The late agnostic physicist Euan Equires wrote in his book "The Mystery of the Quantum World" two plausible scientific arguments for God's existence based on quantum mechanics (or more exactly, two technical ways in which God could play a role in quantum mechanics. A more formal argument in this line, and reply to potential objections, would require a more detailed philosophical-conceptual analysis, which I'll develop in future posts).Squires' first scientific argument is this:
Quantum theory offers at least two possible roles for a ‘God’, where we use this term for a being that is non-physical, nonhuman, in some sense superhuman, and is conscious. The first role is to make the ‘choices’ that are required whenever a measurement is made that selects from a quantum system one of the possible outcomes. Such a God would remove the indeterminacy from the world by taking upon himself those decisions that are not forced by the rules of physics. Although expressed in nontraditional terms, this is reasonably in accordance with the accepted role of a God. He would be very active in all aspects of the world, and would be totally omnipotent within the prescribed limits. Prediction of his behaviour from the laws of physics would be impossible (note that we are not permitting any hidden variables in this chapter), although from both the theological and the scientific viewpoint we would want to believe that there were reasons for at least some of the choices; otherwise we would be back with random behaviour and the God would not have played any part. It is interesting to note that this role might even permit ‘miracles’, if we were to regard these as events so highly unlikely that they would be effectively impossible without very specific, and unusual, ‘divine’ choice. For example, according to quantum theory, there must be a small, but non-zero, probability that if I run into a wall, then I will pass right through it. This is a special case of the potential barrier experiment and the wavefunction on the left-hand side, corresponding to transmission, is never quite zero. Then, however small the probability for transmission might be, a God would be able to select it as the outcome, if he so chose. (pp.66-67)
According to this first argument:
1)God could intervene making the choices required each time a measurement is done in order to select an specific outcome (note that, as Squires realize, this would refute the indeterminism which is thought to be esssential to QM, at least in the standard orthodox interpretation. I think the refutation of indeterminism in this level is reasonable because, if God exists, his creation couldn't be dependent on wholly random phenomena in the quantum level).
2)God's essential attribute of omnipotence would be preserved (so, making full justice to the classical concept of God). Other attributes like non-physicality, consciousness, superhuman, etc. are preserved too. (Note that no one of God's attributes implied in this argument conflicts with the classical attributes that theology posits as belonging to God).
Rather, these attributes strongly suggest that we're not dealing with an human-like form of consciousness, but with consciousness with superlative attributes which have been typically reserved to God as the ultimate perfect being.
3)Even miracles would be possible, again vindicating the classical concept of God who intervenes, by his own decisions, in events in this world.
I think this argument could be developed in detail and in a logically rigurous way.
Squires' second argument (which is largely independent of the first one) is this:
The second possible role for a God to play in quantum theory is more relevant to our principal topic. God might be the conscious observer who is responsible for the reduction of wavefunctions. Whether, in addtion, he also decides the outcome of his observations, as in the above paragraph, or whether this is left to chance is not important here. What is important is the fact that God must be selective-he must not reduce all wavefunctions automatically, otherwise we meet the same problem that we met when discussing modifications to the Schrodinger equation in $3.7: the reduction that is required depends on the observation that we are going to make. If, for example, a reduction to figure 16 is made, then there will be no possibility of interference, whereas a human observer might decide to do the interference experiment. It is therefore necessary that the God who reduces wavefunctions, and so allows things to happen in the early universe, in particular things that might be required in order for other conscious observers to exist, should know about these other observers and should know what they intend to measure. God must in some way be linked to human consciousness. (pp.67-68. Emphasis in blue added)
This argument is, in my view, stronger than the first one. But Squires doesn't formulate it in its strongest version. In my opinon, the possible theistic implications of Squires' second argument are more obvious when we asked for the reduction of wavefunctions of the universe as a whole (and hence, previous to the existence of human or extraterrestial (conscious) beings).
We could argue like this:
1-Concious observation is needed to the reduction of the wavefunctions in the origin of the universe.
