, I attended a house party put on by members of a group Dr. Benjamin would rate as mild. At one point, they got everyone’s attention to do a group meditation. Everyone joined hands in a circle in the living room. This was an unbearable trigger for me and I waited out in the front yard until the ceremony was over. In my experience, I would have found most of the situations Dr. Benjamin lived through as undesirable for myself.

Dr. Benjamin describes his deepest and most conflicted affiliation in chapter four: Encounters with Scientology. In a series of his characteristic journal-like essays, he reveals little-known details about the group, such as how they get people to join and what goes on in an auditing session. As a researcher, I never knew much about Scientology before, but the book has given me a substantial education on the group’s inner workings. Since Scientology is a highly secretive group, I believe this is one of the book’s greatest contributions.

One of the most terrifying aspects of Dr. Benjamin’s experience was the amount of money he invested in the various groups he joined. His non-cult friends and family must have found themselves exasperated trying to prevent him from wasting yet more of his hard-earned money chasing the next great thing.
Dr. Benjamin repeats a similar pattern in each group: he becomes intrigued, gets involved, gets hoodwinked for a sum of money, becomes disenchanted, and leaves. He discusses the financial hardships of group involvement quite extensively, which will be informative for seekers who are considering a similar path.

Publishing this book is a milestone for Dr. Benjamin, since it is the culmination of his nearly forty years of writing about alternative spiritual organizations. In essence, Dr. B. is an unapologetic cult-hopper, revealing in chapter five his disappointment with the Jewish religion of his ancestors and the loss of his father at the age of two as factors that may have led him to search for meaning through new age group involvement. He also admits that he joined particular groups after falling in love with women involved in the groups.

After describing and rating all of his group experiences, the book seems to point to the need for a creative non-fiction rendering. It would be refreshing to read a memoir by

Dr. Benjamin that goes in chronological order, offering selected scenes from his journey. He has already told us what he really thinks. Now all that is left to do is to show us the worlds he has discovered sans any further analysis.


Links of interest:

-Elliot's book is available at www.lulu.com

-My subversive interview with Elliot.

-Elliot's articles in the Integral World website.

Richard Dawkins says that rape is morally arbitrary

The transcript:

Justin Brierley: When you make a value judgement don't you immediately step yourself outside of this evolutionary process and say that the reason this is good is that it's good. And you don't have any way to stand on that statement.

Richard Dawkins: My value judgement itself could come from my evolutionary past.

Justin Brierley: So therefore it's just as random in a sense as any product of evolution.

Richard Dawkins: You could say that, it doesn't in any case, nothing about it makes it more probable that there is anything supernatural.

Justin Brierley: Ultimately, your belief that rape is wrong is as arbitrary as the fact that we've evolved five fingers rather than six.

Richard Dawkins: You could say that, yeah.

End of the transcript.

Compare with naturalist and philosopher of biology Michael Ruse:

The position of the modern evolutionist is that humans have an awareness of morality because such awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation no less than hands and feet and teeth. Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. Michael Ruse, The Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics, in the Darwinian Paradigm (pp. 262-269. Emphasis in blue added.)

Or naturalist and philosopher of biology Alex Rosenberg: "One source of meaning on which many have relied is the intrinsic value, in particular the moral value, of human life. People have also sought moral rules, codes, principles which are supposed to distinguish us from merely biological critters whose lives lack (as much) meaning or value (as ours)... Scientism must reject all of these straws that people have grasped, and it’s not hard to show why. Science has to be nihilistic about ethics and morality. Alex Rosenberg, in his article "The Disenchanted Naturalistic Guide to Reality". Emphasis in blue added.

A Japanese among atheists, Christians, parapsychologists and spiritualists: A strange but fruitful journey (part 1)

This is a modest attempt to put in paper (or in digital format) my life as a Japanese living and interacting among wholly different groups of people like atheists, Christians, Buddhists, parapsychologists, spiritualists, ideologues of every kind and other who claim to know the truth.

When I arrived to Canada and US many years ago, I was already very interested in phenomena like psi (precognition, telepathy, etc.) and in spirituality. Coming from a faimily sympathetic to systems like taoism, zen, buddhism and similar, I had a set of beliefs (not necessarily shared by all of these systems, since I had my own view of all of them and wasn't entirely convinced) that shaped my view:

1-Monotheistic religions are based entirely on faith, dogmatic authority and are seriously misguided.

2-There is probably no God (no "big daddy" in the sky, I favorite expression of mine which I now see as strongly ignorant and stupid) and if something like this exists is in the universe as a whole (see point 4).

