Atheist philosopher Stephen Law has written some technical and non-technical articles defending the so-called "evil god challenge", according to which the amount of good that we observe in the world is conclusive evidence that an "evil god" doesn't exist. The challenge (for theists) would be to explain why, in a similar fashion, the amount of evil that we see in the world is not conclusive evidence against the existence of a "good God".
Note that Law is not arguing for the existence of the evil god. He's simply saying that the reasons we have to reject the existence of the evil god are, mutatis mutandis, the same reasons we have to reject the existence of a good God. Therefore, the challenge to theists would be to explain why they accept the existence of a good God but reject the existence of an evil god.
In order to avoid misrepresentations of Dr.Law's argument, let's quote his own summary of the challenge: I simply take the evil god hypothesis (without arguing for it at all) and ask - is this god not pretty conclusively ruled out on the basis of the good we see? And if the answer is "yes", then I ask: "So why should we consider belief in a good god significantly more reasonable than this empirically ridiculous belief? That's the challenge I'm asking theists to meet.
Several problems affect Dr.Law's argument:
1-As Willian Lane Craig argued in his debate with Dr.Law, his challenge assumes that theists infer the "goodness" of God on the basis of an inductive survey of the good in the world. Therefore, the existence of the good would provide evidence for a good God. (Likewise, the existence of evil would provide evidence against the same good God).
But this is not the case. According to classical theism, God is by definition the most perfect being and this includes moral perfection. It implies that the notion of an "evil god" is incoherent, a contradictio in abjecto (similar to a "good Satan" or a "happy hell").
2-Dr.Law's argument assumes that the evil God hypothesis predicts a world without the amount of good we observe. Therefore, the evidence for the existence of the amount of good we observe is "conclusive evidence" against the existence of evil God hypothesis.
In the same inducitve way, the evidence for the evil that we observe is conclusive evidence against the hypothesis that God is good (because this hypothesis predicts, according to Dr.Law's implicit assumption, a world without the amount of evil that we actually observe. Therefore, the observation of such an evil is conclusive evidence against the hypothesis of a good God).
Note that Dr.Law's argument assumes that both hypotheses (the evil God and the good God) are empirically equivalent in regards to the existence of evils and goods in the world so whatever empirical reason you can pose against the evil God could be used to refute the good God too.
Again, it shows that Dr.Law's argument depends crucially on the assumption that the "goodness" of God is inferred by induction. Given that the world is morally ambiguous (it includes many evils and goods), induction cannot decide in favor of the evil God above the good God, or viceversa, and the evidence could be used both to refute the former as the latter.
3-As mentioned above, theists don't consider that the property of "goodness" is something that we infer by induction and observation of the world. Rather, God is good because metaphysically he is the most perfect being. (We could express this as a conditional: IF God exists, then he IS good. In the same way, if Satan exists, then he's BAD. If triangles exists, they have 3 angles and so forth.)
Talking of a "evil God" is so incoherent as talking of a "good Satan" or a "Christian atheist". Law arbitrarily misuses (or misunderstands) what theists conceived as "God".
Instead of talking of a "evil God", Law should talk of an "evil designer" (this is a logically coherent concept). And in this case, I agree that by observation of the world (and inductive inference from this) alone, it is not possible to discern if the designer of the world is an "evil designer" or if it is God (because the world is morally ambiguous).
4-At most, Dr.Law's challenge suggests the dificulty of using induction to discern an "evil designer" from God as the designer of the world. But his argument doesn't prove that God is in a metaphysical par with such an evil designer and therefore that the evidence for the evil is conclusive evidence against God in the same way that the existence of the good is conclusive evidence against an evil designer.
We could summarize Dr.Law's challenge in this way: "On inductive grounds, the morally ambiguous evidence that we observe in the world renders the hypothesis "An evil God exists" empirically on a par with the hypothesis "A good God exists", because the the good we observe refutes the former and the evil we observe refutes the latter".
The implication (and ultimate motivation of Dr.Law's argument) is that whatever argument we use to accept (or reject) the existence of a good God is, mutatis mutandis, a reason we could use to accept (or reject) the evidence for an evil God. He wants to create a stalemate regarding the hypothesis of God's existence, forcing theists to accept that the evidence for an evil God is so good (or so bad) as the hypothesis of a good God. Empirically they're on a par.
This is the "Dr.Law's challenge" for theists.
An again: the essential flaw of Dr.Law (mentioned by Craig in his debate and which Dr.Law couldn't refute) is that his entire challenge is based on the assumption that the moral properties of God are inferred on purely empirical-inductive survey of the evidence in the world and that given the evidence is morally ambiguous, both hypotheses (the evil God and the good God) are on a par.
Dr.Law strongly denies this. When I posed these arguments to him in Edward Feser's blog, Dr.Law replied: "Again no. I don't suppose the moral properties of god are inferred on empirical-inductive grounds. Obviously.
But I do assume that we can reasonably rule out SOME God hypotheses on empirical grounds. As indeed, does everyone, until that is, the penny drops... when suddenly they get hyper-skeptical like Craig did on the night.
Which is your prerogative too. But you'd better have a justification for that radical and highly counter-intutive degree of skepticism (that what we observe can gives us no clue AT ALL about the moral properties of god/s - good, bad or otherwise). Craig didn't. "
Note that he denies the contention that the moral properties of god are inferred by induction based on observation. But then he contradicts himself when he later concedes "But you'd better have a justification for that radical and highly counter-intutive degree of skepticism (that what we observe can gives us no clue AT ALL about the moral properties of god/s - good, bad or otherwise"
Then, are the moral properties of God based on observation (and hence, inferred by induction) or not? Which is Dr.Law's actual position?
In other words, he denies that the moral properties are inferred by induction of the observable world, but then suggest that our skepticism about the moral properties of God are unjustified because intuitively we recognize that the observation of the world (and the inductive inference based on it) DOES tell us something about the moral properties (good, bad or whatever) of God.
But our skepticism about the implications (to the moral properties of the designer) based on the moral evidence provided by the world is justified because the world is MORALLY AMBIGUOUS. The moral evidence is simply insufficient to settle the question about the moral properties of the designer (this is why theists in general don't appeal to this evidence to argue for God's moral properties. Rather, they defend different versions of the moral argumen showing that the existence of an objective, human mind-independent moral order, and hence of the evil as the antithesis and violation of that order, proves that God exists). You get a lot of good in this world, and a lot of evil too. How the hell, on pure inductive grounds, are you going to infer God's moral properties in a world with such a ambiguous evidence?
In other words, the evidence of the world actually tell us one thing, namely: that no rational conclusion about God's moral properties is possible based on such an ambiguous evidence. This is why theists don't infer God's "goodness" on purely inductive grounds, because on inductive grounds the only reasonable conclusion about the moral properties of God is skepticism. The skepticism about this point is a consequence of the ambiguity of the evidence, not an arbitrary assumption by the theist.
Let's consider an analogy:
Suppose that you're testing a parapsychological claim (let's say telepathy). And you get 100 technically correct and competently done studies, 50 of which gave positive evidence for telepathy and 50 of which gave negative evidence. Are justified in inferring that "telepahty exists" or "telepathy doesn't exist" based on such an evidence? Obviously not, the evidence is ambiguous, it includes positive and negative support alike, and from this evidence the only reasonable position is agnosticism/skepticism: we don't know, based on such studies, if telepathy exists or not.
Note that in this case your skepticism about the claim "telepathy exists" is not a purely arbitrary assumption, but a consquence of the existence of ambiguous and conflicting evidence supporting the claim.
Likewise, the the world is morally ambiguous (it includes good and evil), how the hell are you going to infer God's moral properties from this alone? Unless you assume that a good God must necessarily create a physical world in which the amount of good be superior than evil, then the ambiguous evidence would provide evidence against such a God.
But in theism, our lives are not limited to this one (the life on Earth is just a infinitesimal part of our overall existence, which extends beyond this life to the afterlife). Therefore, even if the amount of evil in this world were superior than the amount of good, it could be the case that in the afterlife the amount of good were infinitely superior to any finite evil that we experienced in this finite physical life.
This is why I agree with Craig that Law has the burden of proof regarding the claim that God cannot have any morally permisible reasons to enable the evil in this finite world. As far I know, no atheist philosopher has provided such reasons.
So, the skepticism regarding the designer's moral properties inferred by induction and observation alone is not arbitrary nor counter-intuitive, but that it is based on the fact that the finite world that we observe is morally ambiguous, so no inductive survey of the world can settle the questions about the moral properties of the designer.
Therefore, that God is good is not a matter of induction, but it is essential to the concept of God as the most perfect being. Hence, if such a being exists, then he IS good.
Hear the recent Craig vs Law debate here:
0 comments:
Post a Comment