2-Human (and alien, if they exist) concious observers are posterior to the origin of the Universe (i.e. the concrete physical world existed before the emergence of human or alien consciousness)
3-Therefore, human (and alien) conscious observers are not the cause of the reduction of the wavefunctions in the origin of the universe (the latter is previous to the emergence of human and alien beings).
This implies that a nonhuman, non-physical consciousness is the cause of the reduction of the wavefunction of the whole universe.
It points out to a being which is:
1-Non-physical (since it is the cause of the physical world). Note that if this being were physical (embodied), then we are confronted again with the problem of which conscious observation produced the reduction of the wavefunctions necessary to the existence of his physical body.
2-Timeless (since it is the cause of the universe, and hence of physical time). Being "timeless", it is argueably eternal, since eternity has been classically understood as either 1)Existing in each point of time; or 2)Existing independently of time (i.e. as trascendent regarding to the physical time).
3-Spaceless (since it is the cause of the universe, and hence of the physical space)
4-Conscious (otherwise, not reduction of the wavefunction would be possible).
5-Intentional (since such consciousness cannot reduce all the wavefunctions simultaneously, but only some of them selectively which implies concrete intentions. If conciousness without intention were sufficient to collapse the wave function, then the selectivity mentioned by Squieres would be inexplicable. This point seems to refute some of the versions of "universal consciousness" who see it as purely impersonal consciousness, "all are one" and other argueably unintelligible slogans common in some mystical, Hegelian, Wilberian, and new age circles).
6-Personal (given point 5), since essential to a person is the property of having ends, desires, purposes and intentions (all of the which implies selectivity regarding specific ends or purposes). It is not a purely undifferentiated or impersonal consciousness (whatever it means), but a personal consciousness. We are dealing with a non-physical being which is a person with concrete purposes and intentions.
All the above properties seem to be much like the personal God as understood in classical theism. Again, crucial to the argument is the implication that it is not mere "consciousness" in any undifferentiated, impersonal, collectivistic or mystical sense, but argueably a "personal consciousness". And this cannot be human consciousness, since the concrete universe that we're trying to explain preceded the emergence of humans and other conscious beings (e.g. intelligent physical aliens, if they exist).
It could be replied that perhaps multiple spirits or souls existed before the origin of the universe; and they were responsible for the creation of the universe (this is the view of L.Ron Hubbard and some others) but who argue for this polytheistic view has the burden of proof that it is the case, and moreover Occkam's Razor suggests that positing ONE personal being (instead of an arbitrary number of particular beings) as the responsible for the origin of the physical world is more parsimonious than positing many gods or god-like entities.
So, it seems we have two plausible and very good scientific arguments for God's existence based on quantum mechanics, being the second one far better than the first one.
Atheist philosopher (a sophisticated defender of atheism) Quentin Smith comments:
According to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the wave function needs to be collapsed by something outside the system being measured. The wave function of the universe, accordingly, needs to be collapsed by something outside the universe. Now most versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation regard the observer (often explicitly identified with consciousness) as what collapses the wave function. In this respect, the cosmological application of the Copenhagen Interpretation may reasonably be thought to posit God (or a disembodied person who has superhuman attributes) outside the universe. Indeed, it seems to be the best scientific argument for God which is present in the twentieth century science. (Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Cosmology, p. 325. Emphasis in blue added)
So, if the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM (which sees consciousness as that which collapses the wave function) is true, then we have a purely scientific argument for the existence of God.
In order to deny this conclusion, atheists would have to challenge the Copenhagen Interpretation (an interpretation which they endorse when criticizing the causal principle "whatever begins to exist has a cause", because they falsely think that indeterminism posed by that interpretation implies non-causality regarding the origin of contingent substances. But this endorsement open the door to a new and independent argument for God's existence, so atheists seem to be caught in a kind of dilemma in this point).
Truth-seekers will follow the evidence whenever it leads; hard-core atheists and naturalistic ideologues will follow the evidence except when it refutes atheism (in this case, they become highly skeptical of current scientific theories... as an example, see atheist philosopher Peter Millican's skeptical arguments on contemporary scientific cosmology in his recent debate with William Lane Craig).
In future posts I hope to develop even more these arguments and consider what kind of objections (and replies to the objections) could be posed against them.
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