3-Human beings have probably a soul which could survive death.

4-The "universe is consciousness" (another favorite expression of mine, which now I see as largely uninteligible and philosophically naive) and each of us is a finite part part of that universal consciousness.

I had a lot of other beliefs, but for the sake of this post, let's to stick to the above four. (This was the ideological baggage that I brought to America).

Now, first let me stress that I don't see any of the above beliefs as demostrably false. I'm even sympathetic to some of them (like the number 3), even though for different, more informed reasons.

What I found in America (specially in US) was a kind of cultural battle between Christians and secularists (evolution vs creationism, etc.). At first, I thought these battled was justified because Christians were basically religious dogmatists and bigots who weren't interested in scientific research and evidence.

But I very soon find that "secularists" had an ideological agenda which include suppression of any view which could suggest that materialism was false (including honest scientific research by atheists and agnostic researchers about phenomena like psi or the afrterlife). So I realized that they had an axe to grind against whatever view, opinion or research program which could destroy their beliefs.

I was shocked to discover their dishonesty and how they misrepresent the evidence of parapsychology, for example.

In this point, another thought appeared in my mind: The view about Christians being essentially ideologues and dogmatists who are enemies of scientific research and their only motivation was to predicate their ideology is true? I had bought that idea reading the books of atheists and secularists.

But my confidence in them fell apart. So, I began studying carefully the books of the best Christian philosophers, theologians, scientists and other scholars in order to see what they defend and believe. And in this point I was shocked again.

What I found (with some exceptions) was a rigurous, evidence-based support of their belief system. I found sophisticated philosophical and scientific arguments for God's existence and (for my absolute astonishment) for Jesus' Resurrection which I saw in that time as something beyond historical, rational evaluation and only believed "by wishful thinking and faith" (again, I bought the highly efficacious atheist propaganda!).

Also, I realized that Christian intellectuals had a desire to discuss and debate rationally their beliefs. This was another shock for me, since in the atheist books that I had read, Christians are portrayed as irrational individuals who knows next to nothing of logic, reason and the scientific method, are wholly credulous people and are afraid of discussing their beliefs (and my direct experience with some normal Christian people tended to confirmed this view). I realized that atheists were attacking the weakest Christians, not the better ones (exactly as Richard Dawkins has made recently).

I noted a certain pattern in the atheist argumentation against Christians which was very similar to their arguments against parapsychology. Stereotypes, facile (and long refuted) objections, misrepresentations and straw men, labels, attacking the weakest version of the argument, etc. were common in atheists in their "campaign" against religious and parapsychological believers.

I thought that perhaps I was buying too much in the popular atheist literature. So I began to studying intensively scholarly books and papers by the best defenders of metaphysical naturalism and materialistic atheism. My library had (and probably even HAS) more books defending atheism than books about any other topic. And I was astonished again.

I found that (otherwise serious and rigurous atheist thinkers) posed crude objections and obvious fallacies (repeating long and already refuted arguments) when arguing against the best Christian scholars. I couldn't understand this, since that if religion is false, then its falsehood should be easily shown, specially if religious believers are ignorant and stupid, and atheists are rational, smart and scientific.

Since I shared with atheists the view that religious believers were essentially irrational, ignorant and wishful thinkers (even thought I never had any strong emotion behind this opinion), all the above caused on me a profound and very strong cognitive dissonance. I simply couldn't believe what I was seeing. I never expected such a thing.

In this point I began to suspect that I had been subtly fooled or "taken in" by the atheistic literature that I had read. And I discovered that most non-Christian people in US were fooled into the atheistic-caused anti-religious stereotypes too.

I discovered too that most Christian pastors were anti-intellectual , dogmatists and tended to confirm the stereotypes created by atheists. So, I understood why people in US (who are likely to have more conctact with Christian pastors than with sophisticated Christian scholars) believed the atheistic propaganda.

But this excuse couldn't apply to me, since my anti-religious opinion wasn't based on the time in any experience with Christian pastors and other anti-intellectuals. I bought the atheistic propaganda almost entirely based on books and my own prejudices (+ some ocassional encounters with religious fundamentalists).

So, I concluded that secularism had largely won (with cheap shots and an astute aggresive anti-religious propaganda + the anti-intellectualism of Church pastors) the cultural battle, at least among "intellectually sophisticated" people.

At that time, I was more or less convinced that "spiritualists" had the right answers to a whole of topics which atheists had stigmatized as unscientific "religious fallacies".

And even though I still believe that spiritualists have important things to say, I found in spiritualism something that I had never expected...

I will tell you what it is in part 